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Foreword: China’s iGeneration: From Film 
Studies to Screen Studies
Chris Berry
It is a great honour to be asked to write a preface to China’s iGeneration: Cinema and 
Moving Image Culture for the Twenty-First Century. This is an exciting and fresh, new 
collection of material. First, it focuses on contemporary work in the new century – the 
‘post-Sixth Generation’ period. Second, edited by four young scholars and featuring a 
cohort of fresh faces (as well as some more established names!), it marks a changing 
of the guard in terms of who is writing as well as the material covered.
 However, the book is more than just a collection. It is also an active and self-
conscious intervention into the field of Chinese Cinema Studies, and perhaps Cinema 
Studies as a whole. In the range of topics and approaches covered, it marks out a 
different understanding of what Chinese cinema is in the new century. In their intro-
duction, the editors clearly mark out the specificity of the conjuncture that holds their 
interest and makes the volume cohere. They write of ‘iGeneration cinema’ as a ‘cinema 
of dispersion’ in China today, characterized by: the eclipse of the centralized command 
economy by a burgeoning and multi-polar market economy along with the emergence 
of public discourse not directed by the state; the consumption of moving image works 
across many different platforms with ever-declining distinction between television 
programmes, videos and movies; and viewers who are increasingly mobile and 
individual yet internet-connected, even in collective environments. In the Chinese 
context, perhaps we must also add the social factors beyond globalized neoliberalism 
that have produced an increasingly I-focused and monadic culture: the one-child 
policy and the rise of a national labour market and a vast ‘floating population’ of 
people living away from family and which numbers in the hundreds of millions.
 ‘iGeneration cinema’ is Chinese cinema in the age of the digital. Importantly, in 
this book digital cinema is not in material and technological terms alone, although 
of course it does not neglect the importance of these technological changes as both 
pre-conditions and factors that actively shape the new cinema of dispersion. The 
materiality of digital cinema as technology has been the centre of concern for so many 
writers and theorists concerned about the significance of a shift from the analogue to 
the digital and away from the indexical imprint that light leaves on celluloid.1 Instead, 
the approach in this volume is one that I would characterize as based in a cultural 
understanding of cinema as a culture.2 I want to use this foreword to point out that 
this approach marks a shift away from the understanding of Chinese cinema in terms 
of Film Studies and towards a re-framing of it in terms of Screen Studies.
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 What does this reconfiguration mean and why is it so marked in contemporary 
Chinese cinema and this collection? I would like to start out my consideration of some 
of the reasons for this shift at some remove from this actual collection, by describing 
a question that occurred to me a couple of years ago. China’s iGeneration has brought 
that question back into my mind and helped me to understand it better.
 In 2011, two artists who work with moving images in gallery environments had 
simultaneous exhibitions in London. The Chinese artist Yang Fudong, who is having 
a mid-career retrospective at the Berkeley Art Museum and Pacific Film Archive as I 
write this,3 had a solo exhibition, entitled ‘One Half of August,’ in London at Parasol 
Unit.4 The works were black-and-white, often with velvety night settings. Some were 
single channel and some multi-channel. Many were shot on 35mm and transferred to 
high definition video. One in particular drew attention to its own virtuoso production. 
Fifth Night consists of seven screens stretched across a long wall, on which carefully 
synchronized long takes of a scene from various different angles play. You can tell all 
the shots were filmed at the same time, because an actor might appear doing exactly 
the same thing in two shots at the same time. The cameras track and pan but never 
actually appear in each other’s frames, making the viewer feel a frisson of excitement 
at the sheer risk and high degree of difficulty in executing the work. The ersatz 1930s 
Shanghai setting evokes the first ‘Golden Age’ of Chinese cinema. But, although it may 
have been shot on 35mm, it would be impractical if not impossible to project seven 
separate films simultaneously using seven separate 35mm film projectors. So, while it 
invokes celluloid, its display was distinctly and necessarily digital.
 Meanwhile, on the other side of the Thames, Tacita Dean’s ‘Film’ was the Turbine 
Hall work at the Tate Modern that year. An 11-minute 35mm film, it was projected 
onto a huge column of a screen at the end of the hall. As the Tate’s announcement 
states, ‘It is the first work in The Unilever Series devoted to the moving image, and 
celebrates the masterful techniques of analogue filmmaking as opposed to digital.’5 
Indeed, anxiety about the digital and the possible death of celluloid featured frequently 
in Dean’s own statements about her work. For example, an audio talk recorded for the 
Guardian’s online website is captioned with a statement saying the work ‘is a love letter 
to a disappearing medium,’ and noting that in her talk, ‘she explains how she hopes to 
create something magical and spectacular to carry her message: film is beautiful – let’s 
keep it.’6
 This anxiety about the transition to the digital is something I have never run across 
in the Chinese context, and it is not there at all in Yang Fudong’s Fifth Night (or any of 
his other work that I am aware of). Yang just gets on with it, using celluloid for what he 
likes about it, then transferring it and adding the crisp shine of high definition video 
to the smooth quality of celluloid, and being able to project the result more effectively. 
There is no hand-wringing here. Yang is clearly part of the ‘iGeneration.’
 Around the same time, I was teaching a core module for an M.A. course at 
Goldsmiths, University of London, in Screen Studies. We had a small cohort of 
students from the Department of Film and Television at Shanghai University on 
the programme. One week, I asked students to keep a diary of what moving image 
materials they watched and where. In the ensuing in-class discussion, it soon became 
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clear that some of my British and European students were very attached indeed to 
watching movies in the cinema, as we call movie theatres in the UK. On the other 
hand, my Chinese students watched nearly everything on their computers and iPads, 
and never thought twice about it until it became a seminar topic.
 I do not want to ask here whether this new cinema culture that has emerged so 
strongly in China and is the object of this collection is a good or a bad thing. But I do 
wonder why it is that Chinese moving image cultures seem to have moved so smoothly 
into the digital age, while it has been the subject of so much anxiety in Europe and 
North America? I cannot offer any definitive answer, but I can make some suggestions. 
First, and perhaps most obviously, the English word ‘film’ and most European equiva-
lents make direct reference to the material medium of celluloid. As is well known, the 
Chinese ‘dianying’ simply means ‘electric shadows,’ with no more specific material 
referent than electricity and instead an emphasis on the idea of movement. So, in some 
sense, ‘cinema’ in China has never had a specific association with celluloid, even before 
the advent of the digital.
 Second, as many of my Chinese students frankly told me, the cinema scene in the 
People’s Republic is characterized by strong censorship of theatrically released films 
and a very limited range of titles in release, due to the box office stranglehold of a small 
number of commercial exhibition chains and the absence of independent theatres. 
In these circumstances, few young people who have a genuine interested in ‘electric 
shadow’ culture are motivated to go to the movie theatres. Unlike my other students, 
perhaps it is the case that the more of a cinephile you are in China, the less likely you 
are to be attached to the movie theatre or to celluloid.
 The diversity of the essays in this volume cohere to begin mapping this ‘iGeneration 
cinema’ culture that is emerging so quickly in China. Ranging in coverage from micro-
movies made for cell phones to independent film practices, internet fandom, moving 
image screens in public spaces, informal distribution and first-person filmmaking, 
they add up to a brave new cinematic world. The result is distinctively Chinese, but 
also may well presage new directions and tendencies that will affect us all in the very 
near future.
 Whatever mixed feelings of excitement and disquiet this new cinema culture 
may inspire, it challenges us intellectually to develop new theories, methods and 
approaches. Many of those particular innovations are developed to address the specific 
phenomena considered in the individual essays here. But taken as a whole, what we 
see in China’s iGeneration is a radical re-framing that takes us from Film Studies to 
what might be called Screen Studies. As I have tried to point out here, this approach 
to moving image culture is grounded in more than a technological shift from the 
analogue to the digital, although it might be underpinned by that change. As a cultural 
approach, it is fully attendant to the transformations in patterns of production, 
consumption and discourse around cinema that result when it appears across all 
manner of different screens in different environments and socio-historical situations.
 It is because China’s iGeneration effects the shift from Film Studies to Screen 
Studies in both its conception and execution that I believe this collection is an inter-
vention not only in Chinese Cinema Studies but in Cinema Studies more generally. 
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The cutting-edge quality of Chinese culture makes this possible, but it is a tribute to 
the foresight and insight of the editors and authors that they have been able to capture 
this moment so successfully in the book.
 However, I must also acknowledge that only an optimist would expect the rest 
of our larger field to pick up on the value of this book for all of them. Those of us 
working on non-Western cinemas in English – in other words, the vast bulk of global 
cinema production and consumption by any definition and measure – have long 
become resigned to the determination of our other colleagues to relegate our work to 
a ‘minority interest’ assumed to be derivative rather than at the leading edge. Again 
and again, I hear tales from authors dealing with publishers who insist that they will 
only publish their work if this ‘minority interest’ is clearly tagged by identifying the 
niche that the book is destined for in its title, even if it has far wider significance. But 
that should not deter us from noting and claiming the importance of what is going on 
in this collection both for Chinese Cinema Studies and Cinema Studies as a whole. 
Perhaps I might end by allowing myself not only to hope that China’s iGeneration 
heralds a time in the very near future when more and more cinema scholars can see 
how China is changing our understanding of cinema in general, but also to acclaim 
the collection for making that new perception possible.
Notes
1 Examples might include Sean Cubbitt, The Cinema Effect. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2004; and D. N. Rodowick, The Virtual Life of Film. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2007.
2 Janet Harbord, Film Cultures. London: Sage Publications, 2002.
3 http://www.bampfa.berkeley.edu/exhibition/yangfudong (accessed 5 November 2013.)
4 http://parasol-unit.org/yang-fudong-one-half-of-august (accessed 2 November 2013.)
5 http://www.tate.org.uk/whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/unilever-series-tacita-
dean-film (accessed 3 November 2013.)
6 See, for example, http://www.theguardian.com/culture/video/2011/oct/12/tacita-dean-
film-tate-video (accessed 4 November 2013.)
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Introduction
China’s iGeneration Cinema : 
Dispersion, Individualization and 
Post-WTO Moving Image Practices
Keith B. Wagner, Tianqi Yu with Luke Vulpiani
Chinese cinema is moving beyond the theatrical screen. While the country is now 
the world’s second-largest film market in addition to being the world’s second-largest 
economy, visual culture in China is increasingly multi-platform and post-cinematic.1 
Digital technology, network-based media and portable media player platforms have 
contributed to the creation of China’s new cinema of dispersion or ‘iGeneration 
cinema,’ which is oriented as much toward individual, self-directed viewers as toward 
traditional distribution channels such as the box office, festival, or public spaces. 
Visual culture in China is no longer dominated by the technology and allure of the 
big screen, if indeed it ever was. While China’s film industry still produces ‘traditional’ 
box-office blockbusters and festival-ready documentaries, their impact and influence 
is increasingly debatable.
 This volume of essays captures the richness and diversity of China’s contem-
porary moving image culture, while suggesting that familiar notions of ‘cinema’ 
must be reconceptualized as just one of many platforms and experiences available 
within that broader culture. In the process, each essay contributes to the larger 
project of mapping out where this moving image culture exists within the context of 
China’s individualizing, consumption-oriented, urban and technologically mutable 
post-WTO society.
Cultural dispersion in a WTO era
One of the ways we can conceptualize the dispersion of Chinese cinema and moving 
image culture in the new millennium period is to understand it in relation to socio-
logical and economic changes ushered in by the country’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001. This climactic moment signalled not only China’s official 
integration into the global economic system of expanding capitalism, but also a moment 
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of significant financial and cultural rescaling. For more than a decade, China’s new 
forms of cinema and moving image practices have been capturing this new neoliberal 
reality in ways that cannot be neatly portioned into the standard regional, national 
and transnational perspectives. Rather, this book shows how individual aspirations 
expressed through post-WTO digital and new media can be classified as appraisals 
of cultural realities and possibilities that were either unthinkable or untenable one 
decade earlier. Examples of the new ground broken by Chinese visual culture include: 
documentary exposés, based on found footage of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, about 
substandard construction and the death of thousands of schoolchildren; multimedia 
artists’ films exhibited in upmarket galleries and purchased by collectors for large sums 
of money; filmmakers’ digital activism in preserving Cantonese language through 
videos like Rap Guangzhou; and personal documentaries individually produced by 
subaltern villagers, marginalized juveniles and self-realizing women.
 This volume examines the great upheaval that Wang Hui has described as 
‘neo liberalism with Chinese characteristics,’ while paying special attention to what 
these characteristics mean for new forms of moving image culture. In other words, 
we do not posit a dichotomy between economics and culture in China. In reality, this 
dichotomy should be superceded by analyses that interrogate the intersection of both 
realms. In furthering this goal, this volume examines a wide array of sources, ranging 
from blockbuster movies to individual auteur films to experimental documentaries. 
Our contributors draw on reception theory, neo-formalism and sociological method-
ologies to unpack depictions of China’s cultural transformation in the past decade. 
Neoliberalism, as an increasingly visible/powerful governing ideology in China, has 
come under significant scrutiny as filmmakers have had more freedom to criticize a 
party-state which still intervenes in individuals’ cultural lives through censorship in 
film, TV and art production, distribution and exhibition.2 The chaotic task of keeping 
up with these changes inspires much reflection and critical assessment, as is the case 
with almost everything new in the post-WTO era.
 Following the further implementation of neoliberal policies since 2001, the 
Communist Party continues to eviscerate social programmes, neglect wage–price 
factors and deny the internal antagonisms that exist because of these changes – mainly 
‘industrial democracy versus corruption’3 – all to ensure the survival of this political–
economic system. The rationale is that because of Chinese neoliberalism, social 
welfare institutions and local governments remain in perilous fiscal health, while 
consumption soars along with profits derived from the state-owned enterprises and 
entrepreneurial sectors of the economy. It is also this rise in consumption that frames 
the debate in China over ‘individualization’ (geren hua), a thesis suggested by Yan 
Yunxiang, and one developed from the ‘contemporary individualization thesis’ found 
in the Western social theory, proposed earlier by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, 
Zygmunt Bauman and others. While the discourse of neoliberalism promotes the 
absence of external interference on individuals’ lives, the individualization thesis 
emphasizes the ongoing negotiation between the individual and the state, whereby 
public interventions and modern social institutions can promote individual autonomy 
and self-determination.4 In the context of postsocialist China, Yan Yunxiang argues 
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that the individualization thesis is not only central to, but also a development away 
from, the earlier neoliberal model, as both ideologies emphasize the importance of 
promoting and protecting individual rights and freedoms.5
 A post-WTO transition, of course, continues to impact the cultural sphere beyond 
just the question of individual choice. As Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake have 
argued, ‘[In] the creative–destructive dynamic driving contemporary phases of global 
capitalism, the local goes on being micromapped and micromined into so many 
consumer zone(s).’6 We find this ‘micromapped’ and ‘micromined’ local culture in 
China, which is connected to the cross between privatization and socialism that 
Li Zhang and Aihwa Ong call ‘socialism from afar.’7 With this confluence in mind, 
we observe that China’s politico-cultural and consumer spheres have experienced 
dramatic changes since 2001. New developments include more hedonistic revelry 
(including frank discussions about sexuality and sex acts); more cosmopolitan travel 
for business, leisure and educational opportunities (including mobility in and out of the 
country); more concern on personal happiness (ie. food safety, air pollution, environ-
mental issues, real-estate market); self realisation as the heated public discussion on 
the marriage issue of high income, highly educated women); outspoken activism 
(and repression, in the case of Ai Weiwei); neo-nationalism (in positions vis-à-vis 
Tibet, Japan and the United States); more black market criminality (and its growing 
consumer base); greater levels of migration (as a result of shrinking job opportunities 
in rural areas and the eroding of familial bonds); and greater social flexibility around 
questions of gender identity (as more LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) 
organizations in metropolises and more queer personalities online and on the ground 
than ever before), to name a few. These examples of ‘multiple private choices’ and new 
expressions show an ‘increased latitude to pursue self-interest that are at the same time 
variously regulated or controlled by the party-state.’8
 Regardless of how amorphous this regulation of choice may sometimes seem, the 
Chinese government continuously censors external internet content via the Great 
Fire Wall, its cancellation of gay rights parades and film festivals (YunFest in 2007 
and 2013), its detainment of foreigners who speak out ‘politically’ in the country (as 
happened after Elton John’s so-called controversial support of Ai at a concert in Beijing 
in 2013). All of these developments ultimately point to the existence of several different 
dichotomies in contemporary China: between media access and suppression, material 
acquisition and deprivation, middle-class mobility and enduring poverty – dichotomies 
which are all depicted across official, semi-official and unofficial media platforms.
iGeneration cinema: Scene, technologies, global contexts
China’s ‘iGeneration cinema’ began sometime in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, when digital image-making technologies and internet connectivity made 
more dispersed modes of production, distribution and consumption possible. In this 
sense, the iGeneration continues to overlap with what film studies scholars call China’s 
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‘Sixth/Urban Generation’ and with the country’s contemporary commercial film 
market. When we speak of iGeneration cinema, we are speaking specifically of three 
key developments in cinematic and moving image culture: (1) the emergence of new, 
non-industry producers and venues as key ‘nodes’ within the Chinese cinema and 
moving image scene; (2) the ubiquity of digital and internet-based technologies; and 
(3) the globalization of individualization and experience under conditions of ‘neolib-
eralism with Chinese characteristics,’ as we have described previously. Taken together, 
we argue, these developments have ushered in a new period of cinematic culture that 
is significant precisely because it threatens to displace the ‘old’ cinema, much as digital 
and on-demand technologies have corresponded with a drop in US movie attendance 
to mid-1990s levels.9
 Why use the term ‘iGeneration’? One answer is that it has become an accepted 
practice in studies of Chinese cinema, and particularly of mainland Chinese cinema, 
to mark major shifts in cinematic practice by referring to each discrete stage as a 
‘generation’ (Fifth Generation, Sixth Generation and so on). We have two reasons 
for naming the most recent major shift ‘the iGeneration.’ First, the ‘i’ indicates an 
emphasis on ‘individuals,’ or what we have termed ‘individualization.’ It stands for 
an increasing concern with individual self-expression and self-realization, ‘relying on 
oneself ’ (kao ziji) in uncertain times, and the prevalence of an increasingly solipsistic 
directorial style among independent film practitioners. While previous studies distin-
guish one cinematic generation from another primarily according to chronology and 
socioeconomic structures, we also take technological change into account – in this 
case, the emergence of digital technology as an essential factor changing filmmaking 
around the globe.10 Therefore, the other ‘i’ dimension of the ‘iGeneration’ is the use 
of information technology – the internet, personal computers and personal media 
technologies (cameras, players, smartphones) – for audiovisual image-making and 
image distribution. Adobe Flash, iPhones, blogs or microblogs (weibo) and mobile 
social media applications have given rise to a post-cinematic culture of amateur 
production and transformed cinema into yet another form of online experience for the 
hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens with access to the internet. Personal modes of 
consumption have triumphed over theatrical modes. The ‘i’ is now ascendant.
 Whereas ‘cinema’ once referred to production for, and experience of, the communal 
screen, in the post-cinematic era of moving image culture cinema is increasingly 
another form of televisual or online content for personalized screens. On the commercial 
end of the spectrum, this transition is marked by the fact that television-based media 
enterprises, not film companies, are the most economically vibrant producers of 
cultural content in East Asia.11 Visual aides-mémoires on Chinese television currently 
range from programmes devoted to celebrated philosophers to the cultural legacy 
of Deng Xiaoping. In her chapter on these visual aides-mémoires films shown on 
television and in movie theatres since the late 1990s and 2000s, Chen Xiaomei tries to 
tease out contradictory representations of Deng, the initiator of China’s post-socialist 
reform, as he is now re-represented in different filmic and televisual manifestations. 
She examines what is indispensable to Deng’s legacy and what is not, and in the 
process questions the ‘cultural logic’ that these visual aides-mémoires serve in the 
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greater cine-media nexus found in twenty-first-century China. Personal modes of 
consumption have triumphed over theatrical modes.
 Our focus on this new group of filmmakers and practitioners is not to say that 
moving image culture has become completely individualized or private. Digital formu-
lations are always communal – that is to say, shared and collectively discussed – even 
as velocity and intensity of personal media consumption reaches startling magni-
tudes. (For more on this phenomenon, see Paola Voci’s chapter in this volume.)12 One 
example of this communal aspect of film production and consumption in contem-
porary China is the posting and tweeting of content links online – for example, to 
humourous parody films (e.g. Hu Ge’s ‘Wheat Bun,’ an internet sensation from 2007). 
In addition, the increasingly popular format of wei dianying, which literally means 
‘mini films’ or ‘short films’, relies almost exclusively on online circulation. Moreover, 
professional filmmakers have begun to submit to a culture of constant online 
exposure. For example, starlet Zhou Dongyu’s efforts to create an internet persona 
through online publication of gossip and personal statements directed at her fans, or 
film studios’ internet marketing of new film releases through online events, adhere 
to the marketing of the self and of cultural products as new icommodities in China. 
All of these developments indicate that audiences expect content to be delivered 
to them, rather than consumed as part of a public, shared event. This ‘me culture’ 
(ziwo wenhua) is particularly noticeable among young Chinese, iGeneration media 
consumers, as expressed through their creation and unceasing calibration of online 
identities through posted ‘selfies’ (zipai) – pictures taken of and by one’s self using 
a phone or laptop camera – microblog (weibo) Wechat profiles and Facebook-style 
status updates.13 Updating an older film media theory in light of this intense internet 
activity in China, Ralph Parfect’s chapter in this volume deploys reception theory to 
analyse online responses to Zhang Yimou’s The Love of the Hawthorn Tree (2010). 
Here the aging auteur and his film have found new life – not in movie theatres, but 
rather through online chat rooms where people prosaically, and sometimes poetically, 
discuss the film’s nostalgic treatment of Maoist-era sexual politics.
 What are the consequences of all these changes for Chinese cinema – or, as we 
have termed it, moving image culture – in the new millennium? For starters, a 
growing individualized culture is an increasingly pluralistic culture, in the sense that 
creators strive to create discrete, individual points of view. Again, some would refer 
to such work as solipsistic, but such critiques can become tricky when iGeneration 
work reveals individual image-makers’ perspectives on ‘big’ issues, such as familial, 
societal and environmental change. Tianqi Yu, in her chapter, explores first person 
documentary practice by a cohort of women filmmakers , including Yang Lina, Wang 
Fen, Liu Jiayin and Song Fang. While some of these films investigate hidden familial 
trauma, Yu regards this practice of filming oneself and one’s closely related as a form 
of communicative practice, a practice that proactively builds the bridge of the broken 
communications and re-negotiates their position as daughters in their families and 
women in society at large. Their work blends the virtues of the family with experi-
mental aesthetics that emphasize, unabashedly, the ‘i’ in individual immediacy and 
intimacy (see Tianqi Yu’s chapter on female first-person documentary).
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 Another big issue for the iGeneration is the forging of a digital activism, which 
illuminates the participatory use of the internet and electronic devices for the articu-
lation of group identity (see, for example, Jia Tan’s chapter on digital activism and 
Cantonese identity). Elsewhere, Ai Xiaoming’s documentary film Our Children brings 
to life the toppled edifices after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake as a testimony to the 
‘visual wreckage preserved by ordinary people with whatever recording devices they 
have.’ Ying Qian studies this film, which examines the concrete and steel rubble of 
the earthquakes as sites of remembrance and also documents the results of hasty 
urban planning and its disastrous consequences in China (see Ying Qian’s chapter). 
Another significant new area of documentary film involves films devoted to animals 
as primary documentary subject. Three Sisters/San jiemei (Wang Bing 2012) and My 
Himalayan Vulture/Wo de gaoshan tujiu (Tashi Sang’e, Zhou Jie 2009) go beyond their 
‘ostensibly fringe, auxiliary and/or dependent life conditions/roles and permeate into 
the very texture of the documentaries’ – creating a ‘humanimal’ documentary genre, 
as explored by Yiman Wang in her chapter on docu-ani-mentary cinema.
 The subjective ‘i’ in contemporary China has become more visible and more 
engaged with the wider world through access to, and visual commentary on, the 
world’s ever-growing sea of digitally transmitted information. In no small measure, 
technology has collapsed the distinction between direct and indirect experience. 
Indeed, as Shu-mei Shih contends, ‘it is no wonder that the relationship between the 
eye and the “I,” and increasingly between the camera and the “I,” has emerged as one 
of the major theoretical issues in studies of visuality.’14 Moving image technology has 
become, in a sense, more ‘micro,’ in terms of permeating and mediating the space of 
individual interactions. This change is not unique to China, but it is nonetheless new 
in Chinese cinema. The many ‘i’s of China’s visual- and techno-literate population 
are rapidly transforming the cultural sphere. How is this happening? And how is it 
different from the post-cinematic culture elsewhere in the world?
The iGeneration scene
Pluralism at the level of individuals is not political pluralism, but it nonetheless offers 
a certain freedom and autonomy of self-expression. Individualized subjects in China 
are becoming unmoored from – or are detaching themselves from – communal 
social institutions such as production teams, work units, kinship networks and 
hometowns. State policies emphasize that individuals should become consumers and 
pursue aspirational notions of ‘quality’ (suzhi), while at the same time denying the 
importance of ‘Western-style’ human rights, constitutionalism and democracy.15 The 
editors see Wu Wenguang’s influence and support for civic action and decades-long 
commitment to Chinese documentary as central to publicizing human rights suffering 
in China, especially his ideological and creative treatment of the issue since the first 
screening of his seminal documentary Bumming in Beijing in 1990. Commenting on 
the evolution of Wu’s docu-style, what we refer to as an ‘NGO-aesthetic,’ Matthew D. 
Johnson’s chapter discusses the wider appeal of Wu’s films to international audiences, 
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ensuring that human rights concerns/advocates in China maintain visibility and 
receive support from transnational networks of humanitarian aid, NGO funding and 
global awareness campaigns. Yet Wu composes these films without losing their local 
appeal and constructs a critique of fledgling government involvement in rural areas 
with his trademark flair for politicizing the banality of neglect.
 Moving in a different direction from Wu and Johnson’s assessment of him, Keith B. 
Wagner discusses the less politically committed films that he calls ‘reckless documen-
taries.’ Wagner outlines the loose faction of filmmakers behind these documentaries, 
individuals who are striving to abandon the rules and convictions typically associated 
with issue-based filmmaking, characteristics best exhibited by the truculent newcomer 
Xue Jianqiang and his film Three Small Animals II (2009). Xue’s approach (and the 
approach of other kindred documentary filmmakers) is marked by the abolition of 
so-called ethics for an approach that one might see as heedless and at times boorish, 
as well as by visual characterizations of the here and now of China’s peripheral cities 
and populations; these films cast a critical eye on the Chinese government’s neoliberal 
policies and its ‘two nation strategy’ – one fixed on hyper-development and the other 
with unchecked underdevelopment.16
 In the case of the film industry, China’s deregulation and compliance with WTO rules 
have largely eliminated barriers to domestic and foreign investment. Marketization has 
become sustainable and the state’s role in film production has diminished. New policies 
issued through the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) have 
led to the privatization of formerly state-owned and state-operated industries – not just 
film studios, but also distributors. Beginning in 1993, these developments forced the 
16 remaining state-owned studios to find ways of marketing and selling their films in 
the absence of guaranteed government support. By 1997, China’s neoliberal economic 
reformers had turned their attention to film production, and state-funded ventures 
were replaced by local, privately controlled operations backed by foreign capital, while 
overhauled state-owned film groups represented government interests via a new model 
of public–private joint management. China’s WTO accession in 2001 ushered in a new 
period of reduced barriers to foreign investment and market entry, though the state 
maintains a guiding (sometimes heavy) hand.
 Within the domestic private sector, SARFT has made it possible for private 
companies with as little as one million RMB in assets to engage in film production and 
distribution.17 In 2010, for example, the central government officially urged support for 
the further development of the cultural industry, including regular capital infusions to 
the film industry from the financial sector.18 More recently, private equity funds have 
become a new force in the film industry, investing massively in the construction of 
exhibition sites (such as IMAX or luxury cinema chains in shopping complexes) and 
in film production (usually involving co-production within the Greater China region 
and with foreign capital or film professionals). Many of these high-tech theatres or 
IMAX super-theatres were relatively unknown to Chinese consumers two decades 
ago. Jeesoon Hong and Matthew D. Johnson’s chapter probes the impact of what they 
label ‘New ScreenSpaces in China,’ particularly those found at the Shanghai Expo 
in 2010. Reflecting on the impact of ScreenSpaces, they suggest moving beyond the 
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Manovich/Bolter school of thought regarding the aesthetics of technology or remedi-
ation paradigms, and find instead greater rapport with Alexander Galloway’s notions 
of interactivity and interface.
 As for co-productions in ‘Greater China,’ the Beijing government’s ‘Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement’ with Hong Kong in 2003 facilitated more rapid absorption 
of Hong Kong’s remaining film production resources into the Chinese movie industry. 
With respect to other foreign investors, SARFT encourages Chinese film companies to 
pursue investment-seeking – including the recruitment of human capital – mainly in 
co-production, and less in the more profitable sites of film exhibition and distribution, 
which are still strictly controlled by the state. Foreign investors, such as Hollywood 
studios, are encouraged to co-produce with Chinese companies in order to bypass 
China’s film quota system on imported films and gain access to the mainland Chinese 
market.19
 Thus, a major consequence is that in 2013, the mainland Chinese film industry 
has far more participants than was the case just a decade ago. State, private and 
foreign investors commingle and compete like never before. As critic Dai Jinhua 
has discussed, 80 per cent of films produced in China rely on non-state or overseas 
capital.20 Nevertheless, the state remains dominant. The trinity of the state-owned 
China Film Group, Shanghai Film Group and Xi’an Film Group ensures that a steady 
stream of ‘main melody’ ideological films and hagiographies enters the market, 
seemingly in defiance of popular taste’s drift away from top-down political art. The 
state’s dominance over the film sector, however, is primarily reflected in what is and is 
not approved for production or exhibition. As is well known, independent filmmaking 
devoted to a range of subjects, some of them quite taboo by state standards, took off 
in the 1990s simply by circumventing the state-regulated system. Fifth Generation 
‘renegades’ like Zhang Yimou took Chinese cinema to international markets on 
the strength of iconoclastic styles and exotic subject matter. The so-called New 
Documentary Movement of Zhang Yuan, Wu Wenguang and other proponents of 
observational cinema also burst onto the international festival, university and arts 
scenes during this period, giving rise to a whole cohort of documentary filmmaking 
‘amateurs’ with their own stories to tell. In the new millennium, Fifth Generation 
allegorists gave way to the gritty realists of the Sixth/Urban Generation. New directors 
such as Jia Zhangke largely repeated the internationally focused pattern established by 
their predecessors, but with enough innovation in production and aesthetics to qualify 
for their own generational moniker.
 iGeneration filmmakers have thus come of age in an era when many filmmakers 
of the Fifth Generation, Sixth/Urban Generation and New Documentary Movement 
were and are still active cinema and media producers. As we have begun to show, 
China’s iGeneration moving image scene is increasingly diverse. The growth of the 
private sector has brought with it new industry developments, particularly a keen 
sense of competition. Meanwhile, joint ventures between domestic and foreign enter-
prises have added new financial channels and opportunities for producers. Political 
rules (spoken and unspoken) and SARFT regulations still apply, in part to muzzle 
government critics and historical revisionists, and in part to manage the threat to 
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China’s domestic film industry posed by foreign film imports. The latter has been 
partially contained through imposition of a quota system and revenue-sharing scheme 
currently allowing for the exhibition of 20 foreign films per year, and the number was 
raised to 34 in 2011, 14 of which must be in IMAX or 3D. This system21 has been less 
successful in limiting the flow of pirated (recorded and bootlegged) and downloaded 
(streaming and P2P) films into China, as evidenced by frequent Motion Picture 
Association of America complaints.22 Other measures to curtail Hollywood’s influence 
include periodic ‘blackouts’ of foreign films during holidays and the manipulation of 
release schedules to reduce head-to-head competition between domestic and foreign 
blockbusters.
 In addition to a competitive and internationalized cultural marketplace, iGener-
ation image-makers must also contend with the power of filmmakers from previous 
generations over cultural trends. These ‘main-melody’ filmmakers, based in the 
state studios, produce mainstream propaganda films for popular consumption via 
block booking and political education. Many main-melody films produced or 
co-produced by the state-owned film groups employ classic Hollywood narrative 
and characterization methods, and feature regional superstars to achieve the effect of 
‘blockbusterization’ of propaganda drama,23 such as in the production of The Funding 
of a Republic (Jianguo daye, 2012). Commercially oriented filmmakers, such as 
superstar director Feng Xiaogang, specialize in entertainment films (such as comedy, 
drama, martial arts and crime thrillers) as well as hyperkinetic genre mash-ups which 
have recently captivated domestic audiences, such as the domestic hit If You Are the 
One I&II (feicheng wurao I & II, 2008, 2010), and historical event blockbuster24 Back 
to 1942 (2012). Support for this commercial sector comes primarily from domestic 
private film companies, but such distinctions are blurred by investment from state-
owned and foreign corporations. In addition, internationally well-known directors 
from the Fifth Generation have begun to produce commercial Chinese blockbusters 
for regional and global release. Of these films – Hero is perhaps the most obvious 
example – and is typically characterized by exotic ‘oriental’ settings, stories of ancient 
empires, elaborate production, musical soundtracks featuring Chinese instrumen-
tation, and simulated feats of martial arts daring reminiscent of earlier ‘knight-errant’ 
(wuxia) films and novels. Sixth/Urban Generation directors, such as Jia Zhangke and 
Wang Xiaoshuai, have cashed in as well, continuing to court international audiences 
while simultaneously reaching out directly, through films licensed for domestic 
release, to China’s growing urban bourgeoisie.
 Music or sound theory has often been neglected by film critics and more generally 
in the disciplines of film and cultural studies. To bring back in the aural as central to 
the moving image itself, city films are back as a genre of film, in and beyond China. 
From platforms of expression to new metropolitan dissections of urbanity in China, 
Ling Zhang’s chapter on digitizing city symphony films explores the early twentieth-
century German-themed city symposium film Berlin: Symphony of a Metropolis 
(1929) and how several Chinese filmmakers have paid homage to it by exploring 
the seemingly endless construction of new urban centres in China during the new 
millennium, making films with delicate musical scores and new, visual expressions. 
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What is surprising about Zhang’s analysis is the careful attention she places on the 
scoring of the sequences, explicating the harmony of rhythm between architecture and 
music as it is composed visually.
 If we have now established a dozen or so films associated with the iGeneration, 
who else, then, also falls under this categorization? In our view, this label should not 
refer to filmmakers born during a specific time period – for instance, those who came 
of age during the 1990s – but instead describes directors and moving image-makers 
whose work has been determined by the digital (i.e., the use of digital and networked 
technologies is prevalent in its production, distribution and consumption); is no 
longer correlated with the experience of postsocialism; and depicts a China that is 
globalized, individualized and shares features of neoliberal globalization with the 
world beyond China’s borders (i.e., is not predominantly self-orientalizing or auto-
chthonic). As we have argued, some of these filmmakers possess a strongly solipsistic 
streak, but others use personal technologies to create interpersonal amateur works 
or engage in documentary-based social advocacy. In addition, not all iGeneration 
directors are anti-commercial, art-for-art’s sake underground practitioners. Directors 
with notable box office successes include Xu Zheng, director of Lost in Thailand (Tai 
Jiong, 2013), and writer-turned-director Guo Jingming, whose debut Tiny Times I 
& II (Xiao shidai, 2013) attracted both derision and applause with its depictions of 
unbridled upper-class consumption.
 iGeneration filmmakers also openly question where commodities and capital 
figure in the country, at a time when money itself seems to be what is on a lot of 
Chinese minds. Yet how do filmmakers deal with money cinematically, when it is not 
venerated like it is in the West (at least not publicly)? In Xiao Liu’s chapter, money is 
more than just currency – it is a thing that obtains its own life, energy and seductive 
power as postmodern filmic object (capital as a visible thing) and filmic subject 
(capital as commodifiable in its cultivated status as a new cultural thing, post-Mao). 
Money thus becomes reified and its mythical or magical power is articulated in a film 
like Jiang Wen’s Let the Bullets Fly (2010) and its narrative and visual terms that allude 
to the extraordinary economic times enveloping the country.
 In addition to releases via the theatre and, via piracy on the internet, iGeneration 
work has emerged in the context of a concomitant proliferation of minjian (grassroots, 
nongovernmental) film festivals devoted to the exhibition of amateur work, as well 
as by the increasing number of screening spaces devoted to independent and experi-
mental moving image culture. Piracy is often linked to the country’s market structures, 
including a ‘“freemium” business model’ that violates, ‘erodes’25 or ‘diffuse[s] the 
values of creativity.’26 The problem with capital-intensive infrastructures in the music, 
telecommunication, film and new media industries in China is that it fosters rampant 
file sharing, copycatting and bootlegging. This leads to non-contractual reproductions, 
and such reproductions are then sold by unlicensed vendors or accessed and then 
downloaded from the internet.27 It is these very copyright and piracy issues that Dan 
Gao’s chapter ‘From Pirate to Kino-eye’ expands and deepens with a view toward this 
practice being fictionalized as a trope in contemporary Chinese film. Yet what is at stake 
in these fictive portrayals of pirate culture? What does it mean to act as an appropriator, 
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and is this a new mode of expression? For one thing, Gao sees piracy as a new digital 
cinephilia, one which violates distribution networks in order to create new modes of 
expression. To put it in her own words: ‘What kind of customs, tastes, sensibilities, and 
knowledge are being produced and accompany this subject formation of the digital 
“pirate?” Or, what kind of techniques do “pirates” used to posit themselves within the 
fissure between postsocialist reality and the pirated, informal media worlds?’
 These spaces of critical public discourse on piracy and independent filmmaking, 
though mainly limited to communities of practitioners, scholars and enthusiasts, 
are sufficiently dispersed throughout China to have created an interconnected 
independent scene.28 Prominent venues include the China Documentary Film Festival 
(Beijing), Chinese Independent Film Festival (Nanjing), and Yunnan Multi Culture 
Biannual Visual Festival (Kunming), or ‘Yunfest.’ In her chapter, Ma Ran analyzes the 
impact of these independent festival networks, especially more ‘fringe’ venues such 
as the Chongqing Independent Film and Video Festival (CIFVF, since 2007) and 
the minjian film festivals. To this list must be added screenings in universities, cafes, 
bars and art galleries. On the official side, state-owned central and regional television 
stations, such as CCTV Channel 9 and the Shanghai Documentary Channel, have 
also begun airing independently produced documentaries. This latter move is perhaps 
tantamount to recognition of public demand for more independent voices within the 
state media, despite the fact that the works are inevitably ‘censored’ – pre-screened 
and, in some cases, edited to remove politically sensitive content.29
iGeneration technologies
Finally, and most importantly, the rise of iGeneration filmmaking is supported by 
digital technologies such as DV cameras and social media. These technologies make the 
production and sharing of moving images considerably easier than was the case under 
prior technological conditions and, we argue, have enabled new forms of information-
sharing and individual empowerment. New technologies have also given rise to new 
genres and formats, such as increasingly popular ‘micro films’ (wei dianying), which 
are exclusively shown via video sharing sites, internet protocol television (IPTV) and 
mobile applications. They have also facilitated artists’ films and multiscreen moving 
image installations, now a familiar sight in upmarket galleries and contemporary art 
museums.
 Digital film- and image-making is everywhere in China today. Since many iGener-
ation figures began their careers during the 2000s, very few have ever shot or recorded 
on anything but digital cameras, or edited on anything but computers. The iGener-
ation genealogy of camera technology begins with clunky camcorders and currently 
ends with compact, handheld, memory-rich Sony cameras – or with camera phones 
and Flash. D. N. Rodowick, speaking about the digital turn more generally, argues that 
the new technologies are primarily distinguished from – and can come into conflict 
with – the old technologies by virtue of their attendant ideology of simulation:
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Narrative conflict with the digital reasserts the aesthetic value of analogue images 
as somehow more real than digital simulation, not only at the cinema but also 
in computer gaming and other new media. The Matrix is a marvelous example 
of how Hollywood has always responded ideologically to the appearance of new 
technologies. Incorporated into the film at the level of both its technology of repre-
sentation and its narrative structure, the new arrival is simultaneously demonized 
and deified, a strategy that lends itself well to marketing and spectacle.30
This is partly true of contemporary cinema in China – simulation has become 
spectacle, particularly in the commercial realm. At the same time, digital cameras 
have also given rise to a vibrant culture of amateur realism and self-representation, 
so we cannot wholly concur that authenticity lies solely with analogue technologies 
or low-resolution images. We do, however, concur with Rodowick that moving image 
studies must take account of the digital evolution, and ‘navigate the rapid flows and 
directions of technological change.’31 In our view, the most significant impact of digital 
and networked technology on Chinese cinema is the creation of a post-cinematic 
moving image culture, or affect. Cinema – whether as industry or culture – can no 
longer be distinguished from broader configurations of media, and entertainment 
can no longer be distinguished from contemporary dynamics of high-volume data or 
information ‘flow.’
 This post-cinematic condition allows for the mixing of moving images with an 
ever-widening variety of agendas and expressive modes via the digital spaces which 
all of these elements – technologies, individuals and aesthetics – inhabit. One of the 
main theorists of the post-cinematic condition, Steven Shaviro, has described the 
origins of the concept thusly: ‘Digital technologies, together with neoliberal economic 
relations, have given birth to radically new ways of manufacturing and articulating 
lived experience.’32 Moreover, according to Shaviro, the post-cinematic condition is 
defined by the rapidity with which new subjectivities and perceptions can be deployed 
across the globe via moving image culture and data networks:
Films and music videos, like other media works, are machines for generating affect, 
and for capitalizing upon, or extracting value from, this affect. As such, they are 
not ideological superstructures, as an older sort of Marxist criticism would have 
it. Rather, they lie at the very heart of social production, circulation, and distri-
bution. They generate subjectivity and they play a crucial role in the valorization 
of capital. Just as the old Hollywood continuity editing system was an integral part 
of the Fordist mode of production, so the editing methods and formal devices 
of digital video and film belong directly to the computing-and-information-
technology infrastructure of contemporary neoliberal finance.33
Admittedly, Shaviro’s analysis – focused on the nature of affect in the United States – 
may not wholly align with China’s realities, particularly the nature of public and private 
culture since 1978. But the basic point seems valid. The technology employed by the 
iGeneration was not created for the specific purpose of creating an entertainment or 
ideological ‘superstructure’ – its functional uses are far more open-ended. And yet the 
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technology is unified by the same basic design goal, which is to capture attention (in 
the context of competing information sources) through their insistence and ubiquity.
 What iGeneration image-makers employ digital technology for is thus wholly 
dependent on the maker’s intentions. Some seek to inhabit global theatrical or virtual 
spaces as entertainers, artists and advocates. Among the more socially engaged 
image-makers, some ‘netizens’ choose to be identified (even if by noms de plume), 
others remain anonymous. Representations are fantastic or real, identities blurred 
or concrete. Some combine several of these qualities at once. Genres include spoofs, 
documentaries, narratives, or ‘pure’ spectacles that recall the very birth of cinema. 
The political is not always present, but neither has it been abandoned. Exposé-style 
documentaries depict the failures of the party-state to protect its citizens, while 
downloaded propaganda may be subjected to ‘re-mixing’ that ranges from the ironic 
to the scathingly satirical. Some iGeneration filmmakers rely intensively on animation 
or the editing of found footage. Others are less interested in conventional narrative 
techniques and focus instead on punkish provocation through audience-abusing, 
‘in-your-face’ images of violence, degradation and raunch. A common denominator 
in all of these newer forms of image-making is the phenomenon that Haidee Wasson 
calls ‘networked screens’ – the fusion of the digital camera with high-speed telecom-
munications and social media. Images are rapidly produced, digested, commented on, 
and recombined to form new images.34 Substance, meaning and truth are in the eye of 
the beholder, as has always been true of cinema.
 The networked screen is also changing the very nature of exhibition space. At a 
micro level, images are proliferating in social space through the ubiquity of theatres, 
political displays, advertising, personal media players, smartphones, computers, 
television, and the falling price of LCD- and plasma-screen technology. Like the sea of 
data it swims in, moving image content is everywhere. The saturation of public, semi-
public and private or personal space with these networked interfaces is hard to miss, 
even if individual responses remain difficult for researchers to access. Nevertheless, 
personal computers, smartphones and social media have likewise moved reception 
into the digital arena, where blogs and response columns fill with audience opinion 
and planted buzz.
 Animation continues to be an understudied genre. Some critics misidentify it as 
children’s media, indelibly connected to lowbrow sensibilities from Sunday morning 
cartoons. Others even disavow more serious-minded animated films from Pixar 
(such as WALL-E, an animated film about environmental degradation, recycling and 
cinephilia that has received scant critical attention despite its incorporation of these 
important themes). Because cartoon culture is not taken as seriously as it should be, 
studies on the subject are rare, especially articles that provide an accurate picture of 
the animation industry today – both in commercial and amateur production. Perhaps 
this is because of the dynamics of East Asia’s regional animation development and the 
dominance of its production juggernaut – Japan. More significantly, the expansion of 
Chinese animation can be traced to the ‘missing period’ and has grown in popularity 
from the early Reform Era to the current post-WTO moment. In this volume, Weihua 
Wu sheds light on the very recent happenings in the world of Chinese animation 
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by building on his previous research regarding the political economy of China’s 
animation industry and the country’s amateur, fan-driven Flash animation scene.
The iGeneration in global context(s)
It is difficult to define the iGeneration in terms of aesthetics. As China’s moving 
image culture has grown substantially in its diversity of producers and reproducers 
in the past decade, it now defies easy characterization. As the breadth of this volume 
indicates, digitally driven multiplicity of representational modes is one of the iGenera-
tion’s defining features. Coupled with China’s economic growth, post-Deng reforms in 
the country’s cultural industries have also played an important role in supporting the 
emergence of new players – a theme that we have touched upon frequently. With the 
amendment of China’s constitution in 2004, the call to the development of creative and 
cultural industries by the then Hu-Wen Leadership, China’s leaders are now charged 
with creating an ‘advanced culture’ by:
deepening cultural restructuring, improving the system of the market for cultural 
products, deepening the internal reform of cultural enterprises and institu-
tions, gradually establishing a management system and operational mechanism 
favorable to arousing the initiative of cultural workers, encouraging innovation 
and bringing forth top-notch works and more outstanding personnel.35
These reforms have resulted in the increased circulation of ideas, goods and media, 
while creating larger markets for monetary and intellectual exchange. At the same 
time, they have also accompanied a wider process of globalization that has trans-
formed China’s culture industries irrevocably.
 It is difficult to miss the tide of international media, and particularly cinema, that 
has reached China’s shores in theatrical or bootlegged form in China’s post-WTO 
era. At the same time, this globalization of visual media has been a two-way street, 
as Chinese directors have been a presence on the international festival scene as far 
back as the 1980s. More recently, domestic international film festivals, such as the 
A-list Shanghai International Film Festival and the Beijing International Film Festival, 
invite international film professionals into China to embrace this growing hotspot of 
international co-production and collaboration. International art circuits, university 
campuses, as well as expatriate- and bourgeois class-frequented cultural ‘contact 
zones’ (e.g. Beijing’s 798 Art District, Shanghai M50 Art District, Shenzhen OCT 
LOFT), have provided a complementary infrastructure to cultivate domestic and 
international cultural consumption. The conversation with Dong Bingfeng by Tianqi 
Yu in this volume reveals some first-hand reflections on how the increasingly inter-
connected film world and art scene in China is changing how we conceive of ‘cinema’ 
and is pushing the disciplinary boundaries between film studies and art history. 
Tracing the curatorial history of how art films have been included in ‘experimental 
sections’ of China’s domestic independent festivals and exhibited in art spaces as 
film installations, Dong discusses the special features of ‘cinema as exhibition’ in the 
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context of Chinese contemporary art and independent cinema, and how it reflects the 
intertwined and interconnected nature of ‘iGeneration’ cinematic production.
 To be sure, not all filmmakers embrace globalizing trends, and there has been 
a distinct ‘local turn’ in iGeneration image-making that focuses solely on specific 
geographic, personal or digital communities, such as animal documentary and first-
person documentary. For this reason, it is unlikely that future surveys of cinema and 
moving image culture in China will ever be as complete as those produced during the 
heyday of the Fifth Generation. If anything, the promise of cinematic terra incognita 
is now stronger than ever before, in part due to the diversity of cultural artefacts to be 
uncovered, and in part due to broader international interest in China’s media culture 
– the latter a testament to China’s rising significance within international political, 
commercial and academic circles.
 The growing international prominence of China’s national image is apparent in 
venues and forums across the globe – whether in international public spaces (e.g. Times 
Square in New York), art fairs (e.g. La Biennale di Venezia), academic programmes, 
or in any business or cultural institution with a credible global strategy. Chinese art, 
scholarship, insider analysis, expertise and investment are in high demand worldwide, 
including in other emerging markets that are eager to emulate China’s growth rates 
(or, as China’s official rhetoric under new President Xi Jinping would have it, to share 
in the ‘China dream’). Much of this admiration can be connected to China’s economic 
stability since the 1997–8 East Asian Financial Crisis and the improvement in its inter-
national position relative to the European Union, Japan and the United States since the 
2008 Global Financial Crisis. Such economic good fortune (linked, at least in theory, to 
prudent macroeconomic policy) has helped create a cosmopolitan Chinese upper class 
that is able to afford luxury brands, real estate, and other markers of elite status in ever-
greater quantities. Such elites have always existed in China; their numbers, however, are 
now far greater than they were a decade ago. Greater parity in international economic 
and political relations, and even the re-establishment of a ‘Sinocentric’ world order, 
once again appear as real possibilities, as does irreversible First-World decline.
 This narrative, however, conceals the existence of considerable inequalities in 
Chinese society. The country’s per capita GDP, even adjusted for purchasing-power 
parity, is 92nd among the world’s 195 countries36 and is $3,000 below the global 
average.37 iGeneration films have often captured this internal economic unevenness in 
images that reflect affluence, poverty, and much in between. These films also address 
the sense that China is experiencing both an unprecedented and contradictory moment 
in its history. How long will the good times last? And have they even arrived? Many 
of iGeneration filmmakers, like their Fifth and Sixth/Urban counterparts, sometimes 
seem torn between admiration for China’s changes and scepticism concerning the 
future, and even the present, as is illustrated in Ying Liang’s Good Cats (Haomao, 2008).
 Finally, while this volume does not posit a complete break between the iGeneration 
and earlier generations such as the Fifth Generation and the Sixth/Urban Generation, 
it does argue for a reconsideration of the use of the generational taxonomy. Although 
the director remains a key figure in film studies, the changes wrought by new technol-
ogies and post-WTO market regimes have by now made it impossible to understand 
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the ‘generation’ marker as referring to a shared set of personal experiences in Chinese 
society as expressed through filmic texts and other elements of moving image culture. 
Personal experiences of visual culture are now inscribed via media such as experi-
mental and amateur documentaries, animation, artists’ films, 3-D and IMAX image 
configurations, all of which are as much about ambiguous cultural positions as they are 
about market success. Therefore, we are asserting that future studies of Chinese film 
‘generations’ will be shaped by a newer, and in our view more accurate, paradigm – 
one that understands moviemaking and cine-media practices as embodying a range of 
agendas (such as the pursuit of nation-building, profit, cultural capital, social justice), 
and functions (such as state didacticism, commodified leisure, surveillance, self-
expression, identity construction, activism and transnational connoisseurship). While 
these agendas and functions frequently overlap, chapters in this volume represent an 
attempt to capture how Chinese cinema and moving image culture has been reinvig-
ourated, reinvented and even recycled by iGeneration practitioners and audiences.
Structure of the volume
iGeneration cinema is a multifaceted phenomenon that exists in and through different 
systems. Accordingly, we have organized this volume into sections devoted to: (1) 
technologies, (2) aesthetics, (3) social engagement, (4) platforms and politics; and (5) 
online audiences. In our view, each of these systems represents a key node of scholarly 
and critical inquiry. The five-part formulation owes something to the classical division 
of film studies into production, content and reception, but emphasizes – as we have 
done throughout this Introduction – the importance of technology, and the ways 
in which iGeneration film- and moving image-making overlaps with other social 
practices in contemporary China.
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Toward a Communicative Practice : Female 
First-Person Documentary in Twenty-first 
Century China
Tianqi Yu
Communication is truth; communication is happiness. To share is our duty; to go 
down boldly and bring to light those hidden thoughts which are the most diseased; 
to conceal nothing; to pretend nothing; if we are ignorant to say so; if we love our 
friends to let them know it.
Virginia Woolf
This chapter explores the changing features of the individual self in China as demon-
strated through first-person filmmaking by women around the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, a time when China has been going through a process of decol-
lectivization and individualization. I centre my analysis on Wang Fen’s They Are Not 
the Only Unhappy Couple (Bu Kuaile de buzhi yige, 2000) and Yang Lina’s Home Video 
(Jiating Luxiang, 2001), and also include readings of other examples such as Liu Jiayi’s 
Oxhide I (niupi, 2005) & II (niupi, 2009) and Song Fang’s Memories Look At Me (jiyi 
kanzhe wo, 2012). As both aesthetic and social pioneers, these women have been 
experimenting with a new documentary language to express their subjectivity and 
thus depart from earlier Chinese independent documentary practices in the 1990s 
for two key reasons. First, unlike many documentaries traditionally made by male 
filmmakers, the women who make these films tend to highlight a personalized vision, 
by bringing their own intimate familial spaces to wider audiences and reflexively 
turning themselves into key characters in their own films. Second, their first-person 
documentary practice often arises from a subversive impulse: namely, it departs from 
the political economy of the mainstream film industry, connecting a new strand of 
film practices to the iGeneration canon; and at the same time it challenges these 
filmmakers’ traditional role as women constrained by patriarchal expectations and 
the burdens of institutional and familial persecution. It is here that they negotiate 
their position in the still largely male-dominated film world, as well as their personal 
position as daughters in these families.
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 First-person filmmaking in China emerged around the start of the twenty-first 
century, within ten years of Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in 1992, which marked 
a new intensification in development of the socialist market economy ‘with Chinese 
characteristics.’ Along with fostering rapid economic growth, China’s post-Mao 
reform has also stimulated what the anthropologist Yan Yunxiang observes as 
an ‘individualization process,’ in which individuals have been largely untied from 
previous social institutions, and have gained more space and autonomy to develop 
their own lifestyle choices.1 Alongside China’s colossal economic boom and rapid 
mass urbanization, individuals are quietly transforming their social roles, often in 
subversive ways. Through various eco-political and cultural practices, individuals 
are consciously and unconsciously examining and reconstructing their individual 
subjectivities. These practices have included women’s first-person filmmaking, which 
has demonstrated some features of contemporary women’s lives in the individualizing 
China of the post-Mao era. In fact, the increasing number of female filmmakers and 
the focus on personal narratives regarding memory, family and private spaces are in 
many respects at the centre of what we deem here ‘iGeneration’ production. There are 
considerably fewer female directors among the so-called Fifth and Sixth Generation 
filmmakers, and those relatively well known to the public include Ning Ying, for her 
Beijing Trilogy For Fun (zhaole, 1993), On the Beat (minjing gushi, 1995), and I Love 
Beijing (Xiari guan yangyang, 2001), and documentary Railroad of Hope (xiguang 
zhilü, 2002); Li Yu for her Buddha Mountain (guanyin shang, 2011); and Li Hong 
for her documentary Huido Fenghuang Qiao (1994). These filmmakers have become 
the leading female directors to emerge in this past decade. Some of them have also 
produced films in innovative genres for theatrical release, such as Wang Fen’s debut 
thriller Suitcase (xiangzi, 2008). In addition to these female directors, established Sixth 
Generation filmmakers, such as Jia Zhangke, also explore personal narratives about 
memories and family. For example, both of Jia’s innovative documentary films 24 City 
(24 chengji, 2008) and I Wish I Knew (haishang chuanqi, 2010) exclusively reconstruct 
their narrated histories through personal memories of the past. This theme is also 
explored in Luke Vulpiani’s chapter in the next section of this volume.
 In this chapter, I will combine a close inspection of these filmmaking practices with 
textual analysis of the films. One the one hand, I analyse how the filmmaker’s self is 
represented on her own camera, through what Catherine Russell calls the four layers 
of self-inscription in autoethnographic film: (1) the self – that is, the speaker in the 
first-person voice-over; (2) the seer, the ‘origin of gaze’; (3) the seen, the ‘body image,’ 
the subject in the film; and (4) the editor, who constructs a certain aesthetic style.2 
On the other hand, I read this practice as an art practice, as well as a form of socio-
political participation. I will situate my analysis of women’s first-person documentary 
practice in the debates over China’s path toward individualization discussed by influ-
ential anthropologist Yan Yunxiang3 and further elaborated by others.4 The debates 
on China’s individualization process are largely influenced by the contemporary 
individualization thesis, developed from the theories of Zygmunt Bauman, Anthony 
Giddens, Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim.5 This thesis arose in an attempt 
to understand individualization as a social phenomenon that emerged in the second 
 Toward a Communicative Practice 25
half of the twentieth century, or the so-called second modernity,6 where individuals 
tend to be nomadic, non-linear, fluid, reflexive, and have lots of choices.
 Yan7 recognizes four features of contemporary life demonstrated by the ‘European 
individualization thesis,’ two of which also describe the traits of the individualizing 
society in contemporary China. The first one is ‘disembedment,’ or what Giddens 
regards as ‘detraditionalization’ 8 from external social constraints, including cultural 
traditions and encompassing categories such as family, kinship, social classes, ethnic 
groups and local and national communities. The second one is what Bauman refers 
to as a paradoxical phenomenon of ‘compulsive and obligatory self-determination,’ 
in order to search for ‘re-embeddedness.’9 This means individuals under the modern 
social structure have to take full responsibility for their own issues and be more 
proactive to develop their lives. This process requires a new set of social institutions to 
enable and structure individual choices and to provide resources, techniques, security 
and incentives for individuals to develop their own way of life.10 However, while 
individual freedom is rather flexible and uncertain in contemporary Western society, 
individual rights and freedoms in China are largely at the discretion of the state. Under 
these circumstances, the traditional institution of family still plays an important role 
in providing individuals with a sense of security and identity.
 In this sense, proactive first-person filmmaking by women can be read as an action 
of their ‘re-embedding’ themselves back into the family. By reconnecting themselves 
with the traditional collective institution, they are consciously searching for their 
sense of self, and also examining how family has been transformed in the broader 
‘detraditionalization’ process. Instead of passively performing the conventional image 
of their ‘given’ identity of obedient daughter, these women take a dual role of both 
daughter and independent outsider. In negotiating this contradictory role of playing 
both observer and subject, these filmmakers use the camera as a mediator, whereby 
their practice bridges a conversation with their parents – and, by extension, with 
the audience – on the renegotiation of the parent–child relationship and the role of 
women in contemporary Chinese society.
 In the first part of this chapter, I will discuss how first-person filmmaking practices 
initially developed in the West, and then situate this type of filmmaking into the 
sociopolitical and historical contexts of contemporary China, especially regarding 
issues related to women and individualization in the post-Communist epoch. I will 
then analyze how Wang and Yang position themselves as strong authorial voices, 
but also as relational subjects. Lastly, I will probe the reception of the films, the 
ethics they have challenged, and how these challenges have been carried on by other 
women filmmakers in recent years. I argue that the women’s first-person documentary 
filmmaking that I study here can be seen as a form of ‘communicative practice’ 
between children (daughters) and parents, generating what Harriet Evans regards as 
‘a new ethics of mutual recognition and exchange between parents and children.’11 In 
my observation, Wang’s and Yang’s authorial voices do not just speak for themselves, 
but for the family as a larger collective. This echoes what Yan identifies as the tension 
between the increasing demands for freedom imposed on individuals and the 
unavoidable and re-dependence of the individuals on social institutions – in this case, 
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the family. Nevertheless, the women’s first-person films that explore familial traumas 
have not been widely shown to audiences in public spaces outside the film community, 
and have received criticism for being narcissistic and solipsistic. They are also seen as 
challenging the relational and collective-centred social ethics that dominated tradi-
tional Chinese society as well as Mao’s China, cultural forces that are still influential 
today. These criticisms suggest that the individualizing society in China seems not to 
have accepted women who openly challenge parental and patriarchal power. Their 
position in society and communicative practices have remained the subject of an 
ongoing negotiation in China since the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Defining first-person filmmaking in the West
To understand first-person filmmaking as a form of film and art practice, I will first 
provide a review of how it originated and developed in the West. We can trace its 
emergence to North America and Western Europe during the late 1960s and 1970s, a 
time when the politics of identity dominated the general cultural sphere.12 Filmmakers 
and artists came to document their own engagement with society, reflecting the 
multi-layered nature of fragmented self-identities, in terms of sociocultural practices, 
ethnicity and sexuality, all of which were seen as categories constantly in flux. The 
advance of video technology in the 1970s then played a compelling role, as the influ-
ential documentary film theorist Michael Renov explains that, ‘[v]ideo can be seen 
as a format historically joined to the private and the domestic, a medium capable 
of supplying inexpensive sync sound images, a vehicle of autobiography in which 
the reflexive gaze of the electronic eye can engender an extended, even obsessive, 
discourse of the self.’13 The presence of digital video cameras in China since the late 
1990s has had a similar effect to that of video in North America in the 1970s. In 
addition, the epistemological critique of postmodernism and poststructuralism also 
had a strong impact on the emergence of a more reflexive documentary form, or what 
Bill Nichols postulates as the ‘reflective mode’ and ‘performative mode,’14 which has 
been further explored by film scholar Stella Bruzzi.15
 Since the 1980s, first-person documentary filmmaking has been the subject of a small 
but highly significant number of scholarly studies in traditional Anglo-European film 
studies.16 In particular, Catherine Russell’s appropriation of Mary Louise Pratt’s term 
‘autoethnography’ to the field of filmmaking is instructive. For Russell, ‘[a]utobiography 
becomes ethnographic at the point where the film or videomaker understands his or 
her personal history to be implicated in larger social formations and historical processes. 
Identity is no longer a transcendental or essential self that is revealed, but a “staging of 
subjectivity” – a representation of the self as a performance.’17 Chris Marker’s San Solei 
(1984) and American filmmaker Ross McElwee’s Six O’Clock News (1994) can be seen as 
autoethnographic examples in their inwards exploration on the maker’s own self, even if 
it is a fictional self, as was the case in San Solei. Nevertheless, the term autoethnography 
still emphasizes an Orientalist division of ‘Self and Others’ that is outmoded today.
 Toward a Communicative Practice 27
 Michael Renov prefers to use ‘filmic autobiography’18 to describe this autobio-
graphic mode of nonfiction and emphasizes the genre’s confessional features. These 
confessional elements are present in the work of Jonas Mekas, Wendy Clarke, Alan 
Berliner and Michelle Citron, all of whom explore the personal, often familial, 
issues to promote self-understanding, emotional repair or memory reconstruction. 
Elsewhere, Laura Rascaroli’s highly inspiring monograph Personal Camera adopts 
the umbrella term ‘personal cinema’ to refer to films that explicitly document issues 
directly relating to the first-person self, including the sub-genres of diary films, self-
portrait films and notebook films. Closely engaged with Renov’s analysis, Alisa Lebow 
prefers to use the term ‘first-person documentary.’ Instead of stating a singular self, 
she claims that first-person expression always belongs to ‘the first person plural,’ which 
embeds the history, memory and identity of a much larger entity.19
 Here I take the concept of first-person documentary to describe the films I analyse, 
while also taking inspiration from the scholarly discussions of autoethnography, filmic 
autobiography and personal cinema. This is to avoid overt separation of self and other 
in ‘autoethnography,’ and these films are not necessarily all about the maker’s self as 
in autobiography. I understand the concept of ‘first person’ to have a strong conno-
tation with the self as an individual subject. ‘First-person filmmaking,’ according to 
this view, is a practice where filmmakers point the camera inward to film the self and 
milieu, and choose to inscribe their first-person voice through revealing elements of 
the filmmaking process, interacting with the subjects, and reflexively commenting on 
their filmmaking. This genre also includes the creative use of home movies, animation, 
found footage, graphics, re-enacted scenes and even theatrical performance. Elements 
of reflexivity, subjectivity and performativity are often interwoven together to deliver 
a hybridization of documentary modes and formats. Films of this type that have 
gained significant commercial and/or critical success include Marlon Riggs’ Tongues 
Unties (1989), Ari Forman’s Waltz with Bashir (2008), Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 
9/11 (2004), and more independent productions such as Alisa Lebow’s Tref (1994) 
and Andrés Di Tella’s Fotografías (2007). Such films articulate – through first-person 
narration – a subjective interpretation of one’s world or one’s vision of the world for 
the viewer.
Women’s first-person documentary in individualizing China
Pioneered by women filmmakers, first-person documentary film ought to be seen as 
a groundbreaking mode of intimate documentation in postsocialist individualizing 
China, which has experienced a transformation of social structures through decol-
lectivization or ‘songbang’ – which literarily means to untie (or loosen control of) 
individuals.20 Individuals are emancipated from ‘the ascribed, inherited and inborn 
determination of his or her social character’21 and have to rely more on themselves. 
This has consequently encouraged the rise of a ‘me culture’ (ziwo wenhua).22 However, 
this does not mean individuals have been totally unencumbered by social structures 
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and norms.23 Instead, human identities have been transformed ‘from a “given” into 
a “task,” and [being charged] with the responsibility for performing that task and 
for the consequences (also the side-effects) of their performance.’24 Two key women 
filmmakers under investigation in this chapter actively challenge their ‘given’ identity 
through their filmmaking practice. In this sense, they are a crucial part of the ‘iGener-
ation’ – proactively deconstructing their ‘given’ identity and using a new alternative 
amateur documentation tool – the digital video camera – to negotiate a new way of 
communication. Both women filmmakers, as daughters, view filmmaking as a way to 
renegotiate their gendered identity.
 One of these women is Yang Lina. Born in 1972, Yang was trained as a dancer and 
worked at the People’s Liberation Army Theatre in her 20s. During these formative 
years, she felt increasingly uncomfortable, as the environment was very socially and 
aesthetically rigid. Eager to express her true self, Yang left her military work unit and 
went to Beijing to start a new life.25 From 1996 to 1999, she used a mini DV (digital 
video) camera to film the daily lives of a group of old men in a Beijing residential area. 
This work formed the basis of her first documentary Old Men (a.k.a. Lao Tou, 1999), 
which won her much public attention. Home Video is her second film, and investigates 
her parents’ divorce.
 The other filmmaker I discuss here is Wang Fen. Born in 1978 when China had 
just started its economic reform, she attended a drama and performance school 
starting at the age of nine. Unlike Yang, Wang has never worked in a state-owned 
work unit, partly because the state no longer allocated compulsory jobs by the time 
Wang reached working age in the late 1990s. Wang first worked as a freelance actress, 
then she realized that she wanted to be a director. She borrowed a video camera, went 
back to her hometown in Jiangxi province, and made her first documentary about her 
parents.26
 Ten years after making her first film, They Are Not the Only Unhappy Couple, Wang 
was sitting with me in a modern restaurant in Wangjing, a recently developed middle-
class district in Northeast Beijing. Looking out on a set of glitzy modern apartment 
blocks and newly erected skyscrapers that reflect the country’s economic success over 
the last two decades, we started to chat about personal stories of living through China’s 
dramatic social transitions. Wang recalled the experience of making her inaugural 
first-person documentary in her early 20s, a personal journey that investigated her 
own parents’ unhappy marriage.
At that time, I was only about twenty-one years old, but already an adult. I was 
eager to know myself, my emotions, and how I became who I was…These were 
some things I did not understand and really wanted to know… Before that, it is 
usually the parents who take care of the children, but by making this film, I start 
to care about them.27
It was the desire for self-understanding and parent-child communication that 
compelled Wang to take a digital video camera back home just as these cameras were 
becoming available on the Chinese consumer market for the first time. She regards 
the making of They Are Not the Only Unhappy Couple as the starting point of her 
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adulthood, when she was willing to display emotional concern for her parents. As a 
filmmaker, Wang also believed that the film could raise wider social awareness about 
marital problems and domestic issues in contemporary Chinese society.28 However, 
traditional Confucian family ethical relations tend to construct women as powerless 
and voiceless. To a large extent, the woman plays the role of the daughter and the wife, 
subject to the father, the husband and the eldest son respectively, which is indicated 
in the ‘Three Obediences.’29 Rather than simply following the conventional ethical 
norms, however, the two women filmmakers inscribed themselves as strong authorial 
voices in their films, constantly asking questions from behind the camera.
 Resistance to the ethics of female obedience as a discursive process has gone 
through various changes in China, dating back to the country’s modern individuali-
zation process in the late nineteenth century. During the May Fourth period in the 
1910s and 1920s, a group of modern, educated, intellectual ‘new women’ emerged 
and actively challenged traditional perceptions of Chinese womanhood.30 However, 
the Nationalist Government repressed these ‘new women’ during the ‘New Life 
Movement’ in the 1930s, seeing them as a challenge to political uniformity and social 
stability.31 After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, gender inequality 
was strongly countered through a series of legislation, such as the new Marriage Law 
and the establishment of the Women’s Federation or ‘Fulian.’ The empowered new 
strong female figure was largely used for the construction of the socialist collective 
ideology, signifying that the Communist Party would liberate the female victims 
of traditional Chinese feudal society and help them become active members of the 
proletarian class. However, in the period from 1950 to 1980, and despite assertions 
to the contrary by the Communist Party,32 a gendered hierarchy continued to exist.33 
Nevertheless, the status of women rose significantly in Mao’s China, as compared to 
their role in traditional Chinese society.
 Even with all the social changes that have accompanied Chinese economic reform 
since 1980, popular discourse in China still maintains a focus on the importance of 
women’s re-emphasizing their own familial obligations. As Evans states, ‘“soft and 
gentle” images of a supportive femininity topped the rankings for desirable wives. 
Treating love and sex as key constituents of a happy and stable marriage rapidly 
became crucial criteria of China’s new claims to being a “modern society.” Though 
these images were sometimes disturbed by others of the “strong woman” (nüqiangren) 
and the ambitious female entrepreneurs, the dominant popular message is one of a 
naturalized and emotional female and connotes the attributes of gentleness, sympathy 
and care.’34 Confronting this mainstream discourse, women’s personal writings, as ‘an 
act, a negotiation of selves and identities in history’35 emerged in the 1980s, unconven-
tionally exposing personal emotions, desires and sexuality from women’s perspective. 
These writings have faced strong criticism and been denounced as ‘privacy literature’ 
(yinsi wenxue).
 In the face of this denunciation, public opinion towards personal writing has 
changed during the 1990s, which marks an age of ‘privacy fever.’36 Such (semi-) 
autobiographical women’s ‘individualized writing’ (gerenhua xiezuo)37 is now enjoying 
a re-proliferation, however, and has been packaged as a seductive popular cultural 
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commodity38 to satisfy the rapidly globalizing market society, as well as the hedonistic 
and narcissistic consumer culture [in China].39 Though such women’s personal writing 
has carved out a space for women’s own voices, the mass consumption of it has made 
women’s personal voice subject to market forces, problematizing the traditionally 
oppositional relationships between women’s culturally prescribed roles and their 
newly independent voices, as well as between the private and the public sphere.
 Turning the camera inward to explore filmmakers’ familial aspects in a fast-trans-
forming society, female first-person documentaries can be read as ‘DV individualized 
writing.’ Judith Butler highlights the role of iterability in performativity in cultural 
construction, which means ‘a regularized and constrained repetition of norms.’40 As 
women filmmakers, Yang and Wang are ‘performing’ – but also challenging – the 
stereotyped ‘given’ role of the passive obedient daughter. By reconnecting to their 
parental history, they are actively producing a new understanding of a parent–
daughter relationship. It is in this sense that I regard these two women’s proactive 
first-person filmmaking about their parents’ marriages as a kind of active commu-
nication (goutong). Their work can also been seen as a mode of ‘communicative 
practice,’ a term used by Harriet Evans, developed from Jürgen Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action. While Evans uses this term to describe the changing pattern 
of mother–daughter communication, as daughters of the younger generation in 
her ethnographical studies long for emotional relatedness with their parents,41 the 
women filmmakers in my study also aim for a reconnection with their parents and 
are proactively altering the communication pattern they used to have with their 
elders. Unabashedly rebellious, first-person filmmaking by women also serves as 
means of social/cultural construction, as they subversively generate a new set of ethics 
for communication between parents and children, through the medium of the DV 
camera.
A strong authorial voice
Both Yang and Wang approach their parents not just from the viewpoint of a daughter, 
but more as an ‘outsider’ – an independent individual who shows responsibility 
towards her family, and renegotiates the filial duties expected of a daughter. While 
Yang uses handheld point-of-view shots to create a subjective gaze at her parents, and 
uses off-screen first-person voice to lead the narrative, Wang does something quite 
different, in that she creates a formal ‘objective’ look and speaks calmly to her parents, 
trying to maintain her position as an ‘outsider.’
 In Home Video, Yang aims to dig out the unspoken secret that has caused the break 
between her divorced parents and between her father and her brother. She inscribes 
herself as the seer, equating her own eyes with the lens of the camera, and the speaker, 
who speaks from behind the camera. And her film subjects also speak directly to her 
camera in close-up. Such cinematographic techniques demonstrate a more intimate 
relationship between the filmmaker and the subjects, and are very different from the 
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conventional fly-on-the-wall observational documentary mode that had a significant 
impact on earlier Chinese independent documentaries in the 1990s. Yang’s personal 
relationship with her family members enables her camera to enter the private familial 
space. She conducts interviews in a very casual way, interrogating her parents almost 
like an arbiter. When talking to her mother or her father, Yang’s camera sometimes 
looks at them from above. Her voice coming behind the camera sounds very firm, 
almost in an aggressive manner.
 The film opens with a medium-close up of Yang’s mother lying on the bed and 
wearing only her underwear. Yang’s off-screen voice states persistently: ‘I want to 
make an investigation into the divorce of my parents. If you think it is boring or too 
intrusive, I will stop.’ Her voice is the first one we hear in the film, making it clear it 
is ‘I’ who is holding the camera and investigating ‘my’ parents’ divorce. Yang then 
cuts away from these personal interviews and moves to three family members, to 
compare their different attitudes toward the divorce and its subsequent effects on the 
whole family. It is interesting to note the mother seems not care about disclosing the 
family scandal to the public. In contrast, even though her father and her brother are 
on opposite sides in this dispute, neither was willing to participate on camera in the 
beginning. After gaining support from the mother, the film cuts to Yang’s father lying 
in bed in a different bedroom. The camera zooms in on his face, as he addresses the 
viewfinder: ‘Your mum has no idea about anything. She’s just happy that she’s going 
Figure 1.1 Yang asks the mother to persuade the father in Home Video (2001).
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to be an actress, right?’ Yang laughs while replying: ‘No way. How can you think of 
her like that?’ It cuts back to the mother looking up at the camera, saying: ‘Tell him 
to think about it carefully.’ Then the camera follows the father walking around, while 
Yang’s off-screen voice speaks: ‘If you don’t agree, I’ll keep following you around.’
 While the father’s rejection may come from self-censorship, feeling ashamed about 
talking about the divorce, the brother thinks remembering the ‘broken past’ will hurt 
them again. In another shot, the camera reveals the brother sitting in a darkened living 
room facing the camera in a medium close-up as he says: ‘I cannot support this.’ As 
Yang insists, the brother replies: ‘…If we all just speak from our own points of view, 
it will turn into a family war…This is not just an average event from our past…You 
are hurting people…Stop talking, turn that thing off….’ Similarly, the father tries to 
cover up the lens, asking Yang to stop filming: ‘It’s best not to do anything that you 
will regret.’ Despite this warning, Yang firmly replies: ‘…No, I will be very fair.’ At this 
moment, she does not simply act in the role of a daughter, but like a judge, with the 
ability to make her own independent decision on this issue. Though challenged in this 
way by the two male figures in the family, Yang does not give up. She even shows how 
her brother criticizes her on camera. In a shot of the brother sitting in living room 
in medium close-up, he tells Yang, ‘I think you are a little shameless.’ Yang does not 
feel guilty; instead, she admits it and playfully says from behind the camera, ‘Yes, yes, 
you are right. I’m beginning to feel very shameless…’ Nevertheless, the father and the 
brother finally agreed to participate.
Figure 1.2–4 The three interviews are cross-cut in Home Video (2001).
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 After the interviews, Yang invites the mother and the brother to watch the film 
together and records their responses. It is the first time we see the mother and the 
brother together, and for them to see what the father thinks. Then, despite Yang’s 
mother’s warning not to show the film to her father, Yang insists on doing so. The 
father figure is challenged not only through encouraging him to remember the hidden 
family history and tell it in front of the camera, but also through the filmmaker’s use 
of the mother’s and brother’s subjective memories to disturb the father’s own memory 
and judgement. Toward the end, Yang says she hopes the film can bridge the long-term 
misunderstanding among these three traumatized family members.
 In They Are Not the Only Unhappy Couple, Wang’s first-person influence is articu-
lated strongly through her self-inscription as the ‘seer’ and the ‘editor.’ Wang creates 
a look that is less personal and more objective. She puts the camera on a tripod to 
achieve a stable view, constructing the interview setting in a more formal way. The 
father and the mother each sit in the middle of the frame in medium close-up, and 
address the camera directly, rather than looking at Wang behind the camera. As in 
the film about Yang’s parents, the close relationship between Yang’s parents and their 
daughter makes the parents reveal themselves to the camera without much worry. For 
them, it is more like their daughter’s amateur home movie practice than a new mode 
of documentary filmmaking.
 Like Yang, Wang edits the material and constructs her parents’ confessions 
according to her own personal interpretation. In the opening sequence, Wang uses 
some experimental elements, having her parents to ‘perform themselves.’ Wang 
accomplishes this by starting in fast-forward, as we see close-ups of two pairs of 
hands cutting out phrases like ‘marriage,’ ‘love’ and ‘family’ from magazines. Then 
we see one set of hands throw the paper cutouts into a bin, and another set of hands 
pick them out of the rubbish. The film moves next to an establishing shot, as the 
camera zooms in and we see a couple standing side by side, who we will later realize 
are Wang’s parents. In this sequence, Wang introduces us to the relationship of her 
parents through a performance she directed. It is a construction of how she wants to 
present her parents.
 Wang’s off-screen voice only appears a few times from behind the camera, speaking 
in a very calm and unemotional tone. She neither argues with her parents loudly nor 
laughs nor cries with them, as Yang does in her film. This neutral tone of questioning 
reinforces her position as someone who tries to stand outside her own familial 
relationship, and creates a space for her parents to confess, to speak out about their 
pain.
Still a relational self
Even though both Yang and Wang take on a transgressive role in their films that 
challenges the traditional image of the daughter, their authorial voices do not just 
speak for themselves, but for the sake of their family as a larger collective.
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 In Home Video, Yang’s interviews with her mother, father and younger brother are 
shot via a consecutive and cross-cut technique, producing the appearance of a face-
to-face conversation between the three, with the central focus on the family. While 
one person recalls an event, the other two immediately respond. As their conversation 
reveals, the violent family history is that the mother had an affair, which the brother 
witnessed and then later told the father. The father consequently began beating the 
mother for her infidelity, and they divorced because of these irreconcilable spousal 
difficulties. The brother also witnessed the domestic violence, and therefore has a 
complex set of feelings towards the parents. The film reveals that the relationship 
between the mother and father, as well as the relationship between the father and the 
son, are in fact strained.
 Yet Yang is not the only person who cares about the family as a whole. Her mother 
insists that Yang should not show the film to her father, as it would ruin the relationship 
among the family members that has just been rebuilt again in recent years. The mother 
is especially afraid that the younger brother would lose his inheritance from the father. 
However, in the end Yang still shows the film to the father. In the last shot of the film, 
Yang asks what the father thinks. Her father responds by asking his daughter the same 
question: ‘What do you think?’ Film scholar Yomi Braester argues that this moment 
indicates that Yang is the ultimate protagonist of the film.42 However, as I see it, what 
Yang cares about most is the family appearing as a collective, which is the central focus 
of her film. Yang believes that this filmmaking activity has indeed created a chance for 
the family members to re-examine their relationships, and to engage in a deeper level 
of communication than they have had in a long time.43
 In They Are Not the Only Unhappy Couple, Wang’s camera focuses on examining 
the relationship between the husband and the wife. The majority of the film is made 
of two separate confessional interviews with the mother/wife and the father/husband, 
cross-cut and organized like a dialogue of the two. The film presents the couple’s 
dissatisfaction towards each other. The father starts with revealing his promiscuous 
love life and affairs with other women, followed by the mother saying, ‘I never really 
trusted him.’ The film cuts back to the father complaining about his wife, then back the 
mother who is frank about her animosity towards the man she married. The couple 
speaks to the camera, to their daughter, and it seems like they do not know these 
interviews would be shown to the public.
 As the conversations continue, we realize that the traditional ethical relationship 
between husband and wife is seriously strained in Wang’s portrait of her family. In 
Chinese culture, the ‘Three Cardinal Guides’ request that the husband guide his wife, 
showing her affection and protecting her from harm, while the ‘Three Obediences’ 
request that the wife obey the husband. Even when socialist ideology replaced 
traditional family ethics in Mao’s China, the new morality of socialist ‘command-
ership’ required an equal relationship and mutual respect. However, Wang’s parents’ 
confessions to her personal camera have somehow destroyed the stereotyped image 
of a good harmonious couple. As the film continues, it reveals that Wang’s parents’ 
unhappy marriage might be a result of China’s changing sociopolitical climate during 
the Maoist era, when the father could not marry another woman because of class 
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differences. In one scene, Wang leaves her father alone with the camera on and asks 
him to say whatever he wants to say. The father appears to be a little uncomfortable at 
first, gazing at the camera, but then he starts to confess:
On the issue of marriage, I have been tortured my whole life. Why? Because I 
cannot be with the one I love. The society did not allow it. But the one I don’t 
like at all becomes my real wife, then I do not experience a single happy day ever 
since…
It is interesting to analyse whom the father is addressing in this segment when he is 
by himself. Is he addressing his daughter, as he knows that she will eventually watch 
this? Is he addressing himself, revealing the pain in his heart? Is he addressing other 
potential viewers and does he knows that this confession will be watched by a larger 
audience? The father reveals that he attributes his unhappy marriage at least partially 
to the Communist class struggle during the Cultural Revolution, when people were 
grouped strictly according to their class labels and when personal affections toward a 
member of a different class were not encouraged.
 This scene of the father’s personal confession stands in sharp contrast with the last 
scene, where Wang’s parents are standing happily together side by side, waving goodbye 
to the camera. This ‘happy together’ moment is a conscious performance in front of 
the camera, which can be read in several ways. Is it a performance directed by Wang, 
who imposes her own romantic wish on to her parents? Is the performance happening 
because her parents want to present a happy image when they are together facing the 
camera, not knowing what each other has said? Or is it actually part of their daily life, as 
they both reveal that they do not want to divorce, because they wish to give their children 
a unified family? In all of these possible interpretations, the family members, both Wang 
and her parents, still show considerable care for the family as a collective unit.
Ethics of screening
Filming oneself and one’s family is an important self-understanding process. Wang 
Fen regards the investigation in her film as valuable guidance for her to understand 
the meaning of marriage. She states that, even if she had not made the film, she would 
have understood the problem later. The filmmaking accelerated the process, at a time 
when she had just started a relationship herself.44 Now Wang does not choose the 
traditional path of marriage for herself, but instead has given birth to a son with Ai 
Weiwei, China’s most politically outspoken contemporary artist (who is also already 
married to another woman). It would be an oversimplification to judge Wang’s choice 
of her unconventional unification of partnership as a direct response to her parents’ 
unhappy marriage, but it nevertheless shows her rebellious attitude towards tradi-
tional marriage. As for Yang Lina, the criticism she received from her brother and 
father, as well as from her audience, has made her reflect on her own ethical relations 
with her family and the audience.45
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 While writing is a process limited to a space of one’s own, at least until publication, 
these women have moved their process of discovery a step further. By using a DV 
camera instead of a pen, they create new avenues of communication – reconnecting 
with their parents on the one hand and directly challenging the problematic familial 
relations (and the expectations of women) in Chinese society on the other. Their work 
draws attention to a re-examination of the institution of the family, which has become 
heavily layered and more complicated in China’s period of transition. Their films 
illustrate the fact that family, as a traditional institution that has historically defined 
the individual self in an ethical relational society, still plays an important role in the 
construction of the individual self. Presenting themselves in the complex relations, 
these women still think highly of the family as a collective group, which can provide 
individuals with a sense of identity and security. However, unlike the May Fourth new 
women of 1920s China and the post-Mao individual women writers who built up a 
collective power and social awareness, these female filmmakers have not yet formed a 
broader alliance.
 Even though Yang and Wang have only interacted with a limited number of people 
through their filmmaking and screenings, these two women have been regarded as 
highly transgressive and have received strong criticism. Their filmmaking has not 
only challenged their parents, but has also provoked their audience in serious ways 
and disrupted conventional Chinese expectations of passive obedient women. Their 
capturing of their family members’ stories on film has drawn attention to ethical 
questions. As Yang’s mother says in the film: ‘A movie like this will have a huge 
impact, but it will make us all look very bad, Yang Lina.’ Home Video has only been 
shown three times in ten years – once at the Leipzig Film Festival in Germany, and 
twice inside China. Similarly, They Are Not the Only Unhappy Couple was first shown 
at Yamagata International Documentary Film Festival (YIDFF) in Japan, then it was 
shown twice in Beijing. Wang Fen recalls that some domestic journalists seriously 
criticised her as being shameless.46 To some extent, such responses reflect the societal 
taboo regarding public discussion of personal familial issues in contemporary China.
 It cannot be denied that both Yang Lina and Wang Fen hoped to make a ‘film as 
a film.’ In Home Video, Yang’s mother’s response to Yang’s idea of filming the family 
as ‘fashionable’ and a ‘good topic’ somehow also reflects her own intention. As Yang 
reveals, ‘I’ve been listening to my mother talking about the issue several times, and 
think maybe I can make a film out of it, and investigate how others think of the issue.’47 
However, by making a film out of it and showing it to a wider audience, the familial 
issue is no longer a personal one. The strong criticism these filmmakers received made 
them question their own motivations, and they have not made similar documentaries 
since. Wang was funded to make a domestic commercial fiction feature in 2008 before 
editing some documentaries for Ai Weiwei, the father of her son. And while Yang Lina 
keeps making documentaries, she treats it as a profession, has done some commis-
sioned work for foreign broadcasters, and has avoided personal topics.
 Their self-censorship says something about the complex construction of the 
individual self. Gendered expectations of obedience and filiality, as well as family 
obligations, still play a crucial role in the individual constrcution of self in contemporary 
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China. While the individualizing society of post-reform China has offered these 
women more autonomy to pursue their selves outside of the traditional familial space, 
society seems not to have accepted women who openly challenge parental power and 
their conventional roles as a way to renegotiate the communication patterns between 
parents and children. It also indicates that society has not yet opened up public spaces 
for individuals to examine their selves in the context of unstable, uncommunicative 
familial relations that were, to a great extent, created by the dramatic transitions 
occurring in society.
 To challenge the still highly patriarchal structure of contemporary Chinese society 
(as well as the patriarchal nature of the independent film world itself), Yang Lina 
recently finished her debut feature fiction Longing For the Rain (2013), which deals 
openly with women’s sexuality by representing the sexual desire of a newly affluent 
urban middle-class woman. Yang aims to represent the innermost desires and 
emotions of women living in today’s China, a topic that is rarely portrayed even in 
Chinese independent cinema.48 The film, according to Yang, was not submitted for 
censorship and will mainly be shown internationally at film festivals and to a small 
audience in independent domestic screenings. Touching on a topic that is little repre-
sented in Chinese cinema, even by women filmmakers, Yang hammers at the invisible 
‘taboo’ in the still largely patriarchal society. Moving from the documentary genre to 
the fiction genre is also a way to avoid the sensitive ethics of documentary filmmaking.
More women first-person documentaries
Following pioneer women filmmakers Yang Lina, Wang Fen, Tang Danhong, more 
filmmakers are exploring their private familial issues as well as their engagement 
in the public spaces through a first-person approach. These include Shu Haolun 
(Nostalgia, 2006), the amateur filmmaker Hu Xinyu (The Man, 2001, Sister, 2003, and 
Family Phobia, 2010), the younger iGeneration filmmakers Wu Haohao (Criticising 
China, 2008 and Kun1: Action, 2008) and Xue Jianqiang (I Beat the Tiger when I was 
Young, 2010 and Martian Syndrome, 2010). Similar to the first women filmmaking 
pioneers, these filmmakers have explicitly depicted the self in family or public spaces, 
challenging existing social conventions and ethical relations. Keith B. Wagner’s 
chapter in this volume offers a fresh and in-depth analysis of the subversive nature of 
Xue’s practice, which he reads as part of small faction of ‘reckless documentaries’ from 
a marginalized social class in China’s regions. Apart from these relatively unknown 
filmmakers, the internationally recognized artist and activist Ai Weiwei has also 
produced a number of highly controversial first-person political documentaries with 
his volunteers.
 In addition, more women filmmakers are starting to make personal documentaries 
by presenting themselves on camera. For example, Beijing Film Academy graduate 
Liu Jiayin has made two award-winning first-person docu-dramas, Oxhide I (2005), 
and Oxhide II (2009) with his/her family members playing themselves. Similarly, Song 
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Fan’s Memories Look at Me (2012) also portrays her and her parents in their domestic 
setting, as they casually dig up shared memories from mundane family life in the 
past. It is interesting to note that neither of these filmmakers describes their work as 
documentary, as it involves real-life characters playing themselves and the filmmakers 
also taking part. Liu’s and Song’s films, as well as the two films studied here by Wang 
and Yang, are all dialogue-based, and the conversations are usually unscripted, with 
individuals speaking in their home dialects. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that such 
parent–daughter conversations, no matter how casual they seem, are all carefully 
staged for the purpose of filming, as if a communication between the two generations 
is only possible through a deliberate arrangement. Another woman’s first-person film 
that deals with generational communication is Zhang Mengqi’s Self Portrait: Three 
Women (2010). Solely focusing on the women of the filmmaker’s family, the film 
explores different values of love and marriage among Zhang’s grandmother, mother 
and herself. Different from other dialogue-based productions, this film includes 
elements of on-stage performance, as the filmmaker/dancer Zhang uses her own body 
as a communicative tool, performing in front of the camera as a way to communicate 
to her mother, and to herself.
 Furthermore, a few women in China’s subaltern classes are also beginning to create 
first-person documentary films with DV cameras. They use the camera both as a 
communicative tool and as a constructive engine to build a new identity. Guo Lifen’s 
My Name is Fenfen (2008) documents her personal experience as a rural-to-urban 
migrant worker in China’s nationwide urbanization and decollectivization process. 
Familial conflicts, especially her challenges to patriarchal authority, are inevitably part 
of her transitional life. Shao Yuzheng, one of the amateur villager filmmakers in Wu 
Wenguang’s ‘Villager Documentary Project,’49 has also made first-person documen-
taries since 2005. Unlike other female filmmakers, who predominantly focus on 
familial issues or their personal emotions, Shao is more like an independent journalist, 
as she keeps a record of the daily events in her village, even documenting her own 
interaction and confrontation with the state media and legal bureaucracy.50 By doing 
so, she has not only challenged the stereotypical image of the peasant class, but also 
the image of an illiterate domestic peasant woman who has little interaction with the 
public and wider society.
 In all these films, the construction of self, especially with regard to gender, has been 
further complicated in a society that is undertaking a dramatic decollectivization, 
urbanization and marketization processes. While these women filmmakers raise their 
strong authorial voice, confronting the conventional expectations of women, they still 
care about the family as a collective unit. Utilizing different devices of cinematic repre-
sentations to inscribe themselves in their films, these women filmmakers are searching 
for a new voice, and new ways to communicate with their families and the society. 
The complicated and problematic family relations explored in these films also reflect 
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Quasi-Documentary, Cellflix and Web Spoofs : 
Chinese Movies’ Other Visual Pleasures
Paola Voci
In China, as elsewhere, new locations and new media have redefined the experience 
of watching a moving image, beyond just the cinematic experience.1 The visual works 
that one can view outside movie theatres differ greatly in scope and style. Some explore 
alternatives to classic Hollywood narratives; others engage with the documentary idea, 
but reposition themselves away from realism and, in fact, might offer surreal and even 
distorted representations of the real. Often crossing the fiction and nonfiction divide, 
these movies simply fall under the broad category of non-feature films.2 The producers 
often embrace the cheaper, more manageable and far-reaching DV technology and 
rely on distribution channels as different as television, the internet and galleries.3 
Among non-feature films, Chinese video art and experimental videos have attracted 
most of the scholarly attention, while much less academic interest has been given to 
other movies.
 In this chapter, I begin to look at these other movies and explore some recent devel-
opments in Chinese moviemaking beyond the silver screen and outside art galleries, 
such as the quasi-documentary, the e gao (or spoofs) and the cell/DV flicks. I argue 
that their lightness contributes to establishing a new relationship between movies and 
pleasure.4 In my analysis, lightness refers to a self-reflective and often humorous mode 
of representation, but also relates to issues of production and distribution. Superfluous 
and often volatile cultural products, these movies are unlikely to be seen as generating 
either commercial or intellectual capital, and thus effectively locate themselves beyond 
the duality of popular and élite culture.
The sensual panda: Ceci n’est pas un documentaire
An intriguing example of lightness is Ying he Bai (Ying and Bai, Zhang Yiqing, 2002), 
a quasi-documentary in which irony goes hand in hand with sensuality.5 Ying and Bai 
is an unusual take on the national icon: the panda bear. The movie revolves around 
a panda, Ying, and his relationship with Bai, his trainer and caretaker, but, from the 
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start, it displaces our expectations about what a panda story is generally about.6 Not 
only are pandas among the most widely recognized symbols of China, they are also 
linked to a variety of controversial issues, from China’s commitment to wildlife preser-
vation to so-called panda diplomacy.7 Yet, the movie deals with none of the above and, 
in fact, at the end of the documentary one has a hard time describing what ‘the story’ 
is really about. In Ying and Bai, authenticity seems to be displayed in the recording of 
the everyday routine of a panda and his caretaker. However, the shots are often edited 
and explicitly manipulated to comment on the unusual ménage à deux. In fact, editing 
and camera angles change the relation between Ying and Bai into a ménage à trois, as 
the woman and the panda’s enclosed reality is invaded by broadcasts on a television set 
with which they both share their lives. The staging of an artificial viewing relationship 
between the panda and the television set upsets the idea of authenticity in the film 
even further.
 The opening shot of the film is framed upside-down. Shown through a set of iron 
bars that clearly indicate that the camera is located behind a cage, one can see a little 
television set with a window in the background. A news programme is on. A woman 
enters the shot, hangs a picture on the wall, moves towards the camera, opens the 
cage, gets out a bowl, and exits the frame. At this point, the movie cuts to a medium-
shot of a panda sitting on its head, revealing the source of the previous point-of-view 
shot. The next shot is a close-up of the upside-down television screen with a news 
journalist who is reporting on President Bill Clinton’s potential impeachment. As we 
realize that the panda is actually watching the news, the tone becomes humorous. The 
scene suggests that the documentary is going to be an exploration of the life of a panda 
captured from his perspective, with some sardonic comments on the human beings 
who surround him.
 As the video introduces Bai, a sad-looking single woman whose life has been 
dedicated to the training and care of Ying, an odd love story unfolds. The relationship 
between the woman and the panda is shown in its most intimate and almost sensual 
details. The intensity of Bai’s physical connection complicates the documentary at the 
levels of both form and content. In one scene, Bai strokes Ying through the bars of 
the cage. The camera’s point of view is once again placed inside the cage, but, unlike 
the scenes where the panda is shown as if he is watching television, the panda’s 
reaction (or, in fact, lack of reaction) in this case is not exposed. The absence of the 
shot-reverse-shot structure keeps the focus on the woman’s agency in this interaction 
with the panda. Surrounded by a dark background, the close-up of her face kissing 
the panda is strikingly bright and her skin is exposed in piercing detail. While softly 
addressing Ying, Bai strokes him with both sensuality and sorrow. The mocking tone 
is gone; Bai’s deep sadness and solitude fill the screen.
 Sexuality, its repression, and its outlets eventually become the unexpected focus 
of the documentary. In one scene, the panda is shown rolling on his back while 
seemingly looking into the camera; a laconic subtitle helps us decode his movements: 
‘Masturbation.’ Off screen, a female voice talking over a fast-paced music soundtrack 
encourages viewers to move up, left, and right. The soundtrack already suggests 
what the next shot – a medium-shot of the television screen – reveals: the panda is 
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watching television, again. At least this is what the narrative shows, but does not ask 
us to believe. On television, three women in aerobic shorts are stepping up and down. 
As the blonde who is leading the exercise in the front asks, ‘Aren’t you feeling your 
body getting hot?’, the camera returns to the panda rolling in the cage. While the scene 
clearly invites laughter, the joke is not so obvious. Are we laughing at the masturbating 
panda or at the women on the screen? The documentary does not provide time to 
intellectualize the rapid mockery into a structured message as the following fragment 
of Bai’s life shifts again.
 However, Bai never becomes a real protagonist. We only receive very scattered 
information about her life through short inter-titles. For instance, we learn that she is 
half-Chinese and half-Italian, used to be a well-conditioned dancer, and left China to 
live for a long period of time in Canada. However, many pieces are missing from the 
mosaic. Rather than expanding on Bai’s unusual life story and engaging in a serious 
exploration of her solitude, subsequent scenes revert to lightness and instead go back 
to illustrate the everyday routine of her life with Ying (e.g. his defecation, his baths, his 
eating habits) and their physical connection.
 Ying and Bai ends with no real conclusion, and ultimately challenges not only 
the idea of a linear narrative, but the notions of genre and mode as well. The video 
Figure 2.1 Surrounded by a dark background, the close-up of her face kissing the 
panda is strikingly bright and her skin is exposed in piercing detail. While softly 
addressing him, she strokes him with both sensuality and sorrow. The mocking tone 
is gone; Bai’s deep sadness and solitude fill the screen. Ying and Bai (2002).
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evokes elements of nature shows, docudrama and mockumentary, while also shifting 
from satirical to empathetic tones. Its mode of representation of the real relies on 
manipulative shots rather than the ‘on-the-spot-realism’ typical of the move towards 
authenticity initiated by the ‘new documentary movement’ and its subjective conjec-
tures about reality.8 Disguised as a documentary on a panda, Ying and Bai is better 
described as an exploration into trans-gendered and trans-species sexualities and 
unfulfilled desires. The panda and his trainer both share a life behind bars where the 
outside world is out of reach and only accessible through a television. On screen, 
old films, news and morning fitness programmes are the only markers of time in 
the unchangeable and timeless routine of Ying and Bai. For example, we know that 
one year has elapsed because of the television news’s references to Clinton’s sexual 
scandal, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the Y2K scare. But 
on almost every occasion, each piece of mediated reality is shown as either remote 
(shown through the cage bars), absurd (displayed upside-down), or laughable (as seen 
through a panda’s perspective). The only tangible, compelling and authentic moments 
are the small and intense pleasures the two prisoners can offer to each other when the 
television is off.
Lightness and internet movies
Self-reflexivity and irony have also been recurrent traits of online movies. Unlike their 
feature-film counterparts, which can only be downloaded either illegally or at a cost, 
cellflix (mobile phone movies) and e gao (spoofs) are mostly legal and free.9 While 
cellflix are rarely longer than a minute, spoofs are much longer, generally ten to 20 
minutes long.10 Both phenomena have generated widespread discussions on Chinese 
blogging sites and, recently, Hu Ge’s spoofs have also attracted the attention of Western 
media. The free, creative flow of online movies is likely to be further regulated in the 
near future by the Chinese government, which for now continues to focus on word-
based filtering for its censorship. In the meantime, cellflix and web spoofs are enjoying 
relative freedom.
 For instance, in January 2006, the Shanghai-based magazine Metroer launched 
a cellflix online competition, where the submissions could (and can still) be viewed 
and downloaded from small windows within the larger Metroer webpage.11 Mostly 
entertaining and light, these movies, with their hypershort format, fulfil both artists’ 
desire to exhibit their fast-created visual work and web visitors’ desire for a quick fix to 
satisfy their curiosity. The ‘one click’ easiness of the cellflix distribution and reception is 
certainly an important factor in defining both the quality and the aims of these movies. 
However, upon a second, more attentive look, these movies show more than their average 
40-second format seems to allow. Most of these flix contain explicit references to films, 
parodies of famous events and people, or more implicit commentaries on urban isolation.
 For instance, despite its travel-diary layout, the cellflick Zai Xizan (In Tibet) frames 
itself within the larger context of cinematic representations of Tibet. Its superimposed 
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titles mimic that of the film Kekexili (Kekexili: Mountain Patrol, Lu Chuan 2004) and 
some shots evoke Tian Zhuangzhuang’s Delamu (2004). Yige zai zumujiade xiawu 
(An Afternoon at Grandma’s) goes beyond the home-video format and uses three 
simple but carefully framed shots to expand its 63 seconds into a long, silent, slow 
afternoon which manages to capture the increased marginality of old age by glancing 
at a mah-jong game, a window opened onto a narrow alley, a sleeping old man, and 
the final medium close-up of a grandma’s direct look in the camera. Even more capti-
vating are the short experimental narratives of the quasi-MTV video Shanghai Freak 
(no Chinese title), which shows elliptic images of Shanghai accompanied by Carla 
Bruni’s ‘La Dernière Minute,’ or the surreal Tango on the Fingers (no Chinese title), a 
31-second dance of two fingers and their long shadows on a table, accompanied by the 
notes of a tango.12
 Lightness becomes parody and explicit satire in web spoofs. The most famous 
example is Yige mantou yinfade xue an (The Bloody Case that Started from a Steamed 
Bun, a.k.a. A Murder Caused by a Mantou), a spoof of Chen Kaige’s Wuji (The Promise, 
2006). The video began to circulate on the web in February 2006, just weeks after the 
official release of Chen’s Wuji. The producer, Hu Ge, declared that he decided to create 
this spoof because he was extremely disappointed by Chen’s film, and was mad about 
having wasted his money and time to watch such a bad movie. Hu Ge had also previ-
ously produced a spoof of The Matrix (Wachowski Brothers, 1999), but it was only 
when he successfully parodied The Promise and was threatened by a lawsuit that he 
became a big hit among netizens inside and outside China. The spoof originated its 
own sequels, like Yige mantou fayinde mafan (The Troubles Caused by a Bun), which 
relies on clips from Hong Kong films starring Stephen Chow, and Yigen kuaizi fayinde 
ming’an (The Murder Caused by a Chopstick), which spoofs Zhang Yimou’s Yingxiong 
(Hero, 2002) while also making some references to Osama Bin Laden.13 Hu went on to 
produce his first self-produced mini-feature film, Niaolong shan jiao fei ji (Annihilate 
the Gangsters on Niaolong Mountain), a parody of famous films (although this time no 
original footage was used to avoid copyright problems). The movie was released as a 
web video on 6 June 2006.
 Parodies of famous films go together with parodies of real life. In April 2006, Bashi 
Ashu (Bus Uncle), a video showing an old man and a young man quarrelling on a bus, 
attracted the attention of more than a million viewers.14 Evidence of its success is the 
fact that the video exists in multiple versions. Besides its original Cantonese version, 
on YouTube one can find a censored edition (where all the obscenities are blanked out) 
and Chinese-language and English-language subtitled versions. Other ‘hot remixes’ 
(with added music, captions and animation) have also been added in the following 
months.15
 While circulating widely among the netizens, spoofs are very limited as a popular 
culture phenomenon because of their medium and the required computer literacy 
required for viewing or downloading web-based videos. Furthermore, although 
produced for entertainment, their commercialization beyond the usual association 
with internet advertising (e.g. Google ads) remains unlikely.
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Quasi-conclusions: Popular culture and unpopular movies
In the Chinese context, moviemaking and screening environments still remain under 
the control of the state, although whether such control is factual rather than nominal 
has increasingly become a source of debate. Independent movies have become the 
privileged location for exposing the constrictions and the limits of such control. Sixth 
Generation filmmakers working outside the film bureau’s approval have been regarded 
as either champions of an underground resistance to censorship in China or de facto 
allies of the system that initially banned them but ultimately allowed them to gain 
first an international reputation and then even a domestic audience. In both cases, the 
implied assumption has been that in Chinese cinema, dissent is a serious matter, either 
an issue to debate and fight for or one to condemn and attack. On the other end of 
the spectrum, one finds those working with the blessing of the system. Among these 
commercially successful filmmakers, one finds the new practically minded like Feng 
Xiaogang, as well as established filmmakers like Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, who 
have also put their creative efforts towards the production of the ultimate blockbuster.
 The movies that are discussed in this essay, meanwhile, are still largely unknown. 
Produced by moviemakers ranging from professional documentarians to amateur 
videomakers, these other movies belong neither to the world of movie theatres nor 
to the world of art galleries. Rarely broadcast on television, they have very little or 
no commercial potential. They are far from being mainstream, but they do not claim 
to represent any serious dissent. They are popular culture products that are not likely 
to actually become popular. Being unpopular is not the same as being controversial. 
While some of these movies deal with delicate social issues such as prostitution or 
homosexuality, many are simply not suitable for television broadcast – not because 
of censorship’s problems, but rather because of their unusual length or format. 
Furthermore, even though political and social concerns are not necessarily rejected, 
they are often dealt with in an unserious or even frivolous tone. In most cases, such 
lightness is not a sign of superficiality, but rather reflects the moviemaker’s own self-
reflective and often ironic agenda.
 My brief exploration of visual pleasures offered by independent movies circulating 
outside of movie theatres in China shows that connection with cinema remains an 
important cultural reference. Even though many movies have almost completely 
abandoned film as a medium and the silver screen as an outlet, the connection with 
cinema has not been disengaged, but complicated instead. Not only are films the main 
inspiration sources for spoofs, but films remain the archetype against which videos 
(DV or cellflix) variations are developed. Yet, the critical discourse surrounding 
Chinese cinema is still mostly constructed around the supremacy of full-length feature 
films, which has defined as marginal all other genres. What makes the study of movies 
like Ying and Bai even more peripheral to film studies is that not only do they depart 
from what Christian Metz has defined as a ‘king’s highway of filmic expression’ (i.e. ‘the 
feature-length film of novelistic fiction’), but, in doing so, they also engage with means 
of production and distribution outside film studios and movie theatres.16 Given these 
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circumstances, it is no surprise that, with very few exceptions, discussions regarding 
the role of film within new media and multimedia in China have occurred separately 
from discussions regarding cinema.17 A more inclusive and interdisciplinary approach 
to moviemaking that acknowledges the centrality – rather than peripherality – of the 
relationship between film and new media is a necessary and long-overdue addition to 
Chinese film studies.
 When discussing the relevance of movies produced thanks to the introduction 
of new technologies, a note of caution is warranted. The possibilities offered by the 
introduction of DV, cyberspace and mobile phones should not be overemphasized 
and need to be understood in relation to the new media environment developed in 
what Chris Berry has appropriately defined as postsocialist China.18 Since the early 
1990s, cinema, television and the internet have all experienced important reforms 
and changes.19 Currently in China, an impressive number of television stations run 
their programmes with different degrees of autonomy, but arguably have less editorial 
freedom than the state-run China Central TV (CCTV). Film production and distri-
bution has also undergone some major reforms during this period. As the case of 
the Sixth Generation has shown, it is now possible to shoot a film without the Film 
Bureau’s official approval. In addition, even if a film is not released in movie theatres, 
it can still be legally distributed and purchased as a DVD.20 While one should not 
overestimate the power of the internet, web posting (e.g. file transfer protocols, peer-
to-peer file-trading systems, blogging and moblogging) has also managed to create 
new spaces for the distribution of films and videos. In sum, the availability of cheaper 
and more manageable means of film production would not have had the same signifi-
cance without the innovations that have occurred regarding different channels of 
distribution.
 While new media have brought about radical changes in access to and circulation 
of information in China, one also needs to acknowledge the restrictions set in place 
by the Chinese cyber police with the complicity of the Western corporate world. 
For instance, in January 2006, Google announced the launch of google.cn, a limited 
and censored version of the popular search engine that was specifically tailored for 
Chinese users according to the Chinese government’s requirements.21 Furthermore, 
cyber filters are only a relatively small obstacle for those who are already privi-
leged enough to browse the internet. Many other factors (e.g. the country’s major 
rural–urban divide and, more broadly, the deeply unequal distribution of China’s 
new wealth) limit access to new media to an even greater extent.22 In sum, unless we 
historicize and contextualize the advent of new media in political and economic terms, 
Marshall McLuhan’s vision of a global village or Pierre Levy’s utopian dream of a new 
democratic and collective intelligence created thanks to the all-encompassing power 
of the internet can only lead to a distorted image of the actual power of technological 
innovation.23
 Thus, the relevance of ‘non-feature film’ independent movies does not lie in their 
technological novelty per se, but rather in how they are contributing to the redefinition 
of the visual medium in China and how they are de-intellectualizing the discourse on 
dissent and avant-garde. Their most provoking feature is not their use of new means 
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of production and distribution, but their deployment of lightness and their exploration 
of mockery, sarcasm, paradox and insincerity as evocative and disobedient visual 
pleasures.
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Notes
 1 Art historians, critics and curators have been quite active in the debate over the 
new experimental art. See Wu Hung, Transience: Chinese Experimental Art at the 
End of the Twentieth Century, revised edition (co-published with the David and 
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Alfred Smart Museum of Art, 2004). Chris Berry and Bérénice Reynaud have helped 
pioneered the discussion on documentary filmmaking, but much work is yet to be 
done in this area. Scholars working on cinema have not yet given enough attention to 
the recent development of video-making and its significance in changing film culture 
at large.
 2 By using the term movie, I wish to emphasize that, increasingly, ‘film’ is no longer the 
main medium for these type of works.
 3 In China (as elsewhere), digital technology has impacted on almost all visual arts, 
from feature films to video arts. For instance, director (screen writer and novelist) 
Cui Zi’en has exclusively used this type of medium to produce his videos. The winner 
of the 63rd Venice Film Festival was Jia Zhangke’s Sanxia Haoren (Still Life, 2006), 
which was entirely shot on a high-definition digital camera.
 4 I borrow and adapt the notion of lightness from Milan Kundera’s association between 
the multiplicity of insignificant events and their deep (unbearable) meaning in 
defining human existence.
 5 The movie is distributed as jilupian (documentary) by Channel Zero Media (CZM). 
According to CZM’s viewing data, Ying and Bai was broadcast only once on 11 April 
2002 on Yangguang weishi channel.
 6 Ying and Bai was awarded Best Documentary, Best Director, Most Innovative 
Documentary and Best Sound Effects at the Sichuan Television Festival in 2001. It won 
Best Director at the 19th China ‘Golden Eagle Awards’. It was also selected for the FIPA 
in France, as well as the Shanghai International TV Festival. CZM website, filmmakers: 
www.bjdoc.com/english1/makers-yiqingzhang.htm (accessed 9 January 2014).
 7 In line with a long tradition of using pandas as a gift to support diplomatic relations 
(a tradition that is well-exemplified by the donation of a pair of pandas following 
President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China), in March 2006 the Chinese 
government offered to send two pandas to Taiwan. The offer was viewed by many as 
an attempt ‘to destroy Taiwan’s psychological defences.’ Huang Shi-cho of the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union party, quoted in Mark Magnier, ‘Attack of the Pandas: Will Taiwan’s 
wary, pro-independence government succumb to a pair of China’s most adorable 
ambassadors? History says yes,’ LA Times, 21 March 2006.
 8 Chris Berry’s translation of jishizhuyi as ‘on-the spot-realism’ well captures the close 
link to a very specific temporality that characterized most of the works that are 
generally referred to as part of the ‘new documentary movement’ of the 1990s. Lü 
Xinyu was the first scholar to use the term ‘xinjilupian yundong’ in her book, the first 
book-length analysis of the renewal of Chinese documentary. Chris Berry, ‘Facing 
Reality: Chinese Documentary, Chinese Postsocialism,’ in Hung Wu, Huangsheng 
Wang and Boyi Feng (eds), The First Guangzhou Triennial Reinterpretation: A Decade 
of Experimental Chinese Art 1990–2000 (Guangzhou: Guangdong Museum of Art, 
2000), 121–31. Lü Xinyu, Jilu Zhongguo: Dangdai Zhonguo xin jilupian yundong 
(Recording China: Contemporary Chinese new documentary movement) (Beijing: 
Shenghuo, dushu, xinzhi sanlian shudian, 2003).
 9 The term cellflix is used as the English equivalent to shouji dianying (cell phone 
movies) on the Metroer website and explained as the merging of ‘cellphone + films.’ 
One wonders if the creators of this term wanted to reference the Australian-based 
Film Lovers of Independent Cinema (FLICs) or the controversy surrounding 
copyright violation and companies like Clean Flicks, Flick’s Club and Family Flix, 
which re-edit and then rent ‘clean’ versions of films.
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10 Most of the videos that populate video sites like YouTube.com are made with cell 
phones rather than DV cameras; blogging has increasingly turned into moblogging 
(mobile blogging).
11 A link to the Cellflix page is on the main Metroer page. A complete list of the 
submissions also includes DV short movies.
12 Tango on the fingers was posted by kfotoe on 2 April 2006 and won the first prize. 
Metroer decided to start a second competition in July, as submissions continued to 
arrive.
13 Both videos were available for free download on several sites.
14 ‘The film was uploaded on YouTube.com and then seen by the whole wide world. As 
of 19 May, 1.2 million people have watched the video clip! (Update: 1.9 million as of 
26 May; ETTV cited a 5.9 million figure on 27 May, which probably combines all the 
editions)’. EastSouthWestNorth, www.zonaeuropa.com/20060524_1.htm (accessed 6 
March 2014).
15 The original video is available on YouTube (accessed on 20 August 2006), where one 
can also find links to all the other versions.
16 Christian Metz, ‘From Film Language. Some Points in the Semiotics of the Cinema’, 
in Gerald Mast, Marshal Cohen and Leo Brady (eds), Film Theory and Criticism, 
fourth edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 68–78.
17 In particular, traditionally Chinese television has been studied separately from 
film, mostly from a communication studies perspective: e.g. Junhao Hong, The 
Internationalization of Television in China: the Evolution of Ideology, Society, and 
Media Since the Reform (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). Specific television events have 
been analysed from an anthropological perspective: e.g. Stanley Rosen and Gary Zou 
(eds), ‘The Chinese Television Documentary “River Elegy” (part I)’, Chinese Sociology 
and Anthropology, vol. 24, no. 2, Winter 1991–2, 3–90. Among the exceptions (i.e. 
comparative studies which bring together film and other media), one finds Bérénice 
Reynaud, ‘New Visions/New Chinas: Video-Art, Documentation, and the Chinese 
Modernity in Question,’ in Michael Renov and Erika Suderburg (eds), Resolutions: 
Contemporary Video Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 
229–57, and ‘Cutting Edge And Missed Encounters: Digital Short Films By Three 
Filmmakers,’ Senses of Cinema, no. 20, May–June 2002. See also Sheldon Lu’s studies 
on television included in his China, Transnational Visuality, Global Postmodernity 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
18 While many contested the use of Western theoretical categories in the Chinese 
context, I believe that ‘postsocialism’ is a useful framework of analysis because it 
does not position itself as a linear, temporally consequential development from 
a previously accomplished socialism, but rather points to a new awareness of its 
unstable meanings.
19 For an overview on the recent developments in Chinese media industry and a critical 
analysis of its changed scope and reception, see Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, Michael 
Keane and Yin Hong (eds), Media in China (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002).
20 For instance, Zhang Yuan’s East Palace West Palace was released on authorized DVD 
even though the film had not been approved for movie theatre distribution.
21 Google was just the last in a long list of big software providers and internet routers 
(e.g. Microsoft, Yahoo and Cisco) that all reached commercial agreements with 
China by giving in to certain restrictions. ‘Internet router firm Cisco had no qualms 
about building a great cyberwall around China, which blocks Chinese surfers from 
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“subversive” foreign Web sites. Thus Yahoo has obliged the Chinese government by 
tracing pro-democracy e-mails to one of its users. The e-mailer has been jailed, and 
Yahoo has effectively become a Chinese police auxiliary.’ Sebastian Mallaby, ‘Google 
and My Red Flag,’ Washington Post, 30 January 2006.
22 According to a state-sponsored study, Chinese internet users are estimated to number 
more than 130 million (about 8 to 10 per cent of the total Chinese population). China 
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), 16th Statistical Survey Report on the 
Internet Development in China, July 2005.
23 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. London: Ark, 1987, 




Individuality, State Discourse and Visual 
Representation : The Imagination and Practices 
of the iGeneration in Chinese Animation
Weihua Wu
The past two decades have witnessed dynamic technological and cultural changes in 
China’s animation industry and its cinematic representation, developments that have 
converged with the arrival of the new iGeneration filmmakers and audiences in the 
twenty-first century.
 Chinese animation has been historically termed Meishu film (literally, fine arts 
film) in Chinese film studies vocabulary. The earliest examples of animation in 
China were the Wan Brothers’1 patriotic shorts of 1930s, which were distinguished 
by their artistic experimentation, strong nationalism and protest against the Japanese 
invasion and occupation of China. Later, the first Chinese Animation Conference 
was held in 1962 in order to address the animation film industry and its impact – not 
only as a specifically Chinese genre related to Chinese classical painting and with the 
ability to ‘educate children’ but also to entertain. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese 
government regarded Chinese animation as an ideologically ‘established, national 
film genre’ that is ‘represented as a cinematic linkage between Chinese modern art 
history and the socialist literary canon.’2 This link between animation and ideology 
has deteriorated since the mid-1980s, and the widely accepted term Meishu film has 
also fallen into decline.
 More recently, during the 2000s, animation has embraced digitally drawn animation 
practices and the immersive internet experience, while managing to throw a farewell 
party to the traditional socialist animation discourse found across the 1990s. This 
chapter historicizes the past two decades in which China’s animation industry has 
faced two main challenges: (1) a struggle to relocate itself among the state discourse 
of animation culture; and (2) the opening-up to the global market to circulate and 
compete with other expressive cartoon mediums. Throughout this period, younger 
Chinese individuals can be seen as fighting against the visual hegemony of established 
Chinese animation culture by creating a unique virtual space for dialogue through the 
practice of web-based Flash animation.
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 Among the flourishing forms of animation in the new millennium, I analyse three 
different genres of Chinese animation: (1) commercial television series; (2) independent 
and academic animation; and (3) web-based Flash animation. These three categories 
are interrelated on some levels, as each intervenes and creates new cultural spaces to 
respond to the changing spectatorship of Chinese animation. The rise of the animation 
series for commercial television has suited the Chinese government’s attempts to 
develop domestic cultural industries in China. The emergence of independent and 
Flash animation, meanwhile, has demonstrated how computer-mediated technology 
encourages individual expression that encapsulates the iGeneration prerogative of 
‘relying on oneself ’ (kao ziji), a prerogative that has consequences which state 
discourses are struggling to control. Young artists and amateurs from the iGeneration 
openly represent their desires, dreams and fantasies about living within the glories 
of global economy and pop culture, expressions that the Chinese Communist Party 
tolerates more than ever before. These animators have grown accustomed to creating 
content that takes advantage of greater visual autonomy in China. As such, Chinese 
animation represents a unique genre not only in the realm of global cinema, but also 
in the field of Chinese film studies.
The rejuvenation of animation on Chinese television – 
a historical review
The People’s Daily Overseas newspapers published a front-page article on 23 November 
2005 headlined ‘“China-made” Called for in Cultural Products’. The article argued 
passionately that the Chinese animation industry should contribute to the state-
directed ideological discourse within the burgeoning creative industries. The article 
placed animation in a key position within film and television culture and the wider 
industry. It also argued that Chinese animation should be oriented toward commercial 
and market-driven priorities rather than ideological ones. The author argued that 
Chinese animation needs to brand its own creative industry by borrowing from 
foreign animation industries, which should serve as important models to drive new 
cultural production in China.
[…] Japan’s animation industry, which accounts for 63 percent of the world’s 
market, is now worth more than US$170 million. Disney’s animated feature 
Mulan has been seen around the world, earning more than US$400 million and 
becoming one of the company’s most profitable movies. […] China has time-
honored cultural traditions, profound cultural resources and immense reserves 
of creative energy, all of which will be needed to develop an international culture 
industry with Chinese characteristics.3
Of particular interest here is a belief that Chinese animation has the potential to be a 
dominant player in the country’s creative industries, yet such precedence rests on the 
achievements of Chinese animation in the 1990s and their development of several 
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successful television series. At the end of the 1980s, there were only seven animated 
series produced in China, with only 47 episodes in production by all animation 
studios combined. This low level of production was addressed through the launch of 
nine National Animation Industry Bases across mainland China by the middle of the 
2000s. The annual gross from animated television series increased by 20 per cent from 
2005 to 2012 due to this new infrastructure and government support. More than 73 
per cent of the newly produced animation series saw distribution from these national 
bases. From 1995 to 2012, the dominant call by defining animation as a commercial 
product, as well as the expectations highlighted by the state’s cultural policy, have 
attributed to a year-on-year increase in the domestic production of animation. By 
2011, the local animation studios produced a total of 435 episodes (about 261,224 
minutes in length) of youth-oriented animated series; and in 2012 there were 395 
episodes (222,938 minutes) repeated on air in mainland China.4 Significant produc-
tions in 2011 and 2012 include: Blue Cat’s Three Thousand Questions (424 episodes), 
Star Wars (384 episodes), The Dinosaur Era (264 episodes), Seaworld (312 episodes), 
Sports (226 episodes), Cosmic Aviation (400 episodes),5 and Pleasant Goat and Big Bad 
Wolf (1,050 episodes).6
 China’s animation industry has shown its cultural power by taking a leading role in 
the development of the country’s rising creative industry. In light of this productivity, 
new animation series are aesthetically sophisticated and have high production values, 
and are based either on simple storytelling models for a child-oriented demographic 
or provide scientific and moral education narratives for a more adult demographic. 
These works also often adopt classic plots from sources such as Chinese myths, 
folklore and moral fables with animal characters. Here the aesthetic authority of the 
Chinese School had been destabilized and frequently translated as a kind of visual 
parody which marked a pragmatic farewell to the mimicry of Chinese traditional 
animation culture.
 To better understand Chinese animation, it is crucial to analyse the contradictory 
relationships between the state, the audience and the domain of digitized visual 
production. Chinese scholars have yet to develop a historical and theoretical model 
to examine both the hegemony of the Chinese School and the range of cultural 
consequences that have resulted from the aesthetic interactions between computer 
technology and Chinese animation. Animators and Chinese audiences were convinced 
that computerization and a mutual exchange between traditional visual culture and 
digital technology would lead to the production of China’s own animated block-
busters. Assumptions about the ideological power of animation suddenly assumed a 
reflective, flag-waving position from which to pursue the renaissance of a decaying 
glory of the past generation of Chinese animation.
 Much of the problem lies in separating the techno-cultural machine of the 
animation industry, which is influenced by official state discourse and the visual narra-
tives that are generated by it. The former became entangled within the metaphors of 
state discourse and adopted systematic procedures to enhance Chinese notions of an 
animation industry, while the latter faced the danger of being trapped in a wonderland 
of Oriental spectacles that constitute ‘not simply feelings of nostalgia’ but also, as Rey 
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Chow notes, ‘involve a coeval, co-temporal structure of representation at moments of 
cultural crisis.’7
The coming of age of independent animation
Following the widespread desire for a shift in the production of animation – and 
coupled with the rise in state discourse to redefine the cultural industry in China 
– more and more of the country’s universities and arts academies promised to lead 
animation to the forefront of creative innovation in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). Two leading animation schools in China, the Animation School of the Beijing 
Film Academy and the Animation and Digital Arts School at the Communication 
University of China, both contributed significantly to the empowerment and diversi-
fication of independent animation filmmaking in China, especially as more and more 
students enrolled in these schools’ degree courses. As the direct consequence of this 
engagement, one began to see independent animation reappear after a 60-year absence 
in China’s film history, caused by advances in digital technology.
 The term ‘independent animation’ was introduced to Chinese animators and scholars 
in 2002, when Rebecca Jean Bristow gave a speech at the Chinese Cartoon Industry 
Forum entitled ‘Animation Education in China,’ where she explained that independent 
animation in the United States had broadened its creative practices and would be helpful 
to Chinese animation education.8 The term was then used in 2003 to name the Chinese 
Independent Animation Festival, which was organized by the UltraGirl Animation 
Studio – a venture co-founded in 2000 by the band New Pants, which sold albums to 
support its work in clay animation. The small festival was held at the Beijing 22 Film 
Café and exhibited the works of independent animators (mostly students).
 Independent Chinese animation in its present form has flourished owing to 
computer technology, with the internet providing a platform on which individual 
animated works could be made and distributed both nationally and globally without 
the intervention of industry professionals. This independent animation is not homog-
enous, and can be divided into three broad groups. The first group is the researchers 
in computer graphics and students of animation who help the mainstream Chinese 
media update their skills in visual effects. The second group comprises individual 
animators (usually industry insiders) with backgrounds in professional animation 
making; this group usually works for non-government run studios or commercial 
animation companies. The third group includes self-taught animators, most of whom 
have little or no previous experience in making or producing animation works and 
who relate to the rise in amateurism in China’s cultural sphere.
 In the late 1990s, Chinese animation experienced a subversive revolution in its 
visual narratives following the spread of independent animation and computer graphic 
activities such as computer game animation, special effects in film and television, 
and animated messages for mobile phones. At the same time, the mainstream 
Chinese animation industry struggled to compete with the popularity of its Western 
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counterparts – such as Pixar in the United States and Aardman in the United Kingdom. 
Most animators who had either worked for government-run animation studios, or 
been employed by Western or Japanese animation companies, began to establish or 
co-found animation studios to challenge domestic cultural stagnation and the frenzy 
of downloading blockbuster film animation from California (particularly Toy Story 
(1995)) and from Bristol, England (particularly Wallace and Gromit: The Wrong 
Trousers (1993)). For instance, Jun Meng, the director of Talk (2001),9 joined the 
team of BlackAnt Studio (which focuses on hand-drawn animations) when he left an 
animation company in Shenzhen and returned to Beijing to move back to pre-digital 
animation. Jun had become dissatisfied with the decline of traditional animation and 
the emergence of the Western and Japanese animation industry in China, and finally 
began to explore the creative possibilities of independent animation, which meant that 
he could at least make something he wanted to be seen publicly.
 Talk was one of two independent animated films shown at the Unrestricted New 
Image Festival in 2001; the other was UltraGirl Studio’s clay animation I Love You.10 
The festival also featured 104 digital documentaries and live-action fiction shorts that 
were produced between 1996 and July 2001. Talk was a hit among internet users and 
gained attention from both animators and animation fans. The animation draws on 
cultural memory through the lens of a boy’s old camera, as it captured the Cultural 
Revolution, his first love, and inspired his passion for photography.
 Since the release of these two seminal animated films in 2001, the everyday life of 
Chinese people is now a common narrative trope in independent animations such 
Figure 3.1 Talk, directed by Meng Jun. BlackAnt Animation Studio, 2001.
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as Snow11 and Life.12 Snow draws a vivid picture of the urban life of young students, 
while Life comes to narrate a one-day story of the romantic but simple life of suburban 
Chinese lower classes. These animated films offered a fresh perspective on the lives of 
ordinary Chinese people, but the opportunities to take this kind of creative approach 
to social reality are so limited that only a few independent animators work in this area 
today.
 This dialectic between new technology and older storytelling techniques is encap-
sulated in many scenes in recent animated films where digital technology opens a 
window for independent animators to construct the storylines and characters they 
want, while still occupying, in a nostalgic mode, the grand narrative space fashioned 
by classical elite literature in China. Two examples of this digital/traditional binary are 
Pond13 and Ode to Summer.14 These animation films borrow conventions and iconog-
raphy from traditional Chinese landscape paintings: ‘yellowing’ the background to 
mimic ancient canvas and using line-typed characters to flatten the pictorial plain. 
Since the mid-1980s, the main Chinese animation studios, Shanghai Animation 
Studio and Changchun Film Studio, have not produced traditional water and ink 
animations due to the expense and complicated nature of the process. Water and ink 
animated practices can be used to evoke nostalgia, but use of technologies that mimic 
water and ink effects can potentially narrate another story of cultural nostalgia, a story 
focusing on a commercialized souvenir of a traditional process rather than on the 
process itself.
 Without the Academic Awards, many independent animators would not have the 
opportunity to display their work in China. Flash animation can gain a wide audience 
on the internet, but non-Flash independent animation often malfunctions on the 
internet, due to the challenges related to transforming file formats. Indeed, many 
Figure 3.2 Pond, directed by Huang Ying, 2003.
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independent animation websites have disappeared due to evolutions in technique, 
technology and animators’ lack of interest in maintaining their sites. Even websites 
with up-to-date information have many links that are out of date. For example, on the 
Animation Kitchen clay animation website of Chen Zhang, Xinning Xie and Bo Cai, the 
demonstration links on the ‘Introduction to our Work’ page is no longer connected to 
a URL. This is also the case on UltraGirl Studio’s website, tintoon.com. Nonetheless, 
the Animation Sky Studio – operated by Yihui Chui, Da Li, Xiaoping Zhou, Yue 
Wu and others – launched anisky.com to distribute their creative and commercial 
projects, create an animators’ community, and build up an independent channel for 
Chinese clay animation. While independent animation does not have much of an 
online presence, there are a few internet sites that offer stable channels for uploading 
independent animations. For instance, chinanim.com, the website of the Chinese 
Animation Association, includes all fields of animation in China. Although most of its 
content comes from state-sponsored media/animation companies, it also offers a space 
for experimental, independent animation. Before this site went live, Chinese audiences 
did not get a chance to watch Talk or Ode to Summer until they were released on this 
website.
 Animated shorts like The Butterfly Lovers benefited from China’s cultural tradition 
of unlimited expression afforded by the shadow play of the pre-industrialized era, the 
cinema/television screen of classical animation from different modernist periods, and 
the digital interface of trans-media animation in the computer era. Even with the diffi-
culties involved in making and distributing animation, independent work still paved 
the way for an effective usage of digital technology for creativity ingenuity.
 Independent Chinese animation emerged in the 1990s concurrently with 
independent live-action films from Sixth Generation filmmakers, digital video and 
the newly formed cyberculture. Global digitization altered the cultural interface so 
that style became even more important than essence in contemporary China, leaving 
animators to busily reconfigure the visual style of Chinese culture.  This transfor-
mation, however, created a remarkable opportunity to see the world and Chinese 
animation anew.
The rise and fall of flash animation during the 2000s
As dramatic cultural changes swept through China in the 1990s, Chinese audiences 
witnessed a new form of independent animation practice online, the Flash animation 
short. Flash is a software program designed by the US-based Adobe company that 
was initially regarded primarily as a web-based design tool in China. It has proven 
resilient and popular, with applications for practical forms of web design and devel-
opment, as well for creating autonomous works of animation. Flash had a considerable 
impact on animation in China, accumulating an astounding 50,000 animated works 
produced online, by mostly anonymous animators. The popularity of Flash among 
Chinese animators and fans is part of a trend involving the global expansion and the 
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redefinition of visual narrative storytelling beyond the realm of traditional moving 
image works and into the various regions of cyberspace.
 The histories of animation, computing and cyberculture in China are quite distinct 
from those of the West in important ways. Important differences include: the more 
recent emergence of China as a global economic power; the fact that the state’s control 
and monitoring of the internet is much more heavy-handed and overt in China; and 
the presence of both statutory and unofficial mechanisms of censorship in China on a 
large scale. These factors have meant that the first Chinese animators who used Flash 
were independent artists, designers and hobbyists who had no connection with the 
official, state-sponsored and state-regulated animation industry. For some animators, 
Flash was appealing in no small measure because it provided a means of devel-
oping a form of unofficial, alternative popular expression. Consequently, as a social 
phenomenon, Flash encouraged new areas and intensities of involvement with the 
world of digital culture in general, taking Chinese animators and fans at least obliquely 
into the midst of discussions about the relationship between globalization and 
national culture, not to mention those involving dimensions of personal expression. 
Thus Flash culture in China is part of a much wider trend incorporating all forms of 
creative expression, from painting, sculpture and fiction-writing to filmmaking and 
popular music.
 In pursuit of this new Flash visuality and by the beginning of the 2000s, we 
must admit that these two areas of social development are comparatively immature 
in China. The Flash dream draws on a range of often interlocking motivations: on 
the one hand, there is a desire for personal expression in a society that is becoming 
increasingly integrated into a global popular culture where techno-fetishism has 
value; and on the other hand, knowledge of this program benefits those eager to find 
work in creative or tech fields of employment now that China is more integrated into 
the global economy. Flash animation, arguably, has a strong symbolic resonance in 
China, especially in relation to a burgeoning youth subculture that is closely aligned 
with consumerism and some of the most visible aspects of the expanding digital 
realm. The popularity of Flash as a do-it-yourself medium of self-expression for 
non-professional animators (and their fans) is quite logical in an evermore media-
saturated environment that increasingly favours vivid visual imagery over the printed 
word (although online bulletin boards, blog-writing, podcasting are quite popular 
in China, too). Many users associate Flash with the idea of self-expression, which 
also helps to explain the comparative importance of the Flash aesthetic in China – it 
is a tool not just for building eye-catching websites, but also for contributing to the 
construction of a new self-identity in post-WTO China.
 On 21 November 1999, FlashEmpire.com posted its first list of the 40 most popular 
Chinese Flash animations (measured by click count).15 As a constantly updated 
chronicle of activity, this ‘top forty’ list has become crucially important to the devel-
opment of Flash culture in China. During the first 12 months of the list’s existence, 533 
different animations made the list, including 373 independently produced animations, 
133 website demos and 27 commercial advertisements. One of the first milestones of 
Chinese Flash animation to appear on the list was Jiang Jianqiu’s16 (known online as 
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Lao Jiang) ‘Rock ’n’ roll on the New Long March’ (Xin changzheng lu shang de yaogun), 
a visual interpretation of one of the most famous songs of Cui Jian. The success of 
Jiang’s animated music video led to a September 2000 feature in the magazine Sanlian 
Life Weekly entitled ‘Big Talk with Flash animators,’ which gave an overview of Flash 
technology and an introduction to three Flash animators – Jiang Jianqiu, Qi Zhaohui 
(known online as BBQI) and Zhu Zhaoxi (known online as Baiding). This marked the 
domestic mainstream media’s first acknowledgement of Chinese Flash animation.
 The most prominent indication of the growing importance of this new medium 
occurred between 18 April and 15 August 2001, when the First Chinese Pentium 4 
Computer Game and Flash Animation Festival was held. Mainstream media outlets 
started to report regularly on new developments in Flash animation, and 2001 was 
officially designated as the year of Chinese Flash. But for many Chinese pop culture 
junkies who had not yet climbed onto the Flash bandwagon, the turning point was 
Xuecun’s online music video, ‘People from the Northeast Are All Living Lei Fengs’ 
(Dongbeiren doushi huo LeiFeng),17 produced by Tu Liyi (known online as Babylon, 
and in Chinese as Beibeilong). This video got the ball rolling, and Flash-animated 
music videos were soon all the rage in China. This was a dramatic change for Chinese 
flash animators, whose popularity was previously confined to an online subculture of 
fellow true believers; now, though, their work was celebrated by fans and critics who 
had only recently learned what Flash animation was. The first significant mainstream 
television exposure for Flash came on the employment-counselling programme 
Choose (Xuanze), broadcast on CCTV–10 on 9 September 2001. Subsequently, in late 
2001 and early 2002, Qi Zhaohui and Jiang Jianqiu created nine animated segments 
for a special feature entitled ‘Showing Marvelous Ability’ (Shengong jiemi) on the 
CCTV talk show Tell the Truth (Shihua shishuo). The assimilation of Flash by the 
mainstream media seemed complete by 6 June 2002, with the CCTV–7’s broadcast of 
the first of 85 all-Flash episodes of the animated children’s series Bang Bang English, 
created by Beijing River Culture Development Ltd. Still, despite this surge of mass 
media acceptance, the tools and styles associated with the Flash phenomenon, not to 
mention its subcultural origins, have led some Chinese scholars to regard the form and 
its independent practitioners as a welcome, utterly ‘modern’ challenge to traditional 
pictorial and literary forms with the potential to break through the limitations of ‘old 
media’ forms and pave a digital path to the new media with Chinese characteristics.
 Meanwhile, Chinese avant-garde artists, drama directors and independent 
filmmakers began to adopt the visual elements of Flash animation into their works 
by incorporating the previously marginalized web-based animation style into the 
avant-grade artistic spaces. In May 2001, the Chinese musical drama director Zhang 
Guangtian invited two well-known flash animators, Jiang Jianqiu and Qi Zhaohui, 
to create four animations for his new stage drama Mr. Lu Xun. This was the first 
attempt to transfer Flash animation to 16mm film in China, and it was an indication 
of the degree of cultural and artistic capital the form was now enjoying. Under such 
conditions, Chinese popular culture critics and fans alike began to recognize Flash as 
a genuine phenomenon. The form contained several ingredients that marked it as a 
significant element within the ‘new’ cultural scene: unusual visual rhythms and styles, 
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irreverent themes, nonsensical humour, and the unmistakable presence of genuinely 
idiosyncratic, individual imaginations.
 Besides the original, self-identified Flash animators, there are other individuals in 
loose creative alliances that are also devoted to the theory and practice of Flash, with 
enthusiasts often gathering in cyber forums to share production techniques and story 
ideas. These are mostly animators or younger fine artists who are dissatisfied with 
the lingering state belief that animation is a medium only suitable for children. The 
fact that Flash is relatively easy to learn has allowed people to begin to quickly create 
their own work, and as the latest converts gain expressive ability and confidence, 
some of them begin to identify themselves as professional animators. A number of 
the animation films by these artists are well-crafted and have shown commercial 
potential. These include Bu Hua’s Maomao’s Summer, Cat and Heart;18 Yang Ge’s 
Paradise Garden, Imagination and One Day;19 Ma Lin’s New Youth;20 Doupi’s Nostalgia 
Series and Western Liang Series;21 and Shi Huang’s Pobaby Series.22 Most of these 
works are, to borrow from Maureen Furniss’s description of aesthetic intensity in the 
thematic structure of compilation films, ‘…meditative or poetic in nature, exploring 
experience, emotion or other abstract concepts in depth. They also tend to be highly 
subjective to and rely on abstract concept imagery, which might provide the only 
means of expressing an ineffable notion.’23 Meanwhile, a number of Flash animators 
have developed pictorial methods that simulate traditional Chinese animation’s 
Figure 3.3 ‘May Fourth Movement,’ Mr. Lu Xun, directed by Jiang Jianqiu, 2001.
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self-conscious allegiance with forms of fine art painting and folk expression, as well as 
styles associated with the Western avant-garde.
 The Flash animator Bu Hua’s works simulate the modernist woodcut style in an act 
of commemorating a lost (and more idealistic) world, and through stories that focus 
on subjects such as love, emotion, family relationships and childhood fables. One 
key work, entitled Maomao’s Summer,24 combines film, woodcut printing and Manga 
influences to construct a commentary on the destruction of Beijing’s hutongs (and 
their replacement by pre-fabricated and anonymous apartment complexes that reflect 
China’s neoliberal turn) seen from the perspective of the main character.25 The activity 
that is so lyrically chronicled in this animation is not only a contemporary reality, 
but the work seems to be a commentary on the confusing nature and destruction of 
childhood in postsocialist China, as Maomao constructs her memorial to the past with 
the waste products of modern consumer culture.
 Chinese Flash animators can be seen as facing a contradictory dilemma similar 
to Maomao’s. The mass commercialization of their once-marginal creative form 
looms large: the influence of Western fine art and popular culture tendencies and 
styles is ubiquitous, and the connections to indigenous forms and aesthetics appear 
to be fading. For instance, Yang Ge’s work looks like a post-Impressionist painting. 
Yang’s Paradise Garden26 opens with an illustrator’s daydream, expressed in bold, 
hypersaturated colours, of the dichotomy between the world of reality and a New 
Age fantasyland (accompanied by an Enya song) that is a refuge for fatigued and 
lonely souls. At the end of the story, a visualization of the ‘real world’ is replaced by 
the animator’s daydream, and the protagonist enters a fairyland dreamspace to enjoy 
a series of hyperreal illusions. As this description suggests, Yang Ge’s work is also 
marked by a strong use of symbolism and elements of mysticism.
 Such an overt embracing of highly subjective motifs is significantly at odds with the 
historically realist basis of Chinese animation. Some animators have self-consciously 
created works based on earlier popular and folk culture styles, including the four-
frame comic strip, paper-cut, Chinese shadow puppetry and Spring Festival paintings 
(Nianhua). Ma Lin’s New Youth, for instance, adapts the four-frame strip cartoon and 
features a figure wearing a Chinese cap, accompanied by background music played on 
an erhu (a Chinese stringed instrument that resembles a violin). Doupi’s Western Liang 
Series combines a muted colour palette dominated by browns and grays with Flash 
emulations of watercolour painting and Chinese shadow puppets in order to illus-
trate the animator’s personal philosophical sketches (which appear as onscreen text). 
Doupi also experiments with a simulation of the paper-cut style to create the Nostalgic 
Series. Her work is rather introspective and non-narrative, with animations that 
provide impressionistic visual accompaniments to her poetic musings. One distinctive 
element of her style is the use of an onscreen signature in the form of a traditional 
Chinese seal. Shanke typically include their personal Web URLs and online names in 
the credits of their animations, but Doupi’s seal is unusual in that it explicitly combines 
the technology of the digital interface with an element of classical Chinese represen-
tation. This ‘flattening two-dimensionality’ of temporal factors is itself a frequently 
cited postmodernist trope, a situation characteristic of many forms of contemporary 
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audiovisual culture in which the component parts of a work are appropriated from a 
variety of historical sources, both temporally and spatially. Many Flash animators, in 
China and elsewhere, operate within this digital cultural logic.
 The global diffusion of the key technological tools, as well as some kinds of 
animation products, mean that Chinese artists can draw from both the traditional 
aesthetic principles of indigenous animation and all relevant Western artistic genres. 
Flash has built up a commercial visibility, based initially on the individual and 
collaborative pioneering of such techniques and then on the aesthetic and stylistic 
refinements by more skilled animators. This led, in the space of less than three years, 
to the emergence of an identifiable commercialized studio system working on Flash 
animation. This group includes independent animators such as Gan Tao (known 
online as Labi X), Tan Beilin (known online as Zhouye, a partner of Ziyou kongqi), 
He Dihe (known online as Ranfang hu), He Yi, Cheng Tao (known online as Shanke 
Taotao), Yang Yue (known online as Piaomiao chenfeng) and Li Mingming (known 
online as Yila guan); and animation studios including E-TOON Creation Co., Ltd, 
XOYTO Comic, Snail Studio, Miaoyin Motion Pictures, B&T Studio, Pacoo, Sinodoor 
Animation,27 and others. At this point, the cultural location and significance of Flash 
in China is still evolving, and some of its most talented purveyors have decided to take 
their talents mainstream, caught up in China’s consumerist fever.
 In the short span of ten years, the Flash phenomenon has contributed significantly 
to the transformation of animation in China. Critics of the form are often alarmed by 
the potential of Flash (and other primarily visual forms of digital narrative) to displace 
‘acceptable’ modes of expression, especially given the degree to which these new forms 
are infected with the twin viruses of consumerism and individualism. Along these 
lines, Flash might be seen as one of several popular contemporary styles that have 
generated an immersive crash course on the tropes of postmodernity for Chinese 
users and audiences.
 Flash animation has been a significant factor contributing to the breakdown 
of boundaries between independent and mainstream animation culture and has 
provided audiences with a vehicle for expressing and sharing complex sentiments. 
It has given them a means to simultaneously embrace and ridicule pop mythologies; 
deconstruct the social structures of an acutely immediate, often painful present; 
immerse themselves in liberating nonsense; and give themselves the luxury of relaxing 
with slackly cute and clichéd humour and sentiment.
 Chinese Flash animation’s heyday ended with the rise of online video making and 
sharing around 2010. Flash empire.com closed its business of hosting Flash animators 
and their work, and most of these brilliant animators have all but disappeared. Even 
though the state-sponsored independent animation festival and animation-industry 
support helped create a cultural scene for Flash animators, it is still hard for them to 
find large audiences. Animated television series are once again the dominant form of 
Chinese animation consumed on a national scale in series such as Pleasant Goat and 
Big Bad Wolf (xiyangyang yu huitailang) and Watch out for the Bear (xiong chu mo).
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Conclusion: Individuality, state discourse and 
visual representation
In recent years, Chinese animators have faced difficult aesthetic and cultural dilemmas 
that have been common to innovative Chinese artists in all media since the early 
twentieth century: how to articulate (and rearticulate) the narrative of China’s 
modernization into artistic language, and how to nurture the aesthetic development 
of animation arts. Since the mid-1980s, China’s Fifth and Sixth Generation film 
directors and reform era avant-garde visual artists have explored avenues of self-
expression and artistic experimentation in ways that were seen as taboo since at least 
1949. Animators have explored similar thematic subtexts, both in industry and in 
independent contexts, and their journeys of discovery have taken place in a public 
arena far closer to the centre of contemporary popular cultural trends and aspirations 
than most Chinese fine artists and art filmmakers have been able to enter. In a very 
real sense, Chinese animation – especially independent animation – is at the heart of 
the iGeneration’s changes of cultural identity in the digital era.
 In recent decades, Chinese animation has navigated between state-framed discourse 
and individual artistic representation. Through this process, Chinese animation 
filmmakers have drawn a sophisticated map to show their audience the linkages 
between ideology, individuality and creativity. Chinese animation has reflected both 
the historical changes of the socialist cultural policy and the postsocialist market-
driven industrialization, and paved a path for independent animators, amateur 
filmmakers and spectators of today’s iGeneration.
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 1 Wan Brothers, namely Wan Guzhan, Wan Laiming, Wan Chaochen and Wan Dihuan 
were the first generation of Chinese animation filmmakers in 1930s; they produced 
some shorts, such as such as Citizen, Wake Up! (Shanghai Lianhua Film Company, 
1931), Sincere Solidarity (Shanghai Lianhua Film Company, 1932), Detective Dog 
(Mingxing Film Company, 1933), Price of Blood, Painful Story of the Nation, The Year 
of Chinese Goods and Motherland Is Saved by Aviation (all Mingxing Film Company, 
1934) etc., and the first feature animation The Princess of Iron Fan (Shanghai Lianhe 
Film Company, 1941) .
 2 Wu, Weihua. ‘In memory of meishu film: catachresis and metaphor in theorizing 
Chinese animation.’ Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal 4, no. 1 (2009): 53–76.
 3 I borrowed this translation from People’s Daily Online. For more information, see 
http://english.people.com.cn/200511/23/eng20051123_223463.html (accessed 6 
March 2014).
 4 Jin, Delong. ‘Animation Industry Takes the Leading Role of the Cultural Industry in 
China’ in The 2012 China Animation Industry Annual Conference. Hangzhou, China, 
2012.
 5 Blue Cat’s Three Thousand Questions [Lanmao taoqi sanqianwen]. Hunan Sunshine 
Cartoon Group, 1999 till now. It was first aired on Beijing Television’s Channel 8 in 
October 1999. The broadcasting network included 700 local and overseas television 
stations in 2000. It was once aired simultaneously on 1,012 television stations, with 
13 local satellite television stations.
 6 Produced by Creative Power Entertaining. The show is about a group of goats 
fighting against a clumsy wolf that wants to eat them, which has been becoming 
enormously popular with Chinese school children since its debut in 2005. It is aired 
on over 50 local TV stations, including Hong Kong’s TVB, BTV Animation Channel 
and CCTV. As of 2011, an English dub has been aired in Taiwan. In 2010 Disney 
gained the licence to broadcast the popular children’s show on their Disney Channels.
 7 Chow, Rey. Primitive Passions: Visuality, Sexuality, Ethnography, and Contemporary 
Chinese Cinema. Film and Culture. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
 8 Bristow, Rebecca Jean. ‘Animation Education in China’ in Chinese Cartoon Industry 
Forum. Hangzhou, China, 2002.
 9 Talk (Liaotian). Directed by Mengjun. BlackAnt Animation Studio, 2001.
10 I Love You (Wo ai ni). Directed by Peng Lei. Beijing, UltraGirl Clay Animation 
Studio, 2001.
11 Snow (Xue). Directed by Sun Tian. 2003.
12 Life (Shenghuo). Directed by Han Bo. 2003.
13 Pond (Tang yun). Directed by Huang Ying. Beijing, Beijing Film Academy, 2003, 
DVD.
14 Ode to Summer (Xia). Directed by Xu Wei. Shenzhen, IDMT Ltd., 2003, DVD.
15 The list was regularly updated before 2006.
16 His information was available at http://www.heaventown.com/ before 2007. Some of 
Jiang’s Flash animations were also available at http://flash.tom.com before 2007.
17 Lei Feng, a People’s Liberation Army soldier who died in the line of duty, became 
a famous quasi-folk hero on the basis of his diary, in which he chronicled many 
instances of selfless service for the glory of the motherland.
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18 Bu Hua. Maomao’s Summer (Maomao de xiatian), 2002; Cat (Mao), 2003; Heart 
(Xin), 2003. Bu Hua’s works are available at http://www.buhua.com (accessed October 
2004.)
19 Yang Ge. Paradise Garden (Tiantang huayuan), 2002; Imagination (Huangxiang), 2002; 
One Day, 2005. Yang Ge’s works are available at http://www.yangge.com (accessed 
October 2004.)
20 Ma Lin. New Youth (Xin qingnian), 2002.
21 Doupi. Nostalgia Series (Huaijiu xilie), 2002–3; Western Liang Series (Xiliang 
Xianhua), 2002–3. The Western Liang was a short-lived (400–421 ad), northern 
kingdom of the 16 Kingdoms Era. Its capitals were Dunhuang and Jiuquan in Gansu. 
Doupi’s animations are available at: http://doupi.com/xl_download.htm (accessed 
October 2004).
22 Shihuang. Pobaby (Xiao pohai), 2002–6. The name Pobaby was translated by 
Shihuang from a form of Chinese northern slang that often was used to scold 
naughty kids. Available at http://www.shihuang.com/ (accessed October 2004).
23 Furniss, Maureen. Art in Motion: Animation Aesthetics. London: John Libbey, 1998.
24 Available at http://www.buhua.com/flash/maomao.html (accessed October 2004).
25 The onscreen titles read (the approximate syntax is in the original English 
translation): ‘Maomao is an ordinary child, one day she found the beauty of the 
dismantling of old Beijing houses, For the first time, she noticed there are chai (a 
character marking a building for demolition) everywhere. She knows the saying “Out 
with the old and in with the new.” But who else would bother to look back at those 
dismantled houses like looking back on old times? Maomao decided to build a “city” 
to memorize the disappearing old houses. All the materials would come from the old 
houses. She goes to collect all the materials. Ten days later…’
26 Listed in the sub-category of ‘New Media Art’, http://www.yangge.com/yangge.
htm (accessed October 2004). Also available at http://flash.tom.com/flash_show.
php?user=flash_yangge&id=30719 (accessed October 2004).
27 See http://www.e-toon.com.cn/; http://www.xoyto.com/; http://www.snailcn.com/; 




Cinema of Exhibition: Film in Chinese 
Contemporary Art
Dong Bingfeng
In conversation with Tianqi Yu 
Translated by Hui Miao
Dong Bingfeng is regarded as one of the most active curators and art critics working 
on Chinese contemporary art and visual culture in mainland China today. In the past 
eight years he has worked at several different contemporary art museums, including 
the Guangdong Art Museum, Ullens Center for Contemporary Art and Iberia Center 
for Contemporary Art. At these leading art institutions, he explored the nature and 
ontology of the ‘moving image’ in its various forms – video art, new media art, video 
and film installations – pushing the boundaries of the various forms and decon-
structing the moving image culture. Currently, Dong is the artistic director at the Li 
Xianting Film Fund, where he has implemented an intensive exploration into artists’ 
films shown in gallery spaces, or what has been recently referred to as ‘cinema of 
exhibition.’ China’s iGeneration co-editor Tianqi Yu interviewed Dong Bingfeng on 
the emerging field of ‘cinema of exhibition,’ and in the interview Dong shares some of 
his views on cinema and moving image culture, particularly among China’s current 
iGeneration.
****
Tianqi Yu: As a curator, art critic, and the current artistic director at Li Xianting 
Film Fund, can you please introduce the kinds of projects Li Xianting Film 
Fund is involved in, and what your engagement with moving image curation is 
at this organization?
Bingfeng Dong: Since taking over at Li Xianting Film Fund, my work is naturally 
integrated with the agenda of the Film Fund in the area of independent films 
and documentaries, especially in terms of research and film festival curation. 
Chinese contemporary art and independent film have been purposefully 
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put together as an important combination through which to explore the 
interrelatedness and differences of these two moving image cultures.
  In China’s specific social and political environment, the Li Xianting Film 
Fund mainly focuses on four areas of work: film archiving, research and 
publications, developing our film academy, and promotion of film festivals. 
In recent years, the Film Fund has been under great pressure from official 
state control. Recently, a large number of the established public film events 
have been either called off or prohibited from taking place, which has forced 
us to consider focusing our future work on two main areas: film archiving, 
and research and publications. These seemingly static and interior areas can 
in fact be a very effective way to support the Film Fund’s academic direction 
and influence, especially in terms of expanding the space and nature of 
the exhibition, as well as attracting new resources to foster international 
cooperation, which remains very important for the future existence of the 
Film Fund. In 2012, the Film Fund published a book series on film directors, 
showcasing works by moving image artists who have experience in multiple 
creative fields in film and contemporary art, such as Tsai Ming-liang from 
Taiwan, Yang Fudong from China, and Raqs Media Collective from India. 
This will become our primary research focus and theme for the year 2013.
Yu: How is the artist film being accepted by young Chinese filmmakers today?
Dong: Currently in China – apart from the Yunnan Multi Culture Visual 
Festival, which focuses on documentaries – experimental films have been 
introduced to major independent film festivals in Beijing, Chongqing and 
Nanjing. The idea is to encourage and attract more artist films and short 
films with a stronger artistic quality to participate in these platforms each 
year. In 2010, the China Independent Film Festival in Nanjing invited 
me to plan a display unit on the subject of creation and presentation of 
Chinese contemporary art and film. Artists such as Wang Jianwei, Cao Fei, 
Zhou Xiaohu, Sun Xun, and other important moving image artists were 
invited to attend the event. Such an event was not a coincidence. In 2001, 
a few minjiang (grassroots) film groups in China jointly organized and 
launched China’s First Unrestricted New Image Festival. The winner of the 
experimental film category was Yang Fudong who was, and still is, a famous 
moving image artist, rather than a director active in theatrical film like Jia 
Zhangke. Similarly, the film festivals that were initiated by our Film Fund 
specifically include artist films within the competition in the experimental 
film category, outside traditional documentary and feature film categories.
Yu: As an emerging visual practice, cinema of exhibition has been attracting 
attention from a growing number of artists, curators, critics and scholars. How 
do you define the concept of cinema of exhibition? When was it first accepted in 
China and how long has it been practised by Chinese artists? Can you trace the 
development in the past ten years for us?
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Dong: The earliest discussions of cinema of exhibition can be traced to Taiwan 
rather than the mainland of China. In 2006, Pompidou Arts Centre organized 
an exhibition in Taiwan, showcasing a large collection of new media art. In 
this exhibition, the concept of cinema as an important concept for moving 
image practice was translated into Chinese and introduced to the Chinese 
language world. In 2007, after Taiwanese director Tsai Ming-Liang’s filmic 
installation work, It is a Dream, was submitted to the Venice Biennale, the 
concept of ‘cinema of exhibition’ was explored by some critics in Taiwan. 
In mainland China, four curators – Huang Chienhong from Taiwan, Du 
Qingchun and Zhu Zhu from mainland China, and myself – co-sponsored 
and planned the project ‘Looking Through Film: Traces of Cinema and 
Self-constructs in Contemporary Art’ at Shenzhen’s OCT Contemporary 
Art Theatre in 2010. It was the first time in China that the ‘artists’ film’ was 
included in the discussion of the historical context of contemporary art in 
China and Taiwan in the last three decades.
  In recent years, cinema of exhibition has become a very important form 
of creative expression and an innovative display of moving image in galleries 
and biennials in China. Compared to ‘video art’ and ‘new media art’ that 
have been accepted and integrated by museums and art critics, cinema of 
exhibition embraces a broader research level and thematic framework in 
terms of history, culture, politics and aesthetics. It is like a new subject in 
the creative production and exhibition of contemporary art. It is at this 
cultural crossroad that ‘cinema of exhibition’ has come into being. For 
example, in Luc Vancheri’s study of ‘contemporary film,’ the obvious focus is 
the transformation of a concept from ‘film’ to ‘installation.’ But for Chinese 
contemporary art, the way films enter the space of art museums and galleries 
not only symbolizes a new combination of temporality and aesthetics, but 
also breaks the viewing experience that is led by other forms of visual art on 
display at art galleries. On a second level, the major shift from the screening 
of films at cinemas to the projection of moving images in exhibition spaces 
has liberated images from the confines of the theatre and offers more 
possibilities of future film. Just as Godard said, ‘Film is no longer the prisoner 
of the movie theatre.’
Yu: What is the connection between cinema of exhibition and video art and 
independent film? In other words, what kind of different positions does the 
artists’ ‘cinema of exhibition’ have in Chinese moving image creative production 
and Chinese contemporary art?
Dong: The emergence of Chinese video art occurred almost in the same period 
of the early 1990s as Chinese independent film. Furthermore, artists and 
film directors insisted upon strict distinctions in each other’s work, which 
was an important phenomenon in the 1990s. In addition to making standard 
video art, many artists were also making documentaries and even working 
on fiction films, while some independent film directors also began to 
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explore a more open-ended filmmaking that is clearly indebted to artistic 
experimentation. The 1990s was a very open period for moving image 
creation. One could say that there was an endless stream of styles and genres 
that were influencing and interacting with each other.
  Performance art, video art and installation art are increasingly the central 
mainstay of Chinese contemporary art, compared to more traditional 
artistic media, including painting and sculpture. The emergence of video 
art started as a challenge to the museum classification principle. In the 
trend of ‘internationalization’ of Chinese contemporary art after the 1990s, 
contemporary video art and artist films became more well-known within the 
international art world.
Yu: Can you give us some examples of Chinese artist films shown at international 
art biennales or on film festival circuits?
Dong: For example, in Kassel, Germany, the Documentary series in 1997 and 
2002 saw three Chinese artists invited to participate, whose main creative 
approach was the melding together of moving image, documentary and 
film to great effect and critical acclaim: Wang Jianwei (documentary ‘Living 
Elsewhere’), Feng Mengbo (multimedia interaction work ‘Family Album’), 
and Yang Fudong (film ‘An Estranged Paradise’).
Yu: What key feature defines the artist film in China?
Dong: Compared to installation art, performance art, and other artistic 
concepts that were greatly influenced by Western art, Chinese video art and 
the artist film have the distinctive qualities of being ‘local’ and recording 
Chinese social reality and history, and are not subject to the traces of 
‘impact-acceptance’ response doctrine under the context of Western history 
of art. The rapid internationalization, globalization and marketization of 
Chinese contemporary art since the 1990s is clearly a response to the logic 
of the global market and cultural politics rather than a consequence of 
local consciousness and transformation. However, current Chinese moving 
image culture, both independent films and documentaries, and cinema 
of exhibition, have a stance of radical aesthetic transformation and social 
participation, such as the ‘citizen documentary’ series by artist Ai Weiwei.
Yu: In this volume, we specifically focus on cinema and moving image culture since 
2000, and advocate the notion of ‘iGeneration’ – here the little “i” can be seen 
as denoting the ‘individual,’ ‘internet,’ and the ‘intertwined and interconnected 
nature of film.’ What do you make of our neologism? Please anchor your 
response by way of your experience as a curator. How might this term be 
emblematic to what is happening with the artist filmmaking practice?
Dong: In fact, my view is not very optimistic. On the one hand, more and 
more artist films are restricted by the mechanisms of the museum system 
and the art market. On the other hand, the so-called independent film 
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and independent art productions have become self-institutionalized. 
By saying ‘self-institutionalized,’ I mean filmmakers and artists operate 
with a preconceived notion before they produce work, particularly for 
what is acceptable by the museums or market. The artwork or films are 
therefore produced for that purpose rather than being pure creative acts, or 
experiments in form.
Yu: Regarding the collection of work: we know that the mechanism of ‘art 
collection’ in the art world has to a great extent challenged the way that film is 
distributed – through theatrical release and more recently through DVDs and 
then online streaming. However, the codified reproduction of digital media is 
also challenging the conventional way that art is being collected. Or should the 
meaning of ‘collection’ in contemporary art change, facing this new form of art 
practice? What do you think?
Dong: In mainland China, the emergence of cinema of exhibition or artist film 
is a form of resistance to discourses and commercial tendencies found within 
the mechanisms of the museum system and the art market. Just as we spoke 
about before, the ‘self-institutionalization’ of video art or new media, the 
emergence of exhibition film must be based on a form of resistance to certain 
commercial purposes or the art exhibition system itself. Naturally, it should 
be a response to theoretical issues or themes of practice that are not covered 
or discussed in the history of art and film. What it aims for should not be 
a fixed art form, but to go beyond the constraints of contemporary moving 
image practices and exhibition patterns, and constantly throw up more 
questions and issues for the viewer, or the potential revolutionary.
The birth of Chinese video art
However, its (the combination of video and installation) target audience is not the 
viewer in front of the television, rather it is the visitor at the scene of the instal-
lation. – Lin Zhonglu1
The main concern in cinema of exhibition is how to imagine the relationship with 
the mass public from the art works. – Jean-Christophe Royoux2
From the perspective of curating, divergent opinions surrounding ‘the origin myth’ 
of Chinese video art are clearly articulated through four research and exhibition 
projects that took place consecutively in mainland China. These four cases are: 
New Media Archaeology at the 2009 Shanghai eArts Festival; Looking Through Film: 
Traces of Cinema and Self-constructs in Contemporary Art at Shenzhen’s OCAT 
Contemporary Art Centre in 2010; Out of the Box: The Threshold of Video Art in 
China 1984–1988 at Guangzhou’s Times Art Museum in 2011; and Moving Image 
in China 1988–2011 at Shanghai’s Minsheng Art Museum. More recently, Chinese 
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Realities/Documentary Vision 1988–2013 at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) 
in New York in May 2013 further confirmed the narrative of how Chinese video art 
came into being.
 In November 1988, Zhang Peili, an artist from Hangzhou, introduced and presented 
one of his moving image productions (called 30x30) at the ‘Huangshan Meeting,’ 
which is considered to be the inaugural meeting that led to the ‘China Avant-Garde’ 
exhibition in 1989. 30x30 was at the time, and is still today, regarded as the first 
Chinese video art work by many art critics and historians. Its content and production 
process were very simple; but the films in the exhibition are very powerful in compo-
sitional arrangement and use the video format to play simultaneously with materiality 
and spatiality. To accomplish this effect, Zhang began by holding a 30cm square 
piece of glass at a height of 40cm from the ground and then dropped it, shattering 
the plate glass on the floor. The broken pieces were glued back together with ‘502 
glue,’ a strong adhesive widely used in China at the time. The same process was then 
repeated until the videotape ran out. The original version of 30x30 was 180 minutes 
in length, which was the longest available running time for Beta videotapes in this 
period. Many leading art historians, critics and now film scholars view this production 
process and the content of this video art work as a form of clever assemblage. In many 
ways, Zhang’s practice was closely linked with the so-called ‘85 New Wave’ of Chinese 
contemporary art.3 Video art came into being in China not in response to Western art 
history or to the development of video art in the West. Rather, it was an unconscious 
‘action’ that started from performance art in China. In fact, the early stage of Chinese 
video art was filled with this kind of ‘image of concept’ which places an emphasis on 
the recording of artistic behaviour.
 It was not until two key events in 1990 and 1996 that video art entered into the 
canon of Chinese contemporary art and became widely discussed by both Chinese 
and international theorists. According to many Chinese artists and critics, the story 
goes like this: in 1990, Professor Mijka from the Hamburg Academy of Fine Arts 
systematically introduced and demonstrated the techniques from Western ‘video art’ 
at the China Academy of Art in Hangzhou. Then in September 1996, the Phenomenon/
Moving Image exhibition was held at the China Academy of Art, which for the first 
time comprehensively and systematically focused on and introduced research and 
exhibition projects on Chinese video art. The significance of Phenomenon/Moving 
Image lies in its translation of the important arguments about video art from the West. 
It was this theoretical platform for discussion and analysis of work that encouraged 
Chinese critics to submit articles and practitioners to present their own creative 
works in a wider context. The same happened in the early 1990s. The dramatic social 
changes in 1989, on the one hand, deepened the rupture between contemporary art 
and official art, which represented tradition and the egalitarian spirit of the proletarian 
class. On the other hand, these social changes accelerated the internationalization 
and integration of Chinese contemporary art and efforts to seek alternative spaces 
of production. In other words, the birth of Chinese video art was a consequence of 
the constant innovation and the intrinsic motivation for experimentation in Chinese 
contemporary art-making in the 1990s. Simultaneously, through external forces, it 
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was advanced into dialogue and exchange in the developing global system of cultural 
commodity exchange. For example, several Chinese artists participated collectively in 
the Venice Biennale in 1993 and the Sao Paulo Biennale in 1994, which serve as two 
obvious examples of the internationalization of Chinese video art.
Independent film, the new documentary movement and 
new media art
The birth of video art in China in 1988 was not accidental, nor was it an isolated exper-
iment in unapproved creative innovation. It is linked to another watershed moment in 
Chinese moving image culture that also occurred in 1988: Wu Wenguang’s decision to 
start shooting his now-canonical independent documentary, Bumming in Beijing. Wu, 
who is considered one of the most important filmmakers of the Chinese documentary 
movement, started filming his debut independent documentary between 1988 and 
1990. Around the same time, China’s first independent film practitioner Zhang Yuan 
was also preparing to produce his first film, Mama. His previous attempt at film, Solar 
Tree, had been aborted while it was still in the planning stages. The screenplay of 
Solar Tree was from the essay ‘Curved Poplar’ written by the famous writer Dai Qing, 
who was an activist in the student movement in 1989.4 Chinese independent art and 
film was dynamic and community-centred during this period. This was largely due 
to filmmakers’ resistance against the official system and the persistence of creative 
freedom.
 Wu Wenguang also raised his doubts over using the term ‘movement’ to describe 
his and his colleagues’ work when he retrospectively examined the independent 
documentaries of the 1990s after a lapse of ten years. He argues that:
So far, I still hold my doubt towards the so-called “New Documentary Movement” 
(including towards DV which emerged later and has been named as “DV 
movement,” I have the same feeling of suspicion). Perhaps there have been some 
new ideas and ways gradually entering into the practice of these documentary 
makers. However, this is only contrary to the propaganda products from official 
TV stations. In other words, this only returns to the due concern of the 
documentary about people and about the existence behind the real social life.5
Looking back at the social atmosphere and creative production in film and art, the 
term ‘New Documentary Movement’ obviously exaggerated what was a personal 
and underground experiment and practice. Lü Xinyu, who coined the phrase ‘New 
Documentary Movement,’ argued that the emergence of these new documentary films 
in China was a move against the ‘special topic films’ that were produced by official TV 
stations before the 1990s and could be regarded as ‘propaganda.’ She states:
This term was obtained in rebellion against the old established customs in 
the Chinese historical context in the 1980s and 1990s. It made the pursuit of 
documentary begin as a consensus. Consensus implied a sense of alliance because 
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of mutual point of reference. Rebellion then emerged as a collective behavior. The 
term “movement” then came into being.6
There are certain overlaps in the concepts and forms of production between video 
art, independent film and the New Documentary Movement. Some video artists 
produced independent documentaries, and some film directors participated in 
the creation of contemporary art. The artist Wang Jianwei began his documentary 
production in the early 1990s. His Production (1993) and Living Elsewhere (1998) 
are standard examples of independent documentaries. They were submitted to the 
Yamagata Documentary Film Festival in Japan 1999. However, the creative concepts 
and central themes in these works are closer to the forms of what would become 
known as ‘artists’ films.’ Artists reject a seemingly objective recording of a live scene. 
Instead, they reconsider the interdisciplinary and cross-field propositions during 
the process of their artistic practice, such as the ‘grey zone’ that has been mentioned 
repeatedly by the artists. For example, artist Yang Fudong started looking for sites for 
filming in Hangzhou in 1997 to shoot his first black-and-white feature film Strange 
Paradise (1997–2002). The single screen works and interactive moving image works 
of artist Feng Mengbo were officially named as ‘Feng Mengbo film.’ By the late 1990s, 
films had undeniably entered into Chinese contemporary artists’ sphere and became 
a major form and concept for their creative works through the emergence of the 
‘independent film movement’ and ‘New Documentary Movement.’ Consequently, 
independent film, documentary, video art and the more complex concept of ‘artists’ 
films’ together constituted a substantial part of the landscape of Chinese moving 
image culture.
 In 2001, a few folk film groups sprung up in China, namely the ‘Practice 
Communities’ in Beijing, ‘Free Cinema’ in Shenyang, ‘101 Film Studio’ in 
Shanghai, and ‘U-thèque’ in Shenzhen. Together, these groups organized and 
launched China’s ‘First Unrestricted New Image Festival.’ The festival was the first 
major non-governmental moving image exhibition. It reviewed and concluded 
the overall trend for independent production in the 1990s. The short film 
Backyard-Hey! Sun is Rising (2001) by Yang Fudong won the award for Best 
Experimental Film.
 The emergence of new media art in China was accompanied by introductions 
and translations of Western theories, technological developments, exhibitions and 
art students training at university level. Later new media art became the ‘engine’ in 
China’s official art system and part of the country’s process of cultural industriali-
zation. For example, in the late 1990s, the China Academy of Art began establishing 
the Department of New Media Art. After the Phenomenon/Moving Image exhibition, 
Qiu Zhijie compiled The Maturity of New Media Art 1997–2001, in which he illus-
trated the phenomenon of creative production in new technologies such as CD-ROM, 
Flash internet art and other new multimedia formats that seemed to supersede video 
art. In 2001, the launch of the Loft New Media Art Centre provided an important 
platform and space for discussing and developing multimedia moving image practices. 
However, it was not until the First Beijing International New Media Arts Exhibition 
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and Symposium in 2004 that Chinese new media art was formally recognized 
as a sustainable and major platform for international collaboration, dialogue and 
exchange.
Art galleries and biennials
As the title of this chapter indicates, there is no doubt that the concept and form of 
cinema of exhibition could not arise without the multimedia art practices that were first 
initiated in the 1980s. In 2002, the feature film An Estranged Paradise (1997–2002) by 
artist Yang Fudong was officially included in the 11th Documenta in Kassel, Germany. 
In his article, ‘Art and Film: Some Critics and Reflections,’ one of the Documenta 
curators, Mark Nash, argued that ‘film has redefined the way that we understand 
contemporary art.’7 Meanwhile, as was apparent at the first triennial Representation: 
Chinese Experimental Art 1990–2000 in Guangzhou in 2002, moving image production 
from film, documentary and video art from the 1990s had become an important point 
of reference and a significant topic among the invited exhibition works.
 Since 2000, both official art galleries (such as the Shanghai Art Museum and 
Guangdong Art Museum) and privately run art museums (such as the Chengdu 
Upriver Gallery, Tianjin Teda Art Museum and Shenyang Dongyu Art Museum) 
have been actively promoting and supporting the creation and exhibition of Chinese 
contemporary art. For example, in 2000, Chinese contemporary art was included for 
the first time as a theme in the exhibition at the Shanghai Biennale at the government-
run Shanghai Art Museum. The biennale also employed an international curator 
system. Some critics suggest that this exhibition was the beginning of ‘legitimacy’ for 
Chinese contemporary art. Indeed, the Chinese authorities started adopting more 
open and more flexible policies toward art in the context of the rise of the market 
economy and the upcoming 2008 Olympic Games. This was in distinct contrast to the 
situation during the 1990s, when the authorities strictly prohibited and suppressed 
the practice of contemporary art. However, this is not the whole story. The partially 
open policy toward artistic expression was also accompanied by a coexisting ban. 
Censorship regarding art and film was not abolished completely – instead, it was 
controlled by official guidance, permission and at times tolerance.
 The organization of increasingly internationalized large-scale biennial/triennial 
exhibitions in China has advanced the development of contemporary art even further. 
Differing quite remarkably from the awkward environment of artistic production and 
underground exhibition in the 1990s, contemporary art is becoming increasingly 
open in China. More art galleries and exhibition organizations are adopting organiza-
tional forms that are more cosmopolitan and experimental in nature. Multimedia art 
and moving image art have increasingly become the theme of major exhibitions, such 
as the continuous ‘Beijing International New Media Arts Exhibition and Symposium’ 
and ‘Techniques of the Visible: 2004 Shanghai Biennale,’ which are important repre-
sentative exhibitions in terms of promoting discussion about moving image art.
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 If we say that ‘video art’ in the 1990s was the initial stage or the meaningful start 
of moving image art practice in China, then ‘video art’ or ‘new media art’ must 
be considered in relation to the creation of alternative spaces in art galleries and 
museums that have emerged since the 1990s. The ‘Black Box’8 has increasingly become 
the theme of art museums, similar to developments in the West. In these museum 
spaces, the technology for projectors and moving image display equipment has 
been updated constantly. In addition, moving image art has gradually expanded and 
penetrated the entire exhibition hall. In the future, perhaps the content of the moving 
image and audience could all become the main content of an exhibition rather than 
the video art that is restricted to a TV screen. In other words, the installation of video 
art and the new image–space relationship have greatly expanded the negotiation and 
tension between the exhibition works of the art galleries and the autonomy of their 
audiences. Art galleries no longer succumb to the static, closed artistic aesthetic and 
intellectual activities (such as traditional painting or sculpture exhibitions); instead, 
they become ‘a public sphere to enter without special qualification.’9 Video installation 
or cinema of exhibition are in some ways a breakthrough and are compelling Chinese 
contemporary art galleries to make changes.
 As this discussion of art galleries and biennales has demonstrated, video instal-
lation art or the phenomenon of ‘film at the art galleries’ have played a significant role 
at Chinese art galleries since 2000. Different from cinema in the traditional sense, 
‘cinema’ shown at art galleries must present a completely new theme and achieve 
breakthroughs in some aesthetic forms and narrative experiments. Perhaps cinema as 
exhibition should first be considered in the context of the design arts and visual arts, 
instead of through the discursive link between film art and film history. Song-Yong 
Sun states that cinema as exhibition has escaped the dimension of continuous 
narrative and representation and has stepped forward towards ‘style,’ the pure ‘visual,’ 
and the ‘picture’ nature of the image.’10 According to Sun, ‘film is not only a represen-
tation of knowledge and theories, but is also a combination of new technology and 
contemporary cultural and visual practice.’11
 Themes explored in cinema of exhibition are not entirely irrelevant to the 
‘democratic’ and ‘public’ thinking occurring at contemporary art museums in China. 
Some of the themes are even more intensively targeted. Without a doubt, there is 
a sufficient correlation between the fields of cinema as exhibition and independent 
cinema. Since 1989, ‘independent cinema’ has greatly promoted and influenced 
the creative production of personal auteur film. This includes the breakthroughs in 
the traditional film industry, such as films by the Sixth Generation directors or the 
‘independent films’ and ‘underground films’ at international film festivals that have 
not yet passed government censorship. It also includes the ‘artist film’ that is the film 
production for certain artistic themes. This genre includes work by artists such as 
Zhao Liang, Wang Jianwen, Wang Fei, Jiang Zhi, as well as the series of feature films 
Seven Intellectuals in Bamboo Forest (2003–7) by Yang Fudong. In order to somehow 
avoid the ubiquitous form of political or ideological censorship in China, the ‘artist 
film’ or ‘cinema of exhibition’ at art galleries and art museums become forms of subtle 
and symbolic ‘micro-resistance,’ or images of artistic action. Especially in the forms 
 Cinema of Exhibition: Film in Chinese Contemporary Art 83
of some exhibitions, such as multi-screening movie devices, these works of art have 
integrated image narrative/non-narrative ambiguity with viewers’ spatial experience, 
suggesting and implying the coming of some democratic consciousness.
The cinema of the future
In my opinion, the question of how to face and answer the future of film is the central 
theme of Luc Vancheri’s book Contemporary Cinema: From Film to Installation 
(Cinémas contemporains: Du film à l’installation).12 From theatrical cinema to art 
galleries, from big screen to small screen, film has become one of the intrinsic driving 
forces of contemporary art. This is especially true with regard to the film in Chinese 
contemporary art. Yang Beichen suggests that,
The significance of film is that it starts with the most pristine light, however, 
it carries out some open and changing works in efforts to achieve the eternal 
guarantee of ‘multiple.’ It allows us to face the things outside this totally blank 
border and those hidden outside the sole projector light and dormant in myste-
rious shadow during the film. We probably can call these ‘the upcoming images.’13
If the question of film is the question of cinématographicité, then ‘film in the future’ 
should be emphasizing the redeployment of the film (in other words, dispositif cinéma-
tographique) rather than certain aesthetic forms or provisions.
 One Half of August (2011) was a very interesting transitional work for Yang 
Fudong. In the film, he emphasized the relationship between architectural space and 
image, attempting to break the limitations of the moving image. Yang projected his 
film series Seven Intellectuals in Bamboo Forest onto buildings or architectural models 
to achieve a kind of live theatrical experience. He then filmed these scenes as they were 
projected on the buildings and architectural modules. The scenes in the film and the 
scenes projected on buildings construct an architectural experience.14 This reminds 
me of some moving image installation works by Taiwanese director Tsai Ming Liang. 
His film Ghost and installation work Erotic Space2 place the same focus on dealing 
with multilayered relationships between moving image and architecture, space and 
viewing, rather than on the organization of a traditional sense of story and theatrical 
experience.
 Since 2000, cinema of exhibition has expanded from being focused on a single 
theme to a reflection on the sites of exhibition. In terms of site layout and space 
planning, these installations are still largely casual and random. Viewers can freely 
decide how long they would like to stop for and walk among the many film screens. 
They have no intention to organize a possible narrative or story. Instead, these instal-
lations are a completely new experience of moving image and space. A film that 
is outside of traditional theatre must face this new experience and challenges, to 
obtain subjective liberation. These works are not only projections in art space, they 
also strongly encourage spectators to participate. For example, many large pieces of 
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animation by the artist Sun Xun (such as his Magician Party and Dead Crow that was 
shown from 30 April to 8 May 2013) are presented as open work sites. Ready-made 
items, footage, set-ups and the visual experience of the animation can be freely 
transformed.
 Finally, I would like to turn to a personal topic of interest: how to carry out active 
and effective artistic practices in the particular social situation and reality of China 
today – that is, the post-WTO epoch of the iGeneration. It is true that the discussion 
over ‘film in the future,’ no matter whether this is proposed at an aesthetic or political 
level, unavoidably touches on the urgent propositions and strategic responses that are 
raised by ‘activism’ in contemporary Chinese society. That is to say, in any aesthetic 
and political dimension, the biggest theme that is faced by cinema of exhibition 
is to restore political passion and space for the imagination. The key reason why 
the future can become the future is because of its current attitude and awareness. 
Or, as the Raqs Media group declared, ‘The future is waiting – the future will be 
self-organized.’15
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Goodbye to the Grim Real, Hello to What 
Comes Next : The Moment of Passage from the 
Sixth Generation to the iGeneration
Luke Vulpiani
The origins of China’s iGeneration can be found through an examination of two films 
by two Sixth Generation directors: 24 City (Ershi si chengji, 2008) by Jia Zhangke and 
Summer Palace (Yíhé Yuán, 2006) by Lou Ye. In this chapter, I argue that these two 
films represent the end of the Sixth Generation as a configuration and are evidence 
of the transition to a new mode of film in China in the latter part of the 2000s called 
the iGeneration. In describing these two movies as ‘transition films,’ I mean that they 
retain many elements of the Sixth Generation, but also contain new elements that 
signal the passage to a different film style in China, particularly in terms of the repre-
sentation of subjectivity and history.
 The Sixth Generation emerged in the early 1990s, with the 1993 film Beijing 
Bastards (Běijīng Zázhǒng), directed by Zhang Yuan, commonly considered the first 
Sixth Generation film. The Sixth Generation constituted, as with other films of the 
early 1990s, an urban turn in Chinese film. Zhang Zhen aptly describes the films 
of the period as having ‘a singular preoccupation with the destruction and recon-
struction of the social fabric and urban identities of post-1989 China.’1 My analysis 
focuses on the Sixth Generation in terms of its aesthetics and film-style, and I posit 
two key concepts that I view as the unique aspects of the Sixth Generation. These two 
concepts are intertwined and work in dialogue with each other. The first concept is a 
realist film aesthetic called ‘xianchang,’ best translated as ‘on-the-scene,’ a term coined 
by the Chinese documentary filmmaker Wu Wenguang (b. 1956) that describes the 
re-establishing of the physical body in urban space.2 The Sixth Generation films 
combine xianchang with fictional narratives, not only to capture the impact of urban 
change in 1990s China, but also to explore urban subjectivity in moments of great 
transformation. The second key concept that I identify is that of a detached specular 
gaze, which I argue is bound up with fantasy and the commodity form. This specular 
gaze, often counterpointed to xianchang, serves to create a subject who is unstable, 
fragmentary and opaque.
90 China’s iGeneration
 By the middle of the 2000s, China was a very different country from that of the 
early 1990s, when the Sixth Generation had emerged. China joined the World Trade 
Organization in 2001, a demonstration of the country’s importance to the global 
economy and its complete turn away from Maoist economics. China’s economy 
continued to grow, and in 2010 China became the world’s second biggest economy, 
overtaking Japan and ranking behind only the United States.3 Li Minqi goes as far as 
to argue that China’s economic power is of such significance that it represents the end 
of the established capitalist powers and a new global order.4 It is important to place the 
iGeneration within this changed economic and social situation. Cultural production 
is part of the wider economy in which it operates, and therefore it is important to 
consider the relationship between economics and aesthetic style, without intending 
to suggest that aesthetics in a particular society are simply a reflection and conse-
quence of the economic base. Yomi Braester, in his book Paint the City Red, argues 
that Chinese cinema in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as wider urban aesthetics such as 
architecture, reflected the economic mode of production at the time:
The cinema shares the plight of urban design, which is subject to a double-tier 
centralised control – state-level ‘economic planning’ (jingji jihua, handled after 
the Soviet model by the State Planning Commission) as well as municipal-level 
spatial planning (chengshi guihua, literally ‘urban planning,’) under the Ministry 
of Construction.5
While the Sixth Generation had an aesthetic defined by the changing space of the 
city, the iGeneration is more influenced by the signifiers of commerce and marketing.
 In my view, the iGeneration has two defining features that differentiate it from the 
Sixth Generation. The first is the iGeneration’s organic relationship with the digital 
and its correlate the internet. The iGeneration cannot be thought or divorced from 
digital technology or culture, which is a condition of its existence. The digital covers 
all aspects of film in the iGeneration, from production (the use of digital cameras 
and software editing packages) to distribution (the use of the internet to circulate 
and market films on both a high-budget and low-budget scale) and reception (the 
computer screen or mobile phone increasingly are the places where films are watched, 
discussed and consumed). The second defining feature of the iGeneration is its 
relationship to the wider economic realm of China in the late 2000s. In particular, the 
iGeneration is in part a consequence of the Chinese state’s desire to create a domestic 
cultural industry that has global reach, while at the same time maintaining control 
over creative and imaginative works. In this chapter, I focus on aesthetic consid-
erations to examine the changing representation of time and the subject during the 
transition from the Sixth Generation to the iGeneration. However, it is also important 
to bear in mind the factors that determine, affect and shape aesthetics.
 24 City – directed by one of the key directors of the Sixth Generation, Jia Zhangke 
– signals the shift to a different mode of film style in Chinese film in the latter half of 
the 2000s, owing to its manner of representating the subject and history. The film is 
structured around the story of Factory 420 – an armaments factory built in Chengdu 
at the beginning of the 1950s during the Korean War. In 2007, the year in which the 
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film is set, Factory 420 is being decommissioned and the land it occupies converted 
into luxury housing. To appreciate the cultural significance of Factory 420, it has to 
be understood in the Chinese context as not just a factory but a danwei (work unit) 
of over 100,000 people, including 30,000 employees and their families.6 The danwei 
in Mao’s China was the fundamental social and political structure that organized 
work and everyday life, including housing, education, health care and policing.7 The 
size and nature of danweis meant they were almost miniature cities within a city. For 
Robin Visser, the danwei and the local street committee (jiedao banshichu) were ‘the 
socialist organizational mechanisms that had once circumscribed nearly all forms of 
urban life.’8 Thus, the significance of Factory 420 being mothballed is that it represents 
not just the loss of a place of employment, but also the loss of the very institution 
that organized life and served as the dominant social structure of Communist China. 
While China has retained a formally Communist government, the changes to property 
laws and the restructuring of urban space during the 1990s and beyond have repre-
sented not only an economic transformation, but a social and political one also. The 
Sixth Generation emerged during these changes and in this regard, 24 City is a typical 
Sixth Generation film, retaining the visual tropes of the transformation of the urban 
space, demolition and the city as a ruin.
 24 City presents a range of characters connected to Factory 420, mainly as talking 
heads in isolated segments. The film uses a pseudo-documentary style and some of 
the characters are based on real interviews conducted by Jia Zhangke. The talking 
heads are intercut with interludes from the characters’ lives and scenes of Factory 
420 being gradually demolished. From the very beginning, 24 City creates the sense 
of a different relationship to time and history than is typical of Sixth Generation 
films. While Sixth Generation characters are caught in the intensity of the present 
moment, 24 City places its characters within a much longer temporal arc. The shift 
to a focus on reflection and memory is evident in the first character in the film, Xiao 
He – an old man who recounts his memories of coming to work in Factory 420 as a 
young man and of his workteam leader, old Master Wang. Xiao He is shown in plain 
mid-shot, sitting on a chair in the empty factory, with only the sound of traffic in the 
background, as if he is being interviewed for a documentary about the factory. At one 
point, a voice off-screen joins in the conversation, prompting him like an interviewer. 
Xiao He’s memories of Master Wang are interrupted by a black screen with writing 
that reads ‘Xiao He, born 1948 in Chengdu, apprenticed in Factory 420 in 1964, to work 
group 61. Later was in the army.’ The next shot is of Xiao He’s worker’s card, which 
contains his photo as a young man. The use of dates is crucial in 24 City and marks a 
shift from the Sixth Generation, where time appears only as an eternal present, to a 
representation of time as movement. The shot of the worker’s card serves to create a 
sense of the film as a historical document and places the old Xiao He in the film within 
a wider history.
 24 City is not primarily focused on narrative, but on the relationship in and 
between the characters, the factory and the city. The film uses a multiplicity of voices, 
characters and viewpoints to create a non-linear narrative that focuses on memory 
and the past. Despite the multiplicity of characters in the film, 24 City actually creates 
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a much more coherent temporal arc than is typical of Sixth Generation works. It is easy 
for the viewer to locate the characters within the wider historical arc presented in the 
film, with Factory 420 serving as an anchor to a common point of reference. The sense 
of historical movement created in 24 City is a development away from other Sixth 
Generation works, where such a concept of temporal movement is largely absent. 24 
City indicates the passage of the Sixth Generation by taking a different stance toward 
events, unfolding the narrative and stories in the film primarily through memories of 
the past rather than moments in the present. The important point is not that the past 
can be re-thought in the imagination, but that the now of the present is materially 
related to a real historical development.
 The representation of characters and subjectivity in 24 City constitute two other 
ways the film moves away from the Sixth Generation, a movement that I argue is 
away from portrait and toward biography. The Sixth Generation’s presentation of its 
characters is that of the portrait – a representation or impression of character that 
focuses on mood and emotions as opposed to experience and understanding. A Sixth 
Generation protagonist is often ambiguous in motive, without a contextual history 
or with only a very sparsely drawn one. Portrait is an effective means in the Sixth 
Generation to capture the young, urban, marginal subjects caught in the frenetic whirl 
of the present, people who are unable to articulate a coherent narrative of the self. The 
characters in 24 City by contrast are presented as biographies linked to both Factory 
420 and the wider historical arc that the film constructs. Similarly, in Summer Palace, 
there is an attempt to present the characters within a continuum of the biographical, 
as a means to explore how the characters are affected by events. This transition from 
portrait to biography, I argue, is one key distinguishing feature of the passage of the 
Sixth Generation to the iGeneration.
 There is an interesting counterpoint created in 24 City between scenes of individual 
characters (particularly their presentation as talking heads) and scenes of more 
collective activity in the form of song, dance, or play. A good example of collective 
activity occurs near the beginning of the film, in a moment when the workers sing 
together. After a few establishing exterior longshots of the factory gates as workers 
arrive, the film moves to an interior shot of a crowd of workers, all dressed in virtually 
identical drab work-overalls, filing up some stairs into a meeting hall. The sequence 
continues with the workers seated in a large hall, as they listen to the announcement 
that Factory 420 is to be closed and converted into luxury housing. The scene ends 
with a collective patriotic song, a scene that can be read in numerous ways. The 
underplayed solemnity of the singing, despite the fact that the workers have in effect 
just been told that they will all lose their jobs, could be read as a biting satire of the 
Chinese people’s compliant behaviours or a subtle critique of the extent to which 
propaganda has so permeated the Chinese population that they sing about the glory 
of the motherland even while the land is being sold from under them. However, the 
scene also functions as one of the few uplifting moments in 24 City, that overall is 
characterized by a downbeat sense of inevitability that I call the ‘grim real.’9 The term 
‘grim real’ was coined by Alain Badiou to characterize the period from the 1970s, after 
the end of political revolutionary movements. I utilize it here in aesthetic terms to 
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describe presentation of an eviscerated bleak real. There are a number of other scenes 
of collective activity in 24 City, such as the performance of a Chinese opera and groups 
playing Mah-Jong, that provide a sense of shared communality absent from much of 
the rest of the film where the grim real persists.
 24 City, although it appears to be realist in style as it utilizes aspects of the 
documentary form, actually has a highly structured aesthetic. The film, like other Jia 
films, is very studied and controlled, with meticulous shot composition, framing and 
mise-en-scène. Xudong Zhang describes Jia’s filmic style as ‘a systematic and methodical 
sociological approach’10 and sees it as a means to interrogate competing versions of 
reality rather than an attempt to present reality as a totality. The constructed artifici-
ality and formalism of the aesthetic style in 24 City plays against the other signifiers 
in the film that codify it as realist – the long-take shots, the interviews and the use 
of diegetic sound. This aesthetic style creates the sense of a sociological study, but 
one that is ambiguous. 24 City creates a sense of elegy, in part through careful pacing 
and the use of long-take shots, in part through a musical score that uses slow-tempo 
sostenuto string compositions in minor keys. The film brings history to the fore 
through a series of different voices, intending to follow the postmodern problematic 
of avoiding grand narratives. 24 City presents not just a visual history, but also an 
oral/auditory history, mixing the stories recounted by the characters with poems and 
songs – not only to signal changes in time, but also to create a multilayered fabric of 
history. The demolition of the factory exists alongside these multilayered memories 
and lives.
 The changes in the representation of subjectivity and urban space evident in 24 City 
are especially prominent in the character of Su Na, who bookends the film. Su Na is 
a young 20-something woman who is intended, no doubt, to be an image of China in 
the late 2000s. She is presented as enterprising, ambitious and savvy. She is aware of 
the importance of the way she looks and is first shown meticulously applying make-up. 
A thread that runs throughout the Su Na segment of the film is her awareness of the 
importance of consumption and the presentation of the self within the cycle of 
consumption – from her carry-case to her stylish, foreign-made Volkswagen Beetle 
car. Su Na works as a personal shopper for rich Chengdu women and travels to Hong 
Kong to purchase fashion and other consumer items on their behalf. Her job is, of 
course, a huge contrast with the life offered to the workers in Factory 420 and evidence 
of the shift toward a more consumption-oriented economy in China in the 1990s. Su 
Na is also presented as an atomized individual; she is never shown with other people 
and the only interaction she has is via a hands-free phone in her car, where she talks 
to her clients (inevitably about money).
 The presentation of Su Na is typical of the style of 24 City more generally, favouring 
slow, static, carefully composed shots and studied camera movements that seem 
weighty with significance. The Su Na sequence begins, after a brief introduction to the 
character driving in her car and talking to her client, with a long-shot of fields with 
buildings in the background. In the left foreground of the shot is a young couple – the 
woman poses while the man takes a photograph. Bright yellow flowers run horizon-
tally across the middle of the frame and the camera pans slowly to the right, to where 
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two middle-aged women dressed in agricultural workers’ clothes walk down a path in 
the centre of the screen with their implements. As the camera begins to pan slowly to 
the right, Su Na’s car is revealed in the right foreground, on a slight diagonal. She is 
seated in the car, posed with her arms folded, looking out of the window. In the right 
background are a number of dark tower blocks, perhaps ready to be demolished.
 The camera continues to pan right, bringing Su Na’s car into the centre of the shot, 
as the two agricultural workers walk in front of her car and out of shot to the right. The 
slow pan brings Su Na to the centre of the frame with the buildings in the background. 
There is a constant low-level rumble of traffic noise heard throughout this scene and 
many others in 24 City, as if a constant reminder of the persistent presence of the 
city even in this seeming rural location. A counterpoint is created between the bright 
colours of the flowers, the car and the darker buildings in the background. The next 
shot is a close mid-shot of Su Na in her car looking out of the window on the right of 
the image; the left of the image is filled with the vivid yellow flowers. The words ‘Su 
Na, born 1982 in Chengdu’ appear on the screen.
 The counterpoint created in this scene purposefully encompasses the young 
couple, the two women workers, and Su Na. Even the very posing of a car in a field 
seems to mimic familiar images from American cinema that treats the car as an 
emblem of consumption and liberation. The shot is carefully composed and highly 
complex, as with many of the shots in 24 City, containing numerous layers of reference 
that are dense with information and significance. It provides a comment on different 
social roles in its contrast between Su Na, the young couple and the older agricul-
tural workers. At the same time, it is tinged with humour – the incongruity of Su Na 
posing in her car in the countryside, seemingly out of place with the rest of the scene 
around her, cannot but strike the viewer as comically odd. Su Na, as with many of 
the characters in 24 City, knows that she is posing for the camera. In this way, the 
film constructs a sense of realism by acknowledging the presence of the camera, but 
counterpoints this sense of realism with the highly composed and structured nature 
of the shot, indicating that what is presented is artificial and not a verisimilitude.
 The Su Na sequence continues with two shots of her in the interior of the desolate 
Factory 420, as she slowly wanders through the now empty building and, in a 
voiceover, recounts her memories of her school days in the factory. There is then 
an eight-minute monologue with a static shot of Su Na framed mid-shot inside the 
factory between two large windows. The cityscape of Chengdu is visible through the 
windows, with its tower blocks and expressways busy with traffic. Su Na’s monologue 
is interrupted twice by a fade to black, which seems to indicate the passing of time as 
it becomes gradually darker outside. The monologue concludes with Su Na crying, 
as she talks about the hard life her parents endured working in Factory 420 and how 
she wants to make lots of money to be able to buy them a house in the new housing 
development.
 The final shot of 24 City is an exterior mid-shot of Su Na. She is framed in profile as 
she looks out to the left over Chengdu’s buildings and expressways from a high vantage 
point at the top of the now desolate Factory 420. The camera slowly pans left to reveal 
more of the Chengdu cityscape, which gradually fills the screen as Su Na disappears 
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from the right edge of the frame. The camera continues to pan slowly over the vast 
cityscape, while the sound of traffic and city life in the background becomes louder. 
The film ends with the words of a poem by Wan Xia appearing on the screen, as the 
image fades to black and music rises. What is left at the end of 24 City is the ‘grim 
real’: the bare autonomous life of the city that subsumes the subject. 24 City leaves the 
Sixth Generation at an impasse, stuck in the grim real without escape. Stylistically, the 
film feels exhausted, with a representational inarticulacy that seems to be smothered 
by the monstrous all-consuming city. Interestingly, Jia did not make a feature film for 
five years after 24 City and, when he did with A Touch of Sin (Tian zhu ding) in 2013, 
he would turn to the wuxia martial arts genre.
 In the iGeneration, the grim real disappears, replaced by a brutal realism or by more 
commercially oriented filmmaking. The brutal realism, seen in the hooligan films, 
conveys a savagely violent, almost anthropological vision of China – the underbelly of 
neoliberal development. The more commercially oriented cinema celebrates China’s 
newfound economic power, even if sometimes appearing uneasy about the rising 
inequality that has been a consequence of economic growth. In 24 City, Su Na can be 
read as a transitional figure from the Sixth Generation to the iGeneration: she is not 
a marginal character and she embraces the new economy and cycle of consumption 
against which many Sixth Generation characters stand. Su Na’s tears, her sadness as 
she tells how she wants a better life than her parents, should be read not as tears for 
her parents’ wasted past but for the grim real of Su Na’s present, where the only ethics 
is money. What disappears in the character of Su Na is the embodied collective once 
at the very heart of Chinese life, which has been replaced by the atomized consumer.
 Like 24 City, Summer Palace ends with tears, but of a different kind, tears that I 
argue seek to bypass the grim real and open historical events to thought. The film 
tells the story of Yu Hong, a young girl from a provincial city, who comes to study 
at university in Beijing in the late 1980s and becomes involved in the tumultuous 
political protests in China in 1989. The protests have the name Tiananmen in the 
West, after the square in central Beijing that became the protests’ focal point.11
 The film is two hours and 22 minutes long and split into three parts, largely defined 
by the locales featured in each part. The first and shortest part, almost a prologue, 
lasts 15 minutes and is set in Yu Hong’s hometown Tumen, a nondescript city on the 
China–Korea border. The second part, approximately an hour, takes place in Beijing, 
where Yu Hong discovers a world of art, politics and sex, and forges the key relation-
ships in the film, with her friend Li Ta and her lover Zhou Wei. The Beijing section 
culminates with Yu Hong and her friends going to join the protests at Tiananmen and 
Yu Hong learning of Zhou Wei’s infidelity with Li Ta. With their university suffering a 
government crackdown following the Tiananmen protests, Yu Hong returns to Tumen 
with her old boyfriend, and the friends remain separated for the rest of the film. The 
final part of Summer Palace, also approximately an hour, takes place nine years later 
and deals with the characters in their adult lives. Yu Hong, who lives in China, is 
consumed by memories of Zhou Wei and drifts between jobs, cities and unfulfilled 
sexual relationships, as the country undergoes rapid economic and social change. 
Meanwhile, Li Ta, Zhou Wei and Li Ta’s partner, Ruo Gu, live as exiles from China 
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in Berlin. Li Ta’s suicide is the catalyst for Zhou Wei to return to China, where he 
eventually has a meeting with Yu Hong in the coastal city of Beidaihe. The encounter 
is a failure, and Zhou Wei drives off without saying goodbye.
 Summer Palace represents a transition from the Sixth Generation to the iGener-
ation, as it explores a more expansive temporal and spatial canvas, as well as 
creating a different relationship to the historical. Xudong Zhang characterized the 
Sixth Generation as a ‘vanishing cinema,’12 and Summer Palace is about revealing a 
vanished moment in China’s political and social history. While 24 City retains the 
key Sixth Generation trope of the city as a site of ruin, Summer Palace turns the city 
into the site of a political ruin. The first section of Summer Palace, set in Yu Hong’s 
hometown, is typically Sixth Generation in terms of theme and aesthetic style. The 
focus on anonymous provincial city life, the pared-down realist aesthetic and muted 
palette bring to mind films such as Jia Zhangke’s 2002 Unknown Pleasures (Rèn xiāo 
yáo, literally Free from all constraint). However, Summer Palace shifts registers in the 
Beijing section, using long steadicam tracking shots and elliptical editing to create a 
sense of energy and vibrant life. In Suzhou River (Sūzhōu Hé, 2000), an earlier Lou 
Ye Sixth Generation film, rapid montage shots of Shanghai were used to represent 
Shanghai as an unstable physical entity, which paralleled the film’s representation of 
ambiguous and disappearing subjects. Summer Palace’s use of montage is not focused 
on the representation of Beijing but on unspoken political events of a traumatic past.
 The enunciating positions in Summer Palace are more complex and the switch 
between registers is more fluid and less clearly signalled than in 24 City. The narrative 
viewpoint in Summer Palace has at least three layers or enunciating positions: the 
point of view of Yu Hong, expressed most directly via her voiceovers and shots which 
appear to signal her memories; short passages of real footage, such as documentary 
shots of the Tiananmen protests and historical events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the return of Hong Kong to Chinese rule; and the narrative eye of the camera, 
which shows events at which Yu Hong is neither present nor a witness. The complex 
and multiple enunciating positions should be read as an indication of the move away 
from realist representation, or xianchang, to a more layered enunciating position that 
seeks to create a sense of history and memory and explore the relationship between the 
two. Summer Palace does not construct an omniscient narrative perspective; instead, 
it approaches the historical through the personal, able to create a clear enunciating 
position for the viewer without taking a didactic or polemical approach to Tiananmen.
 A scene in Summer Palace that exemplifies the style of the Beijing section is the 
one in which Yu Hong and Zhou Wei get together for the first time. The scene takes 
place in the kind of Western-style bar that was becoming popular in the late 1980s 
in China’s major cities. The scene is not only a narrative device to bring the two 
characters together, but also a means of representing Beijing in the late 1980s as a place 
of liberalizing energy and possibility. The sequence begins with a steadicam tracking 
shot of Yu Hong and Li Ta facing the camera as they walk down a street at night past 
lit doorways – perhaps Sanlitun, Beijing’s famous bar street renowned for its bars and 
Western influence. As the two friends walk with Yu Hong’s arm draped over Li Ta, 
the American song ‘You’re Just Too Good to be True’ by Andy Williams plays in the 
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background. The song could be diegetic music from a bar or non-diegetic music, but 
either way it emphasizes the shift in the film to a more cosmopolitan and externally 
directed space that contrasts sharply with the first section of Summer Palace in Tumen. 
The camera turns left as the two friends walk through a doorway into a bar and the 
camera follows them from behind as they enter the busy interior. A sequence of cuts 
then shows various groups within the bar: a seated woman reading a Chinese poem in 
front of an abstract painting, a number of shots of a group having a political discussion 
and a shot of a man singing, accompanied by a girl drumming on the bar and someone 
playing a guitar off-screen. The camera remains mobile throughout these shots, as if 
a curious onlooker exploring an unfamiliar space. The sequence creates the sense of a 
liberal, communal, shared space of creativity and openness.
 The sequence continues with a cut to a mid-shot of Yu Hong alone as she takes 
a seat at the bar, while the American song ‘Seven Little Girls Sitting in the Backseat’ 
by Paul Evans begins to play in the background. The choice of the song seems rather 
comical, as if to emphasize the innocence and even naïvety of the characters at this 
stage of the film. There is then a series of complex cuts between Yu Hong as she sits at 
the bar and Li Ta, Ruo Gu and Zhou Wei, who appear to be sitting across the room. 
Li Ta and Ruo Gu move onto the busy dance floor as the steadicam shot tracks behind 
them, and Zhou Wei comes over to Yu Hong, to try and persuade her to join him on 
the dance floor. Zhou Wei is at first unsuccessful, until Li Ta and Ruo Gu come over 
and help to cajole Yu Hong onto the dance floor. Yu Hong and Zhou Wei dance apart 
at first, but eventually move closer together. The use of editing in this sequence creates 
an interesting dynamic for the viewer, who is led to identify with Yu Hong through a 
number of angles appearing to signal her viewpoint. At the same time, the use of ellip-
tical editing creates a sense of incompleteness, as if the events are being imperfectly 
remembered. Interestingly, the scene recurs at the end of the film as a coda, with the 
viewer told in writing what happened to the characters after the film ends. The music 
in the coda is no longer the breezy lines of ‘Seven Little Girls,’ but the Summer Palace 
theme, composed by Peyman Yazdanian, that appears throughout the film. The theme 
features an insistent bass line overlaid with a slow piano line that is suggestive of loss.
 The Tiananmen protests serve as the central pivot in Summer Palace and divide 
the film in half. Despite the fact that much is alluded to and remains off-screen, the 
sequence represents, as Michael Berry comments, ‘the single most extensive portrayal 
of the incident to yet appear (or disappear) on the Chinese screen.’13 Tiananmen is, in 
many ways, the event that is the unspoken core of the Sixth Generation – the struc-
tural cause that conditions their films, yet always existing as an absence. The trauma 
of Tiananmen and its aftermath can account for the turn away from any direct social 
or political engagement by the Sixth Generation and the intense, sometimes almost 
narcissistic, focus on the individual who seeks an island of refuge from the world. I 
read the irruption of Tiananmen in Summer Palace as the culmination of the Sixth 
Generation – the moment it exhausts itself by saying the unspeakable and representing 
the unrepresentable.
 It is in the Tiananmen sequence that the combination of steadicam shots and 
elliptical editing has its greatest effect. The sequence begins with the sound of running 
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feet, excited chatter and non-diegetic music in the form of the song ‘Oxygen’ by Lei 
Hao14 beginning to play, as a series of quick shots with shaky framing shows groups 
of students rushing to a truck and climbing on board. The song ‘Oxygen’ plays 
throughout the Tiananmen sequence and is crucial to its overall impact. ‘Oxygen’ 
contrasts moments of building anticipation through a pulsing, insistent bass line and 
quiet, almost-whispered lyrics to moments of climax where the female vocals reach a 
soaring crescendo accompanied by swelling strings in the background. The crescendos 
fall with the emergence of a fragile piano line that suggests the impossibility of 
sustaining the intense moments. The lyrics of ‘Oxygen’ are Chinese and can be inter-
preted as a meta-commentary on the sequence, particularly the chorus, which speaks 
of a moment of intense climax of overwhelming proportions: ‘All rays of light rush into 
me / I inhale all of the oxygen / All objects lose their weight / My love proceeds to the 
end of all roads.’15
 The Tiananmen sequence continues with a series of shots of a larger group of 
students, including Li Ta, running to the truck. The movement of the students, quick 
editing, mobile-framing and music create the sense of a rush of energy and pressing 
urgency, as well as the excited optimism of the students. There is a sense of being 
caught in the moment, of xianchang pushed to its most chaotic extreme – of being 
on-the-scene and desperately trying to capture what is happening. The viewer is left 
unsure whether he or she is being implicated in the events or being asked to observe 
them, and this oscillation creates an interesting position for the viewer. For example, 
the next shot is a low-angle shot zoom-in on Yu Hong at her dormitory window 
looking down at the students climbing into the truck. There are then two other quick 
shots of the students climbing onto the truck, but not from Yu Hong’s perspective, and 
the next shot is again of Yu Hong as she turns away from the window. The next shot 
swivels 180 degrees in a whip-pan from the students on the truck to Yu Hong and her 
friend Dongdong running to the truck and clambering aboard, as the sound of the 
truck’s engine being started is heard.
 The vocals of ‘Oxygen’ reach the first crescendo over a number of shots of the 
students on the now-moving truck with banners flying. A mid-shot frames Yu Hong, 
Zhou Wei and Li Ta centrally as part of the group of students on the truck and they 
begin to sing and cheer together. The next shot is of the truck as part of a convoy 
of trucks presumably entering the area around Tiananmen Square and the students 
waving to crowds of supporters off-screen, as cheering and beeping horns are heard. 
A virtual match-on-action cut then moves from the fictional truck to a shot of real 
documentary footage of a truck from the Tiananmen protests. A sequence of 13 shots 
of real footage of the Tiananmen protests follows, lasting 32 seconds in total. The 
real documentary shots include images of the protestors at a packed Beijing railway 
station and crowds of demonstrators carrying placards and banners.16 The final two 
shots show Tiananmen Gate with the famous portrait of Mao almost hidden behind 
the demonstrators’ flags and a long shot of Chang’an Avenue (Cháng’ān Jiē), the long 
road in Beijing that leads to Tiananmen Square, packed with demonstrators. At this 
point, the film cuts back to the fictional world, with Yu Hong, Li Ta and Zhou Wei 
running down a road in a state of euphoria, presumably having just left the protests at 
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Tiananmen, although their mood quickly dampens, as if they already fear what is to 
come.
 The use of the documentary footage represents an irruption of the Real, in the 
Lacanian sense, into the fictional narrative of Summer Palace. The Real in Lacan is 
the thing that the symbolic (in the form of discourse) and the imaginary (in the form 
of fantasies) come up against but against which they ultimately fail.17 The real footage 
has the effect of bringing the fictional events into collision with the historical real and 
forces the viewer to confront the images on the screen as not simply fictional. For 
a Chinese viewer, the scenes are likely to be deeply shocking and also for some no 
doubt intensely liberating, as Tiananmen is one of the great unspoken black holes in 
Chinese political and social history. Even in 2013, 4 June proved to be a sensitive date 
for the Chinese authorities, with the anniversary of Tiananmen being censored in the 
news in China as well as on the internet.18 Perhaps unsurprisingly, this provocative 
sequence led Chinese authorities to ban Lou Ye from filmmaking.19 The consequence 
of this irruption of the Real is a breakdown of the symbolic order: in film terms, of the 
fictional images; for the characters, the breakdown of their world. In Summer Palace, 
the events of Tiananmen cannot be integrated into the symbolic order by the friends 
and remain an open wound throughout the rest of the film.
 Zhou Wei and Li Ta’s infidelity adds a secondary layer to the overall catastrophic 
breakdown. As the university is thrown into chaos – which the viewer is left to 
conjecture is a result of the government/military crackdown – a student tells Yu 
Hong about Zhou Wei and Li Ta’s infidelity. Shortly afterwards, Zhou Wei is told by 
Dongdong that Yu Hong knows of his infidelity and that their relationship is over. As 
Zhou Wei and Dongdong look for Yu Hong at night, they stumble across violent scenes 
of a burning car, students throwing rocks and soldiers with guns slowly advancing. 
Although the film does not show any direct confrontation between the students and 
soldiers, it is easy to make the chilling connection to the government-authorized 
crackdown on the Tiananmen demonstrators. The infidelity between Zhou Wei and 
Li Ta is no doubt a means of expressing the catastrophe of Tiananmen without being 
able to show events directly. However, it should not be read as simply a clever mask 
through which the film can indirectly approach the political dimension of the bitter 
defeat of Tiananmen. The creation of a dual breakdown works in both a literal and 
metaphorical sense, and serves to emphasize the trauma, betrayal and destruction 
the characters, particularly Yu Hong, experience. The attempt to represent and thus 
reflect on the events of Tiananmen is in contrast to earlier Sixth Generation works, 
which turn to the grim real as an escape from any direct representation of the political 
sphere. 24 City, for example, separates the personal and political, seeking to navigate 
an uneasy path between the two spheres; however, this runs the risk of suggesting 
the two can be compartmentalized and hides the inter-relationship between the two 
spheres.
 The final section of Summer Palace explores the consequences of the past and 
highlights the move from portrait to biography that I argue is a symptom of the 
transition from the Sixth Generation to the iGeneration. It is through Yu Hong’s 
sexual relations that Summer Palace most clearly moves to the biographical, exploring 
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the changes to her character during the various stages of her life. Summer Palace 
uses sex scenes in part to stir controversy, but more fundamentally to explore adult 
characters who have complex needs of intimacy, love and pleasure. Yu Hong’s first 
sexual encounter, both in the film and in her character’s life, is with her boyfriend in 
Tumen, and the scene emphasizes the tentativeness of the experience by the virtual 
quiet maintained throughout the sequence and the characters’ awkwardness. Yu 
Hong’s character and sexual development blossom in Beijing through her relationship 
with Zhou Wei. The relationship is intense and loving, as well as volatile and 
passionate. Romantic scenes of them riding bikes around Kunming Lake (Kūnmíng 
Hú), the famous lake around Beijing’s Summer Palace, are mixed with scenes of their 
love-making and contrasted with scenes of violence between the two. The heightened 
personal feelings, of course, correspond with the amplified political events presented 
in the Beijing section. In the final section, Yu Hong has a number of relationships, 
which appear as intense moments of pleasure and release, but which are detached 
from true feelings of intimacy and express her character’s sense of emptiness in the 
grim real of 2000s China.
 It will be sex in the form of a second infidelity between Zhou Wei and Li Ta, who is 
still partnered with Rou Gu, that drives Summer Palace to its conclusion. After Zhou 
Wei and Li Ta have sex in his Berlin apartment, the next scene sees the two characters 
with Rou Gu on the streets of Berlin, where the friends come across a left-wing demon-
stration while out walking. During the scene, the friends go onto a rooftop, presumably 
at a friend’s house, and Li Ta commits suicide by jumping from the building. As Michael 
Berry points out, the two key events, the personal and political, mirror those from 
the Beijing section. He describes the demonstration as follows: ‘The spectral return of 
these socialist deities in an age of liberal economic reform and material prosperity is a 
reminder of the lingering power of the state to discipline, punish and regulate.’20
 However, it is not the state that Summer Palace endows with libidinal force; rather, 
it is the emancipatory power of the collective that the film celebrates, seen in the earlier 
scenes in Beijing. The true moments of pleasure in the film are collective – sports, 
dancing, discussions, demonstrations – or intimate sexual relations. The prominence 
of the red flags on the streets of Berlin during the left-wing demonstration is not an 
echo of the power of the state, but of the optimism of the friends as they rode on the 
truck to Tiananmen. The idea is reinforced in a shot, shortly after Li Ta has committed 
suicide, of Zhou Wei standing alone on a Berlin street as he listens to a street-band 
play ‘Suliko’ – an old Georgian folk song popular in the Soviet Union under Stalin.21 
The sense of sadness Zhou Wei expresses in this scene is not the fear of the lingering 
power of the state, but the sense of lost love, lost possibilities and lost comradeship 
as suggested by the song. Summer Palace cuts from Zhou Wei listening to ‘Suliko’ in 
Berlin to Yu Hong back in China in a restaurant, listening to an accordionist, which 
reinforces the idea of separation. Li Ta’s suicide is not caused by her renewed infidelity; 
rather, the infidelity is a futile attempt to recapture the past and escape from the grim 
real. The sight of red flags at the demonstration in Berlin proves unbearable for Li Ta, 
the most vibrant, artistic character in the film, and her suicide is a mourning for the 
lost emancipatory possibilities offered by the red flag.
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 Following Li Ta’s death, Zhou Wei returns to China for the final, failed encounter 
with Yu Hong. The two former lovers meet at the coastal city Beidaihe in a small hotel 
room and appear to be about to rekindle their love. However, when Yu Hong leaves to 
get some drinks, Zhou Wei, sensing that the relationship is over and cannot be resur-
rected, drives off without saying goodbye. I read the scene as an attempt to refuse both 
the grim real and any easy resolution that would close the events of the film. Summer 
Palace wants to leave an open wound to challenge the viewer and to open memory out 
into the historical real, and thus allow the events of Tiananmen and their impact to be 
considered. At the end of 24 City, the grim real smothers the screen, leaving nothing 
except for a song: an abstract, rather weak residue. Summer Palace, by contrast, opens 
new avenues of thought to a new generation, allowing them to think about their 
origins and how the defeat of Tiananmen conditioned the grim real of ‘the brave new 
capitalist world’ in which China and the iGeneration are left stranded.
 In this chapter, I have traced the origins of the iGeneration through an exami-
nation of two Sixth Generation films that display symptoms of the transition to a new 
configuration. Both the iGeneration and the Sixth Generation must be read as condi-
tioned by the economic and social factors prevalent at the time in which they emerged. 
The Sixth Generation draws on a vernacular of the city and utilizes xianchang, as 
well as a specular gaze, to create an intense focus on notions of reality and truth. The 
iGeneration is in many ways a more carefree configuration, conditioned by digital 
culture and Chinese neoliberalism – an economic mode that mixes global capitalism 
with autocratic state control. It is polymorphous as an aesthetic, heterogeneous and 
universal, it reflects the diversity (and inequality) of China as a major world power. 
The Sixth Generation followed the familiar model of minor national cinemas gaining 
recognition through distribution and visibility at international (mainly Western) film 
festivals and the international art film circuit. The iGeneration, by contrast, is marked 
by the dispersion of the internet – infinitely accessible to anyone with a computer, 
and yet at the same time frequently ghettoized to those who know where to access 
the relevant material. The Sixth Generation is fundamentally a cinematic movement, 
while the iGeneration marks the arrival of the post-cinematic moment in China 
explored in this volume.22
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Digitizing City Symphony, Stabilizing the 
Shadow of Time : Montage and Temporal–
Spatial Construction in San Yuan Li1
Ling Zhang
As an audiovisual medium that developed amid advances in modern technology and 
sensitivity, cinema from its inception formed an intimate affinity with changing urban 
cityscapes. With their ability to capture urban images, reconstruct urban time–space 
and represent urban experience, the ‘city symphony’ films from the 1920s and 1930s2 
constitute a film mode that has been investigated by numerous film and cultural 
critics, social theorists and urban geographers, leading to diverse historical, theoretical 
and geographical accounts.3 City symphony films deploy a combination of everyday 
images and complex montage, an avant-garde artistic practice and documentary 
impulse, in order to articulate the new intensity of speed and excessive sensory 
stimulations that define experience in the rapidly and incessantly changing modern 
city.4 The cinematic portraits of modern metropolises such as Berlin, Paris, New York5 
and Moscow culminate in two exemplary aesthetically sophisticated films during the 
interwar years: Walther Ruttmann’s Berlin, Symphony of a Metropolis (Berlin: Die 
Sinfonie der Großstadt 1927) and Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera (Chelovek 
s kinoapparatom 1929), which highlight the significance of the montage aesthetic in 
conveying the modern mentality of city life and giving it new prominence.6
 In Alexander Graf ’s view, montage, as an expression of urban modernity, played 
an essential role in defining film as a ‘modern’ art form. The representation and 
reconstruction of the pace and rhythm of urban life, as expressed through editing 
techniques, is the overriding concern of the city symphony film genre.7 Montage 
reconstructs fragmented time by reassembling individual shots taken in various 
locations, simultaneously or consecutively. It also spatializes time and creates intricate 
rhythms within a filmic text. Thus, the city symphony film is striving to become the 
most appropriate form for audiovisually representing the modern urban experience, 
while at the same time revealing the urban subject’s unconscious experience or fantasy 
of modern urban life. The standard metrical editing rhythm at the formal level in city 
symphony films, together with an exploration of the dynamics of a global space – time 
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continuum on the level of content,8 embody the modernist impulse, the ideal of visual 
transparency, and the ordering of chaos. By surmounting the human eye’s limitations 
with the omniscient camera eye and non-linear montage synthesis,9 city symphony 
films create a totalizing and abstracting vision – one that is stylized, provocative and 
socially critical. Regarding the city as a significant site of empowerment and resistance, 
cultural critics and urban scholars have intensively discussed the problems of urban 
spatial segregation, social and cultural inequality each based on class, gender, race and 
ethnicity; academics also work within the same broad tradition, seeking to celebrate 
lived urban rhythms, anonymity and the differences found in city films.10
 In this chapter, I examine the employment of montage and the temporal-spatial 
construction in the contemporary Chinese city symphony film San Yuan Li (Ou Ning 
and Cao Fei, DV format, 40 minutes, 2003), in order to explore how the montage 
aesthetic in city symphony films has undergone temporal, spatial and medium/
material displacement and transformation, from the 1920s in the West to twenty-
first century China, and from celluloid to digital video. This case study also allows a 
closer look at the ways in which cinematic time–space and its representation of social 
time–space have been constructed within the city symphony film tradition, while 
maintaining its own stylistic and thematic uniqueness, as well as local specificity, 
entrenched in the Chinese sociopolitical context of urbanization and the third-world 
country’s interactions with neoliberal globalization. As a spatialization of global power 
and located on global circuits, the third-world city Guangzhou is both a generic, global 
city, one transcending locality and temporality, and a city with stubborn local and 
temporal anchors. And it is Guangzhou’s rapid urban development that most likely 
intrigued the directors of San Yuan Li to envisage this twenty-first century bustling 
‘workshop of the world’ – not unlike Ruttmann’s frenetically paced Berlin of the 
twentieth century.
 As a ‘city symphony’ film11 paying homage to Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie 
Camera (1929), San Yuan Li can be put into the genealogy of the city symphony film 
tradition via world film history. However, with an almost 70-year gap between the 
films, the contemporary city symphony in San Yuan Li displays considerable modifi-
cations12 and distinguishing characteristics that make it distinct from other early ‘city 
symphony’ films – not only in terms of form, content and social contexts, but also in 
term of medium. The digital video format that San Yuan Li deploys is imbued with 
some ontological and material differences from the conventional city symphonies, 
which are made with silver-based film stock.13
 The intricate spatio-temporal configuration in San Yuan Li is achieved and 
enhanced by its ingenious deployment of cinematic techniques like rapid montage, 
dynamic camera movements, and extreme camera angles, as well as the manipulation 
of time and speed through fast motion, slow motion and group photos with temporal 
duration.14 The rhythm and temporality constructed in the film are interdependent 
and intertwined with the social time and actual space in San Yuan Li, the village within 
Guangzhou city where the film is set.15 Guangzhou is the capital of Southern coastal 
Guangdong Province, regarded as the frontline of Chinese economic reform, a basin 
of production, and a window opening onto the outside world since the 1980s.
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 ‘San Yuan Li’ is an urban village (chengzhongcun), literally ‘village encircled by the 
city,’ characterized by large-scale rural–urban migration and the radical expansion of 
built-up urban areas. The rapid expansion of Chinese cities has been encroaching into 
surrounding villages since the 1990s. In Guangzhou, the metropolitan area expanded 
from 136 to 287 square kilometres between 1980 and 1999; it now contains 277 cheng-
zhongcun with approximately 1,000,000 indigenous villagers. Losing their farmland 
due to land requisition by the city government, while maintaining property rights 
over their own houses and their housing plots (zhaijidi), local villagers have built 
houses and leased these properties to rural migrant workers from all over the country 
at a premium rate. This new type of urban neighbourhood is considered transitional 
under China’s rapid urbanization because of the influx of new tenants from far-flung 
provinces.
 Chengzhongcun are generally perceived, from the policymaker’s perspective, as 
undesirable in terms of urban planning and governance because of their association with 
inappropriate land use, poor housing construction, severe infrastructural deficiencies, 
exacerbated social disorder and the deterioration of the urban environment. Some 
Chinese sociologists argue that chengzhongcun in fact contribute significantly to 
Chinese urbanization by offering a feasible solution to the housing problem of 
massive numbers of rural migrants, allowing city governments to take advantage of 
cheap and flexible rural labour without bearing the extra costs associated with labour 
relocation.16 Large portions of these urban villages have little connection to the city, 
even though they are physically proximate: they represent the ‘local’ within the ‘local’ 
and the global city of Guangzhou in globalization. The almost claustrophobic density 
of architecture and population in San Yuan Li contributes to the specificity of the space 
and the mentalities of its inhabitants. It also reveals social and historical problems 
related to urban expansion, urban planning, and the inevitable process of globali-
zation that are continued themes from the Urban Generation to the iGeneration.17
 The displacement of the ‘city symphony’ film genre not only implies temporal and 
spatial fluidity, but also provokes some contemplation on the imbricated relations 
between tradition, memory, modernity and urban experience. In San Yuan Li, tradition 
and modernity do not appear as a conventional dichotomy; they coexist peacefully 
and infiltrate each other. Local tradition and collective memory are embedded in 
contemporary cosmopolitan texture and experience, evoking a sense of ‘alternative 
modernity’ with a specific vernacular characteristic in perceiving and experiencing 
time and space in the globalization era, due to the uneven development and tempo-
rality between the West and China. To a certain extent, the urban village San Yuan Li 
is a dynamic site of autonomy resisting the hegemonic power of globalization through 
its own way of allocating and manipulating time and space. Not only are there uneven 
landscapes and sites of powerful symbolism in contemporary cities, but such places are 
capable of generating and maintaining robust and active communities; places where 
collective memory and local meaning shape the social and physical landscape.18 I see 
David Harvey and Michel de Certeau’s insightful accounts of urban time and space, as 
well as theories and observations of urban studies, as valuable frameworks for concep-
tualizing and contextualizing temporal–spatial constructions in San Yuan Li.19
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 In the process of creating compelling city audio-imagery and a cinematic promenade 
in San Yuan Li, the cameramen traverse and observe the urban space from a privi-
leged position, like the Baudelairian city flâneur who is ‘secure in his distance from 
the scenes he observes, and empowered by his ability to penetrate the “labyrinthine” 
spaces of the city.’20 Mediated by a detached and aestheticized view with a mechanical 
‘camera eye,’ the city flâneurs resist the ‘blasé attitude’ of the urban dwellers which 
Georg Simmel elaborates21 and instead produce defamiliarized images facilitated by 
the flexibility, spontaneity and immediacy of the digital medium, enhanced by the 
lightness of the digital camera and the sense of a de-historicized black and white 
digital image. With the film showing the act of walking, cartographic space is trans-
formed into a place of meaning and memory. Thus, within a single urban landscape, 
multiple places defined through use, imagination and a range of cultural practices 
will emerge. De Certeau argues that it is in the act of walking that a ‘myriad’ of uses 
write and rewrite the city as ‘their’ place – creating fragmentary stories that link and 
intersect with other fragmentary stories.22 Cities are comprised of multiple histories 
and a web of coexisting and contesting presents. In Giuliana Bruno’s words, ‘Different 
temporalities are spatially mapped as different sites are revisited in different bodies.’23 
Thus time, space and the rural–urban experience of San Yuan Li village in 2002 have 
been preserved, enriched and immortalized in the filmic tapestry of San Yuan Li, as 
a mobile cityscape and urban memory archive. San Yuan Li is both an homage to, 
and instantiation of, the early city symphony film tradition, and an updating of this 
genealogy, in response to both globalization’s interaction with the local village and to 
technological and aesthetic shifts within the film medium.
Metrical montage and the manipulation of cinematic time
Like music, film is a time-based medium and art form. As a ‘city symphony’ film, 
San Yuan Li is endowed with punctuality and precision, adhering to principles of 
balance and formal discipline in order to achieve dynamic coherence in its aural 
and visual composition.24 The composition is accentuated by both the visual layout 
and movement in an individual frame and the construction of rhythmic montage. 
In Alexander Graf ’s view, rhythmic montage involves the precise calculation of 
duration, which can be compared to musical composition.25 San Yuan Li privileges 
graphic qualities and rhythm over the chronology of the footage through the extensive 
use of metrical montage, and relinquishes the dawn-to-night temporal format that 
prevailed in early city symphony films.26 This configuration allows it to build up a 
more unrestricted narrative and spatio-temporal structure dependent exclusively on 
visual and aural rhythm.
 As a 40-minute long visual symphony, San Yuan Li consists of seven episodes.27 
The first act lasts nine minutes and 23 seconds, and functions as a prelude, depicting 
the process of approaching and traversing Guangzhou city by boat, motorcycle, 
automobile, and finally entering San Yuan Li village by subway.28 The second act is 
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about four minutes and 33 seconds long, and depicts the dense and unoccupied archi-
tectural space in San Yuan Li village in silence. The third section lasts slightly less than 
three minutes, and explores the spatial relationship between mobile airplanes and the 
stationary village in Guangzhou’s cityscape. The fourth episode is around five minutes, 
and portrays street life and performance in public space in the urban village.29 The 
fifth episode lasts about ten minutes, and illustrates nightlife, workshops, service and 
leisure in the village. The sixth segment is three minutes and 23 seconds, and consists 
of 18 group photos with temporal duration of local people in different vocations. 
The final act serves as a postscript, containing two parts: 32 seconds of subtitles 
briefly explaining the significant time markers in the official history of San Yuan Li 
village, and a four-minute outtake of the self-reflexive images of U-thèque members’30 
location shooting, accompanied by a lyrical song.
 The seven episodes are connected by themes and rhythm rather than any chrono-
logical order. This structure takes the spectator on a journey that approaches and 
penetrates the main protagonist of the film – San Yuan Li, the village within the city 
– layer by layer, locating it at the centre of Guangzhou and indicating its intimate yet 
distant relationship to the city.31 The film gradually focuses more on San Yuan Li’s 
residents, who are the essence of the space and who energize silent, uninhabited archi-
tecture into a bustling, vigorous urban village. The increasing vitality and dynamism 
that people bring into the concrete physical space resonate with the intensified tempo 
of the film. In addition, with the ‘music video’ style outtake in the final part, San 
Yuan Li echoes the demystification of the filmmaking process and self-referentiality 
of the camera as apparatus in Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera, which is achieved 
by incorporating footage of shooting, editing and screening the film within the film 
itself.32
 The narrative structure and audiovisual diegesis of San Yuan Li are complemented 
by the dynamic, speedy montage, which corresponds to the filmmakers’ (and the 
audience’s) perception of urban time and space, and which reassembles fragmentary 
images into an elaborate interpretation of San Yuan Li from a fresh perspective. In 
San Yuan Li editor Cao Fei’s words, ‘In editing [the film], [I attempted to] highlight 
visual density and speed. [These two elements] are also the conspicuous features in the 
development of the city; the almost frantic growth oppresses us and intrudes into our 
lives, and we have to be forced to accept it.’33 As the embodiment of a spectacular accel-
eration in the city’s life circle, the dazzling patterns of montage (including single-frame 
editing in some sequences) in San Yuan Li cut back and forth across time and space 
and intertwine disjointed and unruly themes and fragments simultaneously, providing 
an excess of sensory stimuli and unrestrained rhythm.
 The alternating audiovisual acceleration and deceleration of rhythm underscored 
by montage creates a rich pattern of pace in San Yuan Li. The strategy and theory 
of ‘interval,’ borrowed from musical terms and extolled by Dziga Vertov34 as the 
basis of his aesthetic project, also plays a significant role in transitioning from one 
movement, act, or theme to another. Between each two episodes in the film, there are 
intervals: images and music slow down, halt for a moment, and cross-fade before the 
next section starts, communicating through music or ambient sound. In this sense, 
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cinematic time seems to repose briefly, forming an effective contrast with the speed of 
the previous and subsequent parts and highlighting a pulsing rhythm.
 In addition to the use of intervals, the film’s aesthetic experimentation with radical 
temporal acceleration and deceleration involves a manipulation of speed as well as 
the reconstruction of cinematic time. The extensive deployment of fast motion35 and 
slow motion in San Yuan Li alters customary ways of representing actual time versus 
normative spectatorial perceptions of time, creating temporal elasticity. Moreover, 
these techniques generate a tension between the images in different speeds since there 
is only ‘relative speed’; alternating between images in various frame compositions, shot 
lengths and ranges also contributes to the effect. For example, in a 20-second sequence 
(7:33–7:55) in episode one, there is an intercut between fast-motion long shots of 
people entering a building or exercising in the street in comparison to standard-speed 
medium shots of an old woman having breakfast and pouring herself a cup of tea. 
Since the former group of images is in fast motion, the audience will likely have the 
illusion that the later group of standard-speed images are in slow motion. Cinematic 
time is not an absolute concept, but one that depends on contexts within the film and 
on the spectator’s perception; it can be understood as shortened or extended,36 even 
though its duration does not alter.
 Yuri Tsivian relates image speed and cinematic time with shot range in a metaphorical 
way: he regards slow motion as a ‘close-up’ of time.37 Slow motion affords the audience 
more time to scrutinize details in the frame, thus spatializing and visualizing time 
and creating the illusion of an extended and enlarged ‘now’ image. Since the time of 
an individual shot has been stretched with slow motion, a given amount of cinematic 
time contains fewer images. The fast-paced short film San Yuan Li does not utilize 
slow motion very frequently, which greatly increases the capacity of incorporating a 
large number of shots by employing fast motion and rapid montage. Two conspicuous 
examples of using slow motion, however, appear at 25:01 and 28:29 in the film; these 
sequences feature some security guards walking away from the camera and a ball that 
some boys are using to play soccer in the back alley dashing toward the camera. There 
are other slow-motion images, in close-up, of people laughing and of crowds flowing 
in the street. In these sequences, the motion slows down and the moving subjects or 
shifting facial expressions are endowed with a subtle poetic resonance that exceeds 
everyday life and realistic representation, especially when accompanied by music.
 When the film presents images in fast motion, the information presented is so 
overwhelming and transient that it becomes impossible for the spectator to examine 
the details carefully. This illusion of shortening cinematic time increases the image 
capacity in a given time range. However, like slow motion, fast motion also represents 
warped time and distorted motion, in this case through excessive dynamism. Moving 
human bodies in fast motion appear mechanical and almost burlesque, as exemplified 
by the shot of many people exercising in Act One. The human bodies with exaggerated 
speed of motion in this scene seem to be mechanized, performing like androids for the 
audience. However, San Yuan Li does more than involuntarily invoke Vertov’s fasci-
nation with the creation of a machine-man;38 in general, the film embraces a model of 
unregulated human energy.
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 The mechanization of the human body is redressed, in a manipulated, artificial 
way, in Act Six, with the group photos of San Yuan Li residents/inhabitants statically 
posing for the camera in various geometrical patterns. At first glance, these group 
photos seem to be faithful to recorded time (real time in normal speed). However, they 
serve to probe the interstices between recorded time and playback time, employing 
slightly slow or fast motion that can only be discerned when one subject in the frame 
changes facial expression (smiling or blinking), or when another subject traverses 
the foreground of the frame.39 Since people are supposed to maintain a still position 
when taking photographs, which makes slight shifts difficult to detect, it is only in 
these moments that the cinematic time can be seen to be fluid and not frozen. In Ou 
Ning’s words, ‘The static shooting combines still photography and moving image; 
the images seem still, but in fact some tiny moving details are discernible, that will 
invoke an interesting viewing experience.’40 In spite of manipulations of speed, the 
spatio-temporal continuities within these roughly 11-second shots mostly remain 
uninterrupted.
 The tension between photographic mimesis and dynamic motion in these group 
portraits is embodied by the carefully grouped human bodies, which are reminiscent 
of a tableau vivant, a popular spectacle of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
that exhibited mimesis in the form of ‘living pictures,’ in which live ‘actors’ adopted 
immobile poses in imitation of artworks or historical and literary scenes.41 Devoid of 
the imitation dimension in tableau vivant here, these live bodies in this sequence of 
the film are made to freeze (though not strictly, as in tableau vivant) and the corporeal 
landscape turns the body itself into a ‘site’ of exhibition. However, the bodies in 
exhibition are not simply passive objects of viewing; they confront the viewer and 
the camera unflinchingly and even produce self-reflective images if we consider the 
camera lens as a mirror. Furthermore, the four-dimensional temporal-spatial configu-
ration of these animated group photos conveys a sense of uncanniness or uneasiness 
at the moment of confrontation, while the extra-diegetic music and ambient sounds 
seem to hamper this sense42 through acoustic mediation and aestheticization. This 
type of ‘bodily experience of affectivity’43 is also related to the representation and 
perception of time in the digital media age, as Mark Hansen has argued: ‘Insofar 
as new media art invests in the bodily experience of affectivity, intensifying it and 
enlarging its scope, it might be said to embody time consciousness and, indeed, to 
embody the being of time itself.’ The shift from an abstract consciousness of time to 
an embodied affectivity allows for a fuller and more intense experience of subjectivity 
and intimacy.44 The importance of affect is also acknowledged by Ou Ning: ‘[…] 
Taking group photos is a way of expressing emotions for Chinese people; I want to 
denote my identification with them by shooting the footage as group portraits because 
they have inconceivable wisdom and energy in facing harsh reality. There is a kind of 
poetics transcending reality.’45
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Temporalizing visual and acoustic space
In addition to still human bodies in group photos, San Yuan Li foregrounds human 
bodies navigating and mapping space. This is true both of the human subjects in 
the film and of the cameramen as they convey a mobile and subjective vision with 
their ‘mechanical eye.’ The film attempts to construct a three-dimensional audio-
visual space (however fragmented) by combining metrical montage, innovative 
camera movements, unusual camera angles and sophisticated extradiegetic music 
and ambient sound. The mixture of abstract architectural photography and figurative, 
documentary-style sequences presents both a tranquil architectural space devoid of 
human activity and a human-scape which energizes that physical space. These spatial 
continuities persist through rapid successions of disparate and incoherent images that 
suggest sharply discontinuous temporal associations.
 Elusive cinematic space is interdependent with the particularities of the physical 
space of the urban village San Yuan Li. Located at the fringe of Guangzhou city a 
decade ago, San Yuan Li has now found itself in the centre of the city after decades 
of urban expansion. It is surrounded by gleaming high-rise buildings and stands in 
great proximity to the Guangzhou railway station and Baiyun airport.46 San Yuan Li 
has become a besieged urban village, an encircled neighbourhood with porous spatial 
boundaries preserving its own life rhythms, administrative system and rural social 
structure in contrast with the rest of the city. The village has assumed an aberrant 
extra-territoriality that outstrips the clutch of ‘normal’ urban life. As Michel de 
Certeau’s Concept City, which endeavours to render the city transparently, explains, 
‘Rational organization must thus repress all the physical, mental and political pollu-
tions that would compromise it.’47
 Some of the rural-rooted low-income migrant populations in San Yuan Li are 
considered ‘deviant’ by the government and mainstream media, as well as by a large 
number of urban residents; crimes and unlawful activities occurring in the area are 
regarded as social ‘pathologies.’ Many global cities have endured slum clearance and 
gentrification, in the name of rehabilitation and redevelopment, in order to control the 
urban spatial power agenda and turn an unruly space into areas for the middle class 
and their residential and recreational priorities and to rid the areas of the poor and 
the criminal.48 Cities are becoming more sharply divided into ghettos of homogeneity 
based on capital, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation and so on. People are actively 
seeking to avoid encounter and contact with difference, the (threatening) ‘Other,’ 
fostering and giving visual expression to greater imbalance of power and social, 
cultural and economic inequality. This inequality in turn leads to urban partitioning 
and enclaves of homogeneity. However, San Yuan Li’s complexity and vitality resist 
the government’s attempts at rationalized, standardized appropriations of time–space. 
The village strives to sustain its chaotic but vigorous autonomy, a combination (and 
juxtaposition) of global capitalist modes with socialist and agricultural traces.
 The term ‘urban village’ was coined by Taylor (1973) as a response to the bland 
and monotonous developments of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s; the UVF (Urban 
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Villagers Forum) developed the concept as an urban settlement which is small 
and of neighbourhood size; combines residential with work, retail and leisure 
units; aims to be self-sustaining; mixes different social and economic groups; has 
efficient transportation; and is well designed and managed. Despite criticism, the 
urban village has been recognized as a valuable way to encourage social interaction, 
create a balanced community, and unravel the complexities of urban sustainability 
from a systemic point of view.49 China’s urban village shares some similarities 
with the Western concept – such as pedestrian-oriented spaces, accessibility, self-
containment, mixed land use, and neighbourhood interaction. Nonetheless, these 
are largely contingent and spontaneous similarities rather than the results of 
conscious urban planning and management: for example, local villagers who lose 
their farmland build up rental houses that shelter members of the rural–urban 
low-income migrant community. Despite unruliness and disorder, security and 
social problems, the urban village alleviates urban poverty to a certain extent and 
provides rural migrants who lack social cohesion with a sense of belonging. This 
village-style of self-organization has preserved social and cultural traditions and 
played a large role in easing the pressure of urbanization in China.50
 Because of its horizontal spatial constraints, San Yuan Li has grown through 
vertical extension.51 The result is an extraordinary enclave of crowded, well-worn 
tenements, a maze of narrow winding lanes, a thin strip of sky and a hodge-podge 
of shops, eateries and service outlets, all surrounded by modern skyscrapers. In this 
context, architecture can be perceived as a mode of expression and communication. 
As the congestion of construction leaves only a small gap for light52 between adjacent 
structures, there is a serious erosion of privacy among the densely packed inhab-
itants, who, ironically, may never make acquaintance with one another or exchange 
a word. Therefore, as Georg Simmel puts it, ‘The bodily proximity and narrowness 
of space makes the mental distance only the more visible.’53 The physically intimate 
environments foster an anxious, claustrophobic and estranged existence, as well as 
an instrumental, blasé and reserved urban attitude, as a protective response to the 
relentless bombardment of stimuli that one experiences in the modern city.54 Ever 
since Western-style industrial capitalism and urbanization has taken root (in China), 
life in the cities is represented as the ‘unnatural setting for the anonymous interaction 
of an alienated population.’55 However, these rational and calculating factors also make 
liberation possible: they have freed people from the constraints and obligations that 
are a feature of communal country life. This temporary, transitional community of 
rural migrants is in many ways discursive, but linked to a specific site and embedded 
in a larger matrix of socioeconomic relations, forming a place-bound collective 
identity.
 Various temporalities coexist in what we might call a ‘temporal fusion’ within 
these intricate spaces, as well as in the relationship between these spaces and the 
rest of the city. The antique, traditional ancestral temples that epitomize the rural 
dwelling styles of southern China, together with the relics of a religious and patri-
archal kinfolk system, coexist with new rental dwellings illegally constructed by 
villagers to maximize incomes during the latest economic boom.56 The village lifestyle 
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and social network will not easily meet its demise with the local villagers’ changes 
in hukou registration status and occupation. The effervescent modern urban street 
life that has infiltrated San Yuan Li is also juxtaposed with the agrarian lifestyle on 
the village’s interconnected rooftops. Dispossessed of their agricultural lands, the 
villagers-turned-landlords repurpose their rooftops as sanctuaries and retrace their 
pastoral past by turning them into small farms where they grow plants and vegetables 
and raise poultry. This practice generates a conspicuous aerial landscape in the city 
scene, especially when airplanes constantly fly over these rooftop farms; the mobile 
modern technological invention accentuates the tranquil, traditional agricultural 
lifestyle both temporally and spatially, fusing the linear time of technological progress 
with the cyclical time of nature and agricultural convention. In David Harvey’s words, 
‘cyclical and repetitive motions (such as daily routines and seasonal rituals) provide 
a sense of security in a world where the general thrust of progress appears to be ever 
onwards and upwards into the firmament of the unknown.’57 However, the film’s 
employment of dynamic montage and jittery images of airplanes flying over the urban 
village reinforces a pervasive sense of insecurity and uncertainty.
 The airplanes also engage closely with local history and tradition through their 
spatial relationship with the city’s anti-British monument and with a traditional local 
performance (the lion dance). This is demonstrated in two scenes, both of which 
appear in Act Four: (1) a long-shot of an airplane gliding over a soaring monument; 
and (2) a long-shot of an airplane flitting across the frame while a lion-dancing perfor-
mance takes place on a terrace (18:59 and 20:49, respectively). The juxtaposition of the 
horizontal vector and fluttering noise of the plane with the silent, vertical immobility 
of the monument corresponds to the relationship between the ephemeral and fleeting 
and the eternal and immutable. History and memory are embedded in contemporary 
daily life through monument and ritual.
 As a landmark with emblematic meaning, the monument is imbued with a quality 
of permanence and bears the trace of suspended time. Time is stabilized by the 
fixed points of the monument, which incorporate and preserve a ‘mysterious’ sense 
of collective memory: the monument is dedicated to the civil insurrection of San 
Yuan Li villagers against British military forces 160 years ago – a rebellion against 
imperialist invaders that has been written into Chinese historical textbooks as an 
important part of local and national heroic anti-colonial history. The preservation of 
myth through ritual58 constitutes a key to understanding the meaning of monuments 
and, moreover, the implications of the founding of cities and of the transmission of 
ideas in an urban context.59 The place of singular local significance acts as repository 
of collective memory, with communal or shared architectural and spatial symbols; 
however, history itself is not a sufficient condition for generating memorials. The 
past does not inhere in places, but is fused and brought out by groups of actors and 
sequences of events. These sites seem to have a sacred quality about them, in the sense 
of their having been set apart from the mundane and infused with unusual powers of 
instruction and remembrance.60 The civic or public realm – the sites of ceremonies, 
parades and imposing public architecture, and the sites of movement and congre-
gation, of urban density and diversity – advocates a celebration of heterogeneity.
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 As a particular locality situated in a zone of intensive global–local negotiations, San 
Yuan Li is a place that is too complicated and unruly to be disciplined. It both relies on 
and resists globalization.61 It eludes or diverts control with its own rhythm, lifestyle and 
particular constructions of time–space. In San Yuan Li, there is neither a clear demar-
cation between work, leisure and entertainment time, nor a clear division between 
living and business space within some small workshops and factories. Unlike some 
early city symphony films, which underline the significance of the clock in embodying 
standardized time and regulating social life in the modern city,62 San Yuan Li does 
not highlight clocks showing exact time. Instead, it emphasizes quotidian scenes of 
the urban village in action over a 24-hour period as a way of suggesting its resistance 
to the regulated urban schedule and the partitioning of day and night. The creative 
energy permeating the village is partly due to the diverse and changing demographic 
mix of its inhabitants. The population consists mostly of migrant workers from other 
provinces seeking opportunities in the coastal city of Guangzhou, since living in an 
urban village is relatively inexpensive. They bring their local culture, habits, dialects 
and accents to this congested space, and experience a sense of linguistic heterogeneity 
and spontaneous self-diversification. San Yuan Li’s tradition and memory are diluted, 
and its culture is dynamically re-composed and rendered plural.
 The film language deployed in San Yuan Li reflects the cramped space, the chaotic 
yet vigourous atmosphere and the exuberant affectivity of the village. The spatial 
structure in the urban village is so dense that it makes a panorama nearly impossible, 
but the immense ‘sky plaza’ formed by the interconnected rooftop verandas provides 
a vantage point to display an omniscient view in high-angle shots. The formally and 
thematically associated montage and the graphic contrast between images in the 
film create a visual rhythm. The graphic match is constituted through analogous or 
contrasting shapes, lines, camera angles, viewpoints, light/shadow contrasts and other 
visual themes.63 The orderly perspective from above and the disorienting fragmen-
tation of living experience from below also create a compelling visual and sensory 
contrast. With these purposeful motifs, the disparate images and fragments of time–
space, though devoid of inherent correlations, are logically assembled to produce 
meaning and order.
 Moreover, multiple layers of movement – including camera movements, object 
movements within a single frame and double movements of both the camera and 
the vehicle on which the camera has been mounted – suggest the passage of time by 
traversing space and creating spectacular visual cadences. Elsewhere, Andrew Webber 
argues that transportation and motion pictures are coupled in the experience of the 
‘image rush’ of location in transit and a heightened experience of space through time. 
The city is understandable both as a spatial structure (a more or less fixed system of 
spaces and places) and as the motions or transitions that traverse that structure.64 Both 
the fixed and mobile sides of the city are explored and reinforced in the film, through 
elaborate camera movements and the manipulation of lenses, including rapid panning 
shots (horizontal movement), zooming shots (both inward and outward) and tracking 
shots (in-depth or lateral). These techniques penetrate perspectival space, creating an 
unstable, mobile and spatial depth and an evocative sensory experience.65 Through 
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associative montage, a sequence of rapid zooms in and out of rooftops (12:17 into 
the film) intensifies these dazzling and vertiginous effects. The intercutting between 
moving and static shots of the architectural space in Act Two66 puts moments of 
motion and stillness in constant contrast. It also represents movement through the 
mobilization of the abstract, geometric forms of architecture. The mobile vehicles67 
navigating among the motionless urban structures not only travel on the city’s 
skin-like surface (as in the case of the automobile, bus and train), but also underneath 
(subway) and above (airplane), thus constructing a vertical space that cuts across the 
three horizontal levels. On the one hand, the traversing vehicles oppose insularities 
and traverse spatial barriers; on the other hand, they confirm these barriers through 
the same actions. The unrestrained liberty suggested by the flowing, subjective view 
from a fast-moving boat, taxi or subway train augments and multiplies the camera’s 
own movement.68
 The acoustic space constructed by the film’s music and ambient sounds resonates 
with the vivid visual space created by elaborate metrical montage and camera 
movements, stimulating the viewer’s auditory sense. Alexander Graf points out the 
decisive role that music plays in city symphony films, as the mathematical abstraction 
of musical aesthetics endeavours to establish a film language intrinsic to the film 
medium in the city symphonies.69 In San Yuan Li, music determines the structure, 
creates and reinforces the rhythm and shapes the montage pattern70 through its tonal 
variations and tempo shifts. The images that are deprived of diegetic sound seem 
insubstantial and without depth, as if silent pictures were being assembled together; 
synchronized sound magically crystallizes the image and enables it to represent a 
realistic three-dimensional space. In San Yuan Li, most images are accompanied 
by music and added sounds; only a few sequences feature synchronized ambient 
sound. This indicates that the film does not intend to represent the urban village in 
a realistic documentary mode, but in an impressionistic, experimental way. Echoing 
the heterogeneous cityscape, the film emphasizes this urban plurality of sounds, by 
turning a cacophony and euphony with pulsating, extra-diegetic music and boisterous, 
ambient sound. We hear the diegetic sounds of a man playing gaohu,71 miscella-
neous voices from television, various provincial dialects and accents emerging from 
a public telephone booth, sounds from walkie-talkies, mahjong playing, car horns, 
street noise and so on. People are conspicuously involved in creating a sophisticated 
soundscape that plays a significant role in evoking an unruly, vibrant atmosphere. The 
spatial density of San Yuan Li village also exerts an influence on the quality, trans-
mission and perception of sound: the noise can either be sealed off or amplified into 
tremendous echoes.72 In addition, musical metaphors visualize and spatialize sound. 
At the beginning of Act Two, for instance, the music sounds like bells and symbolizes 
the footsteps of invincible time; in this sense, the onomatopoeic music auralizes the 
concept of time instead of visualizing it, thus departing from early city symphony films 
that utilize images of clocks as a corollary device.
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Conclusion
San Yuan Li inherits some vibrant characteristics from the tradition of the city 
symphony films. Its efforts to vividly portray the spatial distinctiveness of an urban 
village in specific historical time and to construct an intricate cinematic time–space 
are particularly indebted to Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera, with its ingenious 
deployment of metrical montage, black-and-white imagery and sensitivity to rhythm 
and tempo. However, as a contemporary digital video work made in a distinct 
cinematic, geographical and social context, San Yuan Li’s aesthetic experimentation 
in cinematic time (fast motion, slow motion and the semi-static group photo) and 
its manipulation of the spectatorial experience of time (shifts in recording speed, 
camera angle and soundtrack) distinguish it from early city symphony films and 
reflect the seemingly uncontrolled acceleration of temporal processes and a more 
fragmented reality of the current era. As Ou Ning explains, the film ‘chronicles the 
fragments of a Chinese city shattered by incessant waves of globalization.’73 Taken 
together, the manifold, fragmentary nature of visual impressions, intensified by rapid 
montage, profoundly alters the perception of discontinuous urban time and space in 
San Yuan Li.
 Furthermore, San Yuan Li develops a sense of time–space distinct from early city 
symphonies because of the new medium of digital video it employs. A delicate, grainy 
texture usually enriches the surface of silver-based film; in the digital image, however, 
the smooth, shiny surface constituted by layers of pixels facilitates an ‘urban-cinematic 
pellicle,’74 since the city as digital image is insistently experienced as face or skin. 
Additionally, in terms of the perception of time, Babette Mangolte claims that the 
difference between ‘real time’ and ‘screen time’ is not clear in digital viewing,75 whereas 
the variation in projection speed and the halting motions of silver-based film make it 
possible in that medium to distinguish between ‘real time’ and ‘screen time.’ In digital 
media, however, electronic recording and the persistence of vision ensure a direct 
correspondence between the two. In this sense, time has been preserved on stand-
ardized digital images: the colours never fades and the time is timeless. Consequently, 
‘time is fixed as in a map in digital and is totally repeatable with no degradation due 
to copying loss, while silver-based film is structured by time as entropy, therefore, 
unrepeatable. The unpredictability of time passing and time past, the slippage between 
one and the other, and the pathos of their essentially ineluctable difference are lost.’76 
In William C. Wees’s view, the highly standardized version of ‘visual life’ composed 
by standardized digital images is focused and stable, constructing unambiguous 
representations of familiar objects in three-dimensional space.77 However, San Yuan 
Li plays with recorded time and playback time, uncertainty and certainty, and the 
unpredictable and predictable, using alterations of speed in an attempt to subvert the 
standardization of the digital medium.
 San Yuan Li exemplifies the empowering potential of new digital video technol-
ogies and their alternative modes of production, distribution and exhibition. With 
the immediacy and democraticization of digital image-making, digital video works 
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consist of more selective images (though they do not necessarily employ better 
selection or quality): the ratio of shooting to finished film in San Yuan Li is 90:1,78 
compared to a ratio of 20:1 for Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera.79 San Yuan Li was 
commissioned by the ‘Z.O.U’ (Zone of Urgency) exhibition, curated by Hou Hanru as 
part of the Fiftieth Venice Biennale in 2003 and screened in an open, metaphorical 
space designed to resemble a train.80 Thus, San Yuan Li experienced double displace-
ments in its initial setting: the shift of the city symphony film genre from the 1920s 
West to contemporary China; and the shift of a digital video work depicting a Chinese 
urban village to an exhibition in the West, thus breaking away from the constraints 
of its original temporal–spatial context. To counterbalance an inevitable tendency 
to reduction, San Yuan Li was supplemented, as a part of a multimedia project, by 
a display of print publications in the screening space. The open screening space, the 
itinerant spectators and the screening mode of recurrence and repetition all differen-
tiate San Yuan Li’s spectatorial experience and perception of time–space from that of 
early city symphony films, which are usually shown in the dark and enclosed space of 
a theatre.
 Finally, San Yuan Li also crafts an alternative understanding and practice of urban 
time–space and modernity, foregrounding the more than 70-year time lag from the 
flourishing age of modernity and cinema in the West.81 The film attempts to represent 
the quickly changing alternative reality of Chinese urban experience in an increasingly 
homogeneous yet fragmented world. By emphasizing the ambiguity and contradictions 
of this experience, the film cultivates a cinematic form with specificity, authenticity 
and singularity that resists the homogenizing forces of globalization in historically 
and geographically distinct ways, even as it remains a result of these forces.82 However, 
San Yuan Li ‘aimed at preserving an archive of an alternative history that registers the 
urbanization process of the city of Guangzhou.’83 The temporal–spatial significance 
of the visual archive as repository of collective memories and experiences has been 
acknowledged by David Harvey: ‘If it is true that time is always memorialized not as 
flow, but as memories of experienced places and spaces, then history must indeed give 
way to poetry, time to space, as the fundamental material of social expression. The 
spatial image (particularly the evidence of the photograph) then asserts an important 
power over history.’84 Thus, the cinematically excavated and reconstructed space of the 
village in San Yuan Li represents histories, memories and belongings, exerting a power 
that transcends historical time.
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their generous support and insightful comments.
120 China’s iGeneration
 2 Including Alberto Cavalcanti’s Rien que les Heures (1926), Walther Ruttmann’s Berlin, 
Symphony of a Metropolis (1927), Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera (1929), 
Joris Ivens’ Rain (1929), László Moholy-Nagy’s Impressionen vom alten Marseiller 
Hanfen (vieux port) (1929), Jean Vigo’s Propos de Nice (1930), Herman Weinberg’s 
City Symphony (1930), Liu Na’ou’s The Man Who Has a Movie Camera (1933), as well 
as some other early avant-garde films picturing New York City in the 1920s such as 
Charles Sheeler and Paul Strand’s Manhatta (1920), Jay Leyda’s A Bronx Morning 
(1931), and so forth.
 3 See, for example, Georg Simmel, Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings (eds David 
Frisby and Mike Featherstone. Sage Publications, 1997); Walter Benjamin, Charles 
Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in The Era of High Capitalism (translated by Harry Zohn. 
Verso, 1992); Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings (eds Marcus Bullock and Michael 
W. Jennings. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, c. 1996–2003); David Harvey, The 
Condition of Postmodernity (Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); James Donald, 
The City, The Cinema: Modern Spaces, in Visual Culture (ed. Chris Jenks. London 
and New York: Routledge, 1993); Giuliana Bruno, Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, 
Architecture, and Film (New York: Verso, 2002), among others.
 4 Mark Shiel, Introduction in Mark Shiel and Tony Fitzmaurice (eds), Screening the 
City. London and New York: Verso, 2003, 2.
 5 Charles Sheeler and Paul Strand’s Manhatta (1920) was shot in New York City and 
René Clair’s Paris qui dort (1925) was shot in Paris.
 6 More examples from other cinematic traditions and non-Western countries are 
worth exploring, such as private film experiments in 1930s Japan, Taiwan and China. 
‘Neo-Sensationist’ writer, translator and film critic Liu Na’ou’s city film The Man Who 
Has a Movie Camera (1933), paying explicit tribute to Vertov’s film, is an inspiring 
resonance in this cinematic tide.
 7 Alexander Graf, ‘Paris-Berlin-Moscow: On the Montage Aesthetic in the City 
Symphony Films of the 1920s’ in Alexander Graf and Dietrich Scheunemann (eds), 
Avant-Garde Film. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007, ix.
 8 Ibid., 78.
 9 Carsten Strathausen argues that the modernist ideal of absolute vision shifts power from 
the ‘I’ of man to the ‘eye’ of the camera so that cinematic vision as such gains control in 
and of these films. ‘Uncanny Spaces: The City in Ruttmann and Vertov,’ in Mark Shiel 
and Tony Fitzmaurice (eds), Screening the City. London and New York: Verso, 2003, 18.
10 Deborah Stevenson, Cities and Urban Cultures. Maidenhead, PA: Open University 
Press, 2003.
11 Or more accurately, a cinematic document that is referred to as a video installation 
instead of a film.
12 Other later city or city symphony films could include Patrick Keiller’s London (1994) 
and American experimental filmmaker Godfrey Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi (1982).
13 I will elaborate on this point later.
14 In my email interview, Ou Ning admits that his work had been influenced by 
Koyaanisqatsi (1982). One of Cao Fei’s later experimental works, and Jia Zhangke’s 
24 City (2008), which is a mixture of fiction film and documentary, both employ the 
same strategy.
15 As a result of rampant urban expansion, San Yuan Li, which was located in the 
outskirt of Guangzhou, now finds itself in the centre of the city even as it preserves 
its rural social structures and lifestyles.
 Digitizing City Symphony, Stabilizing the Shadow of Time 121
16 L. Zhang, Simon X. B. Zhao and J. P. Tian, ‘Self-help in Housing and 
Chengzhongcun in China’s Urbanization,’ International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, vol. 27, 4 December 2003, 912–37; Yuting Liu, Shenjing He, 
Fulong Wu and Chris Webster, ‘Urban Villages under China’s rapid urbanization: 
Unregulated assets and transitional neighborhoods,’ Habitat International, 34 (2010), 
135–44.
17 The social phenomena related to urbanization and globalization presented in the 
film include the government’s requisition of farmland in San Yuan Li in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the emergence of manual workshops in back alleys and migrant workers 
swarming into the city. See Ou Ning, Cao Fei and Hou Hanru’s essays on the San 
Yuan Li project in the book San Yuan Li. I will discuss the problem of ‘globalization’ 
in more detail in the following pages.
18 Jennifer Jordan, ‘Collective Memory and Locality in Global Cities’ in Linda Krause 
and Patrice Petro (eds), Global Cities: Cinema, Architecture, and Urbanism in a Digital 
Age. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003, 32.
19 See, David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. Cambridge and Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990; Michel de Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley, CA, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2002; Linda Krause and Patrice 
Petro (eds), Global Cities: Cinema, Architecture, and Urbanism in a Digital Age. New 
Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003; Deborah Stevenson, 
Cities and Urban Cultures. Maidenhead, PA: Open University Press, 2003.
20 Nezar AlSayyad, Cinematic Urbanism: A History of The Modern From Reel to Real, 
New York and London: Routledge, 2006, 5–6.
21 Georg Simmel, ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life,’ in David Frisby and Mike 
Featherstone (eds), Simmel on Culture: Selected Writings. Sage Publications, 1997, 
176.
22 Stevenson, 8; 68.
23 Giuliana Bruno, Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film. New York: 
Verso, 2002, 185.
24 Alexander Graf, 80.
25 Ibid.
26 Berlin, Symphony of a Metropolis, Man with a Movie Camera, and Manhatta all 
employ this format.
27 Alternatively, one could divide it into eight episodes by considering the epilogue as 
two sections: subtitles and music video.
28 There is a narrative and stylistic continuity with earlier city symphony films: Berlin 
introduces the city from an approaching train and Manhatta portrays New York City 
from a boat in the river.
29 For example, women walking, Muslims strolling, the juxtaposition of ‘Anti-British’ 
monument and ancestral temples, local Cantonese opera and lion-dancing 
performance (staged for the film). In this compact space, the traditional and the 
contemporary, the ideological/political and the rural clan system, the official history 
and non-official local past, all coexist.
30 ‘U-thèque’ is an unofficial cinephile organization that curator and filmmaker Ou 
Ning founded in 1999 in Guangzhou and Shenzhen; they screened and discussed 
foreign and Chinese art films and published independent film magazines. San Yuan 
Li can be considered as a collaborative work shot by some U-thèque members, with 
Ou Ning and Cao Fei as director and editor. One of the cameramen, Huang Weikai, 
122 China’s iGeneration
is an independent filmmaker who has made documentary and experimental works 
such as ‘Floating’ (2005) and ‘Disorder’ (2009).
31 Geographically intimate, but socially, economically and politically marginal and 
distant from the rest of the city due to its rural social structure and migration culture.
32 In Man with a Movie Camera, the narrative structure and temporal continuity are 
broken deliberately in order to construct a more complicated structure. Ou Ning 
explained in an interview that they would disperse and integrate the outtake footage 
in the film to break its enclosed narrative structure if they had more time for editing.
33 Cao Fei, San Yuan Li book, 315.
34 Vertov claims ‘intervals are the transitions from one movement to another.’ Graham 
Roberts, The Man with the Movie Camera. London and New York: I. B. Tauris 
Publishers, 2000, 35.
35 This prevails in San Yuan Li, especially in sections one and four, with the images of 
cityscape and street crowds; here the hectic montage is much faster than that in early 
city symphony films, reflecting a contemporary urban experience of speed.
36 This is also related to whether it is a mobile or stationary shot; if it is a mobile shot, 
or with moving subjects in a static shot, the audience perceives them as shorter than 
that of still subjects in a stationary shot.
37 Graham Roberts, The Man with the Movie Camera. London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris Publishers, 2000, 79.
38 Carsten Strathausen, ‘Uncanny Spaces: The City in Ruttmann and Vertov’ in Mark 
Shiel and Tony Fitzmaurice (eds), Screening the City. London and New York: Verso, 
2003, 30.
39 See examples: 33:17 into the film, fast motion can only be detected when someone 
passing by in the foreground and people in the centre blinking rapidly; 35:04 into the 
film, a chef gives a gesture of ‘V’, showing in slow motion.
40 Ou Ning, interview via email, November 2008 [my translation].
41 Giuliana Bruno, Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film, New York: 
Verso, 2002, 149. Derek Jarman in his film Caravaggio (1986), and Pier Paolo Pasolini 
in his segment ‘La Ricotta’ in Ro. Go. Pa. G. (1963), deploy the technique of ‘tableau 
vivant’. Andy Warhol made Blow Job (1963) and a series of ‘Screen Test’ (1965–6) that 
portray people in the fashion of ‘tableau vivant’ in temporal duration. Jia Zhangke’s 24 
City utilizes a similar way in portraying some factory workers and their families. This 
stylistic experimentation also appears pervasively in contemporary video art works.
42 Jia Zhangke’s 24 Cities reinforces the uncanniness and tension with synchronized 
sound.
43 Mark Hansen, ‘The Time of Affect, or Bearing Witness to Life,’ Critical Inquiry 30 
(Spring 2004), 589
44 Hansen is discussing Bill Viola’s video work Anima (2000), ibid., 589.
45 Ou Ning, interview via email, November 2008 [my translation].
46 Baiyun airport, the once-unique opening of China towards to the outside world, 
now sees itself as a bizarre void inside the urban density of high rises; it has been 
abandoned and obsolete since another new airport was constructed.
47 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley, CA, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1988, 94.
48 Stevenson, 45.
49 Liu, He, Wu and Webster, 136.
50 Ibid, 142–3.
 Digitizing City Symphony, Stabilizing the Shadow of Time 123
51 Cao Fei points out that, ‘there is a limit to the amount of available land for new 
buildings. Hungry for more space to increase rental income, the villagers have 
no choice but to contrive ingenious ways of reaching up to the sky, digging 
underground, as well as stretching out sideways in every conceivable direction…the 
insatiable craving to expand into more space is responsible for this most grotesque 
dwelling style…’. Cao Fei, ‘A Wild Side of Guangzhou,’ San Yuan Li book, 52.
52 Described as ‘one strip of sky’ by local residents.
53 Georg Simmel, ‘The Metropolis and Mental Life,’ in David Frisby and Mike 




56 Ou Ning, ‘Shadows of Times,’ in San Yuan Li book, 40.
57 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. Cambridge and Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990, 202.
58 See, for example, the sequence in which schoolchildren offering paper flowers in 
front of the monument are juxtaposed with a woman and a boy who are burning 
incense in an ancestral temple, suggesting the diversity of San Yuan Li’s culture and 
the coexistence of national and local, collective and private pasts.
59 Harvey, 85.
60 Durkheim, quoted from Jordan, 44.
61 Most migrant workers living in San Yuan Li benefit from globalization because they 
work primarily for factories making products for export and the service professions 
now booming in the new density of the population.
62 There are scenes of the city waking up or falling asleep in both Berlin and Man with 
a Movie Camera, which connote a rationalized schedule and the disciplining of social 
life by controlling time.
63 See, for instance, the collage of images of straight or tangled lines (vertical, 
horizontal, diagonal) of telephone wires at 13:20 in part two; the round wheels and 
duct cutting together in act one; a group of images of differently sized windows at 
10:10 in section two; associative editing of a group of images with television screens 
(29:32–29:55); close-ups of smiling faces (30:49–31:50); and the 18 group photos 
(31:51–35:11).
64 Andrew Webber, ‘Introduction: Moving Images of Cities,’ in Andrew Webber 
and Emma Wilson (eds), Cities in Transition: the Moving Image and the Modern 
Metropolis. Wallflower Press, 2008, 2.
65 The jittery camera movement in narrow back alleys with vertiginous space and 
perspectives conveys subjective experience of disorientation and uneasiness.
66 See, for example, 10:57 to 11:30 (33 seconds). There are 14 shots, half-moving shots 
and half-static, with an average shot length of 2.35 seconds; the moving shots are 
longer at about three seconds, the static ones are shorter (some only last one second). 
The alternation between mobility and stillness creates a compelling rhythm.
67 The transportation vehicles appearing in San Yuan Li include boats, automobiles, 
motorcycles, trains, buses, subway trains, airplanes and bicycles. Walking is also 
treated as a mode of movement, especially in tracking shots.
68 Bruno, 24.
69 Graf, 81.
70 Ou Ning, in a question and answer section at the University of Chicago, October 2008.
124 China’s iGeneration
71 A traditional string musical instrument in the Guangdong area; its tonal quality is 
similar to that of Erhu.
72 On the deafening sound of the airplane, Cao Fei describes that ‘the densely packed 
office buildings and dwellings around the village have sealed up every niche from 
the ground up, leaving no cracks and crannies for the jet noise to seep down onto 
the heedless crowds below…The tiniest of sounds created in such claustrophobic 
surroundings, be that the turn of a key, or a jangle of the bicycle bells, is instantly 
amplified into tremendous echoes.’ Cao Fei, 50 and 53.
73 Ou Ning, 43.
74 Andrew Webber, ‘Introduction: Moving Images of Cities,’ in Andrew Webber 
and Emma Wilson (eds), Cities in Transition: the Moving Image and the Modern 
Metropolis. Wallflower Press, 2008, 3.
75 Babette Mangolte, ‘Afterward: A Matter of Time, Analog Versus Digital, the Perennial 
Question of Shifting Technology and Its Implication for an Experimental Filmmaker’s 
Odyssey’ in Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey (eds), Camera Obscura, Camera 
Lucida: Essays in Honor of Annette Michelson. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2003, 265.
76 Ibid., 264.
77 William C. Wees. Light Moving in Time, Studies in the Visual Aesthetics of Avant-
Garde Film. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992, 3.
78 In other words, 60 hours of footage was made into a 40-minute final film. Ou Ning, 
43.
79 Graham Roberts, The Man with the Movie Camera. London and New York: I. B. 
Tauris Publishers, 2000, 26.
80 Interview with Ou Ning via email, November 2008.
81 The time lag is also related to artists’ belated knowledge of world film history and 
practice, as Ou Ning explains: ‘My interest of film comes from the pirate DVDs…
which helped me complete a study of film history by myself.’ Ou Ning, in http://www.
alternativearchive.com/ouning/article.asp?id=576 (accessed November 2008).
82 Besides Venice, San Yuan Li has been exhibited in various film festivals, art galleries 
and museums in many countries – a result of globalization and the advance of 
information and communication technology.
83 Ou Ning, 42.
84 David Harvey, 218.
7
From Pirate to Kino-eye : A Genealogical Tale 
of Film Re-Distribution in China
Dan Gao
In recent years, the problem of piracy has become an ever more prevalent part, and 
contested practice, of cultural communication and consumption around the world, 
due in large part to both globalization and digital technology. With a proliferation of 
news stories about copyright infringement lawsuits and government crackdowns on 
piracy in China, it is no longer a secret to the rest of the world that piracy has consti-
tuted a thriving and stubbornly persistent black-market ‘profession’ and a ‘culture’ 
in the country for more than three decades. Since the Economic Opening-up [gaige 
kaifang], starting in the early 1980s, China’s piracy practice has already been studied 
heavily in academe, drawing scholarly interest in the fields of critical legal studies, 
sociology and communication studies.1
 In terms of film piracy, two in-depth book-length studies written almost a decade ago 
have laid the groundwork for empirical research and theoretical contemplation – Shujen 
Wang’s Framing Piracy: Globalization and Film Distribution in Greater China (2003) and 
Laikwan Pang’s Cultural Control and Globalization in Asia: Copyright, Piracy, and Cinema 
(2005). Both works approach film piracy in China from a transnational perspective, with 
a shared emphasis on the post-VCD era (the technology of VCD became obsolete fairly 
fast in the West after the rise of DVD, but in China’s case, VCD remained an effective 
format from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s). While Pang ultimately reaffirms piracy’s 
viral effect upon the transnational creative industry in general, Wang is one of the 
earliest media scholars to move the spotlight away from the right/wrong moral–legal 
debate on piracy to its actual practices (i.e. distribution and consumption of pirated 
film) in East Asia – ‘in the hope of knowing the actual experiences consumers had when 
using pirated products.’2 Yingjin Zhang advocates the kind of switch of attention made 
by Wang, pointing to the significant cultural role that piracy has played in China. Zhang 
has gone even further, embracing the study of piracy as a whole new area of audience 
research, suggesting that we may better understand contemporary moviegoers by 
looking back at the history of film piracy, given the fact that illegitimate copies (in the 
formats of LD, VHS, VCD, DVD, CD-ROM, online streaming video, etc.) have been and 
continue to be one of the major means through which films are viewed in China.3
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 In this chapter, I will expand and at times depart from Zhang and Wang’s lines 
of thought, arguing that it is important to keep in mind that piracy, as a mode of 
economic and cultural practice, is a dialectical process. In other words, as people 
participate in illegitimate copying and viewing of media products, they are also 
subjected to the transformation and construction brought about by piracy culture. 
This naturally makes one ask: what kind of new subjects does piracy produce? This 
question can lead to further questions. For instance, what kind of customs, tastes, 
sensibilities and knowledge are being produced alongside this subject formation of the 
digital ‘pirate?’ What kind of techniques do ‘pirates’ use to posit themselves within the 
fissure between postsocialist reality and the pirated, ‘informal’ media worlds? (Here, 
I am referring to both the shadowy ‘underground world’ of piracy commerce and ‘the 
rest of the world’ – i.e. the world beyond China – encapsulated in the pirated foreign 
media products, which the pirates consume and sometimes uneasily seek to identify 
with). How do they live with or resist the postsocialist civic order of things and the 
neoliberal culture in post-WTO China, to which piracy is at once an alleged enemy 
and a secret accomplice, by constituting part of the ‘shadow economies of cinema,’ as 
Ramon Lobato calls it?4 To me, these questions are no less important than the ones 
about the so-called ‘new people’ [xinren] (i.e. postsocialist subjects), which featured 
prominently in popular literary and filmic imaginations in the 1980s and 1990s.5 
Indeed, the ‘pirate’ may be a close kin or subspecies of the ‘new people,’ whose legacy 
has been fleshed out more saliently in the new millennium.
 The participants in the piracy culture I describe here do not only refer to the 
audience/consumer of piracy, but also include the producers (smugglers, owners of 
the reproduction factories, ordinary viewers-turned-bootleggers), distributors (whole-
salers, storekeepers, street vendors, file-sharing netizens) and other possible constituent 
subjects; even scholars and cultural critics who are sympathetic with piracy culture 
(Zhang, myself and many others) can be counted among these informal distribution 
provocateurs. Indeed, in practice, participants in piracy are not locked within one single 
identity, but usually morph from one form to another, depending on their given activity 
and predilection. For instance, a person who goes by a pseudonym when publishing 
reviews in online film discussion boards such as ‘Rear Window’ [houchuang kan 
dianying] (named after a well-known film BBS in China in the early 2000s) may, once 
he goes offline, reveal his other identity as the owner of a ‘DVD theatre’ in the corner 
of the street, enthusiastically changing his persona from a serious petty intellectual 
to boisterous informal street merchant.6 If I may use the signifier ‘pirate’ to bracket 
all the morphologies of this subject, then the focus of this chapter will be on two of 
them, whom I call the ‘pirate-cinephile’ and the ‘pirate-eye’ (a term inspired by Dziga 
Vertov’s idea of ‘kino-eye’). Of course, due to the limited space, it is not realistic for me 
to deal with all of the questions about the pirates that are stated above. As the metaphor 
‘from pirate to kino-eye’ from this chapter title suggests, my major goal here is to 
narrate the transformation certain pirates undergo and look at how they reconstruct 
their experience with film piracy in their writings and audiovisual works. To be more 
precise, my question is: how has the genealogical trope – ‘transforming from a pirate to 
a kino-eye’ – become a narrative that plays into so many recent independent films?
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 In the first half of this chapter, I will give a brief account of the piracy film culture 
that has developed in China in the past three decades, in order to explain the trans-
formative nature of the subjects whom I call the ‘pirate-cinephile’ and the ‘pirate-eye.’ 
This step of analysis is informed by Walter Benjamin’s theory of ‘mimetic faculty,’ 
Dziga Vertov’s ideal of the ‘kino-eye,’ and recent theoretical reconsideration of 
‘cinephilia’ as a desirable mode of film culture in China. Then, I will closely examine 
several fiction films (such as Platform [Zhan Tai, Jia Zhangke 2000], Suzhou River 
[Suzhou He, Lou Ye 2000], and Pirated Copy [Man Yan, He Jianjun 2004]), which 
represent archetypal ‘pirate-eye’ characters. I will finish my analysis with a discussion 
of two documentaries about pirated DVD vendors (who are transmuted by the 
practice of piracy).
A generation of pirate-cinephile
It is almost self-evident that one of the most historically significant aspects of piracy 
film culture in China is that it has nurtured and shaped a considerable portion of the 
consumers and creators of Chinese film in the new millennium. Right at the beginning 
of China’s Economic Reform, the Chinese government started to allow the entry of 
non-state economic elements (individually owned economic enterprises in particular) 
into the market.7 The field of media production, however, was still generally kept in 
the hands of the state. The rights to publish and reproduce print publications (yinshua 
chubanwu – books, magazines, journals and newspapers) and audiovisual publications 
(yinxiang chubanwu – tapes, videocassettes and optical discs) were exclusively entitled 
to a small number of state-owned presses,8 whose production capacities (in terms of 
both the variety of titles and the quality of the output) were quite incompatible with 
the citizens’ enormous appetite for cultural products, which was recognized at that 
time as a new form of ‘cultural fever’ (wenhua re). A ‘book famine’ (shu huang) soon 
swept China.9
 Similar problems plagued the field of film during this period. In the early stage of 
the Reform Era, film and TV were still financed and tightly controlled by the state at 
every step of production and distribution. In 1979, 65 fiction films were produced 
in mainland China, while the country’s moviegoing audience in that year was 29.3 
billion – meaning the average citizen had watched an estimated 28 films that year.10 
These striking numbers clearly point to a severe imbalance between demand and 
supply, and are simultaneously indicative of Chinese audiences’ rising passion for 
film. Unfortunately, domestic film output remained low throughout much of the 1980s 
(only 82 to 158 fiction films were produced per year; in comparison, two decades later, 
this number has tripled – the film output in 2009 was 456).11 In addition, film imports 
were heavily restricted, due to the notoriously small quota imposed by the government 
and stringent censorship throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
 Outside of these formal chains of cultural production for government-sanctioned 
films, an increasing flow of illegal audio and visual products made in foreign countries 
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(as well as Taiwan) began to make its way into China. This material had been quietly 
smuggled into the PRC and spread quickly. In cottage factories in many cities near 
the national border (such as Shishi in Fujian Province, Wenzhou in Zhejiang and 
Haikou in Hainan), popular music cassettes from Hong Kong, erotic Taiwanese poker 
cards, Japanese manga and posters of nude or semi-nude Hollywood stars were widely 
copied and bootlegged. Videocassettes of Hong Kong films were among the most 
popularly disseminated merchandise at that time. They were sold to myriads of newly 
emerging and privately owned video halls (luxiang ting) all over China, as well as to 
movie theatres, where screening booths equipped with video projection systems had 
just opened up as an additional attraction to catch up with the new fad of luxiangdai 
(VHS tapes). According to China Radio & TV Yearbook, the luxiang ting culture 
started to exert its presence in 1983 and reached its heyday at the end of the 1980s,12 
becoming a powerful competitor with cinema and television.
 Indeed, in addition to luxiang ting, there were other venues where films not 
officially released through the government and commercial genre films were made 
accessible to the general public. In certain public libraries – especially larger ones, such 
as the National Library (NLC) in Beijing – any reader could request to watch foreign 
films from their catalogue. For example, a friend of mine – who is an independent 
film director – told me that in the 1990s, he spent several whole days in the NLC, 
watching European art films such as Last Tango in Paris. In many urban centres some 
local cinemas and theatres affiliated with cultural institutions would rent copies of 
the so-called ‘neican pian’ (internal reference films) and ‘guolu pian’ (passerby films) 
from national archives or libraries and arrange a couple of ‘internal’ screenings for 
each film.13 Special privileges were also enjoyed in certain coastal regions, due to 
their geopolitical advantages and cross-cultural demography. For instance, film critic 
Lie Fu recalled, ‘In the 1950 and 1960s, Guangzhou was the only city where public 
screening of Cantonese films could be allowed; at the same time, Mandarin produc-
tions by Hong Kong studios like Changcheng and Fenghuang were also put onto 
screen.’ For Lie Fu and his contemporaries, Guangzhou was already the ‘film special 
zone’ (dianying tequ) de facto at that time.14 Guangzhou also had access to a variety 
of Hong Kong entertainment on TV after the Reform Era, thanks to Yagi antennas 
(well known as the yugu tianxian – fishbone antennas), commonly installed by many 
households in Guangdong Province. However, this type of accessibility to imported or 
banned films remained quite limited in China – this resource was not readily available 
to the general public; at the same time, there was a large population with a burning 
passion for cinematic experiences. In this context, the rise of piracy cinephilia began, 
as described by Jia Zhangke: ‘When implausible (bu heli de) film policy was broken 
through by illegal (bu hefa de) piracy practice, we were falling into a discomforting 
paradox. However, it is a cultural fact that moving [sic] eventually came into the lives 
of ordinary people,’ so that Chinese film lovers were, thanks to piracy, finally able to 
‘watch’ film rather than ‘read’ films from fanzines and newspapers.15
 Like other public entertainment businesses (karaoke booths, disco halls and 
music cafes) of the early Reform Era, luxiang ting were soon subjected to the 
discursive regulation of the state. Most of the films taped and screened at luxiang 
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ting were not only illegally brought into China, but censors and commentators 
deemed much of the content morally decadent, ideologically inadequate, and 
sexually explicit. Many laws and regulations were initiated to stop the spread of this 
viral culture based on smuggling and piracy.16 Massive nationwide enforcement 
to ‘sao huang’ (sweep the Yellow publications) has occurred annually since 1989, 
with illegal films screened in video halls always a major target. However, rather 
than disappearing completely, film smuggling, illegal copying and luxiang ting-style 
screenings submerged into the underground, merging into the enormous body of 
China’s shadow economy.17
 On the one hand, as the price for video recorders and cassettes dropped in the 
1990s, many film lovers chose to buy or rent tapes, and consequently retreated from the 
public space of luxiang ting and into the private spaces of their homes. This more inter-
nalized and privatized mode of piracy film consumption persists today, with magnetic 
cassettes soon being replaced by optical discs, and then by compressed-digitized 
data. On the other hand, publicly participatory piracy culture has developed into new 
forms. Since the end of the 1990s, as digital technologies and equipment such as LCD 
projecting systems and personal computers became more widespread, films that were 
once only available through ‘grey’ channels entered new types of public spaces – they 
were talked about via online discussion forums, introduced and analyzed in fanzines, 
and screened on college campuses and in hip bars. These films were viewed by a new 
species of film-loving collectives – i.e. cine-clubs, student communities, editorial teams 
and column writers, as well as fansubbing groups.18 This new wave of film culture in 
China became quite culturally autonomous and grabbed many observers’ and critics’ 
attention. Piracy’s impact – popularizing otherwise expensive and hard-to-get copies 
of films – was readily recognizable during this period.
 There are so many ways to look at the pirate-film lovers. A lot has been written 
on who they are, where they come from, or what they are doing now. They are said 
to have constituted part of ‘the urban generation’ that revived a ‘cinephile culture’ in 
China using ‘“primitive” or “pirated” form of postmodern technology of the VCD.’19 
They are identified as the ‘saw-gashed generation’ (dakou yidai) – a new breed of 
cultural producers who acquired a certain independent spirit through piracy practices 
and have played it into Chinese rock music.20 Others call them the ‘D-generation’ (the 
all-encompassing ‘D’ stands for disc (die), daoban (media piracy), and digital), who 
have now graduated from a ‘pirate film school’ and become creative media workers 
themselves.21 Many fans and cinephiles cultivated by daoban die become directors, 
critics and scholars, who ‘initiated film websites, entered editorial office of fanzines, 
or published monographs because of their love for film.’22 It is fair to argue that it was 
through and only through intimate emotional and bodily engagement with pirated 
film that the pirate-cinephiles acquired a certain transformative agency – to transform 
themselves as much as to transform the social space they reside in (turning a dingy 
attic into lucrative luxiang ting; or transmuting a bar or classroom into a mini ‘art 
cinema’).
 ‘Cinephile,’ in its most rigorous definition, usually refers to a middle-class educated 
European male movie-goer-writer-cineaste who was active between 1950 to 1980. 
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The term ‘cinephilia’ used to be associated with a certain specific historical period 
and a European identity. Cinephilia, as defined by Susan Sontag, ‘is not simply love 
of but a certain taste in films (grounded in a vast appetite for seeing and re-seeing as 
much as possible of cinema’s glorious past).’23 For many of its renowned interpreters 
(such as Sontag, Antoine de Baecque, and more critically, Paul Willemen), cinephilia 
should be historicized as a phenomenon that appeared after the Second World War 
on the European (mainly French) cultural scene and generally withered away by 
the 1980s. However, some more recent scholarly interpretations suggest that rather 
than quietly dying out in the 1980s, cinephilia has actually expanded its territory 
and thrived in multiple geographic regions other than Europe. This scholarship has 
explored alternative conceptualizations, uses and techniques of cinephilia, especially 
in the digital age, with a more global and less nostalgic vision.24 For these scholars, it 
is still meaningful to continue using this word and moulding it into a much broader 
umbrella term to signify the ‘simultaneity of different technological formats and 
platforms, subject positions, and affective encounters that characterizes the current 
practice referred to as “cinephilia”’ from all over the world.25
 Piracy-cinephilia in China certainly falls under this rubric. Like any other type 
of cinephilia, Chinese piracy-cinephilia is characterized by temporal and geographic 
‘deferral.’26 One form of deferral reflects how Chinese piracy-cinephiles usually 
tend to feel a connection with films that are made outside of their country and are 
recuperated and displaced from a near or distant past. Another form of deferral 
reflects the belated ‘(re)discovery’ of cinephilia (yingchi, miying, or dianying milian 
when translated into Chinese) itself as a mode of film culture. After reintroducing a 
new pantheon of European cinephiles to a renewed standard of this concept, young 
film scholar Li Yang announces at the end of his book Cinephilia: The History of A 
Culture that ‘… this is the real reason why I wrote about cinephilia culture. I want to 
tell the young film lovers in China, your passion and frenzy for film is not alone in the 
world. Your cinephilia has a tradition – you are standing along with many legendary 
figures of the film history.’27
 In such a light, pirate-cinephiles in China view producing and using pirated film 
as much more than just copyright infringement or even resistance against global 
capitalism; rather, it is more about reclaiming what is repressed, rarely seen, or 
forbidden under a conservative (if not xenophobic) cultural regime. For them, pirated 
film is not only an exhibit window through which the ordinary Chinese consumer 
‘shops’ (and inevitably fetishizes) exotic merchandises or a reflective screen where local 
desire gets projected and absorbed at the same time. It is also a viewfinder, through 
which an ‘audience-hunter’ (similar to the reader-hunter de Certau describes28) gazes 
at and ‘preys’ his/her game. The pirate-cinephile is always simultaneously a greedy 
consumer subjected to manipulation and a political dissent ready to take action, 
however benign.
 From Pirate to Kino-eye 131
Kino-eye, pirate-eye
Before analysing mimesis and the formation of the pirate-cinephile turned kino-eye, 
it is helpful to first explain the concept of ‘kino-eye’ (movie camera as the machine 
eye), or the historically complicated connotation of kinok (man with movie camera). 
Kino-eye and kinok are two neologisms created by Soviet filmmaker and theorist 
Dziga Vertov, who led an experimental film group designed to deliver a cinematic ideal 
where human and machine are harmoniously merged in the post-October Revolution 
(1917) context. Indeed, it is a common notion that the apparatus of the movie camera 
can be seen as an extension of the human body and, in fact, human life. For example, 
Béla Balázs suggested that once a camera is set up at a certain angle and starts rolling, 
it is as if the machine acquires its own life. At this time, even if the cinematographer 
(in his case, a war journalist) cannot carry out his mission because, say, his life reaches 
its end, the camera will take over this task. In the famous experimental work by the 
kino-eye group, Man with a Movie Camera (1929), the filmmakers went even further. 
The movie camera is endowed with a morphological quality and, more importantly, a 
‘capability of mimicry’ – which usually only belongs to live beings – through the magic 
of montage. By constructing such an image, Vertov was trying to promote a cinematic 
form in which the human being and the mechanical apparatus of camera can extend 
and ‘learn from’ each other harmoniously. In other words, the kino-eye ideal not only 
envisions elongating the perceptual spectrum of human eye via the machine, but also 
expects the perfection of the human itself, through establishing certain ‘kinship with 
the machine’29 – to mimic, cooperate with and ‘love’ the machine as well as the moving 
image created in their co-production. Inspired by Walter Benjamin, Malcolm Turvey 
suggests that Vertov’s kino-eye ideal can be understood as a playful mimetic game, 
pointing out that a two-way mimesis30 lies at the fundamental heart of it, through 
which both cinema and human being may achieve a sense of liberation.31
 Kino-eye started as a dialectical yet also idealist vision clearly inflected by 
communism and industrial modernism – two consequential outcomes of monopoly 
capitalism. Nevertheless, after moving beyond its Soviet origins, it has been revitalized, 
reinterpreted and recast many times. Vertov used to claim that the kino-eye ‘lives and 
moves in time and space.’32 This statement originally intended to underscore the 
mobility of the machine and the constructive power of cinematic montage; however, 
we can also read it as a prophecy about the kino-eye movement’s recurring life cycles 
in diverse historical and cultural locales. During the century since kino-eye’s initial 
appearance, this notion had been undertaken, translated and further theorized by 
proponents of film and video practices such as cinéma vérité and direct cinema. The 
camera-eye approach has been gradually transmuted into a documentary and episte-
mological tool for filmmakers to come closer to or penetrate deeper into the alleged 
‘truth’ of reality, and hence has lost its original dose of mimetic magic and idealist zest. 
This seems to be an inevitable result of modernization, as Benjamin astutely points 
out, in modern time, as mimetic faculty experiences ‘increasing decay,’ so that ‘the 
observable world of the modern man contains only minimal residues of the magical 
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correspondences and analogies that were familiar to ancient people.’33 This still seems 
to hold true in our information age when everyone is constantly struck by twisted 
strands of messages transmitted via sophisticated new-age machines (TV, PC, smart-
phone and touchscreen pads). For those who seek to shrug off potential manipulation 
of these media and get closer to the ‘truth’ buried underneath mediated ‘realities,’ 
mimetic faculty – the gift of seeing resemblance – may only induce yet another layer 
of illusion one wants to resist, rather than bringing antidotes.
 As a faculty intrinsic to human beings, mimesis still functions as usual in every 
unattractive corner of our life, even though it has lost its past glory as a ritualistic 
practice infused with transcendental power and prestige. For me, the kind of two-way 
mimesis established between man and his camera (and by extension, other human–
media interfaces) presented in Vertov’s ideal of kino-eye is coming back now with 
significant cultural implications where film piracy is concerned. As suggested at the 
end of the last section, the notion of kino-eye (or pirate-eye, in order to make it more 
specific to piracy film culture) provides an interesting analytical angle for us to under-
stand how the pirate-cinephiles interact with their object of frenziness, in often playful 
and ‘primitive’ ways.
 My analysis is not based on fieldwork or ethnographic accounts about individual 
pirate-cinephiles or their community. Rather I choose to establish my entry point with 
certain self-reflexive cinematic representations of figures that I define as pirate, pirate-
cinephile, kino-eye, or pirate-eye. (Of course, most of the filmmakers discussed in this 
section are either sympathetic with the pirates or belong to the generation of pirate-
cinephile themselves.) In the films, we do not see direct connection between kino-eye 
and truth value. Instead, camera and screening devices such as television, once again, 
function in more primitive ways on the users’ affective and bodily experience. In these 
cinematic representations, a ritualistic sensibility is present. It is also clear that the 
characters do believe in the magical power of mimesis, or its ‘schooling’ function, to 
use Benjamin’s word,34 as a workable way to modify, or even alter, their relationship 
with the world. Moreover, pirated discs and digital video cameras are represented 
in these films as mimetic object/subject, just like the camera in Man with the Movie 
Camera. It is as if access to these moving images and machines offers a certain 
empowering force, as Vertov claimed decades ago, and this technological upgrade 
makes possible an expansion of the imaginative and practical horizons of Chinese 
postsocialist subjects.
 After watching several fiction and documentary films that put piracy culture or a 
pirate-cinephile at the textual centre, I was surprised by three things. First, the repre-
sentation of pirate as cinephilic amateur looms large in all these sample texts. Second, 
in recent documentaries, the symbolizing quality of the pirates, which has been 
made quite prominent in fiction films, is replaced by flesh-and-blood, individualized 
life experience crisscrossed with the person’s social status. Third, either textually or 
contextually in all these films, the filmmaker is associated with the pirate in one way 
or another, implicating the various kinds of kinships between them. In Suzhou River, 
a viewfinder is installed for audiences to separate out as well as mirror the pirate and 
the videographer simultaneously; in the case of Pirated Copy, one finds an ambiguous 
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inter-textual amalgamation of the two which is visible in the diegetic world; eventually, 
in DVD Boys and Toto (dir. Huang Weikai, preproduction), the two subjects merge 
together in both films’ visualities, whereby two personal histories are conflated when 
TV screen transmutes into viewfinder, in an aesthetic move by Huang that may or may 
not be perceived as successful. It is fair to claim that these images and stories, driven 
by self-reflexive and documentary impulses, have told us a genealogical tale in which 
the pirate turns into the kino-eye. For either the filmmaker or his audience as the 
postsocialist subjects in China, this metanarrative is certainly constitutive in forming 
new concepts and knowledge about piracy.
DVD culture
One of the earliest visual memoirs that vividly captured this mimetic relationship 
between illegitimate cultural objects and the postsocialist subjects is Jia Zhangke’s 
film Platform. Jia is well known for his affective attachment to popular cultures of the 
early Reform period, including luxiang ting, Chinese rock, disco halls, touring troupes 
and pirated discs, to which he has devoted many nostalgic writings and audiovisual 
works.
 In the film Platform, we see waves of foreign fads – flared jeans, Bollywood films, 
smuggled tape recorders and cassettes, Hong Kong pop songs, perms and breakdancing 
– flooding into a small and conservative inner land town, Fenyang, as the Reform 
deepens. Nevertheless, the younger generation of residents there soon embraces them 
all and is inspired to change its way of life. Some of the kids join a travelling troupe later 
in the film and wander beyond the city wall that symbolizes the limit of old cultural life. 
They perform breakdances and pop songs on the stage for an unknown, yet engaging 
and longing audience, as if they are the embodied and lived ‘pirated copies’ themselves. 
Using their bodies as the medium, these young social performers enliven, exhibit, 
vernacularize, spread, and finally grow the new cultural seeds.
 If piracy culture is only implicitly referenced in Platform as a natural component 
of the ‘new era,’ Pirated Copy, a DV feature film by He Jianjun made between 2002 
and 2004, has offered the most frank representation of piracy culture in fiction films 
to date. Piracy is placed at the central nodal point of the film’s ‘network narrative’.35 
A sexually repressed college film lecturer, a desperate laid-off couple, a prostitute, 
an AIDS-infected drummer and two phony policemen are linked together through 
their encounters with a cinephilic street vendor, Shen Ming, and the pirated DVDs 
he and his fellow vendors bring to every corner of the cityscape. For many reasons, 
the film juxtaposes piracy consumption with human desire (especially sexual desire). 
They mirror and channel into each other on material, psychic and social levels, which 
further drives the image flow and motivates diegetic actions. The film thus becomes a 
perfect text for us to read the mimetic transgression symbolized by piracy culture.
 We are not formally introduced to Shen Ming – the male protagonist as well as the 
nexus of the networked diegetic world – until the fifteenth minute of the film, when 
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he sits in a dark corner against a whole bookshelf of DVDs. Only part of his face is 
lit by the cold fluorescence emitted from the TV screen, which is at the centre of his 
attention (Figure 7.1). This scene is reminiscent of how we are introduced to Mada in 
Suzhou He (Suzhou River, 2000), an emblematic work of the Sixth Generation (Figure 
7.2). Of course, mise-en-scène is but one element that makes an analogy of these two 
characters interesting. As we know, Suzhou River, the Shanghai version of The Double 
Life of Veronique (Kieslowski, 1991), is already a tale about ‘optical twins’ in itself. 
Therefore, before getting into the analogy between Shen and Mada, I suggest that we 
read the two mirroring male protagonists of Suzhou River (‘I’ and Mada) as prototypes 
of kino-eye and pirate-eye respectively. In these two delicately laid-out and paralleled 
love stories of Suzhou River, one of the male characters (hereafter ‘I’) – who is also the 
first-person narrator of the film – never reveals his identity in a frontal shot. ‘I’ is a 
freelancing videographer who seems to be always shouldering his camera. We enter 
the diegetic world through his hand-held, documentary point-of-view shots from the 
very start. In other words, he is the man with the movie camera; he is the kino-eye. In 
addition, ‘I’ claims that his camera doesn’t lie, although we are soon invited to enter a 
love story he makes up, in which all kinds of imaginations and uncertainties abound.
 The second story in the film also revolves around a man, who is named Mada. The 
girlfriend of ‘I’ reads a romantic but sad story about Mada and his lover Mudan from 
a newspaper. Being cynical about the story’s authenticity, ‘I’ fills in the skeleton with 
abundant life details, which merge the two men’s lives in a mystical fashion. The first 
quality ‘I’ gives Mada is that he loves watching pirated discs (meaning he is a pirate-
cinephile). ‘I’ narrates: ‘He may often pass by my balcony to deliver stuff, and then go 
home every day, watching the pirated VCDs he likes for the whole night, usually until 
daybreak. This is how he lives.’ In other words, Mada is different from a kino-eye like 
‘I’ – he is down on the street, a manual labourer, a passive ‘receiver’ of vulgar popular 
culture. This description invites us to read Mada as the double of ‘I’ – his mirror image 
who resides in an opposite space, probably a fictive and romantic world – someone he 
can observe and consume from a distance. Moreover, the girlfriend of ‘I’ and Mada’s 
lover look exactly the same, which further indicates the ambiguous correspondence 
between the two couples. ‘I’ travels back and forth between two lives, unravelling 
love and lie, as well as made-up romantic story and reality. It is not difficult for the 
audience to sense the filmmaker’s uncertainty about history, fiction and the camera-
eye, through an allegorical play enacted by two pairs of ‘optical twins.’ The camera, 
as Vertov suggests, plays the role of a mimetic apparatus here. When reading Suzhou 
River and several other popular filmic texts which put the ‘phantom sisters’ at the 
centre, Zhang Zhen points out that it is ‘the presence of camera… on a metanarrative 
level’ that ‘mediates or triggers the magical transformation of virtual twinhood.’36 In 
a half-realistic and half-fairytale diegesis, the film sets out a two-way mimetic tunnel 
between Mada and ‘I’ using the device of camera.
 This argument appears to be more interesting when we juxtapose Suzhou River 
with Pirated Copy, since on a metanarrative level, we can further see Shen Ming as yet 
another double of Mada in a different diegetic world. Like Suzhou River, Pirated Copy 
unfolds its narrative around the male lead’s amorous relationship. Obsession with 
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Figure 7.1 Shen Ming watching a pirated DVD in Pirated Copy (2004).
Figure 7.2 Mada watching a pirated VCD in Suzhou River (2000).
pirated film in both films can readily be read as the substitute of unfulfillable romantic 
desire. In a sense, like the camera, the TV screen showing pirated films functions 
as the consensual medium that motivates desire and affect of the subject who sits in 
front of it, magically transforming him or her. For instance, in Suzhou River, ‘I’ falls 
for Meimei the mermaid performer at the time when his video camera captures her 
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swimming in the water tank; Mada and Mudan also consummate their love (though 
represented implicitly) after watching a pirated film (see Figure 7.3).
 This point is enlarged and brought even closer to the foreground in Pirated Copy. 
Shen Ming and Mei Xiaojing are two sexually repressed subjects criminalized or 
victimized by repressive social structures of sexuality (Shen is expelled from high 
school because of his love affair with a classmate; Mei was married to a homosexual 
man without knowing his identity). Like Shen, Mei is a fervent cinephile who 
also chooses a film-related profession. She teaches film in college. The difficulty in 
acquiring legitimate copies of foreign art films, which are ‘mistaken’ for porn by the 
police earlier in the film, leads Mei to Shen. We soon find that Mei’s favourites are the 
erotic tales told by Spanish auteur Pedro Almodóvar. These films are not only taught 
in class, but also ‘used’ at home by Mei to channel her unfulfilled desire. Again, like 
in Suzhou River, the flickering TV screen (where sensual scenes from Bullfighter and 
random porn excerpts are shown back to back) and erotic images on DVD covers 
(passed from Shen to Mei), rather than verbal flirtation or physical touches, serve 
as the consensual medium for the two persons to grow the seeds of yearning and to 
cope with their pathologies. Indeed, Shen and Mei are only two figurines among the 
ensemble of ‘pirate-eyes’ depicted in the film. All characters enjoy the companionship 
of the TV screen and pirated discs. The dark corner in which each person consumes 
these ‘banned’ images is also where their suppressed libidos are unleashed. The film 
constantly switches between its own plot and sequences taken out of film classics. 
It is as if the two kinds of moving images serve as the point-of-view shots of each 
Figure 7.3 Mada and Mudan looking into the TV screen in Suzhou River (2000).
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other. It is as if each character’s life and the pirated films are commenting on, or even 
conversing with, one another. By ‘staring’ at ‘each other,’ the character and the TV both 
find playfulness and empowerment in a practice of mimetic nature. Furthermore, the 
filmmaker goes as far as to pair each of his characters with a film or a film genre he 
or she loves. We usually see the sound or image of the film first, and are then cued 
to the character, whose diegetic life trajectory further ‘mimics’ the ‘fiction’ he or she 
watches. Therefore, these pirate-eyes not only associate themselves more closely with 
their objects through watching and imagining. They are like the primitives discussed 
by Benjamin, who get to know the world through the magic of mimetic performances 
and expect to modify their lives via such spontaneous practices or recurring rituals.
 For example, the prostitute in the film likes to do her ‘business’ while playing Wong 
Kar-wai’s In the Mood for Love on the TV screen, as if doing so endows the ongoing 
sex trade with a gloss of secret romance and ironic dignity. In another instance, 
‘inspired’ by Pulp Fiction, a laid-off couple plans an armed robbery so they can pay 
for their son’s book fees. They follow the prostitute into a deserted warehouse, only to 
witness her being sexually coerced by two phony policemen. Out of sincere respect 
for Jules, the hit man in Pulp Fiction, the laid-off man in Pirated Copy takes out his 
pistol, recites the same Bible passage as Jules does, and then shoots and kills the two 
policemen. This ‘heroic’ act, however, eventually pushes the couple to the extreme of 
desperation. The story ends with their suicides. In these ways, poaching and imitating 
the ‘stolen’ plots indeed end up making these ‘modern primitives’ (to be more precise, 
‘postsocialist primitives’) into certain embodied ‘copies’ of the pirated film copies they 
watch. Of course, the process of mimesis and its social consequences may make one’s 
sensorium excited and self-pride soar for a moment. Nevertheless, these playful acts 
eventually exert enormous performative power on the characters, overwhelming their 
‘reel’ lives. They do not necessarily jump out of traps and dilemmas as the result, but 
end up stepping into another degenerated carnival which is destined to be saw-gashed 
or eliminated.
Post-WTO pirate filmmakers: Documenting pirate-eyes
Both Suzhou River and Pirated Copy invoke questions about the interrelations 
between the independent filmmaker and the pirate; between Chinese independent 
cinema and the ‘stolen’ popular culture; and between the TV screen which shows 
the pirated film, the viewfinder in the hands of the filmmaker and the story or life 
on both sides of these mediating planes. If identification or sympathy still seems to 
be oblique or kept at arm’s length in these two fiction films made in the first half of 
the 2000s, two recent documentaries have disposed with romantic fantasies about 
the pirates. In these documentaries, the filmmakers refrained from abusing their 
discursive privilege to appropriate (if not exploit) the pirate’s image to make the film’s 
own statement, and expressed another kind of concern about marginal and grassroots 
subjects through documentary forms of representation. It is interesting that in these 
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two documentaries, the identities of pirate and cinephile no longer stick together. 
Even though screen and camera lens still appear to possess a certain magic power, 
which ignites mimetic impulse and passion, they only constitute one facade of the 
petty disc vendor’s life. The rest is filled with love, friendship, familial relationships, 
emotional attachment to their career, and constant struggle to make ends meet. If in 
the fiction films (including Platform) I discussed earlier, there is always a phantom of 
the filmmaker himself that is projected onto the figure of the pirate-eye, now this self-
reflexive identity seems to have moved to the other side of the viewfinder. He or she 
becomes a quietly documenting observer behind the camera.
 Both the protagonists of Paigu (dir. Liu Gaoming, 2006) and DVD Boy (Dang Li 
Ge Dang, dir. Li Ruihua and Fan Qipeng, 2009) became pirated DVD vendors because 
they were migrant workers who did not have many career choices in the city, as they 
came from underdeveloped towns and had no higher education. Nevertheless, both 
end up finding a sense of belonging and attachment to their illegitimate ‘profession.’ In 
Paigu, the vendor named Paigu claims: ‘I like this business.’ This definitive statement 
is placed at the very beginning of the film, hence serves as part of the foundational 
address of both the vendor and the documentarian. Similarly, DVD Boy also unfolds 
and revolves around its protagonist Huang Liyin’s profession. The zigzagged ‘career’ 
path Huang wanders along also becomes a journey of the boy’s searching for himself. 
Huang starts off as the shopkeeper of a video store located at the entrance of Beijing 
Film Academy. Recounting the genesis of this business, he successfully associates it 
to the glorious past of Chinese art cinema, the Fifth Generation: ‘My boss was Tian 
Zhuangzhuang’s mazai [sidekick]; and I am his.’ Rather than benefitting from this 
‘nepotism,’ however, he is fired one-third of the way through the film. He also fails 
to pull together the DV footage he shoots in his spare time into a short film. And 
when he opens an online virtual DVD store, that does not work out either. His career 
(at least as presented in the film) looks like a chain of failures. In comparison, Paigu 
appears to be quite ‘professional’ in his job and has no difficulty in feeding himself, 
and sustains a regular income by attracting a group of loyal customers. Despite his 
own preference for popular cultural products, Paigu makes every effort to maintain 
a catalogue filled with hard-to-find and high quality art films ‘just because of these 
loyal customers.’ He loves the feeling when the customers find what they need and has 
trained himself to be ultra-knowledgeable about internationally hailed directors and 
film titles, with the help of DVD buyer’s guides. At one point, he says, ‘If I ever have 
enough money in the future, I want to sell legal copies.’ But for now, he hangs a foreign 
filmmaker’s newspaper article defending pirated DVDs on the wall in his room, in 
order to ‘encourage’ himself. The filmmaker follows Paigu deeper into his personal 
world: visiting his family in a small town, sharing his disturbing moments in dealing 
with romantic relationships, and finally witnessing how he has to give up his business. 
As the documentarian points out, the film revolves around pirate vendors as flesh and 
blood persons rather than trying to prove that piracy is a lucrative and exploitative 
business.
 The tangible texture of vendors’ real lives in these two documentaries poses great 
challenge to any mythic shell (no matter villainous or heroic) piracy has been put into 
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by popular discourses. For those who deem piracy sales as a career alternative, piracy 
becomes ‘a locus of political resentment toward the failure of the state and state elites,’ 
as Brian Larkin points out in his extensive study of the Nigerian video industry and 
its root in piracy culture.37 A pirate’s life just resembles the pirated copies he makes 
a living with, which may contain inherent defects or frauds, with no guarantee of 
quality. While trying one’s best to mend the holes, the pirates still inevitably encounter 
rupture, anxiety and frustration. Among these broken pieces of the chain of life, these 
‘systematic failures’ of piracy signify and amplify the state or ideological infrastruc-
ture’s potential for collapsing.
 These two films driven by the ‘documentary impulse’ are more conscious about 
the power imbalance induced by the apparatus of camera, and offer a different kind 
of cinematic identification between the kino-eye and the pirate. They did not indulge 
the filmmaker’s power of shooting and representation; instead, they adopted certain 
techniques in order to pursue visual equality. For instance, many sequences in DVD 
Boy are shot by Huang Liyin of himself (Huang is credited as one of the film’s cinema-
tographers). These parts are presented in black-and-white and crosscut with other 
scenes shot by the two documentarians. Moreover, the film ends with Huang narrating 
his own story in the form of folk rap (kuai ban) – ‘dang li ge dang’ – this is also where 
the film’s Chinese title comes from – as if the kino-eye is handing over his or her 
discursive (or ever historiographical) power to the pirate. Huang uses a chopstick 
and a bowl to strike a rhythm, facing the camera with a big smile. The lyrics tell his 
personal history in third-person: ‘He quit high school at 15 … He wanted to make film 
but obviously failed … However, man’s morality cannot be disgraced, so that his grand 
dream will eventually be realized someday.’ As the lyrics predict, when I saw Huang at 
DOChina in 2009, he did continue to work with the filmmakers of DVD Boy on other 
projects, anticipating further self-transformation through both piracy and amateur 
film practices.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to theorize an under-explored film culture in China’s 
postsocialist era. I argue that piracy is not only a social problem that is of economic 
and moral significance, but also an intriguing object of study for cultural historians 
and social scientists. The history of contemporary piracy in China is of even greater 
importance, given the special political, economic and cultural condition of this 
transitional society. In the past three decades, piracy has manifested as a unique mass 
cultural formation and given shape to new postsocialist subjectivities. It is clear that 
I have only set out one small aspect of this cultural history here, by looking at the 
cultural practices of pirate-cinephiles and pirate-eyes since the 1980s. As I pointed 
out earlier, these people are only some of the many kinds of cultural participants in 
piracy. Pirate, as I define it, consists of a much broader range of subjects, including: 
the first wave of private publishers who ‘plunged into the sea’ (xia hai) at the beginning 
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of the Reform Era; certain intellectuals who abandoned scholarly writing and became 
commercial writers; students who admired Western thoughts and turned to pirated 
books for enlightenment; dissidents who resisted the status quo by consuming 
bootlegs and underground media; and cottage factory-owners who make copycat 
products. In one way or another, they have made various connections with the transi-
tional social reality of postsocialist China through piracy and moulded themselves 
into the historical actors of their age.
 In conclusion, I want to borrow the on-the-go nature of an unfinished fiction film 
project by Huang Weikai to indicate the open-endedness of this chapter, and also to 
highlight, once again, the road on which many pirates are continuing to transform into 
kino-eye. At the end of 2010, I met Huang Weikai, a young independent filmmaker 
from Guangzhou, and got involved in the project he was initiating at that moment. 
Huang has recently become known for his film Disorder, aka, Now is the Future of the 
Past (Xianshi shi Guoqu de Weilai, 2008) – a short compilation documentary made 
from a thousand hours of footage he collected from the hands of a group of DV 
amateurs. Recognizing amateur and grassroots media production as an important 
medium through which Chinese citizens connect with their seemingly alienating and 
ridiculous social reality, Huang decided to make a fiction film which would carry 
on and expand the main concern of his previous documentary works. This new film 
– Toto, now still in preproduction – is exactly a new incarnation of the tale about 
the cinephilic pirate in transformation: a pirated DVD vendor, overwhelmed by the 
potential power of documentary, steals a DV camera and begins to shoot whatever 
his ‘machine-eye’ captures. Eventually, he becomes a ‘kino-eye’ – a videographer and 
a caring documentarian. Although Huang’s project may keep evolving in the future, I 
am quite certain that the tale ‘from pirate to the kino-eye’ has constituted one way for 
many of us to narrate our own history.
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Xue Jianqiang as Reckless Documentarian : 
Underdevelopment and Juvenile Crime in 
post-WTO China
Keith B. Wagner
Standing in front of Wu Wenguang’s Beijing studio in 2010, young documentarian Xue 
Jianqiang is found violently knocking at his predecessor’s door. Armed with his DV 
camera in his film, I Beat Tiger When I Was Young/Wo nianqing shi ye da laohu (2010), 
Xue points the camera aggressively at Wu, zeroing in on his target and pressing the 
father of the New Documentary Movement about his legacy. We hear Xue shouting at 
Wu to leave Chinese documentary film to the now more capable – presumably, Xue 
himself. The implications of such a demand are obvious, if we take this moment in the 
film as an example: the time has come to break the limitations of the still-restrictive 
Chinese documentary form and content, and to do so with unrelenting artistic and 
political conviction.
 Despite the poisonous impression one may gather after watching I Beat Tiger 
When I Was Young, Xue’s debasement of Wu’s career (and other filmmakers in this 
documentary) in some ways stages the debate1 between an older generation documen-
tarian and an enthusiastic newcomer. Culturally speaking, Wu’s Bumming in Beijing 
(1990) remains a hugely influential film in China today due to its portrait of five self-
marginalized artists in the capital that draws attention to a ‘kind of independence from 
dominant structures and ideologies that shape mainland Chinese life,’ and the ‘ways 
in which these directors, and their works, might serve as catalysts of sociocultural 
transformation’ for the 1990s.2 Matthew D. Johnson has argued that Wu’s represen-
tation of a postsocialist reality is ‘specific to these individuals’ “actual lives” (zhenshi 
shenghuo), with particular emphasis on both hardships and “rich experiences” that 
downward mobility paradoxically provide.’3 And this remains a central critique in 
Bumming in Beijing. Here Wu’s ‘spirited critique’ is somewhat compatible with Xue’s 
own documentary trailblazing in the post-WTO period; though Xue’s trailblazing is 
also quite different from Wu’s, whereby he hopes to provide a unique documentary 
vision for the twenty-first century – a method of making that is both vainly expressive 
and socially conscious – a paradox of expression worth exploring in the pages to come.
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 This paradox in writing about Xue and others’ work is what Paul Pickowicz calls the 
‘self-indulgent to the extreme’ phase of independent Chinese film and documentary.4 
Yet I would like to proceed anyway and look at the implications of excessiveness 
to hopefully arrive at the other side of this characteristic by detecting the socially 
conscious elements that are sometimes concealed by iGeneration solipsism. To think 
about Xue’s new documentary vision, we must start with questions of methodology. 
As such, the boundaries and methods for documentary operation in China have 
been newly drawn and discussed in divisional terms by Yingjin Zhang, who cites 
Taiwanese film scholar Wang Weici for methodological guidance. Wang provides 
a standard interpretation of Chinese documentary film, delineating ‘four modes of 
documentary in contemporary China: (1) conventional voiceover (straightforward 
propaganda), which characterizes the mainstream media; (2) observation, which 
emphasizes non-interference and derives from Euro-American direct cinema and 
cinéma vérité; (3) interviews, which became popular with CCTV Living Space; and 
(4) self-reflection, which is still rare in China.’5 In more theoretical terms, Chinese 
documentary film has been in its own categorical context up until 1990, if we think of 
Bill Nichols’s six documentary categories – poetic, expository, observational, partici-
patory, reflexive and performative. Despite their limitations, these presiding categories 
are a necessary evil in film studies because they hold together the disparate patterns of 
documentary filmmaking, in China and in the West.6
 In light of these methods of analysis, the modes categorized by Wang and reappro-
priated by Zhang are accurate; however, I would add a fifth mode to the list – ‘reckless 
documentaries,’ films that catapult their viewers into extreme realities or viewing 
positions. Reckless documentary is a method whereby the observational mode, with 
its cinéma vérité influence, is taken in a new direction, driven by a forceful, even 
combustible look at lower-class subjects who are often encouraged to act badly, even 
violently, for the camera. This combustible mode is derived through an approach that 
is careless of consequence and filmmakers who provoke their subjects to act irrespon-
sibly and behave with little regard for personal safety or ethics, toward themselves 
or others around them. Indeed, this reckless instigation caught on film is arguably 
a new approach in the field of documentary filmmaking in post-WTO China. I 
see Xue living up to this approach in how he targets his subjects on the margins 
of Chinese society, often disregarding ethical or practical precision for a no-holds-
barred approach. And despite the enfant terrible label, his flippant documentary style 
also underpins a crude dissection of Chinese underdevelopment via a sensational 
visuality.
Xue’s tongue-in-cheek attitude
I read Xue’s reckless approach as more in line with contemporary visual artists in 
England than traditional documentary filmmaking in China. The feel of I Beat Tiger 
When I Was Young resonates as incendiary in a postmodern sense, making me think of 
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the Young British Artists (YBA) of the 1990s, particularly the work of Jake and Dinos 
Chapman and their reputation for satirizing other artistic movements, practitioners 
and even patrons in creating artistic pieces that are at their core both sensational and 
polemical in nature. In particular, their sculptural installation titled ‘Hell’ (2000), 
where hundreds of nude and bloodied miniature figurines are encased in a plexi-glass 
purgatory, conjures up scenes from Dante’s Inferno, or even from Dutch medieval 
painter Hieronymus Bosch and his unsettling triptychs.
 Like the Chapman brothers’ ‘Hell’ as grotesque allegory for British (even Western) 
unbridled consumer culture, Xue’s postsocialist configuration of underdevelopment 
is both political and apolitical simultaneously – visually arresting as well as conten-
tious in sociocultural terms. This tongue-in-cheek attitude by the Chapman brothers 
is a commonality I see Xue sharing, and it is refreshing because it signals a paradigm 
shift in the larger Chinese documentary scene the last ten years. Furthermore, Xue’s 
undisciplined attack demonstrates, among other things, a refusal to conform to ivory 
tower standards. This refusal is exemplified by Xue’s challenging of Wu Wenguang’s 
uncontested status in artistic and intellectual circles in I Beat Tiger When I Was 
Young. In fact, Wu’s status is a major issue for newer documentarians to grapple with 
in China: do they challenge, embrace, or ignore his legacy? One imagines Wu to be 
like John Grierson in the influence Grierson had as the British and European father of 
documentary practice in the 1930s. Faced with this creative shadow, Xue shows there 
is indeed something beyond the institutional mosaic of documentary film Wu has 
shaped in China, and at the same time provides a new mode in Wang’s and Zhang’s 
documentary taxonomy.7
 In this chapter, I conceive of Xue’s work as assessing the harm to weaker sectors of 
Chinese society, though admittedly not a new vantage point, an important film among 
others because it continues to structure the steady neoliberal creep in the country. 
And it is a filmic timeline we can trace from Wu’s Bumming in Beijing to Xue’s corpus 
of work. This is so, I argue, because neoliberal policies have left behind many areas in 
China in what Wang Hui describes as China’s Rust Belt; his thoughts guide much of 
my theorizations of underdevelopment in lower-order cities discussed in this chapter. 
I will also question the so-called ethics involved (or not involved) in Xue’s and others’ 
‘reckless documentary’ films. This approach will draw on Yingjin Zhang’s and Yiman 
Wang’s research on the changing nature of documentary film in China. Thus, in 
synthesizing these three scholars’ ideas with my own, I hope to legitimate how Xue 
captures the rise in delinquency among young nomadic types in contemporary China 
in an unsophisticated, bottom-up vision.
A reckless approach to Chinese documentary film
Is the reckless documentary a new niche in contemporary documentary film culture 
in China? I Beat Tiger When I Was Young seems to parallel the tactics of British 
documentary film from the last decade. For instance, Xue’s approach is reminiscent 
150 China’s iGeneration
of the British kamikaze filmmaker Nick Broomfield, who also uses a no-holds-barred 
approach to shadow his documentary subjects. His most memorable film, Tracking 
Down Maggie (1990), audaciously follows Margaret Thatcher in her private life after 
her fall from power as British Prime Minister in the early 1990s. Broomfield’s pursuit 
of Thatcher sees him zigzag across the country, from heckling her at a book signing 
in London to a British Naval ceremony in Plymouth – while Xue takes a more direct 
approach and ambushes Wu Wenguang at his Beijing studio. Here both directors are 
unrelenting and cross traditional lines of documentary production by literally chasing 
their subjects. In effect, these two unorthodox approaches in documentary film come 
to overexpose, aggravate and taunt their respective subjects, and are seen as a new 
mode of documentary filmmaking in England in the 1990s, and a newer approach in 
China in the 2000s.
 In another short documentary, peculiarly titled Martian Syndrome, Xue shapes a 
story about a deranged homeless man with whom he strikes up a conversation, and 
proceeds to analyse and then antagonize from the inside of his own apartment in 
Beijing. Interestingly, the documentary uses practically zero light and switches from 
a darkened interior to a reverse negative of the apartment, whereby the talking head 
shots of the homeless man produce a ghostly effect, even a Martian sci-fi aesthetic in 
its greenish glow – hence the film’s title – and these elements provide a sinister distance 
to Xue’s exploited subject. In addition, Martian Syndrome is strikingly amateurish in 
its formal style, where one is puzzled by the use of a reverse negative but amused by 
the frightening aesthetic it produces. First screened internationally in 2011 at the New 
Generation Chinese Cinema Conference in London, Martian Syndrome drew notice 
from established and young Chinese film scholars.
 Yet before the arrival of Xue’s work in official Anglo-American academic circles, 
I had the privilege of seeing an earlier work of his, in 2010, at the now defunct 
Cinephilia West, in Notting Hill Gate, London. Chinese film scholar and documen-
tarian Tianqi Yu screened Xue’s Three Small Animals II (2009), which will be the focus 
of the remainder of this chapter.8 Not only is Xue’s 17-minute-long experimental 
documentary an illustrative example of neoliberal underdevelopment in China’s 
Rust Belt, but it also focuses on three delinquent teenage boys who commit crimes 
against other youths, capturing a hostility that undercuts the film’s reckless style. 
This, in my view, signals something more alarming, and challenges the showmanship 
and recklessness Xue portends in the earlier films I mention – I Beat Tiger When I 
Was Young and Martian Syndrome. Indeed, Three Small Animals II focuses on the 
negative components of China – impoverishment, exclusion and criminalization of 
both China’s regions and its youth – that on a visual level blurs the boundaries of the 
experimental documentary, toward my notion of a reckless style. Thus, the Janus-faced 
methodology for making Three Small Animals II for Xue is both excessive and churlish 
in terms of its subject matter in the portrayal of juvenile crime, but also unapologetic 
and regionally specific. And by critiquing China as a partition society, Xue exposes the 
allusiveness of more refined and developed Chinese culture.
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Taiyuan
Despite the 17-minute length of Three Small Animals II, one gets an immediate sense 
of the dilapidated post-industrial landscape Xue hones in on and where the film is 
based. The imagery of Taiyuan comes to foreground an uncosmetic set of spaces in 
the northern Chinese city: derelict housing estates and crumbling industrial buildings 
off in the distance of the frame. This uncosmetic set of spaces is Xue’s drab cityscape 
in Three Small Animals II. It is replete with filthy alleyways, cramped inner-city roads, 
rusty mining equipment and scruffy apartment interiors, all drenched by constant acid 
rain – it is a documentary that highlights the now almost-clichéd images of xiancheng, a 
term defined as ‘county-level city.’ The term provincializes urban decay and slow urban 
renewal, which is bundled up with many fictional and documentary films from China. 
During the last decade and a half, we have encountered the xiancheng mise-en-scène in 
the works of Wang Bing, Jia Zhangke, Li Yang, Lu Chuan, Cui Jian, and more recently, 
in the quasi-documentary work of Xue, Xu Tong and Wu Haohao among others.
 However, the difference in Xue’s style if we compare him to other young experi-
mental documentarians is sizeable. Take Xue’s aesthetic experimentation. In Three 
Small Animals II, he incorporates a simple-looking computer-generated clock-type 
calendar, blue and white and half-circular in shape, to accompany his real xiancheng 
footage. This clock-type calendar template comes to break these bleak xiancheng 
images within the filmic frame. Here, we see the hand of the clock display the birth 
year of the three hooligan boys that Xue follows, which acts as a type of marker; the 
significance of the calendar clock is to chronicle how transformation is economically 
and socially attached to these teenage boys. It becomes a ‘translation machine’, to echo 
Henri Bergson and Flaubert before him, where the apparatus addresses a simultaneous 
time outside the cheerful economic reforms felt in other parts of the country, but not 
enjoyed by these teenage boys in Taiyuan. We find in Xue’s and others’ films the explo-
ration not of construction sites where cities are erected overnight or places that await 
gentrification. Instead, we see blatant neglect, deindustrialization and groups of people 
with nothing to lose – acting wildly and destructively – given the destitution they face.
 Beyond the emphasis on time, or its elapse, the documentary provides other 
unusual visual motifs. For example, camera angles are quite haphazard. We see in 
one scene a close-up of a card table with mah jong titles stacked on its surface and a 
pan-out to one child being trained how to gamble on the game with adults looking 
on. In another scene, the filmmaker records one of the teenage boys speeding through 
a run-down area of Taiyuan on a three-wheeled motorcycle, filming over his subject’s 
shoulder as he rides on the back. The composition is intriguing because it parallels the 
circular calendar clock template, which works to gauge large blocks of time. We see 
another circular device in this scene, a speedometer, gauging the motorcycle’s speed 
as it records the three teenage boys carelessly joyriding through Taiyuan. Here Xue’s 
focus on framing the speedometer seems to signify, in some respect, the rapid decom-
position of his young subjects. These reckless teenagers express themselves through 
daredevil acts on their motorcycle, unconcerned for their own safety or the public’s.
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 Most interesting of all, in terms of this documentary’s aesthetic composition, is 
Three Small Animals II’s focus on small-screen displays. In another scene in the reckless 
documentary, the three teenage boys surround a fourth boy and then begin to strike 
him in the head with an umbrella. Their violent actions become just another form of 
stimulation for them to pass time in Taiyuan. We see this dynamic in another scene in 
the film, where there is a cut to a long-shot of them beating another unidentified young 
boy, then a cut-away that puts us hovering over the three delinquent teenage boys 
who are engrossed in watching their assault as it is played back on one of their mobile 
phones. All the time, Xue shoots them holding the mobile phone as they laugh at their 
recent crime, unfazed by their violent offence. The scene ends with them screening this 
content over and over again. Aesthetically speaking, it becomes a documentary mise-
en-abyme mode of framing, strikingly original in its visual adeptness, yet also sinister 
in its ability to address the impact of economic conditions and the fate of its delinquent 
teenagers committing this senseless, or perhaps necessary, crime to survive.
 If Three Small Animals II is a reckless documentary, it shares a political and 
aesthetic link to other recent Chinese documentary and docudramatic films that 
conform to my notion of a reckless mode of filmmaking. These films, defined by 
a loose aesthetic approach that complements a self-affirmed identification with 
regionally based realities, now include themes of criminal activity, usually involving 
jobless males, animal cruelty, natural disasters, dangerous situations and drug use 
– particularly egregious are dog fight videos from Guangzhou and portraits of 
heroin addicts from Shanghai. For instance, many of the dog fight videos that are 
posted anonymously (given their disturbing content) personify this reckless mode of 
filmmaking. Elsewhere, Du Haiban’s hasty decision to film the Sichuan earthquake’s 
devastation a day or so after it happens in 1428 (2009) is another type of reckless 
filmmaking, chasing after danger (much like Huang Weiai’s Disorder from 2007 that 
records urban accidents on Chinese streets). In addition, Shanghai Panic (Andrew 
Cheng, 2002), adapted from Mian Mian’s writings, tells the story of rampant drug use 
and prostitution by young urbanites with nothing to lose. These depraved activities 
caught on camera thus form another, less socially conscious reckless approach and 
point viewers to other uncosmetic environments in China: grubby alleyways, toppled 
architecture, unnamed streets and run-down apartments where these tragedies occur.
 Scenes in these films can also be read in two ways. On the one hand, they focus 
on dangerous situations and illegal recreations we come to understand as the subjects 
(and sometimes the filmmakers themselves) trying in vain to articulate their endless 
lust for empty pleasures (wagers on bloodthirsty dogs to exhibiting human fatalities 
to scoring drugs). On the other hand, these same films, reflexive in format, reflect 
an amateurish style and embrace sloppy editing techniques, which are chalked up to 
rookie mistakes and are a distinct modality of the younger generation’s amateurism. 
The larger phenomenon of amateur filmmaking has been discussed elsewhere by Ying 
Qian, who finds ‘a poverty of aesthetic imagination and artistic vision’ that in some 
way unites directors like Du, Huang, Cheng, Xue and countless other filmmakers in 
contemporary China.9 Their films – including Xue’s Three Small Animals II – confront/
feature subjects no longer enamoured (or never enamoured) with neoliberal reform. 
 Xue Jianqiang as Reckless Documentarian 153
These films come to undermine government discourses of a cosmopolitan life in 
China by going in the opposite direction: visualizing heinous acts of animal cruelty, 
carnage, hedonistic pleasure and juvenile offences.
 Another elusive question remains, and I need to return to Three Small Animals 
II directly to answer it: is it possible to untangle the objectification of Xue’s youth 
in this film from its murky sociocultural critique? And is there an ethical problem 
if Xue refrains from humanizing these troubled teenage boys? And what are the 
consequences of remaining caught in such a paradox, even aporia? One answer 
might be found in Yingjin Zhang’s recent work, where he posits a new appoach not 
only to thinking about Chinese documentary films but also what these newer films 
are saying to the Chinese public. This is important to bear in mind, as Zhang argues 
that ‘Owing to its marginalization [bianyuan] in contemporary China – a deplorable 
fact sometimes attributed in part to irresponsible dismissals by self-designated 
mainstream intellectuals – independent documentary has consistently pursued alter-
native, oppositional, even subversive functions.’10 If I understand Zhang correctly, my 
point of inquiry into these films, however debased they may be, should be with how 
this group of filmmakers – particularly Xue – lacks an allegiance to an ethical position 
(instead they glorify reckless acts, presenting, perhaps too excessively, killer dogs, 
earthquakes and road hazards, drug addicts, and troubled youth to a Chinese public), 
and also with what these subversive functions veil – depressed living standards, in all 
different narrative and visual scales of reference. Therefore, some of the subversive 
elements often dismissed by Western and at times mainland scholars, particularly the 
way in which teenage violence and crime have come to contravene traditional ethical 
values, seem redeemable, in an academic sense, if we think less about the ethical 
questions and more about the social context many of these films expose. At least 
this is the position I have been taking thus far in this chapter. In what follows, my 
Marxist-sociological critique will be fused to several close textual analyses to explicate 
the rise in regional unemployment and lack of family support, which we find Xue’s 
criminalized teenage boys inherit as citizens living in Taiyuan.
Contextualizing underdevelopment and crime
Central to Xue’s original, if subversive, approach is of course the question of how the 
rules for making and interpreting newer documentary films remain in flux, a question 
the filmmakers themselves are beginning to rethink. Three Small Animals II, for 
instance, questions documentary film’s traditional notion of ethical distance from its 
subject. Because of their extreme approach, we can view Xue’s and others’ films that 
focus on socioeconomic problems as a distillation of neoliberalism’s effects on China’s 
most marginalized. I therefore extract from Xue’s reckless documentary the plain 
face of neoliberal underdevelopment. Here I see a newer expression of the limits of 
Chinese neoliberalism in territories that are seen less often, with imagery hardly found 
on CCTV or other private media content circulating China. Instead, Three Small 
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Animals II delineates an uncosmetic projection of parochial life in China’s hinterlands. 
Focusing on the features of Taiyuan – the capital city of Shanxi province, a remote city 
not benefiting as other cities have from complete architectural or structural redesign 
– Three Small Animals II shows its audience a worn and dilapidated set of spaces that 
backdrops Xue’s teenage subjects, and this backdrop lacks the shimmering glow that 
is depicted in much mainstream cinema.
 Speaking about the economic state of Taiyuan, prosperity has all but passed it by. 
It lacks what the ‘coastal belt cities’ have, especially if we follow Xiangming Chen’s 
prognosis, that ‘early developers like Shenzhen and other cities in Guangdong and 
Fujian provinces, which were fairly small and marginal in the past, have raced ahead of 
the more established port cities like Shanghai and Tianjin, which have since picked up 
pace and regained their earlier glory. This sequence and pattern of growing inter-local 
differentiation stems from the state’s policies of targeting and favouring sets of cities 
in different regions for fast and focused growth in a staged and incremental fashion.’11 
In fact, this follows the historical trajectory for neoliberal development in regard to 
city policies in China, where by the mid-1980s, ‘its northeastern and southwestern 
border regions fell much behind.’ Taiyuan is not a city given central consideration 
by the state, as we can gather from the discordant images on view in this film. Thus, 
Three Small Animals II comes to disentangle the familiar logic of neoliberalism’s 
ability to supersede territorial constraints, via its small-scale analysis of three marginal 
teenagers and the dilapidated city they call home.
 In much of its depiction of parochial life, Three Small Animals II stands in diametric 
opposition to Wu Wenguang’s citizen activism captured in his later work – especially 
Dance with Peasant Workers (2001). In that film, Wu presents a polished documentary 
treatment of lower-class misfortune, and its optimistic social message can be seen 
to counterpoise the stark vision we find in Xue’s Three Small Animals II. Indeed, in 
ragged formal terms, Three Small Animals II does not wrap its subjects in the warmth 
of a cosmopolitan amelioration. Instead, it illustrates the instabilities many Chinese 
face. Of course, this is not meant to denigrate Wu Wenguang’s important film, but 
rather suggests a bleaker portrait of Chinese lower-class society that is now present 
throughout the country. I therefore would stress the social context of Xue’s film – 
which is about struggle, tragedy and poverty for Chinese citizens, yet never willing to 
profess a direct political or activist stance against these realities. The events that unfold 
in front of Xue’s viewfinder provide the viewer with a sense of China’s developmental 
problems in this region of the country, or, more dubiously, a penchant for lowly 
characters and their deplorable behaviour. To put it in the words of another young 
documentarian named Qiu Jiongjiong: ‘Shoot films like an animal. Criticize [films] 
like an animal. Animals of a different species [sic].’12 Lu Xinyu argues that low-budget 
documentarians with an affinity for depravity come to view their own ‘social responsi-
bility as an oppressive concept,’ a conundrum most marginalized Chinese filmmakers 
must face.13
 Despite the rejection of so-called ‘social responsibility’ in Xue’s and others’ work, 
many of these reckless films hint at, whether implicitly or explicitly, the scarcity of 
social services in the country with no remedies to fix these social problems, at least 
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in the near future. Barriers to a better life are presented by the intensification of 
deindustrialization and underdevelopment in smaller cities, which often trigger social 
problems that continue to haunt China.14 As Wang Hui argues:
…we must respect the deep relationship between cultural pluralism and the 
problem of development; we must also investigate rural problems alongside 
urban ones. The free movement of labor, public management, and government 
intervention are all necessary conditions for the market system; but how to limit 
its destruction of the environment, traditions, customs, rituals and other aspects 
of life and values is a major problem for the study of development today.15
More generally, Xue depicts not only an unprivileged urban condition for his delin-
quent teenagers, but also espouses an anti-establishment lifestyle, one that Chris Berry 
explains only became ‘possible in the People’s Republic with the development of a 
non-State sector in the 1980s.’16 Three Small Animals II thus crystallizes the dispersal 
and evisceration of citizens and their sites of origin, a genuine embedded feature in 
this documentary film. Moreover, its portrait of these delinquent teenage boys is not 
colonized by a mainstream reality, insofar as it clues its audiences in to the disconnect-
edness and push toward neoliberal nomadism that Xue’s delinquent teenagers face. 
They wander the streets day in and day out in search of excitement and distraction, 
not caught up with typical Chinese activities found at their age: education, family and 
social responsibility. These boys also lack employment to guide them, and ultimately 
the codes of the streets inform their truculent behaviour in Taiyuan. Unemployment 
is in fact common to this region, where production-based services were eclipsed by 
service-sector activities long ago. ‘After 2001, growth rate of labour productivity is also 
higher in service industry than manufacturing industry and the average level is 20.1 
per cent and 11 per cent respectively.’17 Unsurprisingly, unemployment in Taiyuan is 
coupled with weak capital investment from foreign investors, waning state subsidies 
to its lagging manufacturing industries, and no visible tourism industry that would 
otherwise offset the city’s continued underdevelopment.
 The notion that environment dictates social behaviour is not too far-fetched if we 
apply these bleak socioeconomic variables to Xue’s teenage boys, who almost wholly 
lack community or family support to share in their burdens of daily life in Taiyuan. 
These social conditions can be considered as one of many causes of their deviant 
behaviour, and in another scene, we see Xue recording them smashing a factory 
window late at night to steal tanks of compressed air to sell on the black market. Once 
they move the stolen items to the back of their three-wheeled motorcycle and flee 
the scene, one of the boys proudly declares their robbery a success. This scene of the 
theft from the factory is presented in a matter-of-fact, detached style, as Xue passes no 
judgement on the boys for their crime. Therefore, as Three Small Animals II blurs the 
line between a reckless documentarian and a documentarian building a visual record 
of social deviance in an uncosmetic place like Taiyuan, a question emerges: is social 
responsibility relieved of its implication for a better life, when a better life was never an 
option in the first place? To explain this, I have deployed a macro-intuitive approach 
to neoliberal neglect found in regional cities like Taiyuan, which I see this film able 
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to articulate in its focalization on a Chinese underclass – young delinquents, who are 
beneath migrant workers, both in larger cities and in their hometown – and below, 
too, the largely uneducated peasant classes. These jobless and orphaned subjects 
constitute the most marginal group found in the discursive modes of documentary 
filmmaking.
 Though we should avoid calling these teenage boys’ acts of criminal mischief a 
form of ‘gang’ violence, their behaviour does warrant a reflection on recent socio-
logical studies in China, particularly studies of individuals who are exposed to 
criminal activity. In a final scene of violence, we see the three teens beating another 
boy on the street. This violent incident occurs when the three teenage boys form a 
semicircle around a fourth boy, whom they then start to taunt. Initially, the fourth boy 
reacts timidly and takes their abuse. But after he does not react, Xue’s three teenage 
boys begin to push him until he starts to cry. This sign of weakness then incites the 
three teenage boys to push the fourth boy more violently, eventually resulting in his 
being struck in the arms and head repeatedly. Though this appears more like bullying 
than first-degree assault, one finds a complete absence of social restraint in this world 
of neoliberal nomadism, where the three teenage boys lurk about and ‘commit crimes 
basically by chance.’ One might say their temptation to ‘prove themselves’ or just to 
‘act tough’ thus culminates in this public attack and later, I assume, more deviant 
behaviour, beyond these criminal incidents caught on camera. We could call this in 
sociological terms ‘co-offence’ (gongtong fanzui), which refers to the commission of a 
crime jointly by at least two people.18
 This blunt perspective on life in Taiyuan, in a more profound sense, visualizes one 
aspect of underdevelopment and a reality not contested by the Chinese government.19
Unlike other countries that have experienced rapid modernization and indus-
trialization, China, and the Asian-Pacific nations in general, have had relatively 
moderate increases in their rates of delinquency. Still, it can be said that shifts in 
economic conditions in these societies have had an impact on the volume of youth 
crime…In addition, unemployment has risen at an unprecedented rate; in 1990, 
the number of urban unemployed was projected to be 6 million, a rate of 3.5% 
versus 2% a year earlier (China News Analysis 1989). More significantly, in 1991, 
it was estimated that 100 million peasants were unemployed, and projected that 
the number may approach 300 million by the end of the century.20
For example, one can trace the upswing of unemployed to crime and this follows 
China’s move toward neoliberalization. Picking up on this social trend toward crime, 
Manzhi Cao provides the following statistical data from the 1970s through 1989 to 
reflect this troubling economic problem.21
 By 1989, and before the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, the rise in crime 
committed by youth offenders is astounding – an estimated 74.1 per cent of youth 
crime was perpetrated by youths aged 14–25 years. In more recent reports, the 
numbers have remained practically the same, with a slight increase in the 1990s and a 
dip of 2 per cent in the 2000s. Of course, to link all crime to neoliberalization in China 
would be preposterous, but levels of corruption, theft, gambling, unemployment, 
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vagrancy, nomadism, and the elimination of social programmes have all increased 
under China’s market flexibility programmes. These undeniable realities are linked 
to underdevelopment, which seems hard to contest when we see hypermodernity in 
Shanghai and Beijing and deindustrialization in Taiyuan and other lower-order cities. 
Correspondingly, such a transformation of the socioeconomic fabric in China has led 
to higher rates of concern, particularly in juvenile crime committed. No stranger to 
this reality, Wang Hui postulates that Chinese labourers based in more rural areas face 
unique problems and connects this underdevelopment to neoliberalism in China.
…the expansion of the market system brings with it the entry of circulation activ-
ities and its values into all aspects of life, which breaks apart all preexisting social 
structures (such as communities and their values), and brings all communal life 
formations (such as minority formations) down to their lowest common denomi-
nator. In this sense, to merely discuss development from the perspective of the 
freedom to contract labor while ignoring the relationship between development 
and social conditions could indeed lead to the disintegration of society.22
Indeed, in Wang’s view social disintegration is an integral factor to underdevelopment, 
and is reproduced in what Xue’s three disenchanted teenage boys come to face: no 
alleviation of social problems, which means no respect for those problems they 
encounter in Taiyuan. They become reactionary in spirit and rebel to survive and be 
heard like other oppressed youth. While daily routines captured in the film show the 
three teenage boys spending their days with no structure to their schedule, one could 
assume that petty crime like this is brought on by boredom and degeneracy. In this 
regard, I believe the time template is suggestive in Three Small Animals II and signifies 
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and, most importantly, economic growth has been petrified in time, well before 
their births. The three teenage boys in Xue’s film are bound to no moral or economic 
systems – systems that would otherwise regiment how they keep their time, and what 
rewards are reaped in following a path to neoliberal self-sufficiency and sociocultural 
compliance. If we zoom out to view this phenomenon as connected to China’s rapid 
economic growth, such social exclusion relates, to some degree, to the breakdown of 
the familial and fraternal bonds found outside large cities like Shanghai and Beijing. 
These problems are widespread – not just for Xue’s three orphaned delinquents, but 
also for migrant labourers, prostitutes and ethnic minorities, who all struggle to make 
ends meet.
 With the steady disintegration of the domestic sphere in China’s Rust Belt, this 
documentary critiques neoliberal underdevelopment, which can be read through 
the associative patterns of neglect and crime. Taiyuan is thus shown to audiences as 
worn down, with children left behind and a free-for-all mood indulged in by many 
operating at the edge of Chinese society. Moreover, as China’s neoliberal policies 
have continued to weaken the economies of remote small cities like Taiyuan during 
the last 20 years, Xue shows us these changes in less discernible ways via his flippant 
documentary style. Here the dichotomy found in Three Small Animals II is similar to 
Yiman Wang’s witnessing concept.23 I see Wang’s theory as a way to interpret whether 
Xue is literally ‘one of them’ (as he lives in the same city and is related to one of the 
teenage delinquents), while also allowing his ‘actors to co-author’ his production. 
Wang’s concept calls into question the usefulness of hanging onto civic principles (i.e. 
critiquing Chinese social decline) in documentary films such as this one. In other 
words, I believe Three Small Animals II proposes an ‘against the grain’ critical approach 
and does not question whether we actually need to exempt the violent juvenile 
behaviour in the film; on the contrary, Three Small Animals II rejects being ‘irrecon-
cilably split into stable categories of the powerful and the powerless…’.24 To me, the 
film plays with ‘the powerful and the powerless,’ but in its reckless approach defies the 
often lopsided position in which the documentarian usually finds himself or herself. 
Instead, these reckless films contest such a binary in the first place.
 Essentially, Three Small Animals II records the existence of three marginalized 
teenage boys, vulgar as they may be. It represents them as a type of regional citizen 
in China’s Rust Belt, worthy of filmic attention in the post-WTO moment. But the 
documentary’s fatalism is something we cannot ignore either. Wang has argued 
that many grassroots documentary filmmakers develop a double-edged sword in 
their films’ predilection to depict a reality, and due to the need to be close to their 
subjects, it is said, a filmmaker violates a perceived documentary ethics in not 
keeping an objective distance. Wang explains this double-edged sword mentality as 
follows:
…the act of penetrating into the subjects’ private space leads to objectification, 
voyeurism, and exhibitionism, or whether it generates genuine concern for grass-
roots interests and thereby delivers a humanist (renwen) “thick description” of 
the subject’s existential life experience. In other words, the issue of documentary 
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ethics is ultimately bound up with effective presentation and articulation of grass-
roots reality from a humanist, sympathetic perspective.25
Whether considered exploitative or not, Xue’s violation of documentary ethics does all 
of what Wang proposes simultaneously – ‘penetrating into the subjects’ private space 
[that] leads to objectification, voyeurism, and exhibitionism’ – but the violation also 
allows a ‘concern for grassroots interests,’ though not in a manner I, or most theorists, 
are comfortable with.26 Instead, Three Small Animals II visualizes a rather brutish 
reality, and if we cut through the reckless approach, we find neglect and underde-
velopment as associative patterns of documentary critique. These associative patterns 
locate neoliberalism’s inability to penetrate regional cities such as Taiyuan, and are a 
visual testament to underdevelopment; moreover, Three Small Animals II’s unsym-
pathetic presentation of further grassroots problem in China – particularly juvenile 
crime and violence – have evolved to such an extent that many of the aggressive and 
reckless stances taken by the filmmakers now can be seen as a backlash against the 
unsympathetic policies of neoliberal reform being implemented by the state. Right 
or wrong, these are problems that China must face and what we will continue to see 
produced from iGeneration filmmakers.
Conclusion
It is undeniable that regionally based DV practices such as Xue’s have increased due 
to the affordability of digital cameras. Likewise, the most unskilled filmmakers can 
now chronicle and archive what the state calls the most negative of content, so that 
the once-alienated resident is replaced by growing groups of film practitioners, of 
not only the benign variety, but also young hooligan types, eager to document their 
violent deeds. A reckless approach that was incomprehensible to a Chinese public one 
decade ago is now on the rise. More than a latent problem for scholars of documentary 
practice in China, the reckless Chinese documentary represents a new category in the 
‘polyphonic’27 multitude of styles, politics and preferences that embrace brutish figura-
tions of petty crime on film (textual) that in the process disguise the territorial fixity of 
underdevelopment (contextual). I have tried to demonstrate that a Marxist-sociological 
approach is one way to not completely dismiss these reckless filmmakers and their 
rough-acting and rough-talking subjects. Such a reckless approach for making these 
films reflects the petty criminality as a consequence of accelerated marketization in 
Chinese society, and it is a culture that must not be ignored by scholars, especially in 
the context of China’s ‘pragmatic’ experiment with neoliberalism.28
 In terms of the film’s level of objectivity (or lack thereof), Three Small Animals II 
supplies its audiences with a vernacular present, a present unconcerned with audience 
approval or with following the provisions set forth by the state. As such, this film offers 
a glimpse of a small segment of the Chinese population – youth offenders – and by 
doing so consciously violates ethical considerations to bring viewers a no-holds-barred 
approach to oppositional (and unlawful) lifestyles. Through a complete rejection of 
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traditional modes of Chinese documentary filmmaking, Xue has shown the country’s 
most Dickensian subjects through his reckless approach, while coming to grasp their 
spirit to get at the severity of underdevelopment in China’s Northern Rust Belt. In the 
end what we get is a form of anomie, caught between shocking depravity and maverick 
class depictions, and in this episodic accomplishment, it is uncertain whether we may 
or may not see more of it from China.
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Of Animals and Men: Towards a Theory of 
Docu-ani-mentary
Yiman Wang
This chapter explores the implications of animal presence and performativity as 
captured, enhanced and induced by the act of documentation in four contemporary 
Chinese documentaries that showcase variegated animal–human interactions. The 
animals that appear in these documentaries can be preliminarily described as (1) 
work animals, as depicted in Sand and Sea (Sha yu hai, dir. Kang Jianning 1990), (2) 
domestic/food animals, as depicted in Three Sisters (San Zimei, dir. Wang Bing 2012), 
(3) wild, endangered animals, as depicted in My Himalayan Vulture (Wo de gaoshan 
tujiu, dir. Tashi Sang’e, Zhou Jie 2009), and (4) show animals, as depicted in Ying and 
Bai (Ying he Bai, dir. Zhang Yiqing 1999). These categories, however, will be questioned 
in my analysis below. Challenging the understanding that animals play only fringe and 
auxiliary roles in relation to the human world, I argue that these animals permeate 
the very texture of the documentaries, forging a co-implicating relationship between 
the animal and the human that defies anthropocentrism and compels a ‘humanimal’ 
perspective. The imbrication of the animal and the human instigated through the act 
of ground-level documentation leads to what I theorize as ‘docu-ani-mentary’ – a 
new approach to studying contemporary Chinese documentary in relation to global 
environmentalism, especially as articulated in eco-criticism and ecocinema.
 The notion of docu-ani-mentary highlights the continuous animal presence in 
contemporary Chinese documentary-making, despite the filmmakers’ different 
training, affiliations, documentary poetics and socio-cultural-political concerns. As 
such, it allows us to renegotiate the ‘generational’ discourse (that has defined post-
1980s Chinese film history) by underscoring sites of inter-generational dialogue across 
divergences.
 Furthermore, this concept enables us to probe the ramifications of the (often-
times contingent, inadvertent and marginal) animal presence mediated through film 
documentation by raising questions concerning sustainable economy, ethics and 
biodiverse ecocommunity in the face of China’s developmentalism and neoliberal 
policies that contribute to various forms of environmental degradation. It contributes 
to nurturing what Masao Miyoshi terms as ‘planetarianism’ – i.e. the ‘planet-based 
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totality’ that leads humanity to ‘agree in humility to devise a way to share with 
all the rest our only true public space and resources.’1 Such planetarianism based 
on humility and resource-sharing offers powerful theoretical support for recently 
spotlighted public campaigns against China’s rampant animal exploitation networks 
that enable large-scale bear-farming, ivory trade, as well as a dog- and cat-meat 
industry. My concept of docu-ani-mentary, therefore, participates in campaigns of 
animal and eco-preservation in the face of anthropocentric capitalism both within and 
outside China.
 Importantly, I use docu-ani-mentary in contradistinction to wildlife cinema or 
ecocinema. Wildlife film, according to Cynthia Chris, mobilizes ‘the strategy of 
minimizing human presence,’ and ‘seems to invite viewers to forget that their view of 
nature is mediated.’2 Implicit in this genre is the fundamental split between the human 
and the wildlife, hence the irresolvable tension between the attempt to conceal human 
mediation one the one hand, and the persistent anthropocentrism and anthropomor-
phism on the other.
 If wildlife film ultimately signals human spectators’ consumption (albeit distanced 
and obscured) of nature, Scott MacDonald’s notion of ‘ecocinema’ offers a different 
perspective on the imbrication between human practices (including filmmaking) and 
the ecosystem. According to MacDonald, ecocinema has as its fundamental job ‘a 
retraining of perception, … a way of offering an alternative to conventional media-
spectatorship, or … a way of providing something like a garden – an “Edenic” respite 
from conventional consumerism – within the machine of modern life, as modern 
life is embodied by the apparatus of media.’3 The task of retraining perception and 
countering commercial media can be accomplished through long-duration takes and 
other avant-garde techniques by artist-makers, who not only foreground ecological 
concerns, but also strive to minimize the footprint on the ecosystem by their own 
filmmaking.
 Following the burgeoning field of Western language ecocinema, Sheldon Lu has 
introduced this concept into Chinese film studies in a timely fashion. In his Chinese 
Ecocinema, co-edited with Jiayan Mi, Lu defines ‘Chinese ecocinema’ as ‘a critical grid, 
an interpretive strategy,’ and ‘a description of a conscious film practice.’ He especially 
encompasses ‘individual, independent film initiatives that often stand in opposition to 
the prevalent cultural climate at the time.’4 Lu’s affinity with MacDonald’s emphasis on 
the anti-commercial, avant-garde filmmaking practice is obvious.
 In my study, I shift gears and refocus on a set of films in which the oppositional 
stance and the consciousness of the animal-ness (or of the ecosystem in general) are 
not unanimously explicit or thematized. And yet, it is precisely through documenting 
animal presence (ranging from its un-thematized mere existence to its centrality in the 
entire project) that these films contribute to the new framework of docu-ani-mentary 
that de-metaphorizes animality, and debunks anthropocentrism and anthropomor-
phism.5 Furthermore, docu-ani-mentary imagines a humanimal perspective by 
drawing on what Donna Haraway calls the ‘becoming with’ of the human and their 
companion species, and by attending to the sense of responsibility and ethics such 
worlding calls for.6
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 In my analysis below, I trace the ways in which animals exist and persist in the 
interstice of domestication and wildness. It is in this interstice that the anthropocentric 
hierarchies are disrupted, yielding to a humanimal and Haraway-ian ‘natureculture’ 
perspective premised on non-mimetic and non-anthropomorphic sensibilities.7 By 
showing animals in the domestic setting, juxtaposed with humans out of or stripped 
of their conventional domesticity, these documentaries challenge us to fathom the 
extent to which human history has impacted and reshaped the non-human animal 
existence – and conversely, the ways in which the animal presence significantly consti-
tutes, while also pushing beyond, the human history. In this sense, the animal-ness is 
never just a natural, history-less phenomenon, nor a metaphorical symbol reducible 
to human concerns. Rather, its deictic materiality and performativity, as captured, 
elicited and constructed by the documentary lens, constitute the very basis of the 
humanimal and natureculture nexus.8
The work animal
Sand and Sea (Sha yu hai, 1990), a TV documentary co-directed by Kang Jianning 
(director of the International Division at the Ningxia TV station) and Gao Guodong 
(senior journalist at the Liaoning TV Station), was one of the first documentaries from 
within the official media system to capture human and animal codependence as experi-
enced by ordinary people living in remote, isolated Chinese regions. The documentary 
is symmetrically structured, interweaving the stories of a settler pastoralist family in 
the northwestern Tengger Desert and a fishing family on a small northeastern island 
in the Yellow Sea. Director Kang describes the feeling of helplessness in extremely 
secluded environments, as depicted in the documentary, and characteristic of the 
Chinese population in general. Specifically, his ruminations on the families’ seclusion 
and desire to reach out accurately capture the pulse of China in the early 1990s – 
poised for full-scale economic reform that results in major population migration.
 Examined from a humanimal perspective, however, this documentary yields an 
ecological narrative. The adversaries that the families face, especially the unpre-
dictable desert and sea, are also the basis of their livelihood. Their heavy dependence 
on natural resources (seafood, camels, plants and water) stitches the human drama 
into the larger ecosystem. Thus, it is not surprising that animals are omnipresent as 
part of the landscape, and that their presence is taken for granted and treated as what 
Carol Adams calls the ‘absent referents,’ or metaphors of human persistence. Yet, more 
importantly, they also erupt into the foreground with little narrative justification, thus 
compelling an ecological reading.
 To take the pastoralist family as an example, independent of shots depicting the camels 
under human care and camels reciprocating by offering wool, meat, and the means of trans-
portation (and consequently, becoming tightly sutured into the human economic system), 
the film also shows that the camels seem to break free from the human-centred narrative, 
and that visual documentation and composition supersede voiceover description. By 
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gesturing toward an ecological and humanimal perspective, this documentary not only 
demonstrates how human and animal work cooperatively, but also articulates the signifi-
cance of understanding the humanimal cohabitation of the screen space.
 Here is an example on this point. A sequence opens with a wide shot capturing 
the expanse of the desert, with a minute human figure in the distant background and 
a string of white objects in the medium ground. The camera then zooms onto the 
middle part of the white objects, revealing cleanly picked rib bones in close-up. The 
next close-up shot shows a hairy hoof sticking out of the sand, with a fly crawling 
around it. This is followed by two more close-up shots of the skull and ribs and another 
hoof. The film then cuts to a second set of close-up shots showing the pastoral father, 
the mother and their youngest child. The voiceover then narrates the family’s efforts 
to retrieve the camels lost in the desert sandstorm before the animals die of weakness.
 Before the voiceover kicks in, the concatenated close-up shots suggest the humanimal 
affinity through similar tight framing and a consistent, emphatic rhythm of editing. 
Presented as (mostly) still and stranded objects/subjects against the background of 
sand, the animal skeletal pieces and the human faces become eerily analogous, for they 
share the same perseverance and transience in the permanent desert. As death and life 
are equalized through the camerawork and editing, the human and the animal reach a 
new rapport, not based on the interdependent owner-property relationship, but rather 
on their comparable material existence that is both enabled and circumscribed by 
the larger ecosystem. Here the camel (in its solemnly silent, disassembled state) is no 
longer a work animal or a piece of property; or, perhaps it is never just a work animal 
in its relation to the human. And the humans, sitting face to face with their dead and 
living camels, are no longer just the owners. Rather, they share each other’s fragility 
as well as tenacity in the wide landscape. This new humanimal communion echoes 
Haraway’s ‘non-mimetic shared suffering’ and other experiences.
 Importantly, the non-mimetic sharing takes place when the human and the animal 
both occupy the interstice of domesticity and wildness. The camel is domesticated in 
the sense that it is converted into a vehicle of economic gain for the pastoral family. Yet, 
its inextricable linkage with the desert (as poignantly signalled by the skeletal remains 
buried in the sand) ensures its wildness rooted in the larger ecosystem. On the human 
side, the pastoralist family adheres to domestic values to an extent. The father attempts 
to keep the children around by offering to buy a TV as well as an electric generator. 
Yet, his decision to give up farming 20 years before and switch to animal husbandry in 
the Tengger Desert signals a step away from conventional domesticity.
 In the interstice and oscillation between domesticity and wildness, the human 
and the animal acquire a new relationality to each other and to the ecosystem. This 
relationality exceeds the owner–property dynamic to involve both the human and the 
animal as equal participants in the wider eco-landscape. In this sense, the non-narra-
tivized close-up juxtaposition of the camel bones and human faces suggests a diverse 
eco-community with multiple temporalities (of life and death). From this perspective, 
the feeling of isolation and helplessness – from the human perspective – can be 
reinterpreted as a necessary humbling process that opens up a vista of much wider 
relationality and ‘becoming with.’
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The domestic animal
If Kang Jianning’s Sea and Sand offers us a glimpse of the burgeoning humanimal 
and natureculture perspective, Wang Bing’s recent documentary, Three Sisters (San 
Zimei, 2012) foregrounds the present-tense, material existence of animals, compelling 
us to rethink the meaning of the future for a sustainable eco-community. A leading 
figure in contemporary Chinese independent documentary, Wang Bing, contrary to 
Kang Jianning, avoids everything that aims to bring out human drama, including 
aesthetic landscape shots, heavy-handed editing, the use of interview, voiceover and 
extra-diegetic music track. Instead of aestheticization and dramatization, Wang’s 
documentary poetics cast an unflinching and contemplative gaze at the most mundane 
everyday life and toil as experienced by ordinary Chinese people.
 In Three Sisters, winner of the 2012 Venice Horizons Award, the ordinary Chinese 
people are represented by three young girls left behind in a Yunnan village, while their 
father goes to work in the city. In documenting the three sisters’ everyday chores, play 
and caring for each other, the film unpretentiously and unsurprisingly fleshes out the 
experience of growing up in what is commonly perceived as extreme material depri-
vation. What intrigues me, however, is that the girls’ apparently monotonous, even 
miserable, house chores are enlivened by the ever-present domestic animals – dogs, 
goats, ducks, pigs and a constantly meowing cat. Left in the care of family relatives, 
the girls, in their turn, care for the animals. Their daily schedule is significantly deter-
mined by the responsibility of feeding and herding the animals.
 These animals, ordinary and domestic, can be easily dismissed as part of a common 
rural scene that hardly warrants special attention. And the film makes no explicit 
attempt to focalize or narrativize the animals’ omnipresence, other than documenting 
their matter-of-fact, material existence in the three sisters’ everyday life. Yet, a closer 
analysis reveals an interesting phenomenon. While the three sisters barely have the 
necessities of life, the animals are well provided for. Pigs and goats are herded in the 
open air. Ducks and pigs eat from the same fully stocked trough. Dogs follow the 
sisters around. Unlike their human owners, the animals live a seemingly sumptuous 
life with fresh air, healthy food and ample space for roaming.
 This contrast also significantly recasts the meaning of domesticity. From the 
human perspective, the sisters’ material deprivation is easily attributed to their lack of 
domestic protection, resulting from the larger social problem of the collapse of rural 
economy, the exploitation of cheap labour from the countryside, and the disinte-
gration of the family structure. All of these are set into relief by the ironic existence of a 
TV set in the aunt’s home, which barely attracts any attention and fails to make a home 
(contrary to what the pastoral father expects in Sand and Sea). While the children’s 
decreased domesticity is treated as a disadvantage, the animals become less domestic 
with the happy result of thriving in the unconstrained rural landscape.
 Yet, for both the sisters and the animals, living in the interstitial space between 
domesticity and autonomy entails the disruption of their preconceived futurity. 
The children’s schooling is no longer emphasized as a means of self-fulfilment or 
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improvement that might lead to a more enriched material or intellectual life. The 
domestic animals are also somewhat dislodged from their ‘future’ as assigned by the 
humans – namely, being converted into financial profit or consumed for meat (except 
in the one feast scene held by the extended family in a different village). In the absence 
of predetermined futurity, both the human and the non-human animals live in the 
thick materiality of the present and the now. Thus, the film ends up (inadvertently) 
qualifying its professed humanist concern with the sisters’ future. It exposes our 
(well-intentioned) pity for the sisters as originating from the ideological assumption 
of the universal value of modern urban amenities and institutionalized education. 
Furthermore, it deploys fully fledged animal-ness (contrary to industrialized animal 
husbandry or animals as an auxiliary appendage of human life) to invite humanimal 
perspective.
 As such, Wang’s documentary becomes a docu-ani-mentary that presents the 
rooted metabolism between human labour and the ecosystem not as a sign of 
backwardness or deficiency, nor as a simple utopia of human–nature harmony, but 
rather as an ecocommunity premised upon localized everyday contact, care, labour 
and other non-mimetic shared experiences. Needless to say, this ecocommunity is 
under increasing threat from global capitalism and its Chinese manifestations (as illus-
trated in peasants’ dislocation into the cities as cheap mobile labour). Yet, the layered 
materiality of the docu-ani-mentary shows that such an ecocommunity may turn out 
to be more vibrant than we think. In the interstitial space between staying in one’s 
hometown and becoming homeless (for the three sisters), between domesticity and 
free-range autonomy (for the animals), the preconceived ‘future’ becomes suspended 
for both the younger generation and the domestic animals. From this suspension arise 
the questions of what kinds of ‘future’ matter, and how we may envision other futures 
that can best foster a humanimal ecocommunity.
The wild animal
These questions are explicitly tackled in My Himalayan Vulture (Wo De Gaoshan Tujiu, 
2009), an eco-film that offers a glimpse into the possibility of non-human-centred 
ecocommunity. Made by two Tibetans, Tashi Sang’e, a ‘bird-watching Lama’ with a 
PhD in Buddhist Studies, and Zhou Jie, a Tibetan monk who helped found a local 
ecosystem protection society, the documentary is part of the Yunnan Qinghai Rural 
Moving Image Project (Yunnan Qinghai xiangchun yingxiang jihua), launched by the 
Baima Mountain Cultural Research Center of the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, 
in collaboration with Beijing’s Shanshui Conservation Center and three environ-
mental protection associations in Qinghai. Sponsored by the EU–China biodiversity 
programme, the Rural Moving Image Project yielded eight documentaries in 2009, all 
made by local villagers and monks with DV cameras in their respective dialects. They 
represent a range of ethnicities in southwest China; many of these groups were already 
participating in eco-protection programmes.
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 Unsurprisingly, their documentaries all promote the preservation of local natural 
resources and traditional sociocultural practices in face of the onslaught of profit-
driven developmentalism. To convey this message, My Himalayan Vulture opens with 
Tashi Sang’e identifying himself and stating his commitment to vulture preservation. 
Toward the end, he again speaks to the audience in direct address about his project. 
The main body of the film follows him and Zhou Jie helping vultures survive the 
worsening food shortage. They present the problem as one of encroaching commer-
cialization. More specifically, the local merchants sell dead livestock to city people for 
profit, instead of leaving the carcasses in the open air for vultures (as has traditionally 
been done). This disrupted food chain causes the vultures to starve. The documentary 
then shows Tashi and Zhou trekking into the mountains, visiting bird nests and deliv-
ering animal carcasses they have purchased from the herdsmen and merchants to the 
vultures. Toward the end, Tashi sums up his conservation endeavour, only to then 
raise a crucial doubt regarding its ultimate effectiveness. This prompts us to ask exactly 
which strategies should be developed to preserve not only a certain species, but more 
broadly, the sustainable ecocommunity.
 To start understanding the filmmakers’ scepticism, we may turn to the ambivalent 
effects of the DV technology. On the one hand, the DV camera’s portability and easy 
operation makes it a most powerful tool of cutting into the concrete, located situations 
and issues. It contributes to what Ban Wang calls ‘a zero degree’ of constructedness, 
with the documentary being ‘embedded in daily living and works at the grassroots 
level.’9 Furthermore, it significantly connects the local villagers and monks with the 
outside world by bridging the local eco-preservation efforts with global environmen-
talism, and thus contributes to fostering local–global coalitions.
 On the other hand, however, DV also potentially threatens the very integrity of 
the ecosystem the film seeks to preserve, as demonstrated in the film’s DV aesthetics. 
During the filmmakers’ harsh trekking trips into the vultures’ habitat, DV’s close 
miking foregrounds the howling wind and the heavy breathing, enabling us to vicari-
ously experience the filmmakers’ physical exertion. Furthermore, the DV camera’s 
fast zooming in and out alternately makes us privy to extreme close-up shots of 
the eggs and the chicks in the hidden nests, and repositions us far away to survey 
the adult vultures gliding across the vast sky in various directions. At one moment, 
the filmmakers’ closely miked breathing is matched with a close-up framing of the 
chick’s wide-open eyes. The audio-visual syncing creates a haptic effect as if our heavy 
breathing really touched the vulnerable chick. Such DV-mediated intimacy crystallizes 
both the conservationist desire to approach and care for the endangered species and 
the dilemma that such proximity inevitably impinges on the space of the wild animal.
 Indeed, in the tug-of-war between conservationists–filmmakers and merchants, 
the vultures become the ‘subaltern’ animal whose wild scavenging ability is no longer 
sufficient for survival, and who is rendered dependent on human providers. Whereas 
humans and non-human animals have always coexisted and cohabited in a mutually 
adaptive and constitutive manner, the drastic shift in the food chain takes place 
within such a short time span that the wildness and autonomy of the animal species 
are compromised with little chance of re-adaptation. Thus, despite the good intention 
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of preservation, the ecological project may turn out to be a double-edged sword that 
potentially compromises the species’ capacity for self-sufficiency.
 Given DV’s significance in facilitating human control over (as well as interaction with) 
the wild species, the documentary risks making the wild species ‘our own “technological 
creations,” rather than “real” animals.’10 Here, ‘technologization’ of the vultures goes hand 
in hand with their domestication through the filmmakers’ care, which results in what 
Jennifer Ladino terms as the ‘species-ed’ perspective that ‘privileges an anthropocentric, 
often androcentric, way of seeing whereby nonhuman animals are depicted as humans 
see and understand them and often, perhaps more problematically, simply as humans.’11
 This ‘species-ed’ perspective comes under scrutiny when the filmmakers reflect 
on the efficacy of their conservationist endeavour toward the end. It is here we may 
discern a subtle hint of humanimal ‘becoming with.’ After Tashi finishes his didactic 
message with a question, the film fades out, then fades back into an ostensibly discon-
nected coda. In this sequence, a wide long-shot covers two red-robed Tibetan monks 
(presumably the two filmmakers) treading on snow-covered hills toward the horizon. 
Another long-shot shows one monk approaching a group of vultures on top of the hill 
in the background. Then, all of a sudden, he unfolds his head cover, running with the 
fluttering cover over his head, causing the vultures to take off. For a moment, his head 
cover flutters like the birds’ wings. The film ends with various angle shots of the birds 
flying in the sky, skimming over the tiny tents on the grassland.
 The human–bird co-fluttering suggests a sensation of aviation, which the human 
can feel only vicariously through the collective feathery body of the bird flock. The 
moment the human flutters into the flock evokes what Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari term as ‘becoming-animal,’ when the self becomes ‘a threshold, a door, a 
becoming between two multiplicities… . A fibre stretches from a human to an animal, 
from a human or an animal to molecules, from molecules to particles and so on to the 
imperceptible.’12 Cryptic and ahistorical as the language may sound, becoming-animal 
dissolves the anthropocentric notion of human subjectivity, rejects the fixation on 
individuated animal characteristics, and opens the individual up to the contagion of a 
pack or multiplicity of animals. The result of becoming-animal is to become uprooted 
from humanity, and to metaphorically ‘scrape at one’s bread like a rodent’ or to see 
with ‘the yellow eyes of a feline.’13 The stress on the pack and multiplicity, the contagion 
and affect, makes becoming-animal a ‘fearsome involution’ that undermines the 
anthropocentric perspective and blurs the human–animal boundaries.
 Instead of seeing the human as the reference point – being either the enemy or 
the saviour of the vultures depending on how the human economic system impacts 
on the vultures’ food source – becoming-animal enables us to reconsider biodiversity 
from the other side of the lens so that we may recognize the vultures’ infectious wild 
animal-ness itself as an active agent in instigating an affective economy. This affective 
economy is undoubtedly connected to the human economy of production, distri-
bution, consumption and redistribution. Yet, it also resists the logic of quantitative 
calculation and the associated human power of control. Instead, it compels the human 
to yield and to become, rather than just to share, so as to forge a mutually infective and 
inter-subjective humanimal ecocommunity.
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 With this, the on-the-spot, grassroots DV aesthetics can also hope to take on new 
features such as aerial mobility, wild animality and a non-anthropocentric perspective. 
In the next section, I turn to a TV documentary, Ying and Bai (Ying he bai, 1999), to 
study how we may simulate and visualize a non-anthropocentric perspective, and in 
what ways this may reshape human society in relation to deep ecology.
The show animal
Directed by Zhang Yiqing for Hubei TV Station, Ying and Bai: A Chronicle of 1999 
took three years to complete. It was an award-winning documentary praised for its 
humanist spirit conveyed through incisive depiction of profound loneliness shared 
between Ying, the world’s only show panda, and Bai, his half-Italian, half-Chinese 
caregiver. The sentiment of loneliness is in turn seen as a pathological symptom of 
modern human civilization as a whole. To foreground the existential situation of 
non-communication and solitude, director Zhang deploys a TV set as a structural 
device. As the TV blasts apparently momentous domestic and international news 
(echoing the film’s subtitle: ‘A Chronicle of 1999’), Ying and Bai watch nonchalantly as 
if from another world where the news is nothing more than a jumble of sound bites 
and colour blotches.14 Remarking on their asociality, mutual dependence and ultimate 
existential dis-communication, Bai observes (in a third-person title): ‘Nobody could 
understand Ying just as nobody understands herself.’
 Yet, what does it mean to say that a panda is not understood just as a human is not? 
If the film conceptualizes a panda’s emotional and psychic world in human terms, does 
it not simply reproduce what Ladino describes as the ‘species-ed’ perspective? Can we 
understand the panda’s perspective in the documentary as an invitation for humanimal 
co-worlding? To address these questions, I focus on the motif of TV watching and its 
uncanny relationship with domesticity. I suggest that the film not only offers a melan-
cholic study of the alienation effects of excessive domestication, but more importantly, 
gestures beyond the domestic confines through the panda’s nonchalant, even vacuous 
outward gaze. Instead of mapping the panda’s sentiments onto his lonely human 
caregiver, I see the panda’s bodily experience in the domestic and institutional environs 
as a catalyst and a puzzle that demand different practices of living and sharing with 
non-human animals. Rather different from Derek Bousé’s critique that facial close-ups in 
wildlife films only serve ‘to ascribe to animals almost whatever feelings and emotions the 
filmmaker wishes to assign them according to the requirements of the storyline at that 
moment,’15 I argue that the panda’s facial close-ups in this film point our attention to the 
animal’s gaze that challenges human systems of signification. The meeting of the panda’s 
gaze with our gaze makes us wonder about the animal subjectivity, which simultane-
ously invites communication and mutual embodiment, and frustrates them. This renders 
becoming-animal and humanimal co-worlding an open-ended experimental practice.16
 In this documentary, Ying is the world’s last show panda, prematurely retired in 
compliance with regulations in International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
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Fauna and Flora. Incapable of living in the wild due to his long-term training in the 
human environment, he comes to live in Bai’s home as a domesticated animal. The 
film shows Ying with various identities vis-à-vis human institutions (including the 
home and the circus). As Bai’s foster child, he is fed, bathed, instructed to wash his 
‘hands,’ to ride a rocking horse and is perched at a window to look out now and then. 
As a companion and a family member, he demands and receives caress from Bai that 
satisfies his physiological and emotional needs. As an ex-show animal employed in 
Wuhan City Circus in Hubei Province, he has the circus staff to take charge of his 
health and hygiene.
 Most astoundingly, the documentary dispels the audience’s oozy sentiment by 
showing the panda masturbating in the cage. For this voyeuristic gaze, the director 
offers an apology to the panda for violating his privacy. This, combined with the 
panda’s clinging hugging of Bai, not only undermines the stereotype of infant-like 
animals, but also foregrounds an unconventional humanimal physiological meshing 
similar to the Deleuzian notion of contamination.
 This multi-layered depiction of the panda as a child, a worker (or show animal), 
a family member, and a male adult/companion underscores the complexity of the 
panda’s experience with the variegated human institutions. This filmmaker’s apology 
to the panda, in particular, is symptomatic of the paradox of making fun of and 
disavowing the panda’s subjectivity as a means of affirming it, or conversely, positing 
the animal subjectivity only to render it metaphorical. This lends significance to his 
uncanny gaze from behind the bars of the cage and the window. In the exceptional 
setting of domestication-cum-confinement, Ying, Bai and the TV form an impos-
sible trio. By constructing frequent eyeline match shots between the TV and Bai, the 
TV and Ying, or Ying watching Bai watching TV, the filmmaker seems to indicate a 
bonding between Ying and Bai around the TV, which would suggest a conventional 
home environment, with the TV as the new-age hearth. Yet, the fact that Ying’s gaze is 
invariably from behind the cage bars literalizes the confinement inherent in the family 
and other institutional structures. Furthermore, many shots show the TV image 
upside down and split by vertical lines, simulating Ying’s point of view while lying 
on his back, glancing through the cage bars. His playful non-engagement, combined 
with Bai’s melancholic disinterest in the TV news, detours the eyeline match shots, 
converting TV culture into a helpless existential situation in modern society rather 
than a meaningful experience.
 By visualizing the (dis-)interactions between a domesticated wild animal and an 
icon of modern human civilization, the film poses a conundrum regarding the animal’s 
subjectivity. Even as we strive to understand the panda in human terms (imagining 
his ability to ‘watch’ TV), we immediately confront the fact that we do not have access 
to what the panda sees, and how he processes what he sees, and that the panda’s 
subjectivity inevitably departs from and exceeds our anthropocentric thinking.17 The 
impenetrability of the panda’s gaze is further played up as he is perched on a stool 
and looks out of the window. In the long exterior shots capturing the window, we are 
bemused to see a panda’s head sticking out (where we normally expect to see a human, 
especially a child). The panda’s unfathomable gaze makes him a literal anomaly in the 
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human-made environment. His silent, playful and distant gaze introduces an uncanny 
dimension to this environment and defamiliarizes it, as emblematized in the upside-
down TV image.
 In failing to accommodate the panda’s full lived experience, the domestic setting 
(as an important human institution) is exposed as a fragment of the ecosystem. 
Meanwhile, the panda’s gaze leads us toward a fuller ecological realm beyond the 
film’s representational domain. This realm out there is deliberately left unspecified 
and virtual due to the predominantly interior shots.18 Its power hinges upon our 
(imaginary) experience of ecstasy (or being out of the current space) and the ex-body 
existence. Seeing a panda watching TV or looking out of an apartment window, 
therefore, should not convince us of our hospitality to non-human life forms, nor 
allegorize the human feeling of loneliness. Rather, it stimulates the sensation of 
breaking out of one’s conventionalized, domesticated body in order to access that extra 
dimension of humanimal co-worlding or contamination.
Conclusion
I have traced both the quotidian and the remarkable materiality of non-human animal 
existence in four Chinese-language documentaries made since 1990. In a span of 
just over two decades, Sinophone documentary has come a long way in institutional 
setup, funding sources, distribution platforms, technological transformation, aesthetic 
exploration, thematic concerns and sociocultural interventions. Despite these shifts, 
the documentaries I study showcase an abiding engagement with non-human animals 
in various relationships with the human world. Whether explicitly thematized or 
not, the animal presence undergirds and animates the documentaries, making them 
docu-ani-mentaries.
 Through the lens of docu-ani-mentary, my study participates in the local as well 
as global eco-criticism, sharing the agenda of deconstructing anthropocentrism and 
anthropomorphism. In attempting to combat the rampant and destructive poaching 
and trading in bear bile, elephant tusks, animal fur in China, as well as its networks 
of cat- and dog-meat production and consumption, I share Ladino’s endeavour to 
‘articulate new kinds of socially just environment practices as we enter into an era 
where conceiving of a human–nature – or a human–animal – binary is increas-
ingly impossible.’19 In other words, my study explores more productive modes of 
humanimal worlding, which, for Donna Haraway, means to ‘speculate, imagine, feel, 
build something better’ ethically and politically. 20 Docu-ani-mentary offers a unique 
contribution to this agenda due to its mediation of and insistence on the ground-level 
material locations and conditions of the human and non-human animals alike. As ‘a 
form of negotiation’ in the ‘ecology of connections,’ it ‘is itself ecologically placed as it 
consumes the entangled world around it, and in turn, is itself consumed.’21
 More specifically, docu-ani-mentary strives toward a form that can effectively 
negotiate and mediate the material existence of the animal-ness that permeates the 
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human domain, serves human interests to a great extent, and yet ultimately remains 
independent of the human perspective. The creation of the form is closely related 
to film technologies, including the DV camera that facilitates location shooting, 
improvisational capturing, experimental camera angles and framing, and ultimately, 
ground-level interventions. Through experimental usage of the technologies, the form 
of the docu-ani-mentary purposefully or potentially pushes beyond the exclusive 
human perspective. Thus, it fulfils the ecological function of disclosing a new world.22 
In so doing, it urges China’s globalization to take on a new task, namely, to engage with 
and participate in the project of environmentalism and ecocommunal worlding in the 
age of global neighbourliness.
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Working with Rubble : Montage, Tweets and 
the Reconstruction of an Activist Documentary
Ying Qian
I have taken the title of this essay from the last sequence in Ai Xiaoming and Hu 
Jie’s documentary film Our Children (Women de wawa, 2009). Completed in April 
2009, Our Children follows the investigations carried out by grieving parents into 
poor qualities of public school buildings that may have led to high death rates 
among school children in the Wenchuan earthquake of 2008. The film ends with 
a sequence shot in low light by a cheap digital camera. The trembling viewfinder 
captures blurry images of a group of parents sneaking into collapsed schools at 
night to retrieve bits and pieces of the debris. During the day, most ‘ground-zero’ 
sites such as this one were closely watched by local police with public access 
restricted. Fearing that soon the site would be cleared and no evidence would 
remain to hold the government and the construction companies responsible, these 
parents rolled out concrete columns, sawed off steel frames, and brought bits and 
pieces of the ruins back home.
 Ruins are by now a familiar motif in Chinese documentary cinema. Lu Xinyu 
began her book-length survey of the ‘New Documentary Movement’ in 2003 with 
an introduction chapter entitled ‘On the Ruins of Utopia,’ tracing the birth of new 
documentary in early 1990s to a double disillusionment from the socialist ideals in the 
Mao era, and from the ideals of modernization and democratization in the 1980s.1 Abé 
Mark Nornes, writing about contemporary Chinese documentary cinema in 2009, 
observed that demolition and architectural ruins had become a visual staple for the 
documentarians.2 Wang Bing’s nine-hour documentary epic West of the Tracks (Tie xi 
qu, 2003) portrayed the gradual dissolution and abandonment of a sprawling indus-
trial complex in the Tiexi District of Shenyang in northeastern China, the workplace 
for about a million workers. Jia Zhangke’s feature film Still Life (San Xia Hao Ren, 
2006) and documentary film Dong (Dong, 2006) were both set in the Three Gorges 
area, where the building of the Three Gorges Dam led to entire cities and towns being 
razed before their complete submersion in water. In these films, the filmmakers’ 
auteurial cameras cast long and pensive gazes over ruins and rubble that symbolized 
the destruction of ideals, certainties and homes. Ruins represented absolute loss, too 
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broken to be incorporated into a new structure of meaning, and the people surviving 
on them were more or less powerless, unable to change what was happening before 
their eyes. In Our Children, however, one encounters an entirely new engagement with 
a landscape laid to waste. Ruins became sites of investigation, rubble became evidence, 
and the melancholic, auteurial long-takes in previous documentaries gave way to 
vibrant montages of investigative footage made by the involved people themselves. The 
sequence that concluded Our Children, for example, was shot not by a filmmaker but 
by a participant in the nightly mission of stealing debris out of the school site.
 Since around 2004, a new activist documentary cinema has been quietly on the 
rise in China, and Our Children is one of its finest examples. In this essay, I examine a 
number of films made by this new cinema’s most important practitioners, Ai Xiaoming, 
Hu Jie and Ai Weiwei, in order to understand this cinema’s distinct aesthetics, episte-
mology, and its embedding and intervention in politics. This activist cinema, I further 
argue, constitutes a new response to China’s postsocialist condition. The explorations 
of cinema into China’s postsocialist condition have been observed by a number of 
scholars. Writing on both feature and documentary cinemas from China, Chris Berry 
and Mary Ann Farquhar have observed in many films a postsocialist cultural logic of 
pastiche, ambiguity and play, an ‘aesthetic parallel to postmodernism.’3 In a recently 
published monograph, Luke Robinson analyses Chinese independent documentary’s 
engagement with the fleeting, the contingent, and the ambiguous, as a response to an 
uncertain postsocialist environment ‘in which all sociocultural forms are semiotically 
unstable, and where the power to determine their significance is open to outright 
contestation.’4
 These observations are insightful and accurate with regard to a large number of 
independent cinematic productions in China today, yet they do not characterize the 
strategies and aspirations of the emergent activist documentary. While it is true that 
the majority of independent documentaries, as Yiman Wang observes, do not seek 
to alter the social conditions in front of the camera, but only to provide a ‘densely 
textured,’ ‘historical’ experience to alter the way people remember things,5 activist 
documentaries do strive for actual social change. Therefore, rather than reflecting 
and articulating postsocialist experiences such as moral ambiguity, epistemological 
uncertainty, and loss of security and ideals to the banality of neoliberal-inspired 
consumerism and state capitalism, activist documentaries respond to them by 
resurrecting ideals based on moral reasoning at the grassroots and reasserting an 
epistemology based on evidence and testimony. Aiming for lucidity not ambiguity, 
activist documentaries deal with contingency not by denial but by understanding what 
one has reasons to believe.
 In this chapter, I begin by discussing Hu Jie’s Searching for Lin Zhao’s Soul (Xunzhao 
Lin Zhao de Linghun, 2004) and Ai Xiaoming and Hu Jie’s first collaborative work, The 
Vagina Monologue: Backstage Stories (Yindao dubai, 2004). Resurrecting the heroic 
figure of the political activist calling for social change, and portraying exhilarating 
experiences of empowerment enabled by activism, these two films, I argue, laid the 
foundation for the emergent activist documentary. I then proceed to close-read Ai 
Xiaoming and Hu Jie’s film Our Children, in which the filmmakers reinvigorated the 
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use of cinematic montage to bring together fragmentary evidence and found footage, 
and reach for a deeper social reality made visible by the ruins after the earthquake. 
Finally, as Ai Xiaoming regards her earthquake documentaries as forming a series of 
tweets and re-tweets with Ai Weiwei’s documentaries, I discuss Ai Xiaoming’s Why 
are Flowers so Red (Hua’er weishenme zheyang hong, 2010) and Ai Weiwei’s Disturbing 
Peace (Lao ma ti hua, 2009) together as serialized and corroborated cinematic 
actions, and contemplate the conceptual affinities between montage, serialization 
and tweeting as means to bring together activist communities, and reconstruct a 
bottom-up activism that returns epistemological cogency and political salience to 
cinema.
In search for the political activist: Hu Jie’s Searching for Lin 
Zhao’s Soul and Ai Xiaoming’s The Vagina Monologue
Like all new beginnings, China’s new activist cinema began with retrospection. In 
2004, Hu Jie finished Searching for Lin Zhao’s Soul, a three-hour documentary film 
on Lin Zhao, a former Beijing University student condemned as a ‘rightist’ in the 
Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957. A gifted writer and courageous thinker, Lin Zhao 
never rescinded her right to think independently and critically. Writing in her own 
blood on scraps of paper and bed sheets in prison, Lin Zhao produced voluminous 
writings amounting to hundreds of thousands of words, protesting against the ruthless 
political oppressions during the Anti-Rightist Campaign as well as during the first 
years of the Cultural Revolution. She was executed in April 1968.
 In the 2004 documentary, Hu Jie searched for Lin Zhao’s soul by contacting and 
then interviewing people who knew her and who experienced the same turbulent 
historical period. By finding everyone who knew Lin Zhao and contacting them 
for interviews, this former soldier and painter tapped into a close-knit network of 
memory. For years, Hu travelled all over the country to conduct interviews, which 
make up most of the film’s running time. The film not only resurrected the heroic 
figure of Lin Zhao from oblivion, but also created a collective portrait for a whole 
generation of people living through the darkest period of the PRC’s history, some of 
whom had come forward to recount their experiences and offer testimony after forty 
years had passed.
 Hu started to show rough drafts of the film in 2003, four years after the production 
began. Cui Weiping, a professor at the Beijing Film Academy, wrote in 2004 about 
the shockwaves generated by the rough cuts of Hu’s film: ‘The news of the film was 
passed from mouth to mouth; copies travelled from hands to hands among friends… 
Many shed tears, even more lost sleep over it.’6 While the film moved many, it also 
generated a fair amount of controversy. Cui reported that some criticized the film for 
its enthusiastic portrayal of Lin Zhao’s heroism. Lin Zhao, the suffering heroine, and 
her eventual martyrdom were considered to bear too much similarity to the heroic 
figures in China’s socialist era. As the documentary discourse in the 1990s had moved 
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away from heroism and favoured narratives about ambivalent characters living with 
everyday compromises, some felt that Hu Jie’s film was nothing other than nostalgia 
for a lost era.7
 Cui Weiping defended Hu’s film against these critiques. The abandonment of 
heroism in the 1990s was an ‘overcorrection,’ Cui argued, and behind the new motto 
that ‘heroes are just human beings’ lurked an overly narrow understanding of human 
experiences and achievements. Furthermore, Cui argued that the heroic picture Hu 
Jie painted of Lin Zhao was epistemologically different from the reified, abstract and 
obedient heroic figures featured in the Socialist Realist cinemas of the past. ‘Hu Jie 
spent four years on a journey of tens of thousands kilometres, visited all of those who 
knew Lin Zhao first-hand,’ Cui wrote. ‘The film was not created by one individual nor 
by Hu Jie’s own mind. It was a collective creation including the contribution from the 
heroine Lin Zhao herself.’ Likening Hu’s film to orally transmitted epic poetry, Cui 
argued that Hu’s film was a true ‘people’s cinema,’ composed of collective testimonies 
from a large number of people, and expressive of a widespread desire to resurrect 
heroism in today’s Chinese society.
 Searching for Lin Zhao’s Soul circulated on the internet and university campuses,8 
and soon became a centre of attention thanks to an open letter penned by Lu Xuesong, 
a lecturer at the Jilin Institute of Art in northeastern China, in the summer of 2005. Lu 
had learned about Lin Zhao from Hu Jie’s film. Deeply moved, she showed the film to 
her class at the art institute. After a student from her class reported the film screening 
to the school officials, the school made a decision to transfer Lu from her teaching post 
to an administrative position. Inspired by Lin Zhao’s example, Lu penned an ‘open 
letter’ to the president of her school. This letter became a hit on the internet and was 
reposted in countless discussion forums, arousing discussions on education, freedom 
of expression and the possibility of living ‘authentically’ in today’s China.
 In the letter, Lu argued for a teacher’s responsibility to help students become 
authentic people (zhenshi de ren), and questioned whether young people could ever 
grow to live an authentic life if their social environment ‘fetishizes order and unity, 
while fearing life in its full vitality and freedom.’9 Lu called on the society to fight 
against the hypocrisy and indifference that made people willing slaves to arbitrary 
‘hidden rules’ (qian guize), and prevented them from living an honest life. Her protests 
won immediate support from the intellectual community. Both Ai Xiaoming and Cui 
Weiping were among the many who wrote in support of her, lauding her actions as an 
example of the everyday heroism needed in today’s China.10 If the making of Searching 
for Lin Zhao’s Soul enabled collective testimony in a network of memory about Lin 
Zhao, then the circulation of the film brought together outspoken intellectuals such 
as Ai Xiaoming, Cui Weiping and Lu Xuesong as well as millions of netizens in a 
collective articulation of what it would mean to live an authentic life, and whether 
heroism remained relevant in today’s society.
 Encountering Hu Jie and his film Searching for Lin Zhao’s Soul prompted Ai 
Xiaoming to go into filmmaking. A professor of comparative literature at Sun Yat-Sen 
University in Guangzhou, Ai ventured into filmmaking in 2003 when she translated 
and staged Eve Ensler’s The Vagina Monologues at her university. Having watched a 
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rough-cut of Hu Jie’s Searching for Lin Zhao’s Soul, and become acquainted with the 
filmmaker, Ai invited Hu to come and help her record the play. Soon their project 
expanded from a simple performance recording into a documentary film entitled 
The Vagina Monologue: Backstage Stories. Intercutting the performance together with 
interviews with actresses, their families and audiences, the film broke the spatial 
and temporal boundaries of theatre performance, and documented the discussions 
enabled by the play. In the prologue to The Vagina Monologue, Ai added the following 
lines: ‘Things that we don’t talk about are not seen, acknowledged, or remembered. 
What we don’t talk about becomes a secret, and secrets cause shame, fear and myth. 
We talk about [the vagina], because we want to talk about it freely one day, without 
feeling shame.’
 For Ai, The Vagina Monologue and the discursive communities it enabled would 
offer women the transformative experience of speaking the unspeakable, and thereby 
move closer to an authentic life. The film-in-progress was taken to school campuses 
and social organizations that dealt with women’s issues, and inspired many women to 
start speaking about what they had kept silent. For example, young women migrant 
workers, after seeing the film, spoke about sexual harassment from their male super-
visors, which they had not dared to speak about in the past for fear of retribution. 
These testimonies were then edited back into the film, making the film an ongoing, 
open project documenting the exhilarating experiences of empowerment as the video 
of the play travelled to university campuses and social organizations, inspiring conver-
sations and changes of mentalities.
 Making The Vagina Monologue was a transformative experience for Ai Xiaoming as 
well. Encouraged by the visual medium’s ability to reach a wider public, Ai Xiaoming’s 
shift in focus from academic writing to filmmaking seems inevitable. Working on 
and off with Hu Jie and on her own, she has covered topics including date-rape, 
village elections and protests, the plight of HIV/AIDS patients in rural China, and 
citizen investigations around the Sichuan Earthquake.11 These films have allowed Ai 
Xiaoming and Hu Jie to further articulate the distinct aesthetics and epistemology of 
an activist documentary.
Investigating ruins: Grassroots perspectives in Ai Xiaoming 
and Hu Jie’s Our Children
On 12 May 2008, an 8.0-magnitude earthquake shook the Sichuan Province of 
China, leaving close to 70,000 people dead, 37,000 injured and nearly 20,000 missing, 
according to official statistics.12 Among the earthquake casualties in Sichuan, and 
according to the official statistics released a year after the earthquake, 5,335 of the dead 
were school children.13
 Ai Xiaoming and Hu Jie’s Our Children, the documentary chronicling the aftermath 
of this earthquake, starts with a black screen. In darkness, the viewer hears the 
soundtrack of people running and screaming, and a man’s voice telling everyone 
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to calm down. As the soundtrack gradually fades into silence, the screen lights up. 
One sees low-resolution video footage shot just minutes after the earthquake, in a 
small frame about one-quarter of the normal screen size. With three-quarters of 
the screen entirely black and the soundtrack utterly silent, the frame at the centre of 
the screen provides a tunnel vision, a flickering window onto a nightmare. One sees 
grainy images of corpses between cracks, grieving parents searching and wailing in 
the rubble, and people frantically rushing back and forth, but one feels trapped in a 
dream-like immobility by the horrendous image-track divorced from sound.
 It is not possible to identify who was behind the camera for these images – they 
were shot with mobile phones and digital cameras, and these fleeting images were 
all part of ‘found footage’ from the disaster. Shortly after the earthquake, many 
homemade DVDs circulated in the earthquake-affected areas, sometimes on sale 
cheaply on streets, other times passing from hand to hand. They contained video 
footage and photographs, bits and pieces of visual wreckage preserved by ordinary 
people with whatever recording devices they had at hand. With these found images 
filling almost half of the running length of Our Children, Ai Xiaoming and Hu Jie’s 
film provides viewers a precious opportunity to see the earthquake from the survivors’ 
perspective and to understand how cameras were used in the earthquake at the grass-
roots level.
 In Theory of Film, Siegfried Kracauer compares the film camera with Perseus’s 
shield. Mirroring unspeakable horrors that would in reality paralyse us with blinding 
fear, the film camera allows the spectator to see image replicas of horror, thus ‘incor-
porating into his memory the real face of things too dreadful to be beheld in reality.’14 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, people immediately began to use cameras as this 
shield and mirror, to see and understand what had happened. This muted gaze of 
horror, however, was only the initial reaction after the earthquake. Even at the most 
devastating moments, people observed carefully and took note of what they saw. ‘All 
of us saw the collapse from afar,’ one parent said to Ai Xiaoming in an interview. ‘It 
took the elementary school ten seconds to collapse completely. For the high school, 
it took longer, fifteen seconds. We realized that it was too short a time. Few children 
could make it out.’ As it became obvious that the school buildings were among the 
first buildings (and sometimes the only buildings in the vicinity) to collapse, people 
immediately began to ask why, and people’s cameras became fiercely investigative once 
again.
 As many children were buried under the collapsed buildings, parents who partici-
pated in the rescue took up the emotionally impossible task of photographing the 
layout of the corpses in order to discover how and why these children did not make 
it out safely: ‘I saw many children’s corpses just at the exit. If the building had held 
out just ten seconds longer, all these children could have escaped.’ Cameras started 
to record the debris in close-up, as building materials, which had been hidden 
from public view under layers of paint and structures, were now exposed. Parents 
measured the thickness and weight of the construction materials, placed cigarettes 
next to the steel rods before they took a picture, in order to build into the photos a 
scale of measurement. At one site, parents dug out every piece of steel. ‘I was the one 
 Working with Rubble 187
responsible for having the steel weighed,’ a parent said during an interview. ‘Guess 
how many tonnes of steel were there in the three-storey school building? 4.2 tonnes. 
It was not enough for a two-storey family house.’ Verifying measurements, speci-
fying construction materials, photographing everything including building contracts 
and school petitions for building repair, these parents and activists treated sites of 
wreckage as sites of investigation, where they could probe at a deeper reality that the 
ruins had made visible: the inner materials and structures of social construction.
 Parents’ investigative endeavours prompted counteractions from the police and the 
state media. These counteractions were also recorded by cameras, further revealing the 
various forces operating around the ruins. Parents’ video records show that the day after 
the earthquake, parents returned to one school site to find that police had surrounded 
the site, prohibiting anyone from entering. Parents whose children were still missing 
pleaded to be let in, but to no avail. As time went on, some sites were cleared overnight 
without notice. Others were heavily guarded. Stationed at crossroads, police checked 
cameras and deleted photos and videos. Yet the recording activities continued. Parents 
and activists photographed and videotaped every meeting they requested with the 
authorities, every public demonstration they staged. They made newspaper clippings 
and recorded television news clips by simply pointing a digital camera at the paper 
or the television screen. They used the cameras to take notes, photograph documents 
and keep a record of names and telephone numbers of witnesses. When collected and 
placed in a chronology, these materials offered an immensely rich record of grassroots 
organization, protest and negotiations with the government. They also documented 
the highly inconsistent media responses to the parents’ actions, revealing the ongoing 
negotiations between journalists and the authorities with regard to what could be 
printed in the news from day to day. The camera became the critical apparatus for 
the parents and activists to bear witness and share their testimonies. ‘We have audio-
visual materials’ – this was what the parents often would say during interviews with 
Ai Xiaoming and Hu Jie. Then they took out their small digital cameras to show the 
images they had taken. In one memorable scene, a mother holds her digital camera, 
and points to its small LCD screen to show how the police forces stopped demon-
strating parents from marching to the provincial capital to petition the government. 
After pressing a few buttons, she shows her child buried in the ruins, suffocated in the 
collapsed concrete. Ai’s camera captured the mother’s hands tightly holding the small 
screen, as if trying to protect the frame of her testimony.
Piecing together wreckage: Montage over long-takes
Using a large amount of home videos and photographs made at the grassroots level 
meant that the film Our Children had to be constructed in a jigsaw fashion, allowing 
the narrative to arise from fragments of evidence and testimony. The cinematic 
montage, then, became indispensible to such a project of piecing together multiple 
perspectives, voices and found images.
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 Using montage as the organizing principle for documentary, however, was 
uncommon for Chinese independent documentary at the time of Our Children’s 
production. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of independent filmmakers 
have tended to prize long-takes over montage. This was because while montage had 
been used in the early Soviet Union to represent and explore social realities and 
contradictions, it became reified in Stalinist Soviet Union and further in China’s 
Cultural Revolution, driven no longer by the spirit of empirical investigation, but by 
ideologically determined pre-selection of what could and could not be represented. 
Montage was no longer an exploration of reality, but an imposition of ideology onto 
reality. Sergei Eisenstein’s 1948 writing about montage said it all. Montage, Eisenstein 
wrote after Stalinism had become firmly established in all aspects of life in the Soviet 
Union, was the ‘destruction of the indefinite and neutral, no matter whether it be an 
event or a phenomenon, and its reassembly in accordance with the idea dictated by 
attitude to this event or phenomenon, an attitude which, in its turn, is determined by 
my ideology, my outlook, that is to say, our ideology, our outlook.’15
 Chinese filmmakers in the post-Mao era revolted against an ideologically deter-
mined reality. In an essay summarizing the theoretical debates on the meaning of 
‘reality’ and ‘realism’ through the 1980s and 1990s, Wang Xiaolu wrote ironically about 
the notion of ‘essential realism’ (benzhi zhenshi), which he considered a hallmark of 
Chinese socialist realist art. ‘The social problems we see are all just superficial and 
secondary. They cannot reflect the “essence” of our society. If you see starvation, you 
cannot represent it in your work, because it is not really the essence of our society, 
which is bright. That kids in Western countries seem to have good nutrition doesn’t 
mean anything. In essence they suffer from an evil system, and need us to save 
them.’16 This ‘essential reality’ had nothing to do with what the human eyes saw in the 
society, nor with empirical investigations. It was determined a priori by ideology, and 
the montage, enabling selective representations of reality, became a powerful tool to 
fabricate images of an ‘essential reality.’17
 Therefore, it was not surprising that filmmakers looked to André Bazin and his 
advocacy for long-takes when envisioning a new cinema.18 When discussing the 
Italian neo-realist filmmaker Vittorio de Sica, Bazin writes:
The originality of Italian neorealism as compared with the chief schools of realism 
that preceded it and with the Soviet cinema, lies in never making reality the 
servant of some a priori point of view. Whether in the service of the interests of 
an ideological thesis, of a moral idea, or of a dramatic action, realism subordinates 
what it borrows from reality to its transcendent needs. Neorealism only knows 
immanence. It is from appearance only. It’s a phenomenology.19
The idea of ‘phenomenological reality’ (biaoxiang zhenshi) gained momentum among 
filmmakers in the early 1980s, because this reality was something that one could see 
with one’s own eyes in everyday life. ‘Because “phenomenological reality” is what 
everyone can feel and recognize, everyone can make a judgement based on his or her 
own feelings. This gives the right of speech to everyone, and breaks the monopoly of 
political power over the definition of “essential reality”,’ wrote the film scholar Hu Ke.20
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 Meant to debunk political authorities and give the power of judgement back to 
the observer, the turn away from montage to the long-take in new documentary 
successfully established respect for the autonomy of the physical and historical world 
before the camera lens. Yet at the same time, Chinese critics such as Wang Xiaolu have 
also argued that this approach has curtailed the development of filmmakers’ strong 
subjective positions and political will.21 Chinese independent documentary, according 
to Wang, tends to represent ‘atomized individuals and inexplicably miserable lives.’22 
Quoting from Alan Rosenthal’s The Documentary Conscience that ‘in one way or 
another, film should be used as a tool, some would even say, as a weapon, for social 
change,’23 Wang believes that the independent filmmakers must learn to strengthen 
their films’ social engagement, question social phenomena, and seek understanding 
of the social processes that gave rise to social phenomena rather than simply 
documenting what happens in front of the camera.24
 Since their collaboration on The Vagina Monologue in 2004, Ai Xiaoming and 
Hu Jie have always prioritized montage over long-take. The reinvigoration of the 
cinematic montage has been one of the hallmarks of an activist documentary 
aesthetic. In Our Children, montage was used to juxtapose images of official TV 
reports and government documents with shaky and grainy images from the ruins of 
the earthquake. The filmmakers then overlaid the soundtracks of official announce-
ments onto footage from the earthquake site, to reveal the inconsistencies between 
the official rhetoric and the situation on the ground. Montage was also used to bring 
together documentary images made by different people and cameras at the same 
event, in order to consolidate truth claims of images. As filmmakers, Ai Xiaoming and 
Hu Jie’s primary role was not to shoot footage themselves, but to gather and edit found 
images into the most effective montage that could accommodate contending voices, 
while also establishing what multiple voices had claimed to be true. When gathering 
and verifying evidence, the filmmakers treated visual and audio materials differently 
and with a clear hierarchy: in almost every instance, the visual was considered more 
authentic than the audio, and voices were almost always embodied in order to prove 
their authenticity – i.e. a speech was almost always made, at least partially, with the 
speaker in view on camera. The only time when a voice was disembodied was in 
the cases of ‘official voices.’ By signing their speech with their faces and bodies, the 
activists attempted to set apart their testimony and opinion from propaganda. The 
film could be viewed as a series of visual signatures to a shared open letter, echoing 
common practices in the citizen rights movement on the internet such as collecting 
signatures and using one’s true name in web posts.
From montage to tweets: Ai Xiaoming ‘RT’ (re-tweets) 
Ai Weiwei
In June 2009, Ai Xiaoming submitted Our Children to the municipal court of Chengdu 
as supporting evidence for the trial of Tan Zuoren, an environmentalist and writer 
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from Chengdu whose investigations into school buildings in the earthquake area 
had led to his arrest. In addition to sending Our Children to court, Ai decided to 
work with Xie Yihui, a collaborator of Tan Zuoren, on another film entitled Citizen’s 
Investigations (Gongmin diaocha, 2009), using photographs and videos taken by Tan 
and Xie in their investigations and collecting testimonies in support of Tan.
 The Tan Zuoren case brought the Beijing-based avant-garde artist and architect 
Ai Weiwei into documentary activism. Since 2008, Ai Weiwei had been conducting 
a separate citizen investigation with a team of volunteers into children death tolls 
during the Sichuan earthquake. Even though Tan and Ai had worked independently of 
each other, they were aware of each other and their common concerns and efforts. In 
August 2009, Tan Zuoren’s defence lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, one of China’s leading human 
rights lawyers, invited Ai Weiwei to serve as a witness in Tan’s trial. Ai Weiwei arrived 
in Chengdu with a group of volunteers the day before the court opened. However, 
local police forced their way into the hotel rooms where Ai Weiwei’s team was staying, 
and kept everyone illegally at the hotel for 11 hours, preventing them from attending 
the trial. They also arrested Liu Yanping, one of the volunteers in the team, without 
any legal procedure.
 During Ai Weiwei’s trip to Chengdu, the team kept video recordings of their 
daily activities. When the police broke into Ai Weiwei’s hotel room at night, he had 
also turned on the audio recorder, and thereby managed to record the sound of the 
police’s interrogation and attack, including a blow on his head, resulting in a cerebral 
haemorrhage that required an emergency operation in Munich a month later. Upon 
returning to Beijing from Chengdu, Ai Weiwei and his team edited the DV recordings 
into a documentary film entitled Lao Ma Ti Hua (a.k.a. Disturbing Peace), taking the 
Chinese title from the name of a popular Sichuanese dish of braised trotters. The film 
documented the group’s train journey to Chengdu, the nighttime break-in by the 
police at the hotel, and the group’s subsequent dealings with the police in order to find 
the whereabouts of Liu Yanping. Ai Weiwei, two lawyers and Liu Yanping’s husband 
travelled between police stations and public security headquarters, where they were 
repeatedly denied any clear account of what had happened at the hotel and where 
Liu Yanping might be. Having finally gained permission to enter a public security 
headquarters, the group decided not to leave until the police offered clear information 
about Liu Yanping’s whereabouts. While Ai Xiaoming and Hu Jie’s films focused on 
enabling testimonies of the powerless, Ai Weiwei’s film confronted the powerful to the 
point that their power began to crumble. The camera documented the confrontation 
between the police and Ai’s group, filming Ai hurling angry witticisms at the police, 
and locking the police party secretary Xu Hui and a police officer Xu Jie in frontal 
medium shots, watching them growing increasingly embarrassed, self-contradictory 
and distraught during the confrontation.
 Besides making 20,000 DVD copies and sending them via post all over the country, 
Ai Weiwei and his team also circulated Disturbing Peace via the internet, using Twitter 
to disseminate information on the download site. By that point, Ai Weiwei and 
Ai Xiaoming were both Twitter users, and the internet had brought human rights 
activists ever closer as a community. Understanding her own work and Ai Weiwei’s 
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work as tweets and re-tweets that build on each other, Ai Xiaoming began to think 
about making a sequel, or a ‘re-tweet,’ to Disturbing Peace. The resulting film was 
Why are the Flowers So Red: RT Disturbing Peace (Hua’er weishenme zheyang hong: RT 
Laoma tihua). The seriality between the two films can also be seen in their respective 
titles: the Chinese title of Why are Flowers So Red begins with the character Hua, or 
flower, which coincides with the last character in Lao Ma Ti Hua, the Chinese title of 
Disturbing Peace.
 A portrait of a network of volunteers and activists working as far from each other as 
Guangdong, Sichuan and Beijing, Why are the Flowers So Red began with gatherings of 
activists in Sichuan, proceeded to document Ai Weiwei and his team’s daily activities 
in Beijing, and ended with a conversation in prison between Tan Zuoren and human 
rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang. Ai Xiaoming conducted interviews with members of Ai 
Weiwei’s team who had gone to Chengdu and appeared in Disturbing Peace. She also 
spent time at Ai Weiwei’s studio, and documented Ai Weiwei and his colleagues’ 
daily activities, including communicating with government offices to request release 
of information, providing consultation to people from the earthquake region who 
sought help in fighting local government’s corruption and opacity, and supporting 
the works of other social activists. Almost an ethnographic film on China’s activist 
community, Why are the Flowers So Red portrayed Ai Weiwei’s office and home as 
a nexus for activists, writers and artists to meet and share ideas and probed into the 
inner workings of this lively community. How did people come together? How did the 
community sustain itself and expand? How could the activists, especially young ones, 
be so fearless when dealing with the police? What motivated them? Ai Xiaoming’s 
interviews registered the languages, cultures and prevailing moral reasonings of this 
community. ‘Why do you participate in the citizen investigation?’ Ai asked one young 
volunteer. ‘Because it is something warm,’ answered the volunteer, metaphorically 
expressing his humanistic ideals and the community’s emotional tonality.
 While montage in Our Children served to bring multiple testimonies together, in 
Why are the Flowers So Red it created rich intertextuality. Images from Disturbing 
Peace appeared intermittently throughout the film, intercut with viewers’ reactions 
to the film and daily activities at Ai Weiwei’s studio. At a semi-private screening 
of Disturbing Peace attended by artists, journalists and film scholars, Ai Xiaoming 
recorded reactions of the audience during and after the film. Likening interactions 
between Ai Weiwei and the police to an absurdist play, one viewer observed that Ai 
Weiwei was a great dramatist capable of soliciting performance from the police, and 
contemplated on what this absurdist drama had revealed: the utter ‘unreality’ of the 
relationship between ordinary people and the state. Another viewer described Ai 
Weiwei’s filmmaking as close-quarters combat, challenging the police in an unprece-
dented, open manner. Ai Xiaoming’s interest in art as a means to initiate conversations 
and form publics had already manifested itself in her first film, The Vagina Monologue, 
which moved beyond the space of the theatre to explore the play’s engagement with a 
wider society. In Why are the Flowers So Red, Ai Xiaoming highlighted the power of 
film in strengthening an activist community.
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Conclusion: Montage, tweets and reconstruction of an 
activist cinema
Despite Ai Weiwei’s pronounced individualism, Why are the Flowers So Red revealed 
the collective nature of citizen activism, and situated Ai Weiwei as one person among 
a network of people sharing knowledge, information and tactics of citizen action with 
each other. The film ended with the human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang speaking to Tan 
Zuoren in prison. Pu read out aloud, slowly, the names of a long list of supporters and 
colleagues, who had wished to pass encouragement and support to Tan. Many of them 
belonged to the activist communities Ai Xiaoming had portrayed earlier in the film. 
Behind the iron bars, and hearing the support of so many colleagues, Tan was moved 
to tears. By ending the film with this long list of names, Ai Xiaoming again brought to 
the fore the expanding network of citizen activism in China.
 To be sure, Ai and Hu’s films have not only revived heroic figures able to bear 
witness and testify out of one’s life experiences, but also represented a connected and 
mobilized community based on shared concerns. Moving beyond phenomenological 
reality, Ai and Hu use montage to juxtapose different perspectives, corroborate 
evidences and probe into hidden structures underlying the society made visible in 
times of fracture and crisis. Combining interviews, recordings of discussions and 
meetings and observations of everyday activities, these films document political 
and moral reasoning at the grassroots level in the society, and portray processes of 
politicization. Mostly circulating on the internet and in activist networks, these films 
also become serialized as filmmakers work independently but also with each other 
to provide long coverage of important events that continue to evolve. In 2009, Ai 
Xiaoming had already instructed me to watch her films together with Ai Weiwei’s: 
‘These films are best watched in sequence. You first watch “Our Children,” then 
“Citizen Investigations.” After that, you watch Ai Weiwei’s “Laoma Tihua.” Finally you 
come back to me and watch “Why are the Flowers So Red.”’ This, Ai Xiaoming has 
acutely observed, is a form of ‘retweeting.’ As a new media of organizing pluralistic 
voices, and sharing information, Twitter has indeed influenced the cinematic form, 
creating more intertextuality and allowing cinema to move more freely between 
temporal and spatial confines. All these developments help realize a sustained, 
collective search for a new political cinema.
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Provincializing the Chinese Mediascape : 
Cantonese Digital Activism in Southern China
Jia Tan
The recent events of the Arab Spring have shown some positive applications in the 
revolutionary potential of digital technology, which suggest that social media such 
as Twitter and Facebook have found a way to change the world. Such an optimistic 
view on technology is critiqued in Evgeny Morozov’s The Net Delusion in terms of 
‘cyber-utopianism,’ which refers to ‘a naive belief in the emancipatory nature of online 
communication that rests on a stubborn refusal to acknowledge its downside.’1 When 
it comes to digital contention in China, similar tendencies of techno-utopianism 
have gained prominence, overpowering any detractors’ rumblings. Despite many 
scholars and opinion leaders outside of China fixating on the ways recent technol-
ogies, including the internet and mobile communications have strengthened media 
control, surveillance and censorship, a point could be made however that researchers 
are only now beginning to explore the ways in which these newer technologies have 
empowered individuals and communities through the creation of reimagined social 
spaces.2 One such optimistic study would be Yang Guobing’s The Power of the Internet 
in China, in which the author argues that the internet provides spaces for ‘unofficial 
democracy,’ whereby websites provide openings for continual negotiations based on 
the lived experiences of millions of online users in China.3
 This chapter investigates the wave of Cantonese digital activism that can be 
conceived of as another application of social media and formation of moving image 
culture that is worth interrogating. My aim is to inquire beyond the techno-utopia/-
dystopia binary by locating Cantonese digital activism in its historical, social and 
industrial contexts against the backdrop of the explosion of various moving image 
cultures in the new millennium. The present study explores the particularities of 
Cantonese digital activism by deploying the notion of the provincial. I borrow this 
term from the post-colonial scholar Dipesh Chakravarty who asserts that we can 
‘provincialize Europe’ through deconstructing the myth of ‘the West’ as an originary 
site of modernity by revealing the constitutive positions of the colonies in the 
modernization process. Chakravarty has criticized the developmental logic of many 
third world countries that subscribe to the linear narrative of modernity. Rather than 
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provincializing a centre, the present study instead centralizes a province in order to 
explore the theoretical potential of ‘the provincial’ and reconfigure debates on globali-
zation and transnationalism, particularly in the fields of cultural and media studies 
specific to the Chinese online moving image culture.
 This study invokes the term provincial in two ways. First, it employs the province 
as an analytical framework for examining the central–provincial structure in the 
Chinese media industry. Second, it explores the possibilities and problematics of 
Cantonese media activism, in the sense that the term functions as a nuanced way of 
thinking beyond the constraints of cultural dominance versus cultural resistance. In 
other words, I will argue that Cantonese digital activism seeks to uncover how new 
communication technologies, e.g. mobile devices and the internet, in conjunction 
with other mass media such as television, have facilitated new cultural articulations. 
While some of these articulations have been critical of the state’s monolingual policy 
and developmental logic, others run the risk of reproducing existing social hierar-
chies such as class-based discrimination. The progressive and reactionary attributes 
in the same digital activism urges us to move from the question of whether certain 
technologies are revolutionary to the question of how technologies are embedded 
in social relations. In my chapter, I aim to use the provincial to demonstrate a more 
contextual understanding of the relationship between technology and culture beyond 
the techno-utopia/-dystopia binary.
Cantonese activism and its discontents
On 1 August 2010, thousands of people gathered in and around the People’s Park in 
the city of Guangzhou in southern China. The crowd was disbanded when hundreds 
of police marched in and dragged away protesters, filing them away on large municipal 
buses. In front of the confrontational scene between the protesters and the police, 
nearly every protester held either digital cameras, camcorders, or cellular phones 
to document that event. Some of these pictures were immediately posted online via 
telecom networks on Chinese micro-blogs such aso Sina Weib.4 Videos and pictures 
would soon be uploaded to the internet, a place to disseminate opinions and organize 
the street demonstrations, which made the fast mobilization of protesters possible in 
the first place.
 What were the protestors rallying for or against? They had not gathered to voice 
their discontent over environmental pollution, labour disputes, or land confiscation, 
all prevalent social problems and popular topics online in China today. Instead, this 
protest was triggered by a government proposal that the local Guangzhou TV station 
replace Cantonese primetime shows with Mandarin programming during the Asian 
Games in 2010. The protests can now be seen as climactic moments where a series 
of ‘flash mob’ gatherings, street demonstrations and civil disobediences exploded in 
metropolitan Guangzhou, all demanding the preservation of Cantonese language and 
culture.5
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 Cantonese is widely used throughout southern China, Hong Kong and across the 
diverse Chinese diaspora worldwide. Yet, despite its linguistic importance throughout 
greater China, Cantonese has been relegated to the status of a Chinese dialect, soon 
to be expunged in the PRC via a national campaign to promote Putonghua, or 
Mandarin.6 Article 19 of the Constitution of the PRC proclaims the use of Putonghua 
nationwide. We can trace the promotion of Mandarin in the educational sector back 
to the mid-1950s, as the Communist Party had an interest in creating a standardized 
national language. Since that period, the state has championed Simplified Chinese, 
Mandarin and the pinyin system in its educational institutions. Furthermore, dialects 
are highly circumscribed within the Chinese mass media. In January 2001, the Law 
of the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language established Chinese as the 
standard language – officially enforcing Mandarin across the vast public sector, 
including the broadcasting industry.
 Netizens have dubbed such monolingual language policy the ‘Mandarin Promotion 
Machine,’ or more crudely ‘Language Slaughter.’7 To express concern over this 
promotion of Mandarin, netizens organized many street gatherings through social 
media, gatherings that were accompanied by debates, netizen-made videos, songs and 
images of dissent online. Such shows of activism have been tactically combined with 
criticism of urban planning and redevelopment policy, as well as calls for freedom 
of expression in the country. The activism soon received support from Cantonese 
speakers in Hong Kong, Macau and throughout cyberspace, as well as in physical 
spaces within the mainland and beyond. For example, at the same time as the August 1 
demonstration in Guangzhou, hundreds of protesters in Hong Kong joined the demon-
strations as part of the ‘Guangdong-HK Support Cantonese Action,’ working in unison 
from two different Chinese territories connected by digital activists.
 The banner term ‘Cantonese digital activism’ is used here to describe the partici-
patory use of the internet and electronic devices for the articulation of shared 
language and cultural experiences, as suggested by the name of this activism: ‘Support 
Cantonese language.’ Despite the political agency and possibilities fulfilled in this 
wave of activism from user-generated content online to street demonstrations, such 
bottom-up cultural expressions also have limitations – chiefly, they have the potential 
to reproduce social hierarchies. A widely circulated netizen-reproduced propaganda 
poster points to the discriminatory side of Cantonese digital activism. The caption 
reads: ‘Canton people speak Cantonese. Go back to the countryside if you don’t 
understand Cantonese.’ This slogan may be a reference to the millions of migrant 
workers in China who come from the countryside and work in the city. According to 
the population census of 2010, more than four million people living in Guangzhou 
are non-locals, a figure representing more than one-third of the city’s total population. 
Many of these non-Cantonese-speaking, non-locals are migrant workers living on a 
minimal wage, excluded from social welfare due to China’s hukou system of citizen 
registration.
 Notably, compared to previous cases of rights-based activism in China, Cantonese 
activism has a distinguishing cultural dimension, a departure from actions that 
target specific economic needs and social justice issues. After the Tiananmen social 
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movement of 1989, massive demonstrations disappeared on the street within China 
due to high levels of state surveillance, intense implementation of the Economic 
Reform policy, and the de-politicization of politics.8 The previous notable online 
rights activism causes were more or less reclaiming rights regarding specific issues, 
such as labour disputes, legal injustices, corruption and environmental pollution – and 
these campaigns were usually repressed by the state. Most demonstrations permitted 
by the state have tended to be ones with strong nationalistic sentiments, such as 
the anti-American protest after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Yugoslavia in 1999 and the anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005. Elsewhere, and 
after the controversy of Tibet and the 2008 Xinjiang conflicts, the overseas ‘support 
Olympics’ has demonstrated how pan-Chinese cyber-nationalism joined forces with 
street activism abroad.
 The most studied cases of culturally associated online activism in Anglophone 
scholarship have included cyber articulations of nationalism, based solidly on the 
framework of the nation-state.9 Where the Cantonese activists depart from these 
previous studies is how they view the state as a homogenizing mechanism, which 
cannot be explained easily in the nation-state framework in the study of Chinese 
media and culture. Cantonese activism, therefore, is a culturally distinct activism 
that forces us to think beyond the framework of the nation-state and inquire into the 
centre-provincial dynamic.
 Cantonese digital activism is indebted to the development of provincial media 
industries in Guangdong and the influence of Hong Kong media in the last 30 years. 
Though Mandarin is forced upon all educational institutions, the local media in 
Guangdong province enjoy an exceptionally ‘liberal’ linguistic policy compared to 
other provinces. This is why Guangzhou TV station, which triggered the Cantonese 
digital activism, was able to broadcast in Cantonese in the first place. In the next 
section, I will include a brief history of provincial media industries in Guangdong 
and the influence of Hong Kong media, which enabled Guangzhou TV station to 
broadcast in Cantonese when it was founded in 1988.
Provincial media industries in contemporary China
Media apparatuses in China, including the press, radio, film and television, all contain 
heavily administrative structures. Each media apparatus is carefully supervised by a 
corresponding department or unit of the Department of Propaganda. Such a view of 
scale and structure in the media matrix in China is a relevant point to linger on for 
a moment. In reference to scale in the Chinese media, Sun Wanning has invoked the 
term ‘geographical turn’ in order to observe ‘how a range of media studies concerns 
such as media policy, industry, content production and consumption are played out 
at various sub-national levels – the village, the county, the city, the province, and 
the region.’10 So far, this chapter’s use of the term province, carefully chosen over 
other similar analytical terms such as region, is intended to emphasize the structural 
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hierarchy between the provincial and the national, particularly in the context of the 
state-sanctioned Chinese media industry.11
 Regulated under the SARFT, Chinese media companies on different levels have 
been required to be more and more individually accountable for how they perform 
and function financially. Such an administrative centralization and financial decen-
tralization points to the ‘double properties’ of the broadcasting industry in China, 
demonstrating the neoliberal alliance as well as the friction between the nationalized 
entities and transnational capitalism. For example, the Pearl River Film Studio has 
been one part of the highly centralized system of film production. Since its 1958 
establishment in Guangzhou, the Pearl River Film Studio has represented the begin-
nings of a provincial film production centre in a larger wave of development, paving 
the way for provincial film studios nationwide. Following the neoliberal initiative of 
the Economic Reform in the post-Mao period, the film industry and broadcast media 
in China were not only part of the propaganda machine, but were also transforming 
into commercial enterprises seeking to secure profits – nationally, regionally and 
globally.12
 Like radio and film production, the development of television industry in China 
was also caught up in the Reform. In the 1980s, the growth in Chinese television 
reached unprecedented levels, both in terms of the expansion of TV networks and the 
increase in broadcasting hours. The number of TV channels nationwide grew from 35 
in 1980 to more than 500 in 1990.13 As with other provincial and national broadcasting 
media, radio and TV stations in Guangdong are framed in vertical administration 
from the old top-down propaganda model, and horizontal commercial links to local 
or national enterprises. That is to say, while these broadcasters have remained under 
the purview of the state, they are increasingly self-reliant financially. Obviously, the 
provincial media may have more leeway to incorporate commercial operations. 
However, only selected stations at the provincial level may maintain a satellite channel 
and receive nationwide and international coverage.
 Today, China touts more than 3,000 TV channels, most of which are limited to 
local or provincial coverage. Unlike the film industry in Guangdong, where a singular 
provincial film studio centralizes virtually all production resources, the expansive 
infrastructures of the TV networks in Guangdong make this medium a more 
democratic, decentralized platform. At the same time, however, the decentralized 
commercial model is constantly at odds with the imposing centralizing impulse of 
the state. In Lisa Leung’s study of local media outlet Hunan Satellite TV’s role in the 
transnationalization of the Korean Wave (Hallyu) to the Chinese public, the author 
observes that the state-level legal and regulatory mechanisms create obstacles for local 
media to import global media; Leung notes that the state ‘legitimizes and perpetuates 
its political and ideological domination and economic prowess over the local as the 
periphery through restrictive broadcasting and financial policies.’14
 In the context of the TV industry, the umbrella term ‘provincial media’ includes TV 
networks that (1) are headquartered in provincial and municipal centres; (2) mostly 
have provincial and local coverage; and (3) closely reflect provincial and local interests 
and promote national concerns at a local level. In relation to the particularities of 
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provincial media infrastructure in Guangdong, the provincial here is not necessarily a 
counterpart of the national or the global, but rather an integrated part of the national 
media infrastructure.
 Since 1980, in order to compete with the overwhelming popularity of Cantonese 
Hong Kong TV programmes, several TV channels and radio stations in Guangdong 
have been permitted to broadcast in Cantonese. By contrast, other provincial TV 
networks have never been allowed to produce dialect-based programming, despite 
the occasional appearance of such programming in the 2000s.15 Four channels in 
Guangdong TV, four channels in Southern Television, and several municipal-level 
TV channels (such as Guangzhou Television channels) all broadcast in Cantonese.16 
In 2004, Southern Television (TVS) became the only satellite TV channel with 
nationwide coverage to broadcast in Cantonese; all other satellite TV channels in 
China are in either Mandarin or English. Furthermore, Cantonese TV productions 
are also popular in Guangdong. Guangdong’s TV networks began dubbing selected 
Mandarin TV dramas into Cantonese, thus targeting not only Cantonese speakers 
in Guangdong, but also Cantonese speakers throughout the diaspora.17 For example, 
Guangdong TV’s golden programme, Cantonese sitcom Local Husbands and Migrant 
Wives, received high ratings in 2003 and has produced more than 1,000 episodes since 
its debut in 2000.18
 In the next section, I will introduce a netizen-produced commentary via a video 
called ‘Rap Guangzhou (Canton)’ as a specific example of recent moving image 
cultures in provincial contexts.19 The video content is considered against the backdrop 
of the historical development of provincial media; it is analysed in relation to its 
textual engagements and its transmedia disseminations.
Rap Cantonese: Netizen ‘Vidding’
Among the abundant user-generated content from Cantonese digital activism, ‘Rap 
Guangzhou (Canton)’ is a widely circulated, netizen-produced Cantonese video that 
articulates the consciousness of people who want to preserve Cantonese. 20 The song 
tactically incorporates criticism of urban planning and redevelopment policy and 
calls for the preservation of Cantonese. This combination is reflected in its lyrics, 
which elaborate on the disappearance of Cantonese language in everyday life and the 
demolition of Cantonese neighbourhoods in the urbanization process. The following 
excerpt from the song’s lyrics delineates the disappearance of Cantonese, both as a 
language and as a way of life:
Rap Cantonese line by line, please don’t say Cantonese is aging. In this grand 
epoch full of changes, Cantonese is the seal of the past. Rapping Cantonese beat by 
beat, seeing the change of Guangzhou second by second. English and Mandarin 
are often heard in this busy city, but please don’t forget Cantonese. I have been 
living in this city for twenty years; the old restaurants and neighbourhoods are all 
demolished. The news reportages keep reporting on how much money is spent in 
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the preparation for the 2010 Asian Games. I don’t care how much is spent. Our 
collective memories are demolished… Now speaking Cantonese is even becoming 
an issue. I really want to know what is wrong with you. I never say you cannot 
promote Mandarin, but why are you trying to diminish Cantonese?21
The song begins with the mixing of Cantonese and Mandarin audio clips from TV 
news reporting on Cantonese neighbourhoods facing threats of demolition in the 
name of redevelopment. Using first-person experience of living in Guangzhou ‘for 
20 years,’ the singer strongly asserts the frustration caused by the demolition of older 
neighbourhoods. The song has been remade by other netizens into numerous versions 
of online music videos. A popular version of the song is accompanied by the official 
video of the 2010 Asian Games held in Guangzhou – an event specifically targeted in 
Rap Cantonese.
 The Asian Games’ official video, typical of promotional videos for sporting events, 
showcases corporeal movements in athletic activities such as cycling, gymnastics, 
marathons, swimming and running. Relying heavily on crane shots and slow motion, 
the video exhibits athletic bodies on the move. The original Asian Games video 
is at the same time a city-branding product, featuring unfolding modern interior 
spaces – including car assembly lines, a music hall and a shopping mall. Intercutting 
modern architectural space with athletic movements, the video is a visual statement 
of Guangzhou’s modernization and urbanization, asserting it as a desirable city to host 
the Asian Games. The images in the Asian Games promotional video exemplify the 
mainstream visual narrative or the branding strategy, which is a recurring formula of 
promoting Chinese cities on the global stage. The international games demonstrate 
how the nation-state panders to the discourse of neoliberal globalization and its devel-
opmental logic, while also displacing both Cantonese dialect and neighbourhoods to 
make room for Guangzhou’s urban redevelopment.
 Replacing the soundtrack in the Asian Games video with the Rap Cantonese song, 
the netizen-produced video sharply points out that the considerable investment in 
urban redevelopment for the preparation of the Asian Games has led to the demolition 
of ‘our collective memories’ as Guangzhouers. Moreover, in the online video Rap 
Cantonese, the creator not only replaces the soundtrack of the original Asian Games 
video, but also broadcasts the lyrics onscreen in white characters. Here the visualiza-
tions in the video deviate from the meaning in the lyrics, which I shall explain later 
in this chapter. In a typical aerial shot of Guangzhou’s cityscape (see Figure 11.1), the 
modern bridge lies in the foreground while the city skyline anchors the composition 
nicely in the background. The white characters on the screen recount the demolition 
of the old Arcade Building, a residential-commercial space whose exterior arcades 
provided shelter for pedestrians. Visually, for Cantonese readers, the video calls into 
question the demolition – against the backdrop of the city’s new skyline.
 Even more importantly, the Arcade Building emphasized in the lyrics points to the 
lived space of traditional architecture, where people still dwell. In the Asian Games 
video, traditional architecture is occasionally featured – e.g. the Chan Clan Ancestral 
Hall and the Sun Yet-San Memorial Hall. However, these places are mostly tourist sites 
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or performance venues, instead of everyday lived spaces. Thus, the Asian Games video 
favours traditional architecture’s symbolic and ritual values over its everyday lived-in 
quality, a critique presented throughout the Rap Cantonese video.
 The Asian Games video’s celebration of economic development logic, exemplified 
by the obsession with skyscrapers and modernist architectural spaces, goes hand in 
hand with the construction of a local identity by showcasing symbols of ethnic culture, 
such as flower boats, Cantonese opera and historic sites. Another of the ethnic cultural 
traditions featured in the video is dragon boat racing, an ancient folk ritual common 
in southern China. The importance of this ancient sport found a place in the 2010 
Asian Games; it appears multiple times in the video. However, the video emphasizes 
the theatricality of the dragon boat. As shown in the picture (see Figure 11.2), the 
dragon head of the boat, carried by a group of men and centred on the screen, is much 
larger than those used in real competition.
 Again, coupled with the song, the lyrics onscreen complicate the phallic repre-
sentation of the dragon boat head. While the dragon boat asserts the existence of 
traditional ethnic culture, the songwriter of Rap Cantonese suggests that urban 
demolition has been happening so quickly and drastically that ‘one can easily disorient 
oneself ’ wandering in the city, even for someone who grew up in the city.
 The superimposition of lyrics on the image is reminiscent of the popular Karaoke 
culture in China, and an effective way of disseminating the song’s messages to Chinese 
readers. But the fact that the words occupy more than half of the screen creates a visual 
reinscription of the rap song that negates the ‘harmonious’ developments of the city. 
The words appear as a rewriting of the meaning behind the city’s urban makeover and 
Figure 11.1 Still of an aerial shot of Guangzhou’s cityscape in online video Rap 
Cantonese (2010).
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redevelopment. The video also shows how traditional cultures are ‘preserved’ in the 
images, yet are gradually disappearing from people’s lived experiences. Here, besides 
reflecting the conflict of linguistic and regional differences, Cantonese activism 
engages the preservation of traditional architecture, in response to the vulnerability of 
historical sites to intensified urbanization and demolition.
Figure 11.2 Still of men carrying a dragon boat in the online video Rap Cantonese (2010).
Figure 11. 3 Still of a smiling woman in online video Rap Cantonese (2010).
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 The issue of preserving traditional cultures and architectures against aggressive 
urban planning has been a consistent public concern in contemporary Chinese 
cinema. For example, Fifth-Generation director Ning Ying’s Beijing trilogy [For Fun 
(1992); On the Beat (1995); and I Love Beijing (2000)] documents urban change in 
the context of police regulation. As Yomi Braester points out, the trilogy dwells on 
images of demolition and elevates demolition to a metaphor of the erasure of collective 
memory.22 Sixth-Generation director Jia Zhangke’s documentary-realist films also 
incorporate images of demolition as thematic and visual components. Scenes of 
demolition can easily be found in Jia’s Xiao Wu (1997), Still Life (2006), and 24 City 
(2008), featuring urban destruction in the context of small towns as well as major 
cities such as Chengdu. Despite the popularity of the demolition theme, Guangdong 
has been underrepresented in cinema regarding China’s rapid and intense urbani-
zation. From a grassroots perspective, Cantonese activism fills this void by giving 
voice to opposition against drastic urban demolition.
 At first glance, Cantonese activism might appear to be a sort of provincialism, or an 
ethno-linguistic articulation challenging monolithic Chinese nationhood. However, 
the developmental logic of the state, which has led to the demolition of Cantonese 
neighbourhoods in the name of real estate redevelopment, is also attributable to the 
state’s gradual embrace of transnational capitalism beginning in the late 1970s. In 
this sense, critiquing the developmental logic of the state, Cantonese digital activism 
is what Arjun Appadurai has termed ‘grassroots globalization,’ which ‘strives for a 
democratic and autonomous standing in respect to the various forms by which global 
power further seeks to extend its dominion.’23 As demonstrated in Cantonese digital 
activism, such acts of ‘grassroots globalization’ are struggles that are situated in the 
connections and frictions among the provincial, the national and the global. In other 
words, the notion of the provincial clarifies the complicated nature of ‘grassroots 
globalization.’
Transmedia flow and the dissemination of Rap Cantonese
While many studies of new media stress the possibilities and specificities of the 
internet, new media research tends to obscure the transmedia connections as they 
play out in reality. For online activism in general, issues that have gained broad 
appeal continue to rely on mass media – e.g. newspapers and television – for in-depth 
discussion and dissemination of information; at times, activism might also rely on 
state intervention.24 The emergence of Cantonese digital activism has been aided 
by television and press coverage in Guangdong and Hong Kong, which cements 
Cantonese digital activism as a transmedia phenomenon. State-owned media in 
Guangdong, particularly Guangzhou media outlets Southern Metropolis Daily and 
Yangcheng Evening Daily, were at the centre of the so-called ‘battle between Mandarin 
and Cantonese.’ Cantonese digital activism routinely interacts with traditional media, 
including television and the news media. Southern Metropolis Daily was among several 
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newspapers that reported early flash mob gatherings.25 Local television, especially 
Cantonese broadcasts, also played an important role. As discussed above, the Rap 
Cantonese song has several versions of vidding, i.e. different visuals accompanying 
the same song. The song was also broadcast on Guangzhou TV, accompanied by the 
quick-changing images of the cityscape, as a prominent example of online activism 
promoting Cantonese language and culture. It was picked up by the TV station as a 
pro-Cantonese example, as part of its reportage on the ‘battle between Mandarin and 
Cantonese.’
 Broadly speaking, Weibo was one of the most prominent social platforms to 
promote Cantonese digital activism in early July 2010. Thousands followed the 
trending topic ‘abolishing Cantonese,’ which examined a government proposal to 
change Cantonese primetime programming into Mandarin. The Guangzhou TV 
station, whose programming was subject to change under the fiat, aired the results of 
an online survey of the proposal. According to the report, more than 90 per cent of 
survey participants opposed the proposal. On 10 July, in the People’ Park in central 
Guangzhou, about 30 young people gathered and sang Cantonese songs, including 
Cantonese-pop classics by the Hong Kong pop rock band Beyond as well as the 
classic Cantonese nursery rhyme Rain. It was the first kuaishan gathering,26 which 
sparked successive street demonstrations. The gathering was organized by users in the 
Guangzhou bentu wang, an online forum dedicated to various aspects of Guangzhou 
living. The gathering was soon publicized online and by various press and TV news 
programmes in Guangzhou. Southern Metropolis Daily noted that the majority of 
the participants were ‘80 hou,’ a term widely used in mainland China to describe the 
generation born in the 1980s who share some common characters or habits, due to 
their experience of growing up in postsocialist China.27
 On 25 July 2012, thousands gathered in the Jiangnanxi subway station in Guangzhou 
to protest the proposed abolition of Cantonese-language primetime broadcasts. 
Netizens used their cell phones to publicize comments in an almost real-time format as 
the demonstration kicked off. This July mass action in Jiangnanxi subway station, like 
the other demonstrations mentioned earlier in this chapter, were all mediated through 
the use of social media, via computers and mobile devices. The action was praised as 
a ‘perfect victory’ for the spontaneous gathering of netizens and the peaceful process 
by which the activity came together. Describing the convergence of online activism 
and street activism, outspoken intellectual and film scholar Cui Weipin observed, 
‘Online is more than online, netizens are more than netizens.’28 Intrigued by these 
successful internet-facilitated events, provincial television and press outlets joined 
the public debate. Eventually, Guangzhou’s municipal government held a conference 
and dispelled notions of government’s intention to replace Cantonese with Mandarin 
on Guangzhou TV. After the conference, the proposal to change TV programming 
language was never implemented.29 Such an official reaction was highly influenced by 
the transmedia flow of Cantonese activism. In this process, the reportage and discus-
sions on ‘traditional’ media such as newspapers and local television were much more 
than auxiliary developments. This transmedia dimension plays an important role in 
disseminating digital moving image cultures and new cultural articulations.
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Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the ways in which Cantonese digital activism has utilized 
new communication technologies – such as mobile phones and the internet, in 
conjunction with other mass media such as television – to facilitate new cultural articu-
lations, as manifested in online media-making and street demonstrations. Such new 
cultural articulations brought about new formations of moving image cultures in the 
new millennium. Focusing on Cantonese digital activism, I have attempted to unravel 
the plurality of Chineseness, which is obscured by the national framework in the study of 
Chinese media industries, particularly within the fields of political science, communica-
tions and sociology, while too textually derived in the fields of film and media studies. 
This is where my deployment of the provincial comes in; functioning within the frames 
of both the conceptual and the organizational, the term is arguably a more productive 
way to engage with the relationships that span the local, the global and the national.
 The provincial, as this chapter has argued, is a nuanced way of engaging Cantonese 
digital activism as a distinctively cultural activism, both in relation to its modes of 
expression as well as its particularness within the Chinese mediascape. Meanwhile, the 
provincial offers a new perspective to move beyond the worn techno-utopia/-dystopia 
binary. As exemplified by the tactical production of the online video, Rap Cantonese, 
the articulations in Cantonese activism are critical of the state’s monolingual policy 
and developmental logic. At the same time, other articulations in the same activism 
run the risk of reproducing existing social hierarchies such as class-based discrimi-
nation. The progressive and reactionary attributes in the same digital activism urge 
us to move from the question of whether or not certain technologies are revolutionary 
to the question of how technologies are embedded in social relations. Deploying the 
notion of the provincial, I offer a more contextual understanding of the relationship 
between technology and culture beyond the techno-utopia/-dystopia binary. And I 
believe that this contextual understanding is crucial in decoding emerging articula-
tions and moving image cultures.
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Interpreting ScreenSpaces at the Shanghai Expo 
and Beyond
Jeesoon Hong with Matthew D. Johnson
Introduction
Few visitors to World Expo 2010 Shanghai China (hereafter the ‘Shanghai Expo’) 
would have come away unimpressed by the ubiquity of digital screens and billboards 
dispersed throughout the various exhibition sites and pavilions. As an event, the 
Shanghai Expo seemed as focused on media as it was on commerce, with streaming 
video and luxurious imagery playing a key role in captivating visitor attention. This 
global event was not only a fairly typical industrial exhibition, in the mode of the 
globally influential 1937 Paris Exposition; instead the Expo’s pronounced, almost 
excessive use of digital display technology suggested broader connections with a 
primarily urban phenomenon of digital screen proliferation and the ongoing creation 
of what I call ScreenSpace.
Other recent studies of public spectacle in China, particularly those focusing on 
the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games, have also focused primarily on the role 
of multimedia-augmented performance in generating collective affect – for example, 
national pride. This chapter, however, also looks at the geography of screen dispersion 
within exhibitions, multiplexes and other public and semi-public spaces. In it, I argue 
that the increasing prevalence of digital screen technology in China’s social space, 
extending all the way down to the local level, means that society itself has become a 
site of permanent exhibition and screen-mediated collectivity formation.
The themes of this chapter are the spatiality and experience of screens. Its central 
claim is that a close examination of visual power in contemporary China through 
the phenomenon of digital screens suggests that trans-regional state and commercial 
forces have become embedded in urban sites of upper- and middle-class consumption. 
As a result, screen-mediated experiences are characterized by a distinct uniformity. 
They are controlled by companies and state initiatives that are national, or even inter-
national, rather than regional in character. They are also powerful, both by virtue of 
their ubiquity and as a result of their deployment as part of multimedia configurations 
intended to heighten spectator engagement through sensory immersion. By deploying 
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the term ScreenSpace, which is inspired by the term MediaSpace as formulated by 
media studies scholars Nick Couldry and Anna McCarthy, I am connecting this 
chapter’s focus on screens with the MediaSpace method, which examines both the 
spatial forms of media and the experiential spaces created by media.1 I am also inspired 
by Doreen Massey’s argument that ‘spaces’ can be imagined as processes as well as 
relationships.2 In other words, when exploring ScreenSpace it is important to consider 
the production, distribution and consumption of screen-disseminated images, as well 
as the experiences that screens provide. Ultimately, the comprehension and critique 
of ScreenSpace requires that we be attentive to macro-level questions of political 
economy and to micro-level questions of bodily-sensory experience. What connects 
these two sets of questions is the technology of screens.
This chapter begins by considering ScreenSpace from the perspective of the 
Shanghai Expo, prefaced by an account of the relation of this ‘screengoing’ experience 
to the urbanizing upper- and middle-class population’s encounters with ScreenSpace in 
multiplexes and mega shopping malls, such as Shanghai Stellar Cinema City (Xingmei 
zhengda dianying cheng), located in the Super Brand Mall Shanghai (Zhengda 
guangchang). I attempt to convey something of the rich interface between body and 
screen that these experiences imply, with particular focus on the animated ‘painted 
scrolls’ on display at China’s National Pavilion (Zhongguo guan, see Figure 12.1) 
during the Shanghai Expo, as well as on 3D, digital and IMAX screens in other urban 
Figure 12.1 The National Pavilion at the 2010 Shanghai Expo. Source: Lucia Wang, 
2010. Available from: Wikimedia Commons.
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settings. Many of these screens – particularly those of the National Pavilion and digital 
advertising screens found in buses and mass transit systems, elevators, public squares 
and malls – imply a relationship to what I call a ‘mobile audience’. In other words, 
they are intended to capture and engage the attention of individuals whose visual 
position, unlike that of the film-goer, is always changing. Many of my observations 
regarding mobile audiences were formed in the course of fieldwork conducted during 
the Shanghai Expo in 2010. Additionally, I examine the Jia Zhangke film I Wish I 
Knew (Hai shang chuanqi, dir. Jia Zhangke, 2010), which was commissioned by the 
Shanghai Expo’s state planners. This film is significant in the connections it draws 
between historical and contemporary Shanghai and its incorporation of the Expo 
itself as a cinematic setting. These aspects of I Wish I Knew provide rich examples 
of how ScreenSpace experiences fuse the virtual – the reality of the screen – with the 
reality of the spectator’s surroundings. Lastly, I examine how ScreenSpace produced 
at local levels replicates this logic of fusion, by combining multiple media and repre-
sentations of past and present, into site-specific media ‘events’. Here, I argue that local 
ScreenSpace can be viewed as an alternative to more ubiquitous urban ScreenSpace 
forms, based on evidence for the articulation of personal and community narratives.
The proliferation of ScreenSpace: Urban theatres and 
public screens
The production of ScreenSpace in China began with the growth of urban film-going as 
a cultural practice. Since 2002, China’s cinematic exhibition industry has undergone 
rapid expansion following serious capital depletion during the 1990s. Specifically, 
exhibition spaces have proliferated at a rapid pace. In 2010, theatrical screens in China 
totaled 6,200, bringing in box office revenues of approximately CNY 100 billion.3 By 
the end of 2011, there were in total 9,266 screens, of which 90 per cent were used for 
digital projection. Thus, in 2011 more than 3,000 new screens appeared – an average 
of more than eight new screens per day.
Of these more than 3,000 screens, roughly 60 per cent were built in what are 
typically called ‘second-tier’ and ‘third-tier’ cities; in other words, in cities whose 
growth and population makes them politically and economically subordinate to 
global cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Second- and third-tier cities represented 
important and ‘unoccupied’ markets in the wake of China’s rapid national economic 
take-off, markets that were partly captured by locally based theatre chains such as 
Zhejiang Shidai (Zhejiang Epoch) and Sichuan Taipingyang (Sichuan Pacific). Overall, 
however, the increase in screen numbers has been led by the expansion of national 
theatre chains including Beijing Wanda, Zhongying Xingmei and Shanghai Lianhe. 
These three major chains are the most profitable among China’s 40 registered theatre 
chains as listed in 2011.
The rapid growth of the screen numbers was accompanied by great improvements in 
theatre quality and comfort. In other words, it was supported by investment in theatre 
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facilities and by increased levels of film-going. Newly constructed, so-called ‘five-star’ 
theatres are replacing older venues. National and transnational theatre chains, including 
multiplexes attached as wings of ‘mega malls’ – of which Shanghai Stellar Cinema 
City located in the Super Brand Mall Shanghai is a prime example – helped to set the 
benchmark for theatre design, floor planning and furnishing. The result was improved 
leisure experiences for Chinese filmgoers, whose ranks were also growing in terms of 
numbers and spending power. Audiences were also drawn by on-screen spectacles of an 
increasingly overpowering and immersive nature. To that end, 3D and IMAX viewing 
experiences also became an intrinsic part of the new cinematic experience, as exemplified 
by domestic director Feng Xiaogang’s Aftershock (Tangshan da dizhen, 2010), a film 
about the catastrophic 1976 Tangshan Earthquake and its effect on the lives of a mother 
and her children. At the time of its release, Aftershock quickly became the highest-
grossing film in China’s history. This film, which magnified the spectacle of disaster 
using IMAX technology, managed to attract a record-breaking Chinese audience even 
following the advent of home film viewing via computer screens. Its success simultane-
ously signaled the return and evolution of screen culture, both of which were triggered 
by new technological spectacles and patterns of consumer spending.
In addition to the growth of cinemas in second- and third-tier cities, global 
cities such as Shanghai are also able to support increasing numbers of screens as 
their residents’ spending power increases. Screen abundance has, in a sense, itself 
become a symbol of Shanghai’s globalization; the city is home to an increasingly 
inter national, increasingly diverse film culture, and has reclaimed its former place 
as China’s cinematic capital. Like other East Asian global cities such as Seoul and 
Taipei, Shanghai now exhibits signs of a second key development in expansion of 
ScreenSpace – namely, the phenomenon of outdoor and public screens in the form of 
digital advertisements, displays and billboards. Advertisements on LED and plasma 
screens in high-traffic locations where affluent people congregate, or where people 
are predisposed to shop, have become big business in China, especially in large and 
cosmopolitan cities like Shanghai (see Figure 12.2).4 Commercial and transport 
locations in these cities are now saturated with digitally displayed images encouraging 
consumption and, to a lesser extent, displaying political and public safety messages at 
the behest of China’s Communist Party and subordinate government organs. In short, 
the number of urban screens is rising rapidly.
The crucial point here is that ScreenSpace has moved out of the theatre in China. 
So what, then, is ScreenSpace, when seemingly detached from its cinematic environs 
and dispersed throughout the wider city? Theorists of architecture and urban spaces 
can help us answer this question. Robert Venturi’s conception of urban architecture 
as ‘communication for the Information Age’, echoed in Lev Manovich’s description of 
the city as an ‘information surface’, suggests that what we are witnessing is a trans-
formation of all urban leisure space, and perhaps public space generally, into the 
‘augmented space’ of information and image delivery. In this respect, the cinematic 
theatre was but a technological precursor of physical spaces overlaid with communi-
cative ‘surface’ – the digital screen.5 For example, LED screens and digital billboards 
have become important sites of one-way communication within urban settings. 
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Urban screens, like the fixed-image advertisements which preceded them, promote 
consumption and luxury lifestyles. The cityscape has become the imagescape, the 
screenscape and an increasingly information-rich environment. Coupled with the 
additional dimension of spectator experience, this screenscape becomes the sensory 
and technological social terrain of ScreenSpace.
The use of urban buildings, interiors and public spaces as digital ‘skin’ has also 
increased the actual and potential power of cities to serve as sites of political and 
corporate communication. And as cities are linked by political and corporate entities, 
the formation of trans-urban and ‘new’ collectivities becomes possible – not just 
through the political communication of the Chinese Communist Party, but also 
through the advertising of Chinese and multinational brandmakers. The virtual 
space of information has quickly become ‘domesticated’ (Manovich) by commerce, 
the suburb made ‘electronic’ (Norman Klein) and dissolved into to urban space – 
space filled with commercialized electronic billboards through a process that Otto 
Riewoldt calls ‘brandscaping’.6 Like politics during the Mao years, brandscaping 
shapes the urban cultural experience in China. While commerce has not completely 
Figure 12.2 ScreenSpace along Nanjing Road, Shanghai. Source: tayloranddayumi, 
2008. Available from: Wikimedia Commons.
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eclipsed political mobilization as the most fecund source of signs and symbols in 
Reform Era-China, the consumerism that it encourages has become integral to 
China’s national political economy. Indeed, the display of material achievement and 
abundance that characterized the Shanghai Expo was both a major event in the trans-
formation of ScreenSpace, as I discuss below, and a symbolic milestone representing 
the compatibility of a state-sponsored and distinctly ‘Chinese’ identity with the reali-
zation of economic prosperity.
The animated scroll at the Shanghai Expo China pavilion: 
Spectator immersion and mobile experience
The Shanghai Expo China Pavilion was a symbolic and architectural achievement, a ‘gate 
facing toward the world’ as described on Sina.com in the months leading up to the Expo’s 
opening.7 Official statements accompanying the construction insisted that the China 
Pavilion should represent the distinctiveness of China’s civilization and contemporary 
economic achievements – a ‘crown of the East’ (Dongfang zhi guan). The China Pavilion’s 
intended purpose was thus to encourage domestic Expo-goers and audiences to adopt 
the identity of politically, economically and culturally confident subjects – national 
citizens, consumers and bearers of civilization. To this end, it was endowed with a 
particularly distinctive feature – a massive reproduction of the panoramic scroll painting 
‘Riverside Scene at Qingming Festival’ (Qingming heshang tu) by the celebrated Northern 
Song dynasty artist Zhang Zeduan (1085–145). The digitally produced reproduction was 
animated, making it one of the largest and most memorable displays at the Expo and 
portending, perhaps, the creation of a post-industrial, urban exposition aesthetic.
The animated ‘Riverside Scene at Qingming Festival’ display possessed several 
qualities, which suggest that the intended ScreenSpace experience is ultimately one 
of spectator immersion, or overload. Within the digitally enhanced panorama, nearly 
every person and animal is moving or talking. The river flows by. The sky gets darker 
and brighter. Lanterns fade and are kindled according to whether it is ‘day’ or ‘night’. 
The effect is that of a magic spell transforming the spectator, who is submerged 
within the insistent reality of the scroll and its human scene. The screen additionally 
impresses spectators with its aura of technical mastery. A medieval Chinese painting 
is infused with ultra-modern technology; for some Chinese spectators, this fusion was 
undoubtedly a source of great national pride. Finally, the size of the screen-displayed 
scroll, which dominated the hall-like passageway to the China Pavilion’s interior, was 
also intended to attract and overwhelm spectators’ senses. The Pavilion’s scroll was 30 
times larger than the original, and featured an estimated 1,000 moving figures. As one 
moved closer to the scroll, it became possible to hear conversation and street noises 
accompanying the visual impression of motion.
As a manifestation of ScreenSpace, the animated scroll can be placed within a 
global, rather than purely national, context. The relevant trend here not only points 
toward ubiquity of screens, but also their increasingly gargantuan size, as well as 
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toward international image projection and technological competition. Taking the 
Shanghai Expo as an example, the pavilions of numerous other countries also made 
use of panoramic screens and digital screen displays; in fact, the largest screens at 
the Expo were those installed in Saudi Arabia’s pavilion. The scroll production team, 
headed by ‘Chief Creator’ Yu Zheng, was comprised of 70 employees of the Beijing-
based multimedia firm Crystal CG, or Crystal Computer Graphics (Shuijingshi shuzi 
keji), which specializes in ‘architectural visualization’ according to the company’s 
website. By 2010, Crystal CG had already produced work for Olympic Games 
ceremonies in Beijing 2008 and later, in London 2012. In other words, the animated 
scroll – and the phenomenon of China’s ScreenSpace generally – must be seen in the 
context of China’s national advance toward spectacular, screen-based forms of public 
and urban experience.
In addition to multi-sensory overload and scale, the digitally enhanced ‘Riverside 
Scene at Qingming Festival’ also possessed immersive qualities by virtue of its winding 
shape (see Figure 12.4). The massive size of the China Pavilion and its interior spaces 
– the main exhibition hall was 6.3 metres high and 130 metres long – was conceived 
with housing the enormous animated scroll in mind. Combined, the scroll and 
exhibition hall together created what I personally experienced in the course of my 
fieldwork as a ‘surround spectacle’. Like cognate technologies of ‘surround sound’, 
this spectacle totally immerses the spectator, who is potentially anaesthetized, if not 
annihilated, by the overwhelming size of the art and attention-dominating power of 
its technologies. In a sense, the world that it depicted brought spectators into a virtual 
reality, by virtue of the fact that the screen’s surface was not flat, nor was its shape 
Figure 12.3 Images from Zhang Zeduan, ‘Riverside Scene at Qingming Festival’, early 
eleventh century. Available from: Wikimedia Commons.
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square. Rather, it surrounded and enfolded the spectator. Yet ironically, the spectator’s 
experience is not of ‘full attention’ but rather ‘constant distraction’, in part because he/
she was physically incapable of occupying a vantage point from which viewing the 
entire screen was possible. At any given moment much of the screen was hidden from 
view, which gave rise to a perceptual experience that was at once concentrated and 
distracting. One was both captured by the spectacle of the scroll and impelled to seek 
more of the image, to turn the next corner.
It could be argued that the experience of the animated screen was like the 
experience of the Shanghai Expo in miniature. Both were the products of national, 
or a range of national, attempts at seizing spectator attention and overwhelming the 
spectator with an experience of technological prowess and mastery as manifested by 
screens, commodities and architecture. Unlike national histories, the goal was not to 
present a grand, unifying narrative but rather to create an impressionistic experience 
that is – by virtue of the multi-sensory mode of its presentation – partial, distracted 
and fragmented, but memorable nonetheless. The cavernous space of the China 
Pavilion’s exhibition hall not infrequently provided some respite from the animated 
scroll inside; the Shanghai Expo experience could easily become one of frustration and 
fatigue due to the massive scale of the Expo grounds and the seeming endlessness of 
its queues (see Figure 12.5).
Figure 12.4 The digitally enhanced and animated ‘Riverside Scene at Qingming 
Festival’ scroll, located in the China Pavilion. Source: AlexHe34, 2010. Available from: 
Wikimedia Commons.
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Both the China Pavilion and Shanghai Expo experiences draw attention to the 
strengths and limitations of ScreenSpace as a form of immersive spectacle, and to 
experiences that are becoming increasingly typical in heavily media-‘skinned’ urban 
environments. First, ScreenSpace is predicated on a presentation of spatial continuity. 
The ‘Riverside Scene at Qingming Festival’ animated scroll required simultaneous 
operation of 12 projectors on a four-minute cycle. Special software was required to 
coordinate problems related to the overlapping edges of the projected images, so that 
each segment of the panorama was presented as part of a larger whole rather than a 
standalone image. Without this software, the scroll would not have appeared seamless, 
nor would objects have been able to ‘move’ in a visually uninterrupted way between 
images. Just as the technology of film is based on the optical illusion of temporal 
continuity across sequential ‘cuts’, the technology of the animated scroll is based on 
the illusion of spatial continuity between projected images. To the extent that such 
continuity is, or is not, achieved, the immersive effect works, or doesn’t.
This brings up a final point in connection with the animated scroll and invites us to 
contemplate the phenomenon of mobile audience. In the case of the China Pavilion, the 
audience is forced to move around, both in order to see the entire scroll and because 
spectators are not allowed to remain in the exhibition hall indefinitely. Even away 
from the main exhibition hall, visitors were conveyed through the structure by means 
of elevators and mini-trams – it would not be an exaggeration to describe the China 
Pavilion as a kind of perpetual-motion machine. One can easily imagine parallels 
between this situation and the conditions of a thronging urban crowd, which must also 
be engaged with while in a state of constant motion. Twenty-first century ScreenSpace is 
thus immersive not only by virtue of its digital augmentation, but also by virtue of its 
shape – its multi-surface, multi-image and, by necessity, its spatially seamless nature.
Figure 12.5 Long queues and human crowds in the China Pavilion. Available from: 
Wikimedia Commons.
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By way of a conclusion to this section, I would like to invoke Walter Benjamin’s 
notion of ‘distraction’ in part to suggest that the phenomenon of ScreenSpace, while 
perhaps more immersive than could have been imagined in a pre-digital age, is not 
wholly new. Instead, its possibility was readily apparent in the context of the urban 
environment of twentieth-century Europe. Rather than casting solely negative light on 
distraction, Benjamin sees it as the central characteristic of modern perception and, 
accordingly, analyses the urban culture of distraction as collective, habitual, everyday 
and fragmentary. Physical mobility, however, adds greater complexity to Benjamin’s 
conception of distraction. In particular, while film-going audiences are, at least in 
principle, characterized by immobility and silence, the spectators in the China Pavilion 
are mobile. This physical mobility enhances the experience of distraction and, as a 
result, the distracted, mobile audience does not simply receive messages and images in 
a passive manner, but has the additional option of fleeing the site of reception.
The Shanghai Expo as historical montage: Jia Zhangke’s 
I Wish I Knew
In addition to the ‘River Scene at Qingming Festival’ animated scroll, another notable 
screen-based outgrowth of the Shanghai Expo was the specially commissioned film 
by Jia Zhangke, I Wish I Knew. To be sure, the choice of Jia as artistic representative 
seemed jarring due to the director’s reputation as a Sixth Generation iconoclast and 
champion of personal, unvarnished storytelling which deliberately contrasted with 
official narratives. Though primarily a maker of feature and semi-fictional films, Jia is 
also celebrated for his documentaries, use of non-typecast actors and preference for 
local, even peripheral settings. In the end, I Wish I Knew was very much a familiar ‘Jia 
Zhangke film’, owing to its use of historical montage to challenge festival narratives of 
industrial and technological progress.
The natures of commercial exhibitions are above all spectacles attesting to the 
superiority and stability of industrial society in its myriad, corporeal forms. Whether 
held in London (1851), Moscow (1935), Taipei (1936), or Paris (1937) – to name but 
a few well-known and less well-known examples – exhibitions are devoted to the idea 
of ‘progress’ as embodied by architecture, commodities and even entertainment. The 
Shanghai Expo fits easily into this framework. Under the official slogan of ‘Better 
City, Better Life’ (a blatantly pro-urbanization mantra), the entire event was intended 
to represent the reality of China’s own national progress in disparate areas such as 
construction, technology, arts and culture, public etiquette and, more generally, civili-
zation. Like expos of nineteenth-century Europe, visitors to the Shanghai Expo were 
predominantly of the working class, and the Expo’s focal point was commodities – the 
fruits of industrial progress and national wealth. The vision of a globalized, urban 
present and future on display at the Expo was thus directly related to the party-state’s 
ideological project of promising urban lifestyles and elevated living standards.8
Along with the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games (the ‘Beijing Olympics’), to which it 
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was explicitly compared in official statements and media reports, the Shanghai Expo 
was portrayed by its official partners and promoters intended to promote globally an 
image of China as a world-class, techno-cultural superpower. However, one subtle 
difference existed between the Beijing Olympics vision of China and the Shanghai Expo 
vision. Whereas the opening ceremony of the former event celebrated China’s superi-
ority as a global producer of technology, goods and ideas, at the Shanghai event China 
was recognized as the world’s greatest consumer market. Both events, however, strove 
to depict China as having moved on from its economic position as a producer of cheap 
consumer goods and middle tier within global manufacturing value chains, by putting 
forward a new national ‘brand’ of China as the world’s greatest past, present and future 
civilization. Yet despite all of this elevated rhetoric, the steady drumbeat of commerce 
was never faint. More than 90 per cent of Shanghai Expo visitors were Chinese citizens, 
and the national pavilions of other countries – unlike China’s own national pavilion – 
served as platforms for making direct appeals asking China’s domestic consumers to 
purchase goods, educational degrees and travel products from abroad.
All of these developments make the decision to include, as one of the Expo’s cultural 
centrepieces, a semi-realistic, semi-fantastic ‘documentary’ of Shanghai and its history 
somewhat incongruous. Commissioned by the Expo’s planners and screened in the 
event site’s Cultural Center, Jia Zhangke’s I Wish I Knew, used interviews, urban 
tableaux and a ghostly (or angelic) figure to deliver a personal meditation on China’s 
complex past. In form, I Wish I Knew is both an interview-based documentary and a 
historical montage; its elements include first-person narratives woven together with 
images of past and present-day Shanghai. Additionally, Jia employs other cinematic 
representations of the city, as well as a recurring actor – played by Jia’s wife, Zhao Tao 
– who plays a ghost-like role in the film, ‘haunting’ the contemporary city by gazing 
upon its architecture and linking its contemporary urban space to images, sounds and 
stories associated with Shanghai’s history. Other scholars have reviewed I Wish I Knew 
at length, with the basic gist of their comments being that Jia presents a sensitive, 
polysemic reading of Shanghai’s cosmopolitan and tumultuous heritage.9 Here I would 
like to draw attention to two critical details: the first scene and the ghostly figure of 
Zhao Tao.
Critics such as Xu Jing, Dudley Andrew, and Tony Rayns have paid serious 
attention to the first scene (see Figure 12.6). For instance, in the co-authored review, 
Xu Jing and Dudley Andrew interestingly juxtapose the ‘imperious brass lion’s gaze’ 
with Jia Zhangke’s own gaze: ‘A man lovingly buffs the lion, one of a pair sitting at the 
entrance to the Bank of Communication. Red lettering announces this to be ‘A Film 
by Jia Zhangke’, who thereby adopts the lion’s view as his own’.10
In contrast to the Expo’s official vision of urban development and renewal, Jia 
meditates at length upon the literal destruction that Shanghai’s economic growth has 
caused. A stunning reverse shot from the vantage point of the lion includes three 
horizons of Shanghai’s skyline: debris of demolished buildings, colonial architecture 
from the early twentieth century and anonymous, mushrooming skyscrapers (see 
Figure 12.7). One may even detect in Jia’s cinematic ‘gaze’ a visual manifesto that 
recalls Walter Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’. As Benjamin writes:
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A [Paul] Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though 
he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes 
are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the 
angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of 
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage 
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, 
and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; 
it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer 
close them. The storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back 
is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what 
we call progress.11
Whether or not Jia had Benjamin’s appraisal of the ‘Angelus Novus’ painting in mind 
when he directed I Wish I Knew, his contrast of Shanghai’s urban debris with its 
Figure 12.6 Bund, bank, lions and man in Jia Zhangke’s I Wish I Knew (2010).
Figure 12.7 Reverse shot: surveying urban development and debris. I Wish I Knew 
(2010).
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ongoing re-construction does call into question the degree to which his film supported 
the Expo-sanctioned view of progress as desirable and inevitable.
Following the ‘lion’ scene, the Jia-directed camera moves deeper into the city, 
buoyed by the natural rhythms of gentle breezes and the lapping waves of the Huangpu 
River. However, if we apply the logic of the first scene to the entire film, the puzzling 
presence of the ghostly figure, played by Zhao Tao, can be read as a the lion’s avatar 
(and thus, by extension, a symbol of Jia’s own historical gaze), and thus as the angel 
of history in Klee’s painting. In contrast to a similar cinematic figure, Wim Wenders’ 
‘angel of Berlin,’ Jia’s Shanghai angel is dressed in an unfussy white T-shirt and carries 
a collapsible fan (see Figure 12.8), whereas the Berlin angel appears in Wenders’ films 
wearing a long black coat and adorned with a pair of white wings. The Shanghai angel 
is worldly; her modest fan represents a rejoinder to the notion of historical progress, or 
‘wind,’ as progressive or divinely ordained. Toward the end of I Wish I Knew, following 
a series of live interviews arranged as a history of twentieth-century Shanghai, Zhao 
Tao reaches the Expo site itself, figuratively as well as literally locating her in the 
present day (see Figure 12.9). Somewhat amazingly, the scene that greets her is not a 
vibrant image of urban efflorescence, but rather a gloomy ruin littered with debris – 
the wreckage piled at the angel of history’s feet.
Much of the rest of I Wish I Knew also conveys Jia’s implied skepticism concerning 
claims for a better future. The film reaches its emotional climax during a heart-
rending interview with Wang Peimin, the child of a Communist revolutionary 
executed at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party more than 60 years 
ago. At the same time, its historically agnostic visual sublime reappears in a scene in 
which dusty construction workers carry bag after bag of cement. This neo-socialist 
allegory is minimalist and modernist rather than tragic or heroic. A labouriously 
slow and repeti tive rhythm, conspicuous absence of sound and aestheticization of the 
construction site’s dust, muted hues and debris signal an ambiguous stance toward 
Figure 12.8 A ghostly Zhao Tao haunts the rubble-strewn Bund …
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Shanghai’s urban transformation. Toward the end of the film, Jia’s documentary repre-
sentations are pushed aside by interviews coupled with strident and colourful ‘found 
footage’ from post-revolutionary propaganda films. However, Jia’s signature aesthetics 
of urban detritus and toil is reiterated at the very moment when the Shanghai Expo 
makes its cinematic appearance. Rather than a festival celebrating technological 
progress and confidence in the future, Jia’s Expo is literally in ruins. Rather than 
global spectacle of the present, or an idealized vision of China’s traditional past (a 
la the Beijing Olympics), Jia’s introduction to the Expo comes in the form of an 
interview-based, living memory of twentieth-century events and, ultimately, a vision 
of historically directionless destruction.
According to official Chinese media sources and the Shanghai Expo’s own publicity 
materials, I Wish I Knew was simply a ‘documentary about Shanghai’. This bland formu-
lation conceals both the complexity of the film’s aesthetics and the ambiguity of its stance 
toward Shanghai’s present and future. Yet as I have argued here, its view of the twentieth-
century past does not ultimately romanticize ‘old Shanghai.’ Rather, Jia’s 18 interviewees 
provide a range of cautionary object lessons that are not reflected by the film’s visual 
narrative – one must listen for them. With respect to ScreenSpace, the example of Jia 
Zhangke’s commissioned work for the Shangahi Expo brings home another important 
lesson. Just as the ghostly character played by Zhao Tao in I Wish I Knew haunts the city 
of Shanghai, state – artist partnerships are often ‘haunted’ by the overlapping agendas 
and meanings with which top international talent like Jia Zhangke regularly infuse their 
Figure 12.9 … and is juxtaposed against the site of the Shanghai Expo. I Wish I Knew 
(2010).
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work. The production of I Wish I Knew demonstrates that ScreenSpace content may be, 
as in the case of the augmented ‘Riverside Scene at Qingming Festival’ scroll, techno-
logically and artistically sophisticated. Yet the messages implied by I Wish I Knew also 
demonstrate that experience of ScreenSpace is nonetheless rendered ‘open’ by virtue of 
artist and audience perspectives. This is a familiar dynamic in the history of political 
art, with examples ranging from the Roosevelt-era Works Progress Administration in 
the United States to the production of literature under totalitarian leaders like Stalin 
and Mao. To the extent that effective and alluring communication depends on talent 
that state-appointed cultural managers lack, or on audience responses that cannot be 
assured, ideological control over ScreenSpace remains incomplete.
Alternative ScreenSpace: Jian Yi and the Qingyuanshe 
‘memory project’
As I have described, a combination of commercial screens, political screens and 
cinematic screens are among the major constituent elements of ScreenSpace in urban 
China today. Personal media devices and computers represent another form of 
ScreenSpace technology also deserving of close consideration. However, I believe that 
studies of personal screens will ultimately support my basic points – that ScreenSpace 
is rapidly proliferating, and that its content is largely determined by powerful social 
forces such as corporations, governments and well-funded media producers. As my 
examination of the primary screen attractions of the Shanghai Expo has also shown, 
the collective experience generated by public ScreenSpace is characterized by virtual 
participation in spectacles of economic abundance, cosmopolitanism, cultural and 
technological achievement and national progress. However, while such experiences 
are immersive, they are not fully ‘closed’. To return to the example of Jia Zhangke’s 
I Wish I Knew, ScreenSpace platforms and systems remain open to representational 
strategies are not entirely ‘harmonious’ vis-à-vis dominant ideologies and interests. 
And, returning to the site of the Shanghai Expo itself, it is abundantly obvious that that 
spell of ScreenSpace may be perpetually challenged by the sensory experience of long 
lines, crowds and the restless, jostling circulation of bodies. Ordinary people literally 
push back against their built environment with its digital ‘skin’ and thus puncture – if 
only for a few critical moments – the continuum of seamless ScreenSpace immersion.
Another important characteristic of ScreenSpace, and its potential, is interactivity 
between producer, audience, and represented image. Alternatives to ScreenSpace’s 
dominant forms are thus generated both by new technologies (although these may 
be quickly subsumed into pre-existing hierarchies) and by new social actors. In this 
section, I examine one example of ScreenSpace that reflects one possible alternative to 
the dominant culture of ScreenSpace as it exists in strongholds of political and economic 
power such as Shanghai. Here my argument is that a truly balanced perspective on 
ScreenSpace requires acknowledgment of the activities of ‘amateur’ or independent 
filmmakers and videographers. In my view, the ranks of these individuals are growing 
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due in part to the increasing affordability of image-making technology – digital 
cameras, editing software and display platforms – and in part due to a corresponding 
rise in activity related to the archiving and preservation of experience. Neither of these 
developments are strictly local phenomena. Memory preservation via digital technology 
is undoubtedly a global practice. However, it is place-based – that is to say, particular 
to the subjectivities of those whose lives interact with a particular geographic location.
The case I want to highlight here is a regional documentary movement. The 
primary proponent of this movement is Jian Yi, an independent documentary 
filmmaker, community organizer and international cultural consultant. Jian Yi’s 
career as a filmmaker began in 2005, when he joined Wu Wenguang’s China Villagers 
Documentary Project (Zhongguo cunmin yingxiang jihua) as the project’s public 
communication expert (see Chapter 14). In 2009 Jian Yi completed a documentary 
on government-promoted ‘red tourism’ in China titled New Socialist Climax (Hongse 
zhi lü, 2007–9). ‘Red tourism’ (also the Chinese title of Jian Yi’s film) is intended 
to bolster popular support for the Communist Party by encouraging citizens to 
revisit sites with special significance in the history of the Party’s revolution. While 
producing the film, Jian Yi returned to his home city of Ji’an, in Jiangxi Province, 
and participated directly in the establishment of the IFCHINA Original Studio and 
Participatory Documentary Center (hereafter the IFCHINA Studio) on the campus of 
Jinggangshan University.12 The studio’s Chinese name, Qingyuanshe avoids deploying 
sensitive words like ‘documentary’ altogether.13 Like Wu Wenguang’s China Villagers 
Documentary Project, the main activity promoted by Qingyuanshe is documentary 
filmmaking by inhabitants of Ji’an and its surrounding environs – participatory video. 
In Jian Yi’s words, the goal is to make ordinary Chinese ‘camera literate’.
The IFCHINA Studio was in full operation at the same time as the Shanghai Expo. 
If one of the goals of the Expo was to create a new image of China and a unified 
experience of national unity and pride for Chinese citizens, the goal of the IFCHINA 
Studio founders was something quite different altogether – to use a second-tier city 
as a staging ground for a multimedia memory project emphasizing individual histories 
over collective narratives. Because Jinggangshan’s position in Communist Party 
histories as the birthplace or cradle of the revolution, Jian Yi and others have expanded 
their project to include the memories of ‘red tourists’ passing through the city. The 
IFCHINA Studio serves as a repository for photographs collected from tourists, which 
are historical in nature. In short, it is a kind of archive for personal image and memory. 
Another important aspect of the studio’s activities is oral history collection; it also 
engages in the collection and archiving of historical or local documents. According 
to Jian Yi, one of the principal goals of these activities is to record the memories of 
those older than 90 years of age, whose memories are on the verge of passing out of 
the world. The IFCHINA Studio itself, supplemented by the filmmaking of Jian Yi 
and a cast of amateur directors, has held regular screenings and exhibitions for the 
community that make use of these memory materials.
Accompanying this ‘memory project’ is a parallel architecture project, and this 
leads me to my final point concerning alternative ScreenSpace. With the assistance 
of foreign architects, Qingyuanshe helps local residents to rebuild their houses in the 
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traditional and climatically appropriate architectural style of the region. In return, 
house owners allow the local community to use a part of the house, such as the 
front yard or the wall, to display their memorabilia and testimony. In the long term, 
Qingyuanshe’s organizers plan to add recorded oral testimony from the residents, to 
be replayed by passers-by and tourists at the touch of a button; or, for multi-media 
displays incorporating image projection. Using these methods, entire villages become 
information- and memory-rich museums. The architectural goals of the Qingyuanshe 
memory project thus promote ScreenSpace of another kind – a localized, individu-
alized experience circulated via multiple ‘platforms’ within the community and with 
deep resonance for the members of that community. While the IFCHINA Studio 
enjoys a global reputation among artists and participatory video advocates, its ideal 
model is that of an organic, non-didactic relationship with communities within China. 
Within this alternative ScreenSpace, a more profound form of interactivity between 
individual producers and audiences is taking shape.
Critics might challenge the IFCHINA Studio’s claims to collect and re-circulate 
unfiltered, authentic personal experience. Or they might object to the idea that the 
open-ended collection of personal testimony represents a convincing alternative to 
official history and dominant forms of collective identity. Regardless, the IFCHINA 
Studio is among the vanguard of a new wave of memory projects now on display in 
China and abroad, and which do seem to differ from the more dominant modes of 
ScreenSpace I have explored in earlier sections. Unlike Jia Zhangke’s I Wish I Knew, 
the IFCHINA Studio filmmakers largely eschew montage for more direct videography 
– the uninterrupted recording of the act of remembrance. This mode of ‘individual-
izing’ narration is increasingly popular amongst amateur and independent Chinese 
filmmakers, as described elsewhere in this volume (see, for example, Chapter 1). Of 
equal concern, however, is the reliance of such projects on foreign funding. Both 
Jian Yi and the IFCHINA Studio have received significant support from institu-
tions outside of China, to the extent that the scope of their activities would appear 
to depend on such support. The future of alternative ScreenSpace in China, though 
promising, appears fragile.
Conclusion
With the advent of new media platforms such as the internet, some scholars have 
envisioned the corresponding rise of new forms of social organization and subjec-
tivity. What new kind of subjectivities will arise within China’s distinctive media 
environment? Will new, globally networked collectivities emerge to challenge existing 
orders? How will new media platforms empower urban workers, such as grey-collar 
(huiling) employees who perform repetitive productive tasks within white-collar 
technology industries? Who will be the new consumers of information delivered via 
China’s expanding ScreenSpace? Will constant real-time media engagement result in a 
digital revolution, or digital paralysis? Who will hold the upper hand in this brave new 
world – the digital working class, corporations, or the state?
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This chapter has not sought to directly address these questions, but it has endeav-
oured to show that first-, second- and third-tier cities are the most important sites 
for addressing them. By privileging only Beijing on Shanghai, we run the risk of 
overlooking alternative dynamics taking place in more peripheral locations such as 
Ji’an. I have focused much of my analysis on Shanghai because of its visibility within 
the constellation of global urban centres and because it represents one of the densest 
nodes of urban ScreenSpace within China. What we learn from an examination of the 
Shanghai Expo’s screen-based spectacles is that the interface between individuals and 
screens can no longer be thought of in purely cinema- or television-derived terms – 
technologies, and built urban environments, are changing too fast. The implication 
is that looking for evidence of state and commercial power – and challenges to this 
power – in the movie theatre is no longer an adequate methodology for understanding 
how the experience of Chinese citizens is mediated through screens, who does the 
mediating and so on. Investigators into screen culture may need to be less like screen 
critics and more like urban anthropologists; fieldwork is an increasingly necessary 
component of research and informed analysis. What we learn from fieldwork is that 
there is real substance to the Chinese government’s efforts to transform its urban 
and industrial structure toward a more urbanized, more digital-rich form. China is 
more connected than ever before, with one of the most recent waves of connectivity 
emerging from its post-WTO accession ‘universal service plan’ for public cultural 
service (gonggong wenhua fuwu).14 The Communist Party-led state takes supremacy 
in media industries seriously, as part of its agenda to become a comprehensive global 
power – a superpower. The party-state’s power is palpable in MediaSpace, not only in 
ScreenSpace. Media technology, including digital screens, is seen as a crucial puzzle 
to be solved en route to resolving a range of issues ranging from macro economic 
dislocation to political atrophy. Commercial enterprise may yet gain strength through 
advertising and political influence but, as the Shanghai Expo reminds us, the state 
remains China’s pivotal economic and historical actor. This ideology is repro-
duced in ScreenSpace, where the biggest spectacles are essentially state-created, or 
state-financed.
And yet, just as the spectacles of the Shanghai Expo – its architecture, digital 
displays and audiovisual content – draw from global reservoirs of technology and 
human talent, so too have China’s alternative and independent media producers 
nurtured their own transnational linkages with foreign institutions and funding 
sources. The result is a (still) diverse media mélange which is sometimes rendered 
globally invisible by China’s national branding efforts. Who are the most trusted 
sources of news? Whose statements will be taken at face value? This question is not 
China’s alone. As evidenced by the recent WikiLeaks ‘incident’, the dispersion and 
control of sensitive information flows are globally coordinated. This is not a new 
issue, but it is an important one when we consider how ScreenSpace in China will 
interact with the insistent tide of network and information sprawl. Alternative media 
eddies may exist within internet-connected bedrooms, fiscally marginal cities and the 
production facilities of well-funded entrepreneurs. In such ScreenSpace, consumerism 
quickly asserts itself as the dominant cultural. However, just as digital media ushered 
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in the ‘age of the amateur producer’ – thus displacing an earlier, top-down ‘age of 
technological reproduction’ – evidence for dispersed, participatory modes of public 
image creation seems to likewise anticipate an unpredictable future for ScreenSpace.
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Regarding the Grassroots Chinese Independent 
Film Festivals : Modes of Multiplicity and 
Abnormal Film Networking
Ma Ran
When the first Beijing International Film Festival (BJIFF, Beijing Guoji Dianyingji) 
kicked off in late April 2011, the eighth Beijing Documentary Film Festival (DOChina) 
was called off ‘due to unexpected reasons’ (yin’gu). On the BJIFF’s official website 
it is not difficult to find a plethora of celebratory rhetoric that shows off how much 
this state-sanctioned film festival – one of the major three in mainland China – has 
achieved, given its unbelievably short preparation period and the glamour it staged with 
an illustrious line-up of international stars, filmmakers and top film festival directors. 
Not surprisingly, as one of the leading Chinese independent filmmakers and a festival 
programmer himself, Ying Liang decided to call it ‘the most bizarre film festival’ ever.1
 If such a newborn official festival as BIJFF appears ‘bizarre’ to acute observers/
practitioners who are familiar with the Chinese independent film scene like Ying 
Liang, then it indeed poses a unique question about how do we approach unofficial, 
independent film festivals like DOChina in the People’s Republic of China. For 
instance, why are independent festivals in China considered less abnormal if their 
survival is not only contingent on the overall financial condition needed to produce 
these cultural venues, but is also constantly haunted by the seemingly whimsical 
decisions made by the ‘relevant bureaus’ of the state apparatus to cancel these film 
events?
 In their innovative contribution to film festival studies, Thomas Elsaesser and 
Marijke de Valck have built up the ‘international film festival network’ model utilizing 
Niklas Luhmann’s system theory, Manuel Castells’ theory of the ‘space of flows’ 
and ‘space of place,’ and particularly utilizing Bruno Latour’s ‘actor network theory’ 
(ANT).2 According to de Valck, there are two advantages in deploying the Latourian 
theory of network to study film festival phenomenon: it presupposes relational inter-
dependence and includes both humans and non-human actors as objects of study.3 
On the other hand, she also admits that one limitation of the ANT approach is that it 
‘offers few critical tools for assessing power relations.’ She articulates that under such 
236 China’s iGeneration
a theoretical framework, within the power grid of the network, the differentiation 
between prestigious, major film festivals and less important, small film festivals can 
be easily identified as ‘task division,’ with the major media events as central nodes in 
the network whereas the smaller festivals perform specific functions ‘by supporting 
new talented directors, paying attention to specific genres or serving as a cultural-
political platform for (ethnic) minority groups.’4 She also proposes that Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri’s notion of empire can be deployed to critique how neo-colonial 
tendencies still lurk in the global festival network – with Western festivals, funding 
and taste wielding greater influence over world cinemas.5 Meanwhile, she believes by 
connecting to Saskia Sassen and Castells’ theorization about the ‘global space economy,’ 
the spatial and temporal dimensions of film festivals can be further examined ‘to assert 
how power relations on various scales are constituted.’6 Partially sharing de Valck’s 
view regarding Latourian thinking, I hope my focus on the localized/regionalized, 
circulatory/exhibition networks of Chinese independent cinema opens up more 
critical space to engage with the loci of power in the film festival network, given that 
Chinese grassroots film festivals usually operate semi-underground and raise intricate 
questions regarding artistic autonomy, state power and marketization of culture in 
postsocialist China.
 Although the ANT approach will still be a major thread in the arguments presented 
here, it is also important for us to adjust the critical lenses. Take, for example, Wang 
Shu-jen and Jonathan J. H. Zhu’s illuminating piece, ‘Mapping Film Piracy in China,’ 
which extends Latour’s ANT framework to canvass the film piracy networks in China. 
By endorsing Sassen’s argument that the ‘national-global duality’ tends to overem-
phasize the forces of globalization vis-à-vis the power of the state, Wang and Zhu 
believe that globalization should be regarded as ‘conceptually reconstituted “in terms 
of a transnational geography of centrality of multiple linkages and strategic concentra-
tions of material infrastructure.”’7 They agree with the Latourian perspective that the 
network in ANT should be considered ‘as the summing up of interactions through 
various kinds of devices, inscriptions, forms and formulae, into a very local, very 
practical, very tiny locus where no interaction is not framed.’8
 Overall Wang and Zhu highlight the following aspects in re-conceptualizing the 
loci of power: (1) the links and nodes of the network; (2) the directions, movements, 
and forces of the lines that connect the nodes and points; and (3) the realignment of 
spatial organizations and cooperation among various networks and agencies.9 I will 
reappropriate these three aspects to structure this chapter. It will accentuate the study 
of independent cinema-related minjian, or grassroots film festivals, as well as several 
related circulation/exhibition initiatives, entities and other connected networks, which 
have constituted what I have tentatively proposed as the ‘minjian film festival network’ 
(the significance of ‘minjian’ and ‘grassroots’ will be elaborated further later in this 
chapter). Though embedded in its local specificities, China’s grassroots film festivals 
and related entities have developed their regional and global linkages by interacting 
with and counteracting various networks and agencies such as the general public, 
the party–state, the international film festival circuit and mainstream film industries; 
specific attention is paid in this chapter to what Wang and Zhu have referred to as 
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directions, movements and mechanisms connecting the nodes and points of these 
networks.
 The research methodology here is underpinned by case studies based on field trips 
and participant observation. It also involves archival documents including festival 
catalogues, media reportage and discussions circulating on social media platforms 
such as the microblog Sina Weibo (the so-called ‘Chinese Twitter’). In light of this 
amount of material, this chapter is composed of three sections: first, I attempt to 
periodize the domestic exhibition history of Chinese independent cinema and to map 
out related circulatory entities in order to contextualize the evolution of grassroots 
film festivals in the country. Then the second part of this chapter explores the nodes 
and points of the ‘minjian film festival network’ by focusing on Beijing-based Fanhall 
Studio, Li Xianting’s Film Fund, and the Chongqing Independent Film & Video 
Festival (CIFVF, since 2007) in western China. In the conclusion, we shall return to 
the discussion of the significance of ‘minjian film festival network’ by rethinking how 
the network works to engage with the independent film community as well as today’s 
Chinese society.
Two stages of exhibiting Chinese independent cinema
As a veteran curator and dedicated endorser of Chinese independent films, Zuo 
Jing has suggested that the first stage of circulating Chinese indie cinema domesti-
cally lasted roughly from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Grassroots cinéphile/
filmmaking groups were established in several major Chinese cities during this 
period, and the core activities of such groups revolve around ‘film appreciation – 
discussion – exhibition – filmmaking.’10 Their exhibition and screening activities 
generally took place at cafes, bars, or other itinerant venues – and usually emanated 
from culturally liberal colleges and universities and artist communities. Some of the 
major cinéphile/film groups still active today include U-theque Organization (yuany-
inghui) in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, Touchfilm (shijianshe) in Beijing, Rear Window 
(houchuang kandianying) in Nanjing, Film 101 Studio (101 dianying gongzuoshi) in 
Shanghai, Free Cinema (ziyou dianying) in Shenyang and Kunming Film Study Group 
(dianying xuexi xiaozu) in Kunming.11 It has been argued that the introduction of 
Digital Video cameras into PRC and the popularization of DV filmmaking among the 
public since the late 1990s have partially reshaped the semi-underground screening 
and exhibition practices of these cinéphile groups.12 Screening events by such groups 
had to accommodate more Do-It-Yourself visual productions, among which there 
were a certain amount of independent documentary films.13 This trend tightened 
the pre-existing ties between film groups nationwide, since in required stronger 
coordination between the groups, filmmakers and so forth, which also laid the basis 
for the primary organizational format of grassroots film festivals. On the other hand, 
China’s extensive piracy film networks, the timely upgrading and economization of 
hardware such as the VCD and DVD players, and the expansion of the internet since 
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late 1990s has made it convenient and affordable to collect (download) and consume 
pirated versions of Euro-American arthouse films that were once the major sources 
for film groups’ screenings. Consequently, it became redundant for such groups to 
programme and showcase global arthouse cinema. What Jia Zhangke has described 
as the privatized/personalized film viewing experience underscored by its democratic 
connotation has also facilitated the collapse of collective viewing activities in the form 
of cinéphile organizations.14 Today, most once-active film groups have ceased to exist 
after a few years of activities, yet unconventional venues and spaces still prove vital in 
the circulation of Chinese independent cinema.
 As Zuo Jing points out, what has characterized the second stage exhibiting 
practices of Chinese independent cinema is the way several major organizations 
have cooperatively functioned as ‘platforms’ or ‘interfaces’ to facilitate the exhibition, 
research, publishing, production and distribution.15 These major platforms, as delin-
eated by Zuo in 2009, are: Fanhall Studio (since 2001), Yunnan Multicultural Visual 
Festival (YunFest, since 2003), China Independent Film Festival (CIFF, since 2003), 
Caochangdi Workstation Art Center (CCD, since 2005), Indie Workshop (since 2005), 
Li Xianting’s Film Fund (since 2006) and China Independent Film Archive (CIFA, 
since 2009). Arguably, the first Unrestricted New Image Festival (hereafter UNIF) in 
2001 was the first grassroots film festival held in the PRC. It was collectively organized 
by three cinéphile groups (Film 101 Club, Free Cinema and U-theque Organization), 
and was financially supported by the Guangzhou-based liberal newspaper Southern 
Weekend and the Beijing-based IT company Beida-Online. With its open call for 
Chinese independent films produced since 1996, the festival received 109 submis-
sions (including 35 documentaries), which were either filmed with DV cameras or 
equipment borrowed from TV stations. UNIF went smoothly with its screenings 
held at the Beijing Film Academy (BFA) until the fourth day of the festival, when the 
university deemed a queer film called The Box (Hezi, 2001) inappropriate, and the 
whole event was suddenly called off. This led the core organizer Du Qingchun, who is 
also a BFA professor, to complain that ‘nobody would give you a reason [for why the 
festival was cancelled], since in China a film festival is not supposed to be organized 
by the grassroots.’16 Though thwarted in Beijing, the festival continued to tour in other 
cities such as Shenyang, Xi’an, Hangzhou and Shanghai. Unfortunately, UNIF never 
had a second season. In addition, the First Beijing Gay and Lesbian Film Festival (also 
China Queer Film Festival), which took place in the winter of 2001, was also forced 
to cancel its screenings and panels, and it was not until 2004 that the second China 
Queer Film Festival pulled off an uninterrupted platform to showcase queer-themed 
works both from China and abroad.17 Both festivals, through their courageous experi-
mentation with film content as well as organizing format, have provided some early 
templates for other grassroots film festivals to follow suit. It is quite common that 
emerging grassroots film festivals take shape from the organization and networking 
of local/regional cinéphile groups and further rely on their activities to thrive, specifi-
cally regarding the latter’s leverage at the grassroots level in: (1) film selection and 
programming; (2) venue management; (3) audience development; and (4) publicity 
and sponsorship. The two pioneering film festivals are no exception. Such a pattern 
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of cooperation has been repeated with other emerging film festivals, such as with the 
successful launching of YunFest at Kunming in 2003.18 Particularly, for the emerging 
festivals, there are lessons to be learned from dealing with the censors and other 
potential regulating bodies (such as the National Security Bureau, or even the Ministry 
of Education, if any university is to take part in these events); they have been cautious 
about the unstated forbidden zones of the state control. Even if both UNIF and the 
queer festival were forced to cancel by the authorities, the fact that they were organized 
in the first place speaks to the evolution of Chinese indie cinema and the independent 
film community’s demand for engaging with the public. Additionally, grassroots 
film festivals have actually long been considered essential to the global film festival 
network’s circulation and exhibition of Chinese indie films.
 I argue that the conceptualizations of ‘minjian’ and ‘grassroots’ and the ideas of 
being ‘independent’ and ‘alternative’ have provided various nuanced sociocultural and 
political underpinnings to rethink the circulation/exhibition network of Chinese indie 
cinema: these perspectives can help to map out the intersecting networks and relations 
among the party–state, Chinese film industry, global film market, international film 
festival network and the general public. Based on his ethnographic study of film clubs 
and documentary screening events (such as DOChina) in Beijing during the early 
2000s, Seio Nakajima relies on Foucauldian theories of power and agency to approach 
the relationship between grassroots screening clubs and the Chinese film bureaucracy; 
he posits that the independently produced Chinese documentaries are ‘independent’ 
exactly because ‘they engage with the influence emanating from the sphere of the state 
and the economy.’19 Nakajima’s insights also raise intriguing questions concerning 
the ‘status of independence’ for grassroots film festivals, whereas I suppose an under-
standing of the Chinese word ‘minjian,’ which shares a similar meaning with that of 
‘grassroots,’ may help us to switch the critical lens.
 The idea of ‘minjian’ as a preferred term by the indie film community may be 
approached in light of both of its literal definitions, namely: (1) ‘belonging to the 
general public,’ and (2) ‘among the people.’20 To Judith Pernin, the contextualization 
of ‘minjian’ has opened up the possibility of talking about the circulation of Chinese 
independent films from the perspective of the ‘public sphere’ or ‘public space.’21 Yet, 
in searching for an accurate term to describe the cultural and artistic practices that 
‘have developed outside the new state-corporate hegemonic culture of China’ since 
the decisive ‘1989/1992 conjuncture,’ Lisa Rofel and Chris Berry have adopted the 
term ‘alternative’: they believe ‘civil society’ and ‘public sphere’ are not suitable critical 
phrases to describe the contemporary Chinese context, and also deny the applicability 
of the term ‘independent’ since it fails to address ‘the foreclosure on a public, visible 
and organized opposition.’ Hence, they posit the word ‘minjian’ as being ‘civilian 
or popular’ and therefore closely connected with such alternativeness. Arguably, 
‘minjian’ can be understood as one necessary condition for creating and sustaining 
the alternativeness that could bring about significant change without recourse to direct 
opposition.22 This type of reasoning underscores why I intend to approach my research 
subject as the minjian film festival network rather than simply emphasizing them as 
being independent film festivals.
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 Hence although it may be true that the democratic implication of ‘minjian’ justifies 
the independent film community’s identification and engagement with the public, it 
does not necessarily signal a confrontation between the community, the (enlightened) 
public, and the party–state. As indicated earlier in this chapter, films screened at 
minjian festivals are mainly independent films from mainland China, a majority 
of which would encounter difficulties regarding domestic theatrical distribution 
partially due to the problematic system, policy and regulations with film distribution 
and exhibition in the PRC (notorious censorship, lack of film rating system and 
challenges for privately run arthouse theatre chains, etc.). Sometimes filmmakers 
or producers just choose not to apply for the screening permit for their films in the 
first place. Understandably, they primarily rely on minjian festivals and the overseas 
festival circuit, or other niche markets such as Euro-American arthouse chains and 
TV channels for exhibition and distribution. Also, minjian festivals and entities are 
usually affiliated with grassroots non-governmental organizations and initiatives; 
some are sponsored by private capital or made possible with donations and cultural 
funds from both Chinese and overseas institutions such as the European Union, Japan 
Foundation, Goethe-Institute China, Alliance Française and various film festivals and 
film commissions.
 In other words, it is fair to say that grassroots festivals have negotiated a subtle if not 
tricky relationship with state authorities, such as the governing body for film exhibition 
SARFT’s (the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television) Film Bureau, and 
even the national security bureau at various administrative levels. For instance, 
SARFT’s Film Management Regulations (which have been in force since February 
2002) and its Notice on Strengthening DV Management in Theater, Television and on 
the Internet (issued in May 2004) have both laid out legal frameworks regulating film 
exhibitions, including film festivals in the PRC, with the ‘Notice’ specifically targeting 
DV works’ circulation and exhibition. It is therefore noteworthy that grassroots film 
festivals usually do not use the corresponding Chinese phrase for ‘film festival’ (diany-
ingjie) in their Chinese titles, but opt instead to disguise themselves as events titled 
(in Chinese) as ‘Film Week,’ ‘Exchange Week,’ ‘Forum,’ or ‘Exhibition’ to avoid the 
problematic application procedure and thus to evade censorship. Such situations have 
prompted Chris Berry to half-jokingly title his festival report on the Nanjing’s CIFF as 
‘When is a Film Festival Not a Festival.’23 When these film exhibitions do take place, 
the Chinese authorities seemingly grant a type of silent permission, which equates 
to a form of passive regulation and intervention toward the (unauthorized) grass-
roots festival organizers and participants. For the festivals, keeping a low profile and 
imposing self-censorship, whether voluntarily or unwillingly, has proved to be a way 
to survive in the post-WTO period.24 Nevertheless, state supervision and regulation 
of the minjian festivals is unpredictable, non-negotiable and contingent on various 
sociopolitical factors.
 Furthermore, as CIFF’s producer Cao Kai once explained, we can draw parallels 
between the exhibition modes of Chinese contemporary art and those of independent 
cinema. He suggests that contemporary artworks are circulated on dual-tracks: on the 
one hand, there is the National Art Exhibition as the top event connecting the various 
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levels of regional governmental bodies of the China Artists Associations (zhongguo 
meishujia xiehui) and the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles (zhongguo 
wenxueyishujie lianhehui); on the other hand, there is also the exhibition mode of the 
biennial or triennial, initiated by independent curators and independent art institutes. 
Cao emphasizes that in recent years the independently curated biennials and triennials 
‘curve to achieve collaboration with the official bodies horizontally,’ which to a certain 
extent illustrates the road map for minjian film festivals to ‘effectively join force[s] 
with certain local institutes or governmental bodies’25 to ensure visibility throughout 
China and Asia. Finally, while minjian festivals differ from state-run film festivals 
in terms of their programming visions and operational strategies, I argue that the 
study of ‘minjian film festival network’ should also take into account state-sanctioned 
festivals: official film festivals at Beijing and Shanghai in recent years have started to 
co-opt the indie film community by programming and promoting legitimized Chinese 
independent films (i.e. works with screening permits). Essentially, both official and 
minjian film festivals are now embedded in the global film festival circuit. With this 
said, certain observations about the standard international film festival do not apply 
to the minjian festivals, which as mentioned earlier are often under-resourced and 
susceptible to government interference. In the next section of this chapter, I attempt to 
engage with two locally situated film networks in order to better articulate the model 
of the ‘minjian film festival network.’
Minjian Film Festival Network: Departing from Songzhuang
I propose the framework of the ‘minjian film festival network’ (MFFN) to zoom in 
on the circulation and exhibition of Chinese independent cinema at the local and 
regional level. Since the MFFN model is formulated to complement the ‘international 
film festival network,’ I also argue that it may be applied to localized or regionalized 
configurations for circulating minor and alternative films in other locales. For 
example, in Japan and South Korea, indie/arthouse film minjian festivals operate in 
relation to initiatives and entities of a similar nature, initiatives that are distinct from 
the mainstream, commercial models. I find it helpful to deploy the ANT approach to 
the framework of the MFFN when approaching the issues of power, as this approach 
suggests that ‘the analysis of power becomes the study of associations.’26 Yet, as 
mentioned in the introduction, we also need to realize that film festival circuit ‘is 
no neutral assemblage of sites and events.’27 My analysis of the MFFN framework 
has focused primarily on marginalized, under-resourced and localized festivals and 
entities in China. Intriguingly, situated within the hierarchy of the international 
circuit, these minjian film festivals can leverage their linkages with the networks and 
mechanisms of Chinese independent cinema to enhance the festivals’ cultural and 
political profile, which has brought out complex issues of art, politics and power.
 Established by Zhu Rikun and his friends in 2001, Fanhall Studio (or FS, xianxiang 
gongzuoshi, also known as Fanhall Films) ventured into funding and producing 
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Chinese independent films at a time when there were few domestic independent 
entities dedicated to the production and distribution of Chinese independent cinema. 
FS has played a versatile role, from film production and distribution, archiving and 
preservation, to social networking, which is central to their business model and 
cultural ethos. Even though Fanhall Films are available through VCDs and DVDs 
in domestic market,28 FS has not bothered to obtain the screening permits for their 
indie titles. Yet, their indie films could be circulated on the festival circuit, due to FS’s 
connection with various global exhibition and circulation networks. Accordingly, 
besides working as an independent film producer, Zhu also plays a leading role as a 
film curator discovering new films, filmmakers and programming for other domestic 
and overseas film festivals. In addition, the early success of FS was contingent on the 
thriving cinéphile culture in Beijing – including a series of themed weekly events 
titled ‘In Dialogue with the Filmmaker’ (yudaoyan duihua) that began in 2002. This 
venue has not only showcased important (mostly underground) independent films, 
it has also hosted independent filmmakers and film scholars for Q&A sessions and 
panel discussions. In 2003, collaborating with the Media School of Beijing Normal 
University, FS was able to launch the first China Documentary Film Festival (later 
known as DOChina).
 Li Xianting’s Film Fund (LFF) was initiated by the Godfather-figure of Chinese 
contemporary art, independent critic and curator Li Xianting, in October 2006. 
The festival takes place at Songzhuang in the eastern suburbs (Tongzhou District) 
of Beijing, with Zhu Rikun serving as the fund’s first executive director.29 In recent 
years, LFF has incorporated DOChina into its portfolio of activities, and set up other 
entities such as the Li Xianting (or LXT) Film Archive and the LXT Film School (since 
2009). The LXT Film Archive has preserved Chinese independent films (particularly 
documentaries) with its free online library of Chinese indie films, and the LFF has 
sponsored another major minjian film festival, the Beijing Independent Film Festival 
(BiFF), which launched in 2006, with Li Xianting as artistic director. Into the 2010s, 
Fanhall Studio has found its new incarnation as the Fanhall Center for Arts (xianxiang 
yishu zhongxin, henceforth FCA), a self-labelled ‘grassroots art institution’ composed 
of entities such as Fanhall Films, Fanhall Cinema (a new screening venue for indie 
films since 2009), Fanhall Café, and the studio’s official website (fanhall.com).
 Li’s new dedication to Chinese indie cinema has further implications for the 
MFFN. First of all, Songzhuang is a locale that is best known for its artist commune 
founded under Li’s auspices – it is the largest in Beijing, with around 1,500 artists 
and professionals in residence. After artists such as Fang Lijun and Yue Minjun 
migrated to Songzhuang in the mid-1990s and achieved market success, they invested 
in the community financially and creatively,30 supporting the establishment of the 
Songzhuang Art Museum in 2006 and other cultural undertakings. For instance, the 
RMB 100,000 donation that launched the LFF came from Fang Lijun. At the same 
time, the fact that the artist community and initiatives such as LFF have gradually 
gained support from the local government also speaks to the importance attached to 
the promotion of cultural industries by the party–state, since Songzhuang has been 
visualized as an emerging creative cluster by the government and corporations.31 The 
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logic of inscribing minjian film festivals into the grand plan of developing the local 
creative economy has also underwritten the collaboration between local governments 
and minjian film festivals in several other cities.
 Nevertheless, independent film community members do not view Songzhuang-
based film entities as fitting into the standardized, sanitized rhetorics about Chinese 
creativity.32 Instead, Chinese indie cinema engages with the discourse of Chinese 
creativity by exploring uncharted territory and overlooked alternatives, as best 
exemplified with the founding of the LXT Film School, with its open-to-all, short-term 
and non-certificate training courses on filmmaking taught by experienced independent 
filmmakers. More important than the imparting of filmmaking techniques at this film 
school is the delivery of certain socially relevant and even radical philosophies on 
filmmaking, which might not be valued in a classroom tailored for people who want 
to enter the mainstream filmmaking apparatus. Benny Shaffer points out that the 
students at Songzhuang ‘become a part of a vibrant community of filmmakers and 
thinkers,’ where the hierarchy between the instructor and students is often defied.33 
Ambitious students connect with like-minded peers, find future partners for their 
own team, and network with talents within and beyond the local community. Today, 
this film school’s alumni often return to Songzhuang to showcase their own work at 
the minjian film festivals there. In this way, the school is contributing to community 
building for Chinese independent cinema from the pedagogical level.
 As the LFF’s DOChina and BiFF faced obstacles that threatened their closure, 
however, both events were absorbed into the 9th Beijing Independent Film Festival 
in August 2012. Despite interference from local authorities, this festival managed to 
run its full programme, with the last several days’ screenings held at secret venues. It 
remains to be seen whether the Songzhuang-based film festivals powered up by LFF 
and FCA are still viable under the new Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, 
as both the CIFF at Nanjing (scheduled for October 2012) and YunFest in Kunming 
(scheduled for April 2013) were shut down during a time of political transition. At the 
same time, independent cinema-centred screenings and related events still continue 
at FCA. In spite of political pressures, Songzhuang provides a crucial locale to enable 
the general public to get access to independent films.
 Latour believes that if power lies anywhere it is in the resources used to strengthen 
the bonds between people; in light of Latour’s vision, Jonathan Murdoch and Terry 
Marsden regard structure, society and power as the outcomes that occur ‘as actors are 
associated,’ and thus we have to ‘analyze how these resources are defined and linked 
and how actors impose definitions and linkages upon others.’34 As briefly delineated 
above, China’s indie film community would not have been associated with Songzhuang 
without the influx and clustering of artists in the area. In addition, Li Xianting’s 
decision to allow the indie film community to appropriate his land ownership at 
Songzhuang has facilitated the process of association. Moreover, the town tries to 
leverage state policies on creative industries and urban planning to further boost local 
economy; the Songzhuang local government conveniently incorporates the infrastruc-
tural development of independent cinema into its planning framework. Therefore, at 
the local level, the indie film community has skilfully navigated state regulations by 
244 China’s iGeneration
leveraging its affiliation with the cultural industry policy. With the founding of LFF, 
the community has started to ‘impose definitions and linkages upon others’ by carving 
out its own space and exploring new territories at the periphery of Beijing.
Mapping CIFVF geopolitically
Among the minjian film festivals, one thing is distinct: that their ‘modus vivendi’ 
negotiating with state power is obviously geopolitically unbalanced and defies any easy 
generalization. People tend to believe that independent film culture in first-tier cities 
such as Beijing and Nanjing is better rooted in the local cinéphile culture and benefits 
from the concentration of film institutions and cinematic resources. It is surprising, 
therefore, that a hyper-modern place like Shanghai does not host any minjian festivals 
as of this writing.35 Even though Beijing has the advantage of currently hosting several 
minjian festivals, the regulation of indie film events could become much tighter 
given the capital city’s political sensitivity towards cultural events. By contrast, the 
film festivals held in ‘western region cities’ such as Kunming and Chongqing are 
less subject to political interference, perhaps due to the strategies these festivals have 
utilized to collaborate with the local official bodies and corporations, and not solely 
owing to their geopolitical remoteness from Beijing.36
 While the cancellation of the Songzhuang-based minjian festivals testifies to the 
CCP’s tightening cultural policy and state surveillance in wake of more subversive 
acts, 2011 still witnessed the success of the 8th CIFF in Nanjing and the 5th 
Chongqing Independent Film & Video Festival at Chongqing (CIFVF), which says 
something about the complexities of power and control between the government 
and the independent film community. Originally launched to showcase students’ film 
works, CIFVF was founded in 2007. Ying Liang joined the festival’s team of producers 
during its second year, which has considerably facilitated the festival’s evolution both 
culturally and logistically. Compared to the national-scale minjian festivals in Beijing, 
Nanjing, or even Kunming, Chongqing’s festival tends to attract more new talents 
rather than veteran filmmakers and film critics.
 For instance, Ying Liang (b. 1977) – generations younger than Li Xianting and 
Zhang Xianmin (founder of CIFF and the Indie Workshop) – and his colleagues 
aspire to distinguish the CIFVF from other minjian festivals by highlighting three 
aspects, namely: cultivating local consciousness (bentu), supporting new talents in 
independent filmmaking (chuangzuo), and nurturing local audiences (guanzhong). 
CIFVF introduced the NETPAC (Network for the Promotion of Asian Cinema)’s 
‘Asian Film Critics’ Awards’ at the festival by endorsing one feature and one short 
film respectively since 2010, though its size remains essentially unchanged. Arguably, 
the creation of the NETPAC award has enhanced the international profile of CIFVF, 
making Chongqing the only Chinese city affiliated with such an award that is usually 
attached to ‘international film festivals.’ At the same time, however, CIFVF is the 
only minjian festival advocating a local identity (of Chongqing Municipality, and 
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its love–hate connection with Sichuan Province), a discourse often utilized by the 
international film festivals’ city-marketing campaigns. Such a geopolitical focus 
is underscored by the fact that Chongqing is one of the main cities in China’s less 
developed western region, which is complicated by the controversies over Chongqing 
as the former notorious ‘Red Capital’ under the leadership of the once-ambitious and 
since-disgraced political figure Bo Xilai.
 The boldly defined regional and global vision of the CIFVF is particularly apparent 
in three aspects of the festival’s engagement and intersection with the ‘international 
film festival network.’ In summer 2011, the CIFVF collaborated with the newly 
installed Hangzhou Asian Film Festival (HAFF) in organizing a seven-day Film 
Talent Camp. Even though both minjian festivals lacked a presence on the inter-
national circuit and could not lure young film talent with large honoraria, they 
managed to secure sponsors and venue partners, and to run the camp at a reasonable 
budget to cover the living expenses for its ten trainees and several lecturers. It is 
both thought-provoking and ironic that the under-resourced CIFVF set up its talent 
camp to cultivate creative filmmaking skills, with face-to-face consultation with 
mentors, intensive discussions, location shooting exercises and so forth, while the 
master class of the Shanghai International Film Festival is more about kowtowing 
to industry celebrities who give public talks to an unspecified audience. Referred to 
as ‘artivism,’ a buzzword hybridizing art and activism, the Talent Camp obviously 
celebrates the dimension of social engagement characterizing Chinese independent 
filmmaking, which also distinguishes the camp from other mainstream film educa-
tional programmes currently available in mainland China. Later on, the trainees were 
able to gather at the 5th CIFVF in November 2011 to screen their accomplished works 
and attend the intensive masterclass with prominent Thai independent filmmaker 
Apichatpong Weerasethakul.
 Another aspect of the CIFVF’s expanding film programme is its crowd-funding 
initiative called ‘Co-producer Project’ (CPP), which was launched in December 
2011. CPP has appropriated the format of South Korea’s Jeonju Film Festival’s ‘Work 
in Progress’ and the International Film Festival Rotterdam’s innovative financing 
plan ‘Cinema Reloaded,’ the latter of which held that a dedicated film audience 
could become one of the co-producers of selected short film projects by donating 
as little as five euros. Whereas the ‘Cinema Reloaded’ utilized not only its official 
site – cinemareloaded.com – but also the platforms of Facebook and YouTube for 
filmmakers to interact with the co-producers/donors, CIFVF predominately relies on 
Sina Weibo to publicly promote and interact with ‘co-producers’ for its first round of 
CPP projects – reportedly three Chongqing-centred shorts respectively by filmmaker 
Li Ning, Chen Xinzhong and Yutian, with a 50 RMB individual donation limit. 
According to the CPP regulations, co-producers could have their names included in 
the credits and were invited to the premiere of the short films at the 2012 CIFVF. On 
Weibo, the filmmakers regularly update their progress on the short films; they can 
even get the co-producers involved in script development and so on. As a result of its 
three-month online campaign (16 January–16 April 2012), CPP raised RMB 29,790 
from its 148 co-producers.37 As promised, the three filmmakers provided online 
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updates about the progress of their works, which received continuous attention and 
triggered discussion among concerned netizens. I argue that far from a mere replica 
of the ‘Work in Progress’ and ‘Cinema Reloaded’ initiatives, CPP has explored new 
visions of publicness and sense of community for independent filmmaking in the PRC 
by mobilizing the public via social media like Weibo.
 A third dimension of CIFVF’s regional and global engagement is its partnership with 
other Chinese-language film festivals through the network of ‘Chinese Independent 
Filmmaking Alliance’ (cifa), an initiative launched in 2011 for independent films’ 
screening and cultural exchange among art groups from five locales: Hong Kong 
(Ying E Chi and the Hong Kong Independent Film Festival, or HKIFF), Taiwan 
(South Taiwan Film Festival, or STFF), Chongqing (CIFVF), Shenzhen (Art de Vivre) 
and Macao. The cifa network has facilitated the circulation of Chinese-language 
independent works by sharing and co-presenting programmes of new films from 
across Hong Kong, Macau, mainland China and Taiwan, as could be observed from the 
cifa-themed programmes at HKIFF 2013 and STFF 2012. Also, rather than aiming at 
collectively contesting major mainstream regional film festivals such as the Hong Kong 
International Film Festival, or Taipei Golden Horse Film Festival, the cifa-network is 
more about strengthening the presence of independent film culture by realigning the 
indie film communities spatially and conceptually, and thus more emphasis is on the 
indie film communities’ interconnected, cross-regional, socio-political engagement.
 Regrettably, at the time of writing Ying Liang cannot return to mainland China 
from Hong Kong for certain reasons.38 As a result, the CIFVF was not held in 2012. 
The three aforementioned CPP shorts were not shown at Chongqing due to the 
festival’s cancellation, yet they have toured several other film festivals during 2012 
and 2013. On the other hand, the above-mentioned festival networking models and 
projects have inspired and found their reincarnation at other minjian festivals. For 
instance, HAFF also experimented with crowd funding to support its 2012 edition. 
Also in 2012, Ying Liang was able to collaborate with Ying E Chi in launching the 
‘Chinese Independent Filmmaking Fundraising Project’ (CIFFP) to help three young 
Hong Kong filmmakers make their short film projects.39 Ultimately, CIFVF has strate-
gically redefined the way Chinese-language indie film culture is connected with the 
film networks nationally, regionally and thus globally.
Conclusion: The mode of multiplicity and the abnormal festival
In this chapter, I have taken a network-oriented and spatial-oriented approach 
in canvassing the circulation and exhibition of Chinese independent films on the 
‘minjian film festival network’ in Beijing and Chongqing. With the foci on translations 
and transformations, I have repositioned the issues revolving minjian film festivals 
in the dynamic relations among various mechanisms and agencies, as those of the 
Chinese independent film community, party–state, international film festival circuit, 
general public and so forth. Meanwhile, I have situated my theoretical framing within 
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the existing literature of film festival studies; particularly the framework of the ‘inter-
national film festival network’ as carefully developed by de Valck and Elsaesser. This 
framework has lent insight into the questions of network, space and power, which I 
shall revisit in this chapter conclusion.
Mode of multiplicity
The interrelation between these circulating entities on the MFFN can be approached 
as a mode of multiplicity. Taking the example of DOChina, it exists in the multiplicity 
of ‘FCA + Lixianting Film Fund + Songzhuang Art Museum + DOChina (or Beijing 
Independent Film Festival).’ In the case of CIFF, it is the configuration of ‘Indie 
Workshop (Fanhall Studio’s equivalent) + RCM Museum + Nanjing University + CIFF.’ 
We may extend these observations about the mode of multiplicity to two innovative 
circulatory networks of indie films that have come into existence since 2011, namely the 
Cinéphile Collective (qifang) and the Indie Screening Alliance of Art Spaces (ISAAS). 
In qifang, Indie Workshop collaborates with organizers of cinéphilia groups and 
managers of cultural space in second- or third-tier Chinese cities to circulate a body 
of independent films, while ISAAS utilizes independent art galleries and privately run 
museums to exhibit selected indie works. Both networks have demonstrated how the 
MFFN have been spatially reorganized and the border between the interlacing organi-
zations and networks redefined – either by engaging with the revived and reshuffled 
form of the once-active autonomous organizations and cinéphile groups featured in 
the first stage of circulating independent cinema, or by channelling in-between the 
exhibition modes of Chinese independent cinema and contemporary art. Presumably, 
qifang and ISAAS contribute to the community building of Chinese independent 
cinema by expanding its nationwide network. Accordingly, by referring to the ‘mode 
of multiplicity,’ I am also drawing attention to the set of associations devised by the 
independent film community to achieve its goals. To refer to Murdoch and Marsden, 
we may approach the ‘mode’ as ways for ‘resources to be defined and linked,’ and for 
‘actors [to] impose definitions and linkages upon others.’40 Power has been engendered 
through and within such processes and bonds, which we can associate with Wang and 
Zhu’s argument of viewing power ‘in terms of the dynamics of those involved,’ namely 
to view power in relations and as relations.41 In this way, we can develop a more flexible 
view of the contestation between the party–state and the independent film community.
Abnormal festival and public space
Acknowledging that the perspective of ‘power as relations’ has offered insights into the 
proclaimed ‘status of independence’ of grassroots film festivals in the PRC, I still find 
it necessary to elaborate on the public significance of minjian film festivals, which may 
complement and deepen our discussion about power, control and resistance regarding 
the circulation and exhibition of Chinese indie films.
 In his festival report on the 6th China Independent Film Festival at Nanjing in 2009, 
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Chris Berry suggests: ‘the very particular circumstances of China mean that CIFF can 
claim to be the most important film festival in the country.’42 Whereas Berry’s obser-
vation of CIFF tries to tease out the underlying reasons why a minor film festival like 
CIFF can be pivotal to Chinese independent cinema and why the clusters of similar 
independent events are ‘crucial to the artistic health of China’s film industry,’43 CIFF’s 
director Zhang Xianmin has pointed out that such perceived importance is ‘abnormal’ 
(bingtai), since independent filmmakers become heavily dependent on grassroots 
events such as the CIFF or DOChina to circulate their works and make contact with 
the public and the market.44 Yet Fudan University professor Lü Xinyu opposes Zhang 
by stating that it is the society itself that is ‘abnormal,’ since it hardly provides channels 
for individuals to air their opinions. Therefore, Lü argues, independently run film 
festivals are needed, which constitute ‘the outlets for the society to express itself,’ and 
she contends that the independence of events like CIFF is powered by the internal 
force of the society itself.45 Zhang and Lü’s debate could be related to Nakajima’s obser-
vations about ‘counter-discourses’ vis-à-vis grassroots film clubs. Nakajima poses that 
although these clubs might not constitute the Habermasian ideal of the public sphere, 
they have problematized the status quo in China and facilitated the formation of 
counter-discourses ‘that have important and real consequences in the transformation 
of state-society relations in contemporary urban China.’ In other words, such venues 
have extended the possibilities that: (1) documentary films are in fact ‘as discourse(s)’ 
that are accessible to the public; and (2) discourses on documentary films reflecting 
upon social realities could be formed.46
 Similarly, in his study on Chinese independent cinema, Sebastian Veg argues that 
while applying the Habermasian notion of ‘public sphere’ to modern China could be 
somewhat problematic, the conceptualization of ‘public space’ as ‘a discursive space of 
“shared humanity” or of an “imagined community” in which each individual is free 
to air an opinion on matters of public significance’ is workable within contemporary 
China’s context. He believes Chinese independent cinema has sought to give voice to 
ordinary individuals by engaging with the public space that is shaping private stories 
in the country, and such unofficial space is also identified as minjian.47 I agree with 
Veg in that the emergence and evolution of MFFN are not only of vital importance 
for circulating and exhibiting Chinese independent cinema; the permeation and 
extension of this network into the Chinese social texture have testified to the growth 
of certain ‘public consciousness’ as integral to building up the civic culture in China.
 My proposal for the MFFN is also meant to address and describe the alternative 
characteristics of Chinese independent cinema’s circulation and exhibition practices. 
Crucially, with the development of social networks such as Sina Weibo and Douban, 
facilitated by video sharing sites such as Youku, Tudou and 56, the MFFN utilizes 
these social media connecting with different actors despite the limited freedom of 
speech (instanced by the blocking of access to Twitter, Facebook and YouTube) and 
unpredictable censorship in mainland China. Aided with the almighty presence of the 
internet, especially these social media platforms, Chinese independent films are now 
rooted in local and regional independent communities and simultaneously engage in 
the highly fluid global network of image consumption.
 Regarding the Grassroots Chinese Independent Film Festivals 249
 In 2012, even with the constrained sociocultural environment for exhibition and 
screening events of Chinese indie films, reportedly 32 minjian film festivals disguised 
as forums and exhibitions have taken place in 19 cities across China, including locales 
such as Lhasa, Xi’an, Harbin, Urumqi, Shenzhen and Dalian.48 It reminds us of what 
Shelly Kraicer anticipated in his reports on the cancellation of DOChina in 2011: 
‘DOChina was neither revolutionary nor radical. The organizers are savvy, and know 
when it’s time to press forward, and when it’s time to take a temporary step back. A 
very similar event might reappear later in a somewhat different incarnation, in a less 
sensitive location (i.e. one far from the capital), with a different name.’49 Kraicer’s 
observation echoes de Valck’s hypothesis that the film festival network is ‘capable of 
self-preservation precisely because it knows how to adapt to changing circumstances.’50 
But as I have attempted to show, the adaptability and self-regeneration of minjian film 
festivals should not simply be examined in the light of film festival network theory; 
we have to also situate the study of the ‘abnormalities’ of minjian film festivals in their 
connections with the party–state, the international film festival circuit, film industries 
and the general public, so we can better understand how the circulation of culture has 
been transformed by the functioning of MFFN.
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Bringing the Transnational Back into 
Documentary Cinema : Wu Wenguang’s China 
Village Documentary Project, Participatory 
Video and the NGO Aesthetic
Matthew D. Johnson
Chinese cinema is often understood through stark, even extreme contrasts. State 
against private. Studio-made against independent. Fifth Generation against Sixth 
Generation. Fiction against documentary. Above-ground against underground. 
Commercial against avant-garde. Professional against amateur.
 To an extent, this method of labelling Chinese films and their creators reflects 
a certain polarizing of opinion concerning China itself – specifically, the People’s 
Republic of China. China’s government is either loved or hated. Authoritarianism is 
either resilient or brittle. China’s rise will either give way to global economic prosperity 
or to a Third World War. In the cases of both Chinese cinema and China generally, 
one of the most frequently invoked contrasts is that of the state (‘the party-state,’ ‘the 
Chinese Communist Party,’ ‘the Party,’ ‘Beijing,’ ‘Zhongnanhai,’ and so on) in contra-
distinction to some non-state counterpart: society, film directors, artists, the people, 
ordinary Chinese.
 This last contrast is telling. It reflects the fact that for many people, whether PRC 
citizens or those living outside of China, social realities are understood primarily in 
terms of a state/society dichotomy.1 In this chapter, I argue that twenty-first-century 
China, and by extension twenty-first-century Chinese cinema, can no longer be 
understood as occupied by only two types of forces: state and society (or, perhaps 
more appropriately, by the party-state and everyone else).
 Among the elements missing from this mainstream state/society vision are trans-
national actors. In political terms, this third group of actors includes transnational 
civil society organizations and foundations, multinational corporations, international 
institutions and agencies, and NGOs.2 As I will demonstrate, all of these actors play a 
role in the production of moving image culture within China and in the dissemination 
of that culture abroad. Curiously, however, transnational actors have been effectively 
written out of accounts of how films made in China, particularly documentaries, are 
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produced and circulated.3 With the exception of an emerging body of scholarship on 
international film festivals, the state/society dichotomy dominates our understanding 
of who produces Chinese cinema, how it is produced, and what mechanisms are 
involved in its exhibition.4 The diversity and influence of transnational actors should 
not be overstated, but, as this chapter shows, their activities further complicate 
our understanding of what constitutes independent cultural production within the 
context of twenty-first-century, iGeneration China.5 To be clear, my concept of ‘the 
transnational’ refers specifically to state and non-state actors whose activities reach 
across national boundaries; in other words, it is grounded in transnational relations 
theory.6 As I show in this chapter, connections between independent producers and 
cross-border partnerships and between international organizations and Chinese 
government actors have promoted documentary activity in ways that connect the 
state, filmmakers and citizens through development and governance reform.
 My case study is the China Village Documentary Project (Zhongguo cunmin 
yingxiang jihua, 2005–8).7 To most observers of the Chinese cinema scene, the project 
was a product of one of the premier centres of independent documentary filmmaking 
in China – the Caochangdi Workstation, founded by preeminent documentarian 
and independent, cultural luminary Wu Wenguang. The conventional story is that 
Wu, under his own initiative and with funding from the European Union–China 
Training Programme on Village Governance (about which considerably more will be 
said below), recruited ten villagers from all over China to receive training in digital 
video filmmaking and then to document life in their home villages. This footage was 
later edited by a team of younger filmmakers associated with Wu and screened inter-
nationally along with another documentary, Seen and Heard (Jian Yi, 2006), which 
detailed the origins of the project and process of recruiting, selecting, and training 
the villagers. The China Village Documentary Project went on to receive modest 
international acclaim. Moreover, it solidified Wu’s reputation as a filmmaker inter-
ested in marginal people and everyday life, and concerned with the question of how 
artistic ‘amateurs’ – like the ten villager filmmakers – might be empowered by the use 
of relatively low-cost digital technology. In subsequent years, Wu has pursued these 
concerns even further, establishing the Folk Memory Documentary History project to 
produce an oral history of the 1958–62 Great Leap Forward famine.
 One problem with this narrative is that it is not entirely true. Or, to put it another 
way, its credibility depends more on the abstractions of cinematic auteur theory, 
which assumes that authorship in film is determined solely by the personal vision of 
a single director, without examining how the films of the China Village Documentary 
Project were actually produced.8 In the sections that follow, I attempt to lay out more 
precisely how the project became an addition to Wu Wenguang’s rich oeuvre by tracing 
its origins through a complex narrative spanning post-Mao political reform, European 
Union promotion of China’s village democratization and self-government, Ford 
Foundation-funded development initiatives in Yunnan province, and reviews and 
promotional materials framing the documentary project as a product of Wu’s singular 
artistic sensibility. To return to my argument, I am trying to show that independent 
filmmaking in contemporary China is entangled with a range of transnational forces 
 Bringing the Transnational Back into Documentary Cinema 257
that are rarely accounted for in scholarly appraisals of the independent film scene. 
NGOs, international programmes linking foreign governments directly to China’s 
citizenry, and cross-border cultural funding have expanded the range of opportunities 
for independent moving image producers, many of whom had previously relied on 
the better-documented international film festival circuit for patronage and exposure. 
They have also influenced the form of independent filmmaking itself, thus giving rise 
to what I call an NGO Aesthetic – a visual culture of citizen empowerment, if not 
activism, which privileges the principle that ordinary people should ‘tell their own 
stories’ as a means of transforming lower-class society into legible terrain.9
 With respect to the themes of this volume, the story told here emphasizes the 
point that China’s accelerating internationalization, coupled with technological 
change, has made it difficult to continue viewing state/society relations in dichot-
omous terms, or to ignore connections between visual practices in China and 
avant-garde artistic movements elsewhere in the world. Establishing alternatives to 
more dated views, however, requires careful sociological and textual analysis and a 
willingness to get beyond more familiar narratives concerning the recent history of 
filmmaking in the PRC. In particular, I find that most interpretations of the China 
Village Documentary Project – including those circulated by Wu Wenguang and by 
frequently overlooked project co-producer Jian Yi – tend to appeal to a ‘bad state, 
good society’ sensibility familiar to observers of contemporary Chinese politics 
and cinema alike. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to determine whether such 
a sensibility is justified. But it is possible to demonstrate that by valorizing Wu 
and his team of villager filmmakers as authors of the China Village Documentary 
Project, while ignoring or downplaying the project’s transnational origins, we are 
missing something important about the way that state and international forces 
are transforming the context in which independent culture is produced. Instead, 
by searching for clues that might allow us to ‘bring the transnational back in,’ we 
make it possible to understand how changes in iGeneration moving image culture 
are not only being driven by engagement with domestic realities, but also by an 
equally important dynamic of engagement with visual culture and media practices 
from other, non-cinematic contexts. Transnationalism is thus part of the texture of 
contemporary Chinese filmmaking, and as such deserves to be considered alongside 
national politics, temporality, neoliberalism, technology, and other analytics used as 
launching points for investigations of moving image culture.10
The China Village Documentary Project: An overview
The China Village Documentary Project began in 2005. As described on the website 
of Wu Wenguang’s Beijing-adjacent production and exhibition space, Caochangdi 
Workstation (Caochangdi gongzuozhan), the project’s purpose was initially to:
Open a visual channel from the villages by putting video and still cameras in the 
hands of villagers across the nation. The project represents a new direction for 
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documentary-making in China. In its first phase, the selected topic for documen-
tation was village self-governance.11
Several additional details concerning the project are also worth mentioning: it was an 
outgrowth of EU–China Training Programme on Village Governance; it was coordi-
nated and directed by Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi (the latter as an adviser to the EU 
programme); the project outputs were documentary films and photographs created by 
villagers who had joined the project by application; these films and photographs were 
later exhibited along with a 55-minute documentary film about the project, titled Seen 
and Heard, as well as another planned companion film on the history of village self-
governance reform and democratization in China.
 My first contact with the China Village Documentary Project came in 2009, when 
I contributed a review of the now-defunct online China Independent Documentary 
Film Archive (http://www.cidfa.com, CIDFA) to the scholarly journal American 
Anthropologist.12 At that time, the CIDFA website’s media content consisted of 
documentaries produced by Wu Wenguang, documentaries produced by younger 
filmmakers, and documentaries produced by Chinese villagers. As I was already 
familiar with Wu’s earlier work and, within the format of the review, wanted to 
recommend the CIDFA website to anthropologists interested in issues of rural 
change, I was primarily drawn to the backstory behind the villager films.13 A brief 
period of internet research soon revealed the basic narrative of the China Village 
Documentary Project: it had begun as a public communication effort to promote the 
challenges and successes experienced in the course of the China Training Programme 
on Village Governance; the stated goal of the project was to document village-level 
democracy; the films were jointly produced by villagers trained in basic camera and 
documentary technique, and a cohort of young documentary filmmakers recruited by 
Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi to work with the villagers as technical advisers and editors.
 As I also discussed in the review, the China Village Documentary Project had already 
proven to be surprisingly effective in terms of its production and dissemination strategy. 
The first phase of the project had yielded ten short villager documentaries in addition to 
Seen and Heard and Village Documentary Project (China Village Self-Governance Film 
Project, 2006), the latter a 95-minute film including all ten villager documentaries as 
well as brief introductions to each villager filmmaker.14 The personalities of the villagers 
were lively and the subjects engrossing to a first-time viewer. Titles like ‘A Welfare 
Council,’ ‘A Nullified Election,’ ‘Village Head Wu Aiguo,’ ‘I Film My Village,’ ‘Returning 
Home for the Election,’ ‘The Spirit Mountain,’ ‘The Quarry,’ ‘Our Village Committee,’ 
‘Allocation of Land’ and ‘Did You Go Back for the Election?’ convey something of the 
thematic focus of the project, as well as the diversity of perspectives provided by the 
ten villager filmmakers on the overarching subject of self-governance. The villagers 
themselves were spread across villages within nine different provinces, including a 
Zhuang ethnic minority village in Guangxi. A second phase of the project generated 
nearly ten full-length villager documentaries on everyday aspects of village life. 
Whereas the films of the first phase had focused primarily on village elections and local 
governance, these second-phase films were primarily records of quotidian experience.
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 One the most compelling aspects of the China Village Documentary Project was 
the human element – the villager filmmakers themselves. The ages of the filmmakers 
ranged from 24 to 59 years. Only one, wedding studio videographer Yi Chujian, had 
any sort of previous training in image production. Titles of seven of the ten short films 
referred to elections or village governance, but their depictions included extensive 
images of the villager filmmakers interacting with co-villagers, scenes of quotidian 
village life, and abundant dialogue on a range of topics beyond elections. The films 
appeared novel, rich in sociological data and full of candour, particularly when the 
villager filmmakers were themselves interviewed by project personnel. For a first-time 
viewer, it would be easy to see these films – as I did at the time – as a novel experiment 
in citizen filmmaking funded by the EU–China Training Programme (as described 
on the CIDFA website), but conceived and produced by Wu Wenguang personally. 
Because of my own appreciation for the project, I have dug deeper into its origins than 
others covering the China independent documentary scene. As I describe in subse-
quent sections, the most striking thing about the China Village Documentary Project 
which has not already been recounted before is that it is not simply the brainchild of 
one of China’s most celebrated independent filmmakers.15 Instead, the project’s genesis 
reveals an important and poorly understood history of transnational involvement in 
China’s democratization and development process. This process, in turn, has impacted 
the production of realist documentary images of China’s society and villages.
Situating the NGO Aesthetic: Village elections and the 
EU-China Training Programme on Village Governance
My basic argument concerning transnational actors in the field of independent 
documentary image production is that their presence has fostered the development 
of an ‘NGO Aesthetic’ – a specific form or mode of staging which characterizes 
documentaries produced within the space of international organizations and related 
projects. The list of works exhibiting this aesthetic is not necessarily long, but 
it includes the China Village Documentary Project and other works of activist 
or citizen documentary being produced globally.16 Its presence in these works 
suggests that transnational actors have played important roles in the development 
of realist aesthetics within the context of what has elsewhere been called China’s 
New Documentary Film Movement (Zhongguo xin jilu yundong), within which Wu 
Wenguang occupies a prominent position.17 As I show in this section, the attraction of 
the NGO Aesthetic for filmmakers in China derives from two sources: first, a shared 
interest in empowering citizens to serve as recorders of local realities, and second, the 
recruitment of Chinese cultural producers by NGOs and international development 
programmes for purposes of audiovisual data collection and publicity.
 Films that possess NGO Aesthetic qualities follow a ‘logframe’ (logical framework, 
or logical framework approach) strategy of making claims about the necessity of 
development intervention. Logframe-derived planning is ubiquitous within the world 
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of NGO intervention and management.18 The visual culture of films bearing the 
NGO Aesthetic, like logframe strategy and analysis, is distinguished by: (1) an inter-
vention logic based on the need to solve an existing social problem; (2) the proposal 
of an indicator of achievement (e.g. democratic participation); (3) the introduction 
of trustworthy sources of information (e.g. informants) for verification of progress; 
and (4) the highlighting of specific, external conditions necessary for successful 
intervention. A key point to be made concerning logframe strategy, and thus the 
NGO Aesthetic, is that it exists within institutional spaces that are created by both 
state and non-state developmental institutions, as the above reference to ‘interna-
tional organizations and related projects’ indicates. In the case of the China Village 
Documentary Project, the institutional space of production was primarily created 
by the European Commission and the People’s Republic of China Central People’s 
Government Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Civil Affairs.
 The formal intervention logic of the EU–China Training Programme on Village 
Governance (EUCTP), and thus the films produced by Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi 
within the institutional space of this programme, was that China’s villages required 
democratization and self-governance. The reason why so many of the villager films 
focused on these themes was that the films themselves were commissioned as evidence 
of progress in these areas – for example, by positioning villagers as uncensored 
observers of village-level official institutions, or of the electoral process. As such, their 
production, selection and editing and exhibition, was part of an effort to promote 
awareness of village elections in China, but also to draw attention to the efforts of the 
partners in the EU–China Training Programme on Village Governance, the European 
Commission and PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs, to deal with rural problems. They 
were, as Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi acknowledged, part of a general public communi-
cation effort.
 Understanding why such an effort was deemed necessary by the EUCTP requires a 
brief foray into the history of China’s post-Mao democratization and self-governance 
reforms. It is not often noted that beginning in the 1990s, the history of village elections 
in China is partly a history of international (state-to-state) and trans-national (state–
private, state–non profit) relations. Village elections themselves go back to the early 
1980s, and were part of a larger package of local governance reforms enacted by the 
Chinese Communist Party with the intention of promoting local stability, economic 
prosperity, and leader accountability during the fractious post-Mao transition and the 
dismantling of the commune system of rural governance. The goal of such reforms was 
to improve relations between villagers and the state, and thus to make more unpopular 
policies related to taxes and family planning palatable.19 China’s 1982 Constitution 
made legal the creation of elected villager committees (cunmin weiyuanhui) for 
the implementation of these policies, as well as for the handling of public affairs, 
management and provision of social services, mediation of civil disputes, mainte-
nance of public order, and communication between the grassroots and upper levels of 
government.
 Creation of village committees required a ‘democratic education’ process for the 
public – a key detail in understanding why China Village Documentary Project films 
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were produced in the first place. The 1998 Organic Law on Villager Committees 
(the ‘VC Law’) required that committees promote democratic administration and be 
subjected to fiscal oversight. Villagers were to engage in the nomination and selection 
process of committee members. Nomination and selection of committee members 
were carried out under the supervision of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the 
committees represented the lowest level of civil administration within China’s state 
bureaucracy. A prerequisite of the new laws was thus that villagers be taught to behave 
as if rule of law existed – for example: exercising their rights and responsibilities 
under the VC Law by electing accountable leaders. The VC Law was seen by some 
political reformers as a pilot project for implementing competition for committee 
memberships at higher (e.g. township and county) levels. In more immediate terms, it 
introduced the system of urban residents’ committees (chengshi jumin weiyuanhui) for 
city-dwellers living outside of the work unit (danwei) system to village life. In 1999, the 
urban-to-rural flow of governance reform reversed when experimental elections were 
held for larger communities (shequ) in 20 cities.
 Village elections represented a pivotal and contested transformation of local 
governance in China because they potentially threatened the power of Communist 
Party members and other political stakeholders during the early years of CCP rule 
under Deng Xiaoping. While it has become fashionable to deny the existence of 
support for procedural democracy in China during the 1980s, village committees 
were first established in February 1980, and in 1987 the Sixth National People’s 
Congress approved the provisional ‘Organic Law of the Village Committee of the 
People’s Republic of China,’ which preceded the 1998 VC Law by more than a decade. 
The provisional version of the Organic Law was enacted on a trial basis from 1 June 
1988 onward. At the same time, the Ministry of Civil Affairs began organizing 
democratic training and inter-village collaboration, elements of the ‘Four Democratic 
Components.’ By the time the Ninth National People’s Congress did finally revise 
the provisional law to become the new VC Law in 1998, which legalized village 
elections and required that they be held every three years, village elections had already 
become a component of village governance in China. In 2004, the Communist Party 
and State Council granted elections further sanction by jointly issuing a circular 
titled ‘On Completing and Perfecting Village Affairs Transparency and Democratic 
Supervision.’20
 Enter, then, the transnational actors. Already by the early 1990s the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs had begun to build international support for its experiments in 
limited grassroots procedural democracy in China.21 Institutions such as the Asia 
Foundation, Carter Center, Ford Foundation and International Republican Institute 
(US), the governments of Canada and Finland, other European organizations, and 
the United Nations Development Program, all supported and observed China’s rural 
self-governance reforms and related economic reforms. Positive press around these 
developments allowed the Ministry of Civil Affairs to enhance its position within 
the central government. Foreign participation in the reform process began with the 
arrival of a Carter Center delegation to China in 1997; subsequent endorsements 
of the reforms by former US president Jimmy Carter and Vice President Al Gore 
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produced positive international reaction, which was then used internally by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to boost its democratization programme as a key means of 
encouraging positive foreign appraisals following a rocky period in relations between 
China and the international community. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman 
was allowed to report on village elections by the State Council Information Office in 
1998; central leaders like Zhu Rongji appeared pleased with the subsequent positive 
response from US President Bill Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich.22 US, European, and Japanese leaders toured villages, or requested to 
observe elections and discuss their significance with Chinese leaders. Noted ‘hard-
liner’ Li Peng emerged as a supporter of the reforms, followed later, and cautiously, by 
Communist Party General Secretary and PRC President Jiang Zemin.
 The year 1998 was thus not only a watershed in terms of promulgation of the 
VC Law, but also in terms of transnational involvement in China’s village reforms. 
Governments on both sides participated to varying degrees in supporting the 
democratic experiment. Although I use the term ‘transnational’ throughout this 
chapter, the less succinct phrase ‘national-international-transnational nexus’ might 
more accurately characterize the context of events on the ground, which also drew 
in political parties, private foundations, NGOs and other non-state actors. According 
to Qingshan Tan, the focus of non-state efforts with respect to village elections was 
training of election officials and producing civic education materials:
Foreign NGOs such as the Ford Foundation, IRI [International Republican 
Institute], the Carter Center, and the Asian Foundation have all engaged in the 
provision of training materials and courses for electoral officials and elected 
village committee chairs and members. These training activities have helped 
to spread local awareness of village election[s] and improve electoral rules and 
procedures. Moreover, foreign involvements in exchange programs have enabled 
civil affairs and local government officials to acquire technical expertise and 
comparative knowledge in conducting village elections. Furthermore, foreign 
assistance reinforces MoCA [Ministry of Civil Affairs] commitment to policy 
implementation and innovation in village election and governance.23
Stable self-governance through elections was also tied to the prospect of economic 
development. The Carter Center was supported by the US–China Legal Cooperation 
Fund, itself a project of the China Business Forum, Inc., the research and education 
wing of the US–China Business Council.
 It was in this context of political and economic cooperation across national borders 
that the EUCTP started its operations in China. The EUCTP was a long-term inter-
governmental project between the European Commission and the People’s Republic 
of China, with financing from the European Commission and China’s Ministry of 
Commerce. Its origins go back to 1996, when it was first envisioned as one of four 
programmes to ‘nurture local governance in Chinese villages, train young managers 
to do business with China, boost investment there and help European and Chinese 
firms understand each other’s technical standards.’24 In 2001 the EU–China Training 
Programme for Management of Village Affairs was established in Beijing to ‘promote 
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self-government by villagers and democracy in rural China.’ The Ministry of Civil 
Affairs and Delegation of the European Commission to China and Mongolia served 
as executing agencies.25 The EUCTP’s objectives included: (1) long-term cooperation 
and understanding between the EU and China, (2) enhancing understanding and 
observance of law by villagers, elected representatives and local officials, and (3) 
development of village self-governance within the framework of China’s laws and 
regulations.26 In short, the goal of the programme was establishing civil society 
capacity.
 Support for the EUCTP was buttressed by additional interests on both sides. For 
China, the development of local governance capacity and improvement of state-to-
state relations with foreign trading partners were important concerns that most likely 
superseded the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ stated objective of implementing village 
elections. For Europe, the EUCTP also represented a ‘discreet’ channel through 
which to promote human rights in China.27 Within the jointly formulated operating 
guidelines of the project, interventions were focused on capacity-building through the 
institutionalization of law and of human rights. The EUCTP itself, with its emphasis 
on promoting citizens’ civil rights and the selection of village committee officials, was 
one of a range of cooperative projects between the EU and China that were devoted to 
law- and rights-related capacity-building. Others included the EU–China Legal and 
Judicial Cooperation programme (LJC), the Governance for Equitable Development 
programme (with the United Nations Development Programme), the EU–China 
Human Rights Projects Facility, support for the Chinese Federation of Handicapped 
Persons, and a separate programme to promote economic, social and civil rights in 
Yunnan province.28 Within this broader EU–China cooperative scheme, indicators 
of achievement included changes in China’s legal system for the better protection of 
human rights and, perhaps more modestly, progress with respect to legal and electoral 
procedure, including demonstrable and consistent enforcement of laws.
 In addition to institutional development, the second and third major components 
of the EUCTP were training and human resource development and research. The 
programme was initially launched in seven pilot provinces before extending to almost 
all provinces within China; more participants were involved in the EUTCP than any 
other foreign organization-sponsored project.29 Related exchange programmes sent 
Chinese civil affairs personnel and policymakers to Sweden, Germany and France to 
receive governance training and observe local European elections. The EUCTP also 
generated copious teaching materials and reports, as well as public communication 
concerning the progress of the project.
 This last point is significant. Initially, my assumption after reviewing publicly 
available EUCTP materials was that the China Village Documentary Project films 
were conceived as part of a larger programme of electoral observation – in other 
words, as a means of collecting information about local elections and governance for 
training, but also for verification purposes. However, it seems that EUCTP planners 
viewed the project’s main purpose as raising public awareness of village elections and 
issues of village governance generally as demanding sustained intervention. According 
to one programme report:
264 China’s iGeneration
Governance and its components were the subject of numerous interventions. The 
flagship programme in the area was the Village Governance Programme, which 
promoted democracy at the level of rural villages.30
Returning to the final category of logframe analysis raised earlier in this section, what 
this quotation indicates is that the specific, external conditions necessary for successful 
intervention are none other than the presence of the EUCTP itself, the promoter of 
‘democracy at the level of rural villages’ in the context of ‘numerous’ interventions, 
with improvement of law- and rights-based governance as their target.
 The China Village Documentary Project may thus be understood as a public 
communication offshoot of EUCTP efforts to support village democratization 
according to China’s laws. As extensions of EUCTP village-level work, the villager 
films all possess elements of the programme’s own logframe-defined structure – the 
NGO Aesthetic. The theme running across all nine films – elections and local village 
politics – reflects the programme intervention logic. The realities depicted in these 
films provide indications of programme achievement, or lack thereof (and thus 
potential grounds for future intervention). The villagers themselves represent trust-
worthy sources of independent verification. Produced and edited by Wu Wenguang 
and Jian Yi, the films become both documents of the democratization process and 
evidence of its necessity. As such, they serve to legitimate actors external to the village, 
such as the EUCTP itself, as the architect of present and future reforms.
 This last point is perhaps the most difficult to establish, but I believe that it is 
confirmed by the wider dissemination of China Village Documentary Project films 
in settings relatively divorced from the context of independent film. For example, the 
villager films were each broadcast via CCTV 12, the official law and society channel, 
as part of a broader programme of public outreach to encourage village-level democ-
ratization and villager participation in elections. The broadcasts made clear that these 
reforms continued to enjoy the sanction of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and had been 
successfully implemented under the EUCTP. As such, the films represented public 
communication of a specific sort within China – outreach to government officials and 
villagers for the purpose of raising awareness of, and validating, EUCTP efforts.31 In 
addition, both the making of the films and their dissemination seemed to reflect an 
assumption that democratization’s success depended not only on the programme, but 
also on a transformation of villager consciousness effected by placing cameras in the 
hands of villagers and by providing media platforms for sharing results.
The moving image culture of village democratization
Many elements in the China Village Documentary Project films, particularly those 
exhibited when the project’s first phase was screened for an external audience, were 
inherent to the EUCTP’s logframe strategy. The theme of village elections that was 
particularly notable in the first-phase films was essentially dictated by the fact that 
the project was paid for and supported by an international cooperative project that 
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framed village democratization as a desirable outcome. The narratives created by the 
villager filmmakers and project-employed editors focused on the extent to which 
elections and other governance processes produced satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
outcomes. At the very least, these films included visual evidence concerning how 
democratization and development goals were being implemented on the ground. That 
is to say, the films served to communicate the importance of the role being played by 
the EUCTP itself in carrying forward the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ village democrati-
zation experiment. In this sense, the moving image culture of the villager films has, at 
least from a representational perspective, been defined by what I have thus far called 
the NGO Aesthetic.
 Those who have actually seen the China Village Documentary Project films 
will note that the EUCTP is for all intents and purposes invisible within the films 
themselves. As I have noted earlier, the promotional materials related to the project 
make explicit its connection to the EUCTP, or acknowledge that the planning of 
the project preceded Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi’s involvement. How and why this 
has become the case is a question that I will take up in just a moment. For now, the 
more pressing question would appear to be: Where is the justification in referring 
to an NGO Aesthetic at all, when the actors involved in the EUCTP are clearly very 
much governmental? First, it is important to acknowledge that the logical framework 
analysis approach is ubiquitous in international development organizations, and that 
many NGOs are indeed development- and rights-focused in practice. But this is not 
a wholly convincing response. Why not, then, use the term ‘Logframe Aesthetic’ or 
some more appropriate neologism? The real justification comes from an examination 
of where the form taken by the China Village Documentary Project films – in other 
words, the ‘villager documentary’ – has come from.
 The answer, at least according to several scholars who have also researched this 
question, is the Ford Foundation. According to Siosan Un’s 2009 study of independent 
documentary in China, the practice of putting cameras in the hands of ordinary 
people has roots in Ford Foundation-supported projects such as Guo Jing and Zhaxi 
Nima’s Yunnan-focused participatory video education project titled ‘Learn Our Own 
Traditions’.32 According to Un, the China Village Documentary Project followed this 
precedent of putting video and still cameras in the hands of villagers. The notion 
that the ‘Learn Our Own Traditions’ project represented the inspiration for Wu 
Wenguang and Jian Yi’s approach to EUCTP public communication is also raised by 
Yingjin Zhang, who argued that the ‘turn of the Chinese independent documentary 
to collective activism’ began with the Azara Visual Workshop, organized by Guo Jing 
and the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, which aimed to promote ‘participatory 
visual education’ as developmental practice.33 According to Zhang, the Azara Visual 
Workshop not only preceded Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi’s project, but was itself 
inspired by a 1991 Ford Foundation project, the Yunnan Women’s Reproductive 
Health and Development Program, which included support for 53 rural Chinese 
women photographing their daily lives, in this case with the goal of promoting 
awareness and education concerning women’s reproductive health.34 Guo Jing and 
Zhaxi Nima’s ‘Learn Our Own Traditions’ project was then launched with additional 
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Ford Foundation funding in 2002. Like the China Village Documentary Project, Guo’s 
method was to recruit villagers from three Yunnan villages to document distinctive 
local cultural practices. The resulting footage was then edited in Kunming for wider 
dissemination. The Azara Visual Workshop (reorganized as the BAMA Mountain 
Culture Institute in 2004) also benefited from NGO support, in this case from the 
Virginia-based Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy.
 Perceptive insiders will be aware that one of China’s best-known independent 
documentary festivals – the Yunnan Multi Culture Visual Festival, or ‘Yunfest’ – was 
first organized in 2003 by the Yunnan Provincial Museum, then also under Guo Jing’s 
direction. Since then, additional sponsorship for Yunfest has come from the Ford 
Foundation, Conservation International, and The Nature Conservancy. A pattern 
thus emerges: namely, that since 2002–3 independent cultural producers like Guo 
Jing, Wu Wenguang and others have been increasingly engaged with transnational 
NGOs and other international actors, and that the form of their projects has been one 
of participatory video education – what is known in the broader activism and devel-
opment world as participatory video or citizen media.35 The NGO Aesthetic, then, 
is so named because it points to the fact that in addition to the logframe elements 
that I have already discussed in connection with the China Village Documentary 
Project, the most notable impression generated by the project films, and which has 
struck observers familiar with the various projects headed by Guo Jing as well, is that 
they rely on the participation of villagers. This overarching participatory form can be 
viewed as a product of Ford Foundation activities in China dating back to the early 
1990s, specifically via the importation of Ford Foundation developed and funded 
Photovoice (yingxiang fasheng) public health strategies intended to give aid recipients 
an opportunity to communicate their concerns and coping strategies to policymakers 
and service providers.36 The NGO Aesthetic thus has its origins in the international 
development world, but the means of its transmission into China has been the activ-
ities of NGOs in Yunnan province. In this context, Yunfest represents the primary 
node through which participatory education practices have been further disseminated 
into the world of independent film and documentary.
 What international and NGO-led development efforts in China have created is a 
‘glocal’ space occupied by independent filmmakers and cultural entrepreneurs in the 
roles of investigators, liaisons, and interlocutors. Without going too deeply into thorny 
issues of agency, another reason for opting for the term ‘NGO Aesthetic’ over other 
alternatives is that while the China Village Documentary Project also exists within this 
space, its films reveal more of an emphasis on villager participation in the filmmaking 
process, and less of an emphasis on the EUCTP and its initiatives (for which, again, the 
project nonetheless served as a form of publicity). In other words, the project closely 
resembles a participatory video programme of the sort either funded or inspired by the 
Ford Foundation within Yunnan province.37 Both the NGO Aesthetic and participatory 
video form of the China Village Documentary project point to the influence of trans-
national development projects on independent documentary production in China.
 It is worth noting that within China, assessments of the China Village Documentary 
Project have raised important questions concerning the relationship between the 
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documentary producers, Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi and the villager filmmakers.38 
Wu’s reports and interviews concerning the project have stressed the importance of 
encouraging villagers to ‘naturally’ create images of their communities, and through 
this process to develop a sense of their inherent rights to speak and represent.39 
The connection to democratization often goes unmentioned, although participatory 
video activism generally stresses the inculcation of a sense of citizen empowerment 
as a prerequisite of sustained political engagement. Links between the China Village 
Documentary Project and participatory video methods have also been investigated 
in the context of academic communications research.40 It seems fair to say that the 
project is as much an outgrowth of trends in global filmmaking practices as a new 
iteration of China’s independent documentary movement. Nonetheless, as I show 
below, reception of the project has rendered these parallels and paradigms of mutual 
influence nearly invisible.
‘Their own words’: Feeling good about villagers and bringing 
back independence
NGOs and international development efforts, democratization-focused and otherwise, 
have thus provided a new, participatory model for documentary and on-the-spot 
(xianchang) filmmaking in China. This participatory model gained traction in Yunnan 
and, as Siosan Un and Yingjin Zhang have suggested, was most likely emulated and 
adapted in the context of the China Village Documentary Project. Indeed, even though 
authorship of the project is frequently seen to reside with Wu Wenguang, co-producer 
Jian Yi has also been at the forefront of collaborative and community media projects 
in China since 2005, when he founded the ARTiSIMPLE Studio – a forerunner to 
the better-known IFCHINA project founded by Jian Yi, Eva Song, and Douglas 
Xiao in Ji’an, Jiangxi.41 Notable nodes in Jian Yi’s international network include 
the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame; 
the Appalshop documentary film studio in Whitesburg, Kentucky; the CRASSH 
programme at Cambridge University; the British Council; and the Starr Foundation 
and Asian Cultural Council in New York City. Since the China Village Documentary 
Project’s inception, Jian Yi has become a well-regarded documentary filmmaker in 
his own right; in 2005, however, Jian was also serving as a communication expert 
and photographer for the EUCTP. Together, Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi brought to 
the programme a fairly wide range of expertise concerning documentary filmmaking 
practice and, perhaps just as significantly, international ‘best’ practices concerning the 
uses of media in a development context.
 What is striking, though, is how promotion and reception of the ten China Village 
Documentary Project films and the associated Seen and Heard documentary have 
eclipsed the project’s origins in the democratization-focused EU-China Programme 
on Village Governance, the role of China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs in that programme, 
and the documentary project’s obvious connections to a range of participatory 
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education and media efforts that emphasize development rather than ‘art.’ In this 
section I suggest that the most obvious reason for a lack of precision, or even consensus, 
concerning the origins and rationale behind the China Village Documentary Project 
is that many observers of Chinese cinema only see China through the dichotomy of 
state and society, within which the artist stands on the side of the people and against 
the powers-that-be. I also argue that while the writings of these observers may help 
us feel good about what we are watching, they tell us only part of the story about why, 
how, and by whom the films we are watching were actually made.
 Following completion of the first-phase villager documentaries and Seen and 
Heard, Wu Wenguang and Jian Yi hit the road. By April 2006, the films of the China 
Village Documentary Project had appeared at four US universities (New York 
University, Yale, Columbia, and Notre Dame), been shown in Beijing on multiple 
occasions, and appeared at the Hong Kong International Film Festival and Visions 
du Reel, a film festival in Nyon, Switzerland. A selection of villager photos was also 
shown during the US tour, in Beijing, and, later that summer, at the House of Cultures 
in Berlin, Germany.42 Early coverage of the project did not identify it by name. Instead, 
considerable emphasis was placed upon the films as evidence of social unrest and Wu 
Wenguang’s concern for China’s villagers:
For all of China’s many apparent successes, a certain degree of discontent is 
bubbling at the edges. Government-released figures state 74,000 “mass incidents” 
took place in 2004, up from 53,000 in 2003. Many of the protests, most of which 
center on public outrage for government wrongs, have turned violent, resulting in 
skirmishes between villagers and police, burned cars, [sic] and damaged property. 
Recent events involving local residents’ bitter land dispute with local officials 
in Taishi village of Guangdong province only further highlight the precarious 
nature of local level governance in China. Some of the most engaging responses 
to these conditions are coming from China’s artistic communities. China’s pioneer 
documentary filmmaker Wu Wenguang has shot Chinese social problems since 
first picking up a camera in the late 1980s. These concerns are evident in his 
landmark films Beijing Drifters and On the Road, intimate portraits of people on 
the fringe. “This project is closely connected to China’s rural population,” Wu 
explained. “Most of China’s population lives in the countryside; it’s the location 
of some of the biggest problems. I am excited about this because the project is 
based on people’s own ideas and proposals. People need to understand village 
governance in the broader sense – and not just the associations and committees 
but what they stand for and what they could achieve in the broader sense. I think 
this will help more people care for and consider the real conditions among China’s 
peasants. We need to care for the people.”43
To view the films as an artistic response to rural discontent was perhaps an inspiring 
angle to take – one perhaps encouraged at the time by Wu Wenguang himself. But, 
as we have seen, the notion of the films as emerging from ‘the people’s own ideas and 
proposals’ was only part of the story – albeit a compelling part. Two additional aspects 
of the story can be seen as particularly notable indicators of how the China Village 
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Documentary Project was to be received. First, and this is a more minor point, it was 
unclear what the project was to be called. Second, observers understood the project as 
a kind of spontaneous outgrowth of villager concerns, for which Wu Wenguang (and 
the not-yet-visible Jian Yi) served as primary interlocutors.
 According to at least one account, the project’s title was then still the Visual 
Documentary Project on China’s Village-Level Democracy.44 At the time of its March 
24, 2006 screening at the Center for Religion and Media at New York University, it was 
being billed as ‘The Village Video Project with Wu Wenguang.’45 Three days later, at Yale 
University’s Henry R. Luce Hall Auditorium, it appeared as the ‘Visual Documentary 
Project on China’s Village-Level Democracy: An Introduction.’46 Comparing these 
titles, it is clear that promotional emphasis had quickly shifted to the specific issue 
of democratization; the Yale screening was also notable for having disseminated the 
project’s own English-language press materials online in PDF form. These materials 
clearly laid out the project’s relationship to the EUCTP and gave the project a name – 
the Visual Documentary Project on China’s Village-Level Democracy. Wu Wenguang 
was identified as the curator, a documentary filmmaker, and visual consultant for 
the EUCTP; Jian Yi was identified as coordinator, a filmmaker, photographer, and 
an EUCTP public communications expert. The promotional materials also included 
a description of project goals: providing a village-level perspective on village self-
governance, political decentralization, democratization, and ‘bringing together young 
filmmakers and villagers, and seeing changing realities from the perspective of 
the young generation and the people whose lives are dependent on the villages.’47 
The materials’ brief synopsis of the project described its official role as ‘part of the 
public communication activities of the EU–China Training Programme on Village 
Governance.’ It also claimed that the ten villager DV films provided an ‘uncensored’ 
window onto the lives of villagers in remote China, bestowing upon the project an air 
of exoticism and verisimilitude, if not a vague hint of transgression.
 To summarize the story thus far, while some ambiguity existed concerning the 
title of the project and how it had come into being, by the time of the Yale University 
screening, three distinct aspects of the China Village Documentary Project had 
become apparent through its promotional campaign: it was focused on the issue of 
democracy, it represented a collaboration between the EUCTP and filmmakers Wu 
Wenguang and Jian Yi, and it provided an unvarnished and unofficial perspective on 
China’s countryside. As predicted by the project’s early press coverage, the angles most 
appealing to subsequent observers were Wu Wenguang’s role as project impresario 
and the focus on villager filmmaking. In almost all of the accounts, connections to the 
EUCTP were noted, only to be dismissed:
Chinese documentary director, writer, and educator Wu Wenguang’s most 
recent project, the China Village Self-Governance Film Project[,] is entertaining 
and charming, despite its best efforts to be a public diplomacy collaboration 
between China and the European Union. The film series, a palette of combined 
works including video village self-governance reports by rural Chinese and a 
documentary describing the process of preparing the villagers to take their role 
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behind the camera, provides a startling and guileless view of the lives of the people 
most underrepresented in Chinese media. Wu, the central figure in China’s “New 
Documentary Movement” – a cinematic trend that emerged in Beijing in the 
early 1990s – ably captures the personalities and struggles of his charges with such 
grace and naturalness that while the representation of village self-governance is 
poignant, the most lasting impressions from the film are the excitement of the 
villagers about their exposure to and interaction with the documentary mode. 
Truthfully, some of the most interesting parts of the story emerged from outside 
the stated aim of documenting local village self-government. In roughly half of the 
village documentaries, voting never occurs, or otherwise other topics dominate. 
Seeing old women get off of their bikes to talk with one another at a dirt road 
intersection in a Northern Chinese village offers a surprisingly intimate and 
prosaic view of the side of China that often gets left out in most economic growth 
rhetoric. Hearing ethnic Tibetans matter of factly [sic] discuss environmental 
changes in the snowcapped mountains surrounding their village, and what those 
changes mean in their belief system, provides a surprising alternative discourse 
to much contemporary discourse on global warming. Hearing a young urban 
professional talk about how removed his life is from life in his village is more 
revealing to the audience on a human level than hearing the specific reasons why 
he failed to go home and fill in his last ballot. More generally, the ten villager 
documentarians exposed bits and pieces of perspective into the lives of Chinese 
people by capturing domestic moments through happenstance while attempting 
to find democracy in China.48
Other online promotional materials described the issue of village democratization 
in more breathless terms, but continued to identify Wu as the project’s prime mover:
When China’s central government allowed local elections to proceed in 2005, Wu 
Wenguang, one of the main exponents of the Beijing-based “New Documentary 
Movement,” offered villagers in remote areas of the country DV cameras and 
technical training so that they could document this historic event. From house-
wives to peasants young and old, the newly empowered villagers tell stories that 
are intimate, earnest, revelatory – and uncensored. Shifting between documentary 
and news exposé, these vivid accounts range from “A Futile Election” in Shaanxi 
to a housewife observing the everyday life of her community, from a property 
dispute over a quarry field to the impact of governmental decisions on the 
livelihood of Yunnan farmers.49
The project’s own online releases by contrast, continued to emphasize the official 
EUCTP context while also casting doubt on claims for the impact of democratization 
on village life:
This project is an activity organized by the EU–China Training Program on 
Village Governance. We focus on what we call “village self-governance,” which 
refers to the democratic election of the village committee, the democratic 
management of village affairs, transparency of village affairs, democratic decision 
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making, and supervision of the village committee. Self-governance is now a state 
policy that is being implemented (regardless of its effectiveness) among all of 
China’s 700,000 odd villages to a rural population of some 900,000,000. A call for 
documentary film proposal[s] was advertised in September 2005. Some ninety 
proposals were entered for both competitions: Villager DV-Makers and Young 
Filmmakers (under 30). From each category, the ten best proposals were retained. 
The exciting comments written in the proposals entered in by the villagers serve 
as testimonies of how valuable this unprecedented project is – out there in the 
countryside, the villagers, who previously had only been the objects of curious 
cameras, have always had a yearning for expressions of their own.50
In all cases, descriptions framed the China Village Documentary Project as an 
outgrowth of peasant storytelling and testimony.
 In my view, there are several reasons why the China Village Documentary Project 
was reviewed and represented as providing an authentic – that is to say, truthful and 
uncensored – perspective on village life in China, and why the project’s institutional 
connections to the EUCTP were almost uniformly downplayed. The first is that 
the producers themselves did not appear particularly interested in addressing the 
context of the project – namely, grassroots political reform. Instead, the focus of their 
promotional efforts was primarily to depict the films as works of villager storytelling. 
Second, names like the European Commission and Ministry of Civil Affairs do not 
seem to have registered with audiences interested in contemporary cinema coming 
out of China. Third, for producers and audiences alike, the wider field of independent 
documentary filmmaking, with its emphasis on individual artistry or auteur-ism, 
was a more readily available framework for positioning the films than was interna-
tional civil society capacity-building. Finally, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that discussions of current, state-led democratization efforts in China are viewed as 
non-starters outside of official circles. For citizens both inside and outside of China, 
the topic is more likely to be avoided or treated with incredulity, if not suspicion.
 As a result, subsequent packaging and coverage of the China Village Documentary 
Project oscillated between relatively factual accounts of the project’s origins and devel-
opment and a more pro-independence, pro-society spin that obscured its transnational 
and government ties. This spin included praiseworthy buzzwords such as ‘grassroots 
humanism’ and ‘socially engaged art,’ while accentuating the role of filmmakers Wu 
Wenguang and, to a lesser extent, Jian Yi.51 One particularly daring piece linked the 
films to debates over the reemergence of a post-Mao public sphere.52 Where differing 
perspectives appeared, their origins lay largely outside of the Chinese cinema–focused 
transcript of festivals, interviews, academic papers, and online reviews. Supporters 
of activist media placed the China Village Documentary Project within a broader, 
international spectrum of participatory image-making spanning China, the European 
Union, Sierra Leone, England, India, Spain, Iraq, and Lebanon.53 Another perspective 
included that of the Chinese Communist Party’s official English-language website, 
which reproduced parts of an interview with Wu Wenguang in which Wu was quoted 
as stating that:
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If these villagers are given more channels in which to voice their desires and 
rural officials handle them with more meticulous care, patience, [sic] and skills, 
the problems of widespread protests in the countryside will be tackled since the 
Chinese farmers are the “most lovable.”54
According to official Party media sources, both the project and the EUCTP had 
contributed to ‘management in a democratic way’ in the ‘new socialist countryside.’ 
The EUCTP, in particular, was deemed a ‘success.’55 One might note a certain irony in 
international audiences reading the public communication activities of an EU–China 
cooperative project as uncensored perspectives on the dysfunction of local governance 
in rural China.56 More striking, however, is that the Party itself took a positive view of 
both the democratization programme and the related villager documentaries. While 
this response fits into established patterns of the use of grassroots elections to buff 
the CCP’s international image, it is very difficult to place this within the state/society 
dichotomy that appears in so much writing on Chinese cinema and, by extension, art 
and culture in China generally. It is not just the transnational which is invisible in 
accounts of independent documentary filmmaking – the idea that the state itself could 
play an enabling role must be hidden from sight if the twin fictions of independence 
and individual authorship are to be preserved.
Conclusion
This chapter has advanced the argument that independent documentary film 
production in China has been transformed by transnational forces and from 
unexpected directions. Since the 1990s, international NGOs like the Ford Foundation 
have cooperated with cultural producers in China as part of broader efforts to 
integrate audiovisual media into the development process. In the case of Photovoice 
and related participatory video projects, this cooperation has taken the specific form 
of empowering citizen-filmmakers to document their own lives. However, these 
projects are themselves ultimately re-channelled through what I have called the NGO 
Aesthetic – a mode of representation that reflects development managers’ desire to 
create and sustain an intervention logic through the identification of social problems; 
establishes indices of progress; identifies reliable and independent sources of verifi-
cation; and establishes specific conditions necessary for successful intervention. This 
logframe-derived set of elements has influenced the development of what is called 
‘participatory’ or ‘activist’ documentary filmmaking in China. While I have focused 
primarily on the Wu Wenguang- and Jian Yi-produced China Village Documentary 
Project in my account, the NGO Aesthetic is also discernible in other endeavours that 
connect dispersed, participatory video methods of production with developmental 
and rights-oriented intervention goals.
 It is not difficult to locate antecedents to the NGO Aesthetic in community and 
activist media stretching back several decades. However, I would argue that the 
emphasis on dispersed media production through recruitment of citizen volunteers 
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does constitute a new paradigm within the broader narrative of China’s independent 
documentary cinema – one that can also be seen in Wu Wenguang’s more recent 
oral history-based ‘memory project’ devoted to the Great Leap Famine. This chapter, 
however, is less a genealogy of participatory video and the NGO Aesthetic generally 
and more an attempt to demonstrate that the presence of both of these elements in the 
films of the China Village Documentary Project signals the presence of transnational 
networks linking filmmakers in China to state and NGO institutions. It goes without 
saying that directors in China have hardly been latecomers to transnationally circu-
lating audiovisual practices such as Photovoice (developed in Yunnan province with 
Ford Foundation support) and participatory video (an emerging field in which Wu 
Wenguang ranks among the best-known practitioners). While the precise connections 
between innovations taking place in Yunnan and the China Village Documentary 
Project are somewhat difficult to confirm, the similarities between the projects are 
obvious, with Yunfest representing the most likely node linking Yunnan-based Guo 
Jing to Beijing-based Wu Wenguang. In addition, the EUCTP itself can be seen as one 
of many authors of the project, not only for its financial support, but also because its 
activities in the realm of village democratization and elections have dictated the themes 
and, notably, the aesthetic qualities of the China Village Documentary Project films.
 To be sure, Wu Wenguang, Jian Yi, and the villager filmmakers themselves must 
nonetheless be acknowledged as the project’s authors. And yet here again it bears 
repeating that both Wu and Jian have operated throughout their careers in contexts 
extending well beyond the boundaries of China and – returning to my final point – are 
constantly engaging with dynamics that, ultimately, transcend the better-documented 
(and often misrepresented) struggle between state and society which is depicted as the 
central concern of China’s independent documentary film producers. To speak of the 
transnational is not only to speak of international film festivals and their attendant 
critical apparatus of scholars, reviewers, enthusiasts, and programmers, but also of 
NGOs, state-supported development organizations, and even cultural diplomacy. All 
of these elements have been present in the history of the China Villagers Documentary 
Project, with implications not only for how we understand Chinese independent 
documentary and its origins, but also how we understand authorship within that field 
of moving image production. With respect to the project, however, there has been a 
notable trend among observers and even the project’s own producers to downplay 
outside forces in favour of promoting a story about grassroots agency – that the 
project represents villagers’ ‘own stories.’
 This story about agency is not wholly incorrect, but it is incomplete. Its incom-
pleteness suggests that there are still significant shortcomings in how we view film 
production in China. The state/society binary is not the only factor responsible for this 
trend. Another culprit is auteur theory, or the assumption that every cultural object 
must have an individual human producer – ‘the artist’ – when in truth markets, insti-
tutions, networks, and other forms of social organization play a determining role as 
well. While democratization in China is not a particularly successful reform in the eyes 
of the PRC government’s many critics, efforts to carry it out have provided support 
for the China Village Documentary Project and related public communications efforts 
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undertaken by the EUCTP. Likewise, while the Ford Foundation’s activities in China 
are often rendered invisible by the country’s authoritarianism, a small number of 
perceptive scholars have suggested ways in which NGO developmental programmes 
in Yunnan have presaged what might be called the ‘participatory turn’ in China’s 
independent documentary cinema. Here I have attempted to build on those insights 
by showing how they might be leveraged to understand cinema from a transnational, 
non-auteur-centred vantage point. Independent documentary production in China is 
not solely a byproduct of some agonistic conflict between state and society – though 
elements of that conflict are indeed evident – but is a geographically dispersed, 
aesthetically eclectic cultural field whose existence can be attributed to state, non-state, 
domestic, and international actors.
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The Cinematic Deng Xiaoping: Scripting a 
Leader or a ‘Traitor’?
Xiaomei Chen
In China’s post reform-and-opening cinematic world – where filmmakers have shifted 
to individualism, commercialism, urbanization and globalization – how did the Maoist 
filmic tradition survive in post-Mao capitalist China, which had by and large cast doubts 
on the country’s very revolutionary traditions, filmic and otherwise? Did old-fashioned 
tales of revolutionary leaders of the Chinese Communist Party still matter on the 
postsocialist screen? If so, what are the underlying themes, images and characters 
that have continued to draw audiences? This chapter examines a group of films and 
television dramas focused on the glorious life stories of Deng Xiaoping, who is said 
to have brought about ‘real’ happiness to the Chinese people thanks to his prosperity 
policies. On the one hand, the Deng stories on screen seem to work perfectly well with 
the ruling regime’s propaganda machines in post-reform China. On the other hand, 
however, when read between texts, across genres, and especially when compared to the 
most recent scholarship on CCP history, a different Deng emerged: a cautious man with 
great survival skills who had more than once escaped from the frontline of a war for his 
own safety. Most significantly, this chapter argues that propaganda films in a capitalist 
Chinese society with socialist characteristics are alive and here to stay, and should and 
can be taken seriously in our scholarly research on twenty-first-century cinema.
 Similar to performance art versions of Mao’s life stories, film and TV dramas about 
Deng’s career frequently premiered on the founding dates of the PRC, the CCP, the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the birthdays and death anniversaries of their 
leaders. A ‘revolutionary youth idol film’ (lingxiu qingnian ouxiang pian) entitled 
My Years in France (Wo de Falanxi suiyuei) appeared to commemorate Deng’s 100th 
birthday in 2004. This film portrays Deng’s five-year experience in France, from the 
age of 16 to 21, and his participation in the overseas work-study programme (fu Fa qin 
gong jian xue).1 Uniquely focusing on Deng’s adolescent life, the film demonstrates the 
energy, passion, and inspiring utopian appeal of the socialist movement in the 1920s 
that turned a group of Chinese diaspora students into determined Communists.
 This remembrance of the martyrs echoes Deng’s statement at the onset of the film: 
‘More than four years of living in France tempered my unyielding character with 
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tribulations and hardships. Others deemed the Soviet Union as the cradle of their 
revolutionary careers; I am, on the contrary, forever grateful to France, and to its 
miserable realities in the 1920s, and its championship of freedom, all of which had 
fostered my firm determination to become a Communist. How many former friends of 
mine have already given up their lives for the establishment of our new motherland!’2 
This mainstream theme of celebrating early CCP leaders could challenge the legacy of 
Mao on at least two levels: first, other unsung heroes and early martyrs paved the way 
for Mao’s success. Second, the film highlights Deng’s will to carry out the unfinished 
task which appears to be the most challenging.
 In the middle of the film, when asked what would he do if he were to be executed 
as a counter-revolutionary, the teenage Deng states resolutely: ‘for my idealism and 
faith, I have already given them all to the young Communist Party!’ An idealistic 
Deng in his younger days could not have imagined that he would be labelled as an 
arch counter-revolutionary, or ‘an incorrigible capitalist roader’ who had ‘never really 
admitted his guilt nor changed his behaviour’ (si bu ganhui de zouzipai) during the 
Cultural Revolution in the socialist China he had helped established. His long and 
problematic career in the PRC, especially during and after the Cultural Revolution, 
led to his eventual conviction that Mao’s socialist approach, and its adherence to the 
Marxist orthodoxy of waging class struggle, had failed in leading China to prosperity. 
When he became China’s leader, Deng determined that he had to replace Mao’s system 
with his own capitalist approach of a market economy. Ironically, he had personally 
suffered under this system while working as a steel factory worker in France, an unfor-
gettable experience that had turned him to the Communist cause in the first place.
 Another film released to commemorate Deng’s 100th birthday, Deng Xiaoping in 
1928 (Deng Xiaoping zai yi jiu er ba), became part of a series of movies that followed 
the model of a Soviet film series on Lenin, which included Lenin in October (Lening 
zai shiyue), Lenin in 1917 (Lening zai yi jiu yi qi) and Lenin in 1918 (Lening zai yi jiu 
yi ba). These Lenin films were all popular in China, especially during the Cultural 
Revolution, when films from the socialist bloc attracted Chinese audiences due in part 
to the lack of domestically produced Chinese films. The Deng movies on a single year 
also paralleled with those of Mao, such as Mao Zedong in 1925 (Mao Zedong zai yi jiu 
er wu) and China in 1929 (Zhongguo yi jiu er yi).
 Whereas My French Years featured a young Deng in an exotic, romantic European 
setting, Deng Xiaoping in 1928 picks up upon his return to China from the Soviet 
Union. At that time, Deng served as the chief secretary of the CCP Central Committee 
(Zhongyang mishuzhang), and was in charge of running its daily affairs in Shanghai 
from autumn 1927, when Deng followed the CCP Central Committee’s move from 
Wuhan to Shanghai, to May 1928, right before the CCP’s Sixth Congress.3 Gu Bai, 
the film’s director, did not just want to make another biographical film about the 
great leader, so he structured the film entirely as a thriller, a pioneering genre never 
explored before in the leader films.4 Gu dramatized Deng’s effort to protect Zhou 
Enlai and other CCP leaders, then being rounded up by the Kuomintang (KMT) after 
the failure of the ‘grand revolution of 1927.’ Deng succeeded in eliminating traitors, 
retained courageous CCP members who had been set up by the KMT secret agents 
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as ‘conspirators,’ established secure places for the CCP leaders to meet, and provided 
safe passage for all the representatives from different parts of China to depart from 
Shanghai to travel to Moscow in 1929 to participate in the CCP’s Sixth Party Congress.
 These plot details emphasize Deng’s remembrance of his fallen comrades, their 
wisdom and sacrifice. Most significantly, it reflects the hindsight of the filmmakers in 
contemporary times, as Deng was ousted in his later career thanks to mistrust from his 
own party leaders, a running theme that we see in subsequent films and TV dramas. 
The scriptwriter’s claim to historical ‘truth’ can only be appreciated in light of his own 
perception of history and its relevant lessons for contemporary audiences. The film’s 
director revealed his crew’s motivation in producing a movie favourable to Deng’s 
legacy, saying: ‘Our generation, and the entire young generation growing up in the 
Reform Era, all benefited from Deng’s policies to open up China to the outside world. 
We devoted ourselves to the making of this movie with real feeling of gratitude toward 
Deng Xiaoping.’5
 Detective story aside, Deng Xiaoping in 1928 includes the characteristics of the 
‘significant revolutionary historical film’ with a popular love story. Gu wove together 
a suspenseful thriller with Deng’s passionate love for Zhang Xiyuan, whom he first 
met in the Soviet Union and married in Shanghai in 1928. According to Maomao’s 
biography, My Father, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang was ‘a rare beauty,’ and Deng treasured 
his memory of her after she died in childbirth in 1929.6 Similar to My French Years, 
Deng Xiaoping in 1928 also portrays Deng’s deep friendship with Zhou Enlai, his 
superior to protect and a ‘brother’ to guide him. To better shield Zhou from the 
enemy’s round-up, Deng and Zhang rented an apartment on the first floor of the same 
house where Zhou and his wife, Deng Yingchao, lived on the second floor. The two 
young couples’ beauty, passion, friendship, faith and dedication attracted audiences 
both young and old alike, and the casting itself boosted ticket sales, with the film 
featuring well-known movie and theatre stars from China, Hong Kong and America.7
 The next three films and TV dramas I discuss concentrate on one year in Deng 
Xiaoping’s life: 1929, when he established his military career with his leadership of 
the Baise Uprising in Jiangxi Province, as seen in the film Baise Uprising (Baise qiyi); 
a three-part TV drama series, Tiger Commander Li Mingrui (Hujiang Li Mingrui); and 
a six-part TV drama series, The Red River Bank – Deng Xiaoping in 1929 (Hong’an – 
Deng Xiaoping zai yi jiu er jiu).
 Before examining these three performance texts, I will briefly discuss the impor-
tance of the Baise Uprising in relation to similar events. Previous CCP history gave 
much credit to the Nanchang Uprising of 1927 as the CCP’s first military action 
against the KMT and the formation of the CCP military force. By the same token, 
the Autumn Peasant Uprising of 1927, led by Mao, assumed its ultimate significance 
in having established the first CCP armed base by relying on peasants, a uniquely 
Maoist approach that supposedly led to the final victory of the Chinese Revolution. 
Both uprisings were featured in numerous Chinese textbooks, party narratives, 
literature and art. Seen from this perspective, the rediscovered success story of the 
Baise Uprising was indeed significant. In comparison to these two uprisings, the Baise 
Uprising was rarely included in the CCP party narrative, textbooks and public media 
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before and during the Cultural Revolution, or even in the early post-Mao China when 
party narratives were revised to fully credit other key leaders of the CCP, especially 
those persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. In the 1990s, however, the Baise 
Uprising gained prominence as a fruitful event in the Communist Revolution, which 
established the ‘Left and Right Bank River revolutionary armed base’ (Zuoyoujiang 
geming gejudi), and was cited as an early triumphant example of ‘military occupations 
by the workers and peasants’ (gongnong wuzhuang geju).
 Released in 1989, the film Baise Uprising dramatized Deng’s leadership role in 
this uprising that led to the formation of the Seventh and Eighth Red Amy troops, 
which joined forces with Mao Zedong and Zhu De’s troops in Jingguangshan. Clearly 
defining it as a ‘revolutionary history film with documentary features’ (wenxian xing 
de geming lishi gushi pian), the production team dug into historical archives visited 
with survivors of the Baise Uprising.8 Based on this solid understanding of ‘history,’ 
the film crew focused on creating a ‘particular environment’ (dianxing huanjing) 
without losing sight of the powerful image of a young, compassionate, resourceful 
Deng, who, at the tender age of 25, had already established himself as a wise leader in 
the complex historical circumstances of 1929.
 The film Baise Uprising presents the intricate situations in Guangxi around June 
1929, when KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek appointed Yu Zuobai as the president of the 
Guangxi government and Li Mingrui as his special agent in Guangxi. Influenced by 
the CCP’s policies, Yu and Li invited CCP members to join their efforts in managing 
governmental affairs in Guangxi. As a result of this invitation, the CCP sent Deng 
Xiaoping, Chen Haoren, Zhang Yunyi, Gong Hechun and others to Guangxi. Upon 
his arrival, Deng made friends with Yu and Li, convinced them to release imprisoned 
CCP members, developed underground party organizations in Nanning, and carried 
out land reform in the rural areas to inspire peasants to join the revolution.
 The film dramatized a resourceful Deng who makes thoughtful yet swift decisions 
at crucial moments. Most significantly, it depicted Deng as a rebel against the leftist 
opportunist policies of the CCP, then under the leadership of Li Lisan, who ordered 
Deng’s troops to seize urban centres first – an erroneous strategy imposed by Stalin, 
who insisted that the Chinese Revolution should follow the Soviet model of the prole-
tariat dictatorship. One scene, for example, depicts Deng’s debate with his radical 
peers, who called for a quick Communist insurgency (a ‘Nanning Uprising’), in 
imitation of the heroic spirit of the failed Guangzhou Uprising. Deng insisted on the 
contrary: the CCP forces should quickly move to the remote, rural area to join Wei 
Baqun’s peasant movement for sustained military struggles against the KMT. With 
thoughtfulness and wisdom, Deng reminded his comrades to honour those ‘brave and 
exceptional comrades, who prematurely died in the abortive Guangzhou Uprising, a 
painful and profound lesson never to forget.’9
 Upon receiving the letter sent by the CCP Central Committee, Deng responded 
indignantly: we had paid heavily for the rightist policies that brought about the 
failure of the ‘grand revolution’; we would pay an even heftier price for the current 
leftist policies. He dismissed the letter’s charge of him as ‘having fallen into the mud 
of opportunism,’ and indicated he would not back off even if others accused him as 
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having pursued a ‘rightist opportunist approach’ of trusting warlords in their efforts 
to assist revolution. ‘I cannot move heaven and earth, but I take to heart eight Chinese 
characters: “adopt new strategies for different circumstances” (sui ji ying bian) and 
“seek truth in practice” (shi shi qiu shi),’ Deng declared wittily and firmly (205). These 
two characteristics defined Deng’s unique leadership in his later career, both in the 
historical record that this film is based on, and in the representations of this record in 
numerous party narratives and literary works in Dengist China.
 Film, after all, is not history. Other survivors’ memories can, in fact, be read as 
having challenged the dominant role of Deng’s leadership as it was portrayed in Baise 
Uprising. Yuan Renyuan, for instance, gave more weight in his memoir to the contri-
butions of Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui, the warlords who had already supported the 
development of the peasant movement before the CCP leaders’ arrival. Most signifi-
cantly, Yuan pointed to Deng’s absence during the Baise Uprising: he left for Shanghai 
to report to the CCP Central Committee, while Yuan and other leaders threw 
themselves into preparing for the forthcoming uprising: they reorganized the military 
units under CCP control; distributed the resolution of the CCP’s Sixth Congress; made 
uniforms, army flags and arm bands for the insurgent troops; and arrested reactionary 
officers and local authorities to thwart their sabotage (109–10). On 11 December 1929, 
in honour of the second anniversary of the Guangzhou Uprising, they declared their 
uprising in Baise and established the Seventh Red Amy and the Soviet Worker-Peasant 
Government in a mass rally of three thousand participants. Yuan recounted all these 
events without mentioning of Deng’s presence (110–11).10
 By the same token, Mo Wenhua’s memoir emphasized Zhang Yunyi’s significant 
role in leading the 55th Regiment of the Seventh Red Army to reach Jinggangshan 
after Deng had left his troops to report to work in Shanghai after March 1931. Mo 
also gave credit to Gong Hecun (Gong Chu), who was instrumental in building up 
the Seventh and Eighth Red Armies, but who disappeared in PRC history thanks to 
his switching sides to the KMT in 1935.11 Gong, in his own memoir, was blunt: with 
regards to the formation of the Seventh Red Army, Deng was one among many repre-
sentatives sent by the CCP, and he worked ‘only temporarily for a short period of time’ 
‘during Yu Zuobai’s appointment by Chiang Kai-shek in presiding over provincial 
affairs in Guangxi.’ Deng ‘merely played the role of a liaison between the CCP Central 
Committee and the Guangxi Soviet areas’ without ‘any substantial work after the 
formation of the Seventh Red Army.’12
 Published in Hong Kong decades after Gong had defected from the CCP, his 
memoir did not have to toe the CCP party line in celebrating Deng’s career, and thus 
provides a unique perspective on Deng’s role in Guangxi. Most other party histories 
and memoirs recorded Deng’s leaving his troops to report to the CCP Central 
Committee in Shanghai, but they differed in the details as to whether or not the 
Central Committee had indeed asked him to go back or whether he was sent by his 
own local party committee of the Seventh Red Army.13 Yang Bingzhang’s authoritative 
account points out inconsistencies in these versions: both the accounts of Maomao, 
or Deng Rong (Deng’s daughter), and the official party history encounter a dilemma: 
they want to portray Deng as a key leader of the Baise Uprising, which nevertheless 
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failed in its mission to establish a long-standing Soviet area in the region.14 They had 
no choice but to scapegoat Li Lisan, who was dismissed from his leadership position in 
the CCP Central Committee for his leftist opportunist policies; Deng Guang, who died 
in the war; and Gong Chu, who turned ‘traitor,’ for their mistakes that had supposedly 
brought about the defeat of the Guangxi Soviet areas (72). One point is clear, however, 
according to Yang: Deng decided to leave his troops without a collective decision 
from his own committee, and he did not receive any directives from the Central 
Committee to go back to Shanghai. As a smart politician, ‘Deng understood that 
self-protection was the most important factor in one’s political career’ (78). Seen 
from this perspective, the film Baise Uprising deviated from the survivors’ accounts 
and blurred fictionality with historicity by dramatizing the above-mentioned events 
without making clear whether Deng was in fact present. The filmmakers, therefore, 
explored visual images to bypass the complex past by either avoiding narrative details 
or misleadingly juxtaposing images of various events to manipulate facts.
 In 2009 internet bloggers went even further to reveal Deng’s so-called crimes of 
running away from the impending battlefield of the Baise Uprising. In his article 
entitled ‘The Wounds of the Seventh Red Army,’ Wang Buyi quoted former leaders of 
the Seventh Red Army such as Chen Haoren and Mo Wenhua, who had complained 
to the CCP Central Committee about Deng’s fleeing from the uprising, even after his 
peers had urged him to stay. Understandably, Deng wanted to be with his young wife, 
who was on the verge of giving birth to their first child, but who, Wang asked, did not 
have families to look after? Worse still, Deng left the Seventh Red Army for the second 
time, and this time at an even more dangerous moment: during their ‘long march’ to 
the north to join Zhu and Mao’s troops in the Jinggangshan, when the Seventh Red 
Army suffered a series of defeats and was split into two regiments, led by Zhang Yunyi 
and Li Mingrui, respectively. In his ‘My Self-Explanation’ (Wo de zishu), written in 
1968 and submitted to the Central Committee, Deng admitted, ‘Now, I realized that at 
the time when the two regiments lost contact with each other upon their defeats, I, as 
a key leader responsible for the army, should not have left the troops. This is a serious 
political mistake.’ Wang believed that Deng’s ‘fleeing event’ (taopao shijian) added to 
‘the deep wounds’ of the Seventh Red Army, which witnessed other tragedies, such as 
the execution of Wei Baqun by his own nephew, who handed him over after enemy’s 
torture and the wrongful and brutal execution of Li Mingrui by the CCP as a ‘KMT 
agent,’ after he had overcome numerous setbacks to lead the remaining troops of 
the Seventh Red Army to Jiangxi. Li’s calamity resulted from certain CCP members’ 
continuing distrust of his true commitment to the Communist cause because of his 
distinguished career as a warlord commander.
 How to understand the history of the warlord period, which is often interpreted 
in the PRC history as a chaotic time dominated by greedy, ‘reactionary’ and power-
driven military despots, who were mostly to blame for the suffering of the Chinese 
people in the 1920s? For whom did they fight, and how should we evaluate their 
contributions in modern Chinese history? To what extent did they aid the Communist 
movement, and how should revolutionary history represent them? These questions 
would find some answers in a three-part TV drama entitled Tiger Commander Li 
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Mingrui, which premiered in 2001 in commemoration of the anniversary of the Baise 
Uprising.
 Most significantly, Tiger Commander depicted Li Mingrui’s family as having 
a peasant background, with peasants considered the backbone of the Chinese 
Revolution. Li’s father had no choice but to sell his cows to support Li’s career, not 
unlike Deng’s father in My French Years, who raised money to send Deng abroad in 
search of a new life. Li told his family that he joined the military in order to ‘end the 
chaotic world and bring peace for the ordinary people’ and because he ‘hated those 
governments who did not place the interests of the people in the first place.’ Similar 
to Deng’s love story, Li also bid farewell to his beloved wife upon his graduation from 
the military academy. From that point on, his wife waited for his return for years, 
sometimes learning that he was still alive through reading news reports on the war 
front, while she raised their two children on her own without knowing his wherea-
bouts, even after 1949, long after his execution in Jiangxi in 1931.
 Li’s military career did not come about without other personal losses. He parted 
company with his best friend Chen after Chen had led his troops to fight Li in order 
to wipe out the Communist base Li maintained in Baise. The TV drama presents a 
moving scene in which two brilliant commanders, who once had promised never to 
fight each other on the battlefield, now met again by a riverside as agonized friends 
and mortal enemies. At a tense moment in front of a grief-stricken Li, Chen puts down 
his gun and kills himself, leaving behind a piece of paper on which he had written 
these bitter words: ‘Why can’t we travel on the same road / after twelve years of bloody 
war and suffering together / as classmates, comrades, and brothers? / Why pursue 
‘faith’ at the expense of friendship? / He who broke his oath must now kill himself. / 
Let me die, to join our brother Lu Huanxin in heaven.’
 Chen’s resentful words shed light on the predicaments of Li, who, as the concluding 
words on the screen reveal, was ‘wrongly executed in the autumn of 1931 thanks to the 
radical policies of Wang Ming,’ who had erroneously suspected and murdered a large 
number of the CCP leaders and commanders as alleged ‘KMT agents and spies.’ One 
therefore wonders what Chen would have to say about Li’s ‘faith’ in the Communist 
cause, if Chen had lived to hear about Li’s execution, and how Li would have explained 
his own choice if asked by his best friend. One potentially powerful theme of Tiger 
Commander, therefore, resides in how CCP ideology made class struggle a core 
value, and victimized those who had followed its cause as well as those who had 
fought against it. Furthermore, Tiger Commander finally restored the familiar image 
of ‘warlord villains’ – popular stereotypes in countless literary and artistic represen-
tations of the Chinese Revolution – to their rightful place in history, as committed 
soldiers and devoted patriots with their own dreams and sorrows. Most significantly, 
this TV drama explored the same occasion of celebrating the anniversaries of the Baise 
Uprising, but it presented a missing piece of the historical narratives of the uprising 
by praising all the famous men – not just Deng, but also Li Mingrui, his ‘warlord’ 
colleagues, and their irreplaceable contributions to the Baise Uprising, as well as their 
leading the Seventh Red Army to the Jiangxi Soviet area, a heroic deed that Deng had 
failed to follow through with due to his two sudden departures.
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 One might choose to imagine that, when read against such accusations of Deng’s 
‘fleeing incidents,’ an eight-part TV drama series entitled The Red River Bank – Deng 
Xiaoping in 1929, which premiered in 2009, could have raised the issue of possible 
guilt on Deng’s part that might have haunted him in his later years. With the music of 
‘The Story of Spring’ as its theme song, the TV drama began with the elderly Deng, 
in his 80s, taking a walk with his little granddaughter on a beautiful beach in contem-
porary China at the peak of his career, hailed as the ‘chief architect’ of the Chinese 
reform era (Zhongguo gaige kaifang de zong shejishi). Gazing at the ocean waves, 
however, old Deng suddenly sees the ‘ghost’ images of Li Mingrui and Wei Baqu from 
an ethereal past. The youthful, handsome Li and Wei, wearing their Seventh Red Army 
uniforms, ask the old Deng: ‘Do you still remember me?’ ‘I do remember you,’ Deng 
answers humbly. ‘You have sacrificed your life heroically for the Chinese Revolution. 
You will live forever in the memories of the Chinese people.’15 Through the unique 
perspective of the old Deng telling his own stories to his granddaughter, moreover, 
The Red River Bank could possibly be interpreted as Deng’s ‘confession,’ in which he 
defends his ‘fleeing incidents’ because of his passionate love for his wife.
 Part 1 of the series, for instance, presents a tender scene of the young Deng in 1929, 
at the age of 25 in his Shanghai residence, comforting his pregnant wife, who resents 
Deng’s departure to Guangxi at the time when she needs him the most. She under-
stands, nonetheless, that as devoted members of the CCP they have no choice but to 
follow the party’s order at the expense of personal interests. In another scene aboard a 
ship from Shanghai to Nanning (by way of Hong Kong), Deng longs for his wife: ‘I will 
always miss you no matter wherever I go – neither high mountains nor distant road 
will separate us.’ Part Three dramatizes Deng’s personal pains and frustration in finally 
returning to Shanghai, only to find his wife in a hospital bed. After his wife’s death in 
childbirth, Deng recalls the image of his beautiful and energetic wife, only to wake up 
to the harsh reality of an infant daughter, whom he has no choice but to entrust in the 
care of his wife’s sister, before departing for Guangxi without being to take care of his 
wife’s burial.
 If Deng’s love for his wife justifies his ‘fleeing’ from the immanent Baise Uprising, 
The Red River Bank took a bold step further to ‘turning historical memory into 
personal memory in order to recreate the life stories of revolutionary leaders,’ in 
the words of script writer and director.16 It in fact portrayed Gong Chu, historically 
known as the ‘number one traitor of the Red Army (hongjun zhong di yi panjiang),’ as 
a protagonist who contributed significantly to the Baise Uprising in 1929, long before 
he turned a traitor in 1935.
 Presenting the historical figure of Gong Chu in the dramatic character of Gong 
Hecun – another name Gong Chu actually used in real life – The Red River Bank 
depicts him as a vital player. As an underground CCP leader, Gong Hecun manages to 
become the police chief of the city of Nanning and helps Wei Baqun and others escape 
from KMT secret agents. Some critics praised The Red River Bank’s effort ‘not to avoid 
Gong Chu’ but to give him credit where it was due for his proper place in history. 
Internet bloggers went further, contextualizing Gong’s betrayal in the bloody history 
of the ‘Red Army’ period, which witnessed the largest number of betrayals, including 
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seven or eight division and regiment commanders. Wang Buyi, for example, named 
two reasons for this massive betrayal. First, the CCP’s radical campaign up to 1933 to 
eliminate the ‘rich landlords,’ ‘KMT agents,’ and other ‘counter-revolutionaries’ even 
within their own ranks alienated many Red Army commanders and soldiers alike. 
Second, after the Red Army embarked on the Long March north, the units ordered to 
persevere in the south suffered from the relentless crusades of the KMT to eliminate 
them, which resulted in the largest number of traitors among the CCP ranks. Among 
a series of party secretaries and political commissars on the provincial level, Gong Chu 
ranked the highest in his capacity as the chief staff officer of the Central Military Area 
(Zhongyang junqu canmou zhang).
 Nevertheless, Gong had a distinguished career and played a significant role at 
almost every critical moment during the early revolutionary period: he was a veteran 
of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Guangzhou troops in 1917; joined the CCP in 1925; and led the 
peasant movement in Guangdong Province. Gong led his peasant troops from the 
Beijiang areas to participate in the 1927 Nanchang Uprising, and was appointed as 
the party representative of the Tenth Division of the Fourth Red Army after he joined 
Zhu De and Mao Zedong in Jinggangshan. Most significant for our current discussion, 
Gong pioneered and was chiefly responsible for instigating the defection and mutiny 
of ‘new warlord’ troops led by Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui in Guangxi, which resulted in 
the Baise Uprising, and was appointed the chief staff officer of the Seventh Red Army 
thereafter. Despite his critical contributions, the film Baise Uprising unfairly erased 
Gong from history, Wang Buyi contended;17 the film mentioned Gong’s name just 
once, without presenting him even as a minor character, while giving credits to others 
for having led the uprising.
 After Li Mingrui’s wrongful execution in 1931, Gong was appointed as Li’s 
replacement as commander of the Seventh Red Army. Like many others, Gong became 
increasingly disillusioned by the persecutions and executions of numerous colleagues 
in the Soviet area of his unit’s operations. In his memoir published years later, Gong 
bitterly narrated a tragic story of a close friend named Yang Yucun, a brilliant division 
commander in Jiangxi, whose parents were rounded up as rich landlords and had their 
house and properties confiscated; as a result, Yang risked his life to flee from the Soviet 
area and thereafter faithfully served the KMT cause for the rest of his life. After Gong 
expressed his doubts about this massive persecution against one’s own rank and file, he 
was demoted and even accused of having followed the ‘rightist opportunist line of the 
party,’ which gave in to the demands of the people’s enemy. All these occurrences led 
to Gong’s betrayal in 1935 upon the KMT’s brutal campaign to wipe out the remaining 
Red Army troops in Jiangxi.18
 Despite internet bloggers’ attempts to rehabilitate Gong, however, The Red River 
Bank was only ‘safe’ in depicting Gong’s earlier career around 1929, before his betrayal. 
Gong’s history as a traitor nevertheless can be linked to the end of this TV drama, 
when the young Deng finally climbs onto his horse, bidding farewell to the people 
of the Right Bank River areas, and eventually reaches Chongyi in Jiangxi Province 
before he leaves the Seventh Army for the second time (known as the second ‘fleeing 
incident’) to ‘report to the CCP Central Committee in Shanghai.’ Interestingly, The 
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Red River Bank ends its flashbacks at this point. Deng’s little granddaughter in a red 
dress asks him, ‘What happened to Wei Baqun after the Seventh Red Army left?’ The 
ensuing black-and-white scene depicts the brutal murder of Wei by his nephew in 
a cave. The next scene concludes The Red River Bank with a happy image of Deng 
climbing down from his horse to greet Mao for the first time in the Jiangxi Soviet area, 
with Mao’s welcoming remark: ‘Let’s walk together, forward!’
 On the one hand, one might argue that the optimistic ending of Deng following 
Mao reinforces the official line of both Mao and Deng as invisible leaders. On the 
other hand, however, the parallel scenes of Wei Baqun’s murder by a traitor and 
Deng’s survival of the same war period – all narrated from the perspective of Deng’s 
possible guilt over his ‘fleeing incidents’ – can be seen as serving multiple functions: to 
honour a martyr 70 years after his death and to condemn a traitor who brought about 
this catastrophe, without eliminating the possibility of having fused the line between 
the two by dramatizing a brilliant leader who had a distinguished career precisely 
because he was not willing to be a martyr. Seen in this light, the concluding remarks 
of old Deng, as he stares at the ocean waves, make perfect sense: ‘Some say I am brave 
and smart. In reality, I am a practical man. I love my motherland. I serve my people 
forever.’ As we have seen in both party history narratives and in their screen represen-
tations, this ‘practical man’ has finally led China to an economic prosperity without 
carrying out a political reform, which he had promised when he returned to power in 
1978,19 but which, for ‘practical reasons,’ he never realized in his lifetime.
 Deng was not the only practical leader in the Chinese revolutionary narrative. 
Persevering with Blood and Sacrifice (Yu xue jianchi), a 22-part TV drama series that 
premiered in 2008, presents a startling contrast between two practical men: Chen 
Yi, the renowned leader of ‘the three-year guerrilla warfare in the South,’ and Gong 
Chumin, another name used by Gong Chu, the ‘arch traitor’ in the CCP history 
discussed above. The media fanfare celebrating the release of Persevering with Blood 
and Sacrifice reiterated the new party narrative of the twenty-first century, which 
has finally granted ‘the three-year guerrilla warfare in the South’ a significant status 
equal to that of the Long March. Different from the Red Army’s main force of 185,000 
soldiers on the Long March, which fought their way out of the enemy’s elimination 
campaigns, Chen Yi, Gong Chumin (Gong Chu) and their units were left with only 
16,000 troops and 30,000 wounded soldiers, and entrusted with the almost impossible 
task of luring the enemies away from the Red Army main force. As the first piece in the 
film and TV dramas to represent this most difficult episode of the revolutionary war 
period, Persevering with Blood and Sacrifice demonstrates that being ‘practical’ does 
not simply lead to acts of escape, desertion, or betrayal.
 On the contrary, a practical spirit proved to be the best approach for a great leader 
such as Chen Yi, who knew to retreat when the enemy posed overwhelming threats, 
and when to ‘stand his ground’ when others doubted the future of the Chinese 
Revolution. Together with Xiang Ying, the head of the branch bureau of the CCP 
Central Committee (Zhongyang fenju), Chen encourages soldiers to persevere behind 
enemy lines against starvation, cold weather, brutal battles and betrayals by one’s own 
comrades. The practical man is also equally emotional: Chen kneels down in front of 
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the local peasants and begs them to take wounded soldiers into their homes before 
the Red Army’s withdrawal: ‘Some of your sons were killed by the KMT; others had 
already joined the Long March. Please take a son, or a son-in-law, from our troops. 
After you nurture them back to health, you will gain an extra farmhand, or a seed of 
the revolution to avenge the enemies!’ One by one, these wounded soldiers are taken 
home by the local peasants, who shelter them in the most treacherous circumstances, 
with some even giving their own lives to protect them. For obvious reasons, the TV 
series apparently omitted a brutal fact: almost all the wounded soldiers and those 
local peasants associated with the Red Army were slaughtered by the ‘white army,’ as 
recounted in several biographical accounts.20
 Amid this ‘white terror,’ the practical Chen needed to be at his strongest, as 
depicted in Persevering with Blood and Sacrifice. At the lowest point after Gong 
Chumin’s betrayal, when Gong leads the enemy’s campaign to eliminate Chen’s unit, 
some soldiers dismiss their own thoughts of leaving the units after they witness Chen’s 
display of indomitable will; as he says: ‘I have many rich friends in Shanghai and 
Hong Kong, and I could have sought their help and become a big-shot official for the 
KMT government, but I chose to suffer here because I chose not to betray revolution, 
nor my own faith!’21 Chen’s unswerving determination proves particularly touching 
to his soldiers because Chen himself is a wounded man, with a severe injury to his 
leg – the key reason he was appointed for this challenging job, for it was assumed that 
he could not endure the Long March. In this even more exigent job, however, Chen’s 
personal charm, good humour and tenaciousness wins the hearts of his soldiers, 
who follow him to the very end against all odds. In the fateful moment when they 
had no choice but to eat rats, snakes and wild berries to survive, the practical Chen 
also turned ‘poetic’ to inspire his dwindling troops: he recited poetry to describe 
their most unromantic existence as well as his faith in the eventual victory of the 
Communist cause.22
 The loathing of traitors permeates the history, culture and literary and artistic 
representations of China’s revolutionary past, and finds expression in Persevering 
with Blood and Sacrifice with the film’s depiction of Gong Chumin. Portrayed as 
another kind of ‘practical man,’ Gong switched to the enemy’s side in May 1935, 
sharing his inside knowledge of the Red Army in order to capture Chen Yi and Xiang 
Jing. By casting Wang Ban – the gorgeous, rising star from the Beijing People’s Art 
Theater who had successfully played protagonist roles such as Zhou Ping in Cao Yu’s 
Thunderstorm – as Gong, director Hu Mei attempted to portray the ‘humanistic spirit 
of early revolutionaries’ through contrasting antagonists. Familiar to his audiences 
as the striking hero in other TV war dramas, Wang hesitated to take the role at first, 
but he decided to portray Gong not as a ‘bad man,’ but as a ‘waverer in his faith.’ To 
depict Gong as a compassionate lover, Wang added a scene in which he gently kisses 
his wife. After the warm reception of the television drama upon its release in a CCTV 
prime-time programme, Wang became the centre of audience attention for his multi-
faceted portrayal of Gong, whose treacherous acts Wang ‘had defended as if [he were] 
his lawyer,’ in Wang’s own words. Wang’s good looks and his prior roles as striking 
protagonists further blurred the otherwise clearly cut line between hero and traitor, 
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embodying in one character a complex and rich historical past that resists distinctions 
between good and evil.
 Indeed, the storyline more than defended Gong Chumin. At the beginning of the 
TV programme depicting the CCP’s defeat at Laoyingpan (Laoyingpan zhanshi), Chen 
Yi and Gong Chumin, the division commander, were both blamed for having lost 
the front gate to the Soviet Republic, even though it was the result of the erroneous 
military strategy of Li De, a Soviet adviser assigned to oversee Chinese military affairs 
without any prior knowledge of Chinese society, geography and history. The ensuing 
long episodes focusing on Li De, Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai’s debate over which high-
ranking leaders to leave behind – including Li’s insistence on leaving Mao Zedong 
behind and Zhou’s resolve to bring Mao along on the Long March – further explain 
Gong Chumin’s resentment at being ordered to stay behind to lead an almost impos-
sible war after the departure of the main force. Gong’s sense of having been deserted by 
the top leaders of the CCP seems to mitigate, to some extent, his decision to betray his 
comrades. One cannot forgive Gong, nor did the TV drama portray him entirely as a 
positive figure, but enough is presented to depict him as a human being who followed 
the revolution in its early days and made undeniable contributions, but in the end 
had become a practical man pressed by extraordinary circumstances. The TV drama, 
therefore, followed the tradition of the ‘red classics’ by portraying heroes such as Chen 
Yi, but they also presented ‘grey characters’ that are neither heroes nor antiheroes, but 
merely products of their own time and place.
 Contemporary media’s continuing fascination with the legend of Deng Xiaoping 
and other revolutionary-era leaders prompted more films and TV drama series, as 
seen in the 2009 film entitled The Seventh Red Army (hong qijun) and in the 2010 
film The Seventh Red Army and Me (Wo he Hong qijun), which commemorated the 
founding of the PLA and the eightieth anniversary of the Baise Uprising. The Seventh 
Red Army and Me presented a particularly interesting perspective, because the first-
person narrator’s voiceover came from a former KMT commander who had first 
fought against the Seventh Red Army, but who subsequently defected and fought 
alongside the Seventh Red Army because of his admiration for the CCP commanders 
and their ‘just cause.’ The storyline of a KMT commander who converted to the CCP 
cause presented a traitor story in reverse, in which the CCP won a ‘traitor’ who was 
nevertheless as talented and resourceful as Gong Chumin in Persevering with Blood 
and Sacrifice. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, therefore, the party line 
between the vicious KMT and the victorious CCP became even more blurred; what 
remained unchanged, however, was the everlasting legend of Deng, who leads key 
battles to defeat the KMT, a contribution he made as part of the first generation of 
Chinese leaders under Mao. Deng was portrayed as more practical than Mao, even 
on the verge of being a defeatist escapee from the war front; it is this practical man, 
nevertheless, that finally brought China to its successful transformation to capitalism 
in the reform era.
 It is therefore no wonder that a spoken drama entitled Deng Xiaoping begins with 
an Italian journalist questioning Deng in 1986: ‘when you meet Mao in heaven, how 
do you answer Mao if he accuses you of having carried out a capitalist restoration, and 
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regrets that he did not expel you from the CCP membership when he struck you down 
for the second time after the April Fourth movement of 1976?’ Deng replied with pride 
and confidence: ‘Mao would have congratulated me because he had always wanted 
the Chinese people to live a happy and comfortable life!’ Situated in this dramatic 
conflict between Mao and Deng, however, one might indeed wonder if Mao was right 
in distrusting Deng as his successor for the socialist cause. One might also wonder if 
Cultural Revisionary films such as Spring Sprouts (Chunmiao) might have propheti-
cally described what would indeed happen to the rural poor if Deng had succeeded 
in his attempt to restore capitalism: as the film describes, the rural poor would never 
afford medical treatment in a county hospital, whose doctor lets a poor peasant’s child 
die without any treatment because he was busy developing special health regiments 
for high-ranking officials of the CCP. As a typical Cultural-Revolutionary film, Spring 
Sprouts criticized hospitals in socialist China that did not serve the peasants, but only 
the ‘urban overlords,’ as Mao had once criticized the revisionist and capitalist orienta-
tions of the Ministry of Public Health right before the start of the Cultural Revolution. 
Denounced in post-Mao China as a ‘Gang of Four film’ to attack Deng Xiaoping’s 
attempt to restore capitalism, Spring Sprouts takes on a new significance in contem-
porary China when the rural population has paid the heaviest price in Deng’s push 
for capitalism, and when China’s income inequality and the growing disparity between 
the rich and poor have become one of its biggest economic problems.
 All in all, the history of dramatic representations of the life story of Deng in the 
past 40 years – from the anti-Deng films during the Cultural Revolution, to the reform 
period that featured Deng as the greatest reformer, and finally to the urgent reflections 
on the pitfalls and consequences of the reform period – reveals contradictions and 
grey areas in our usual representations of ‘revolutionary’ and ‘counterrevolutionary,’ 
‘socialist’ and ‘capitalist,’ leaders and traitors, and everyday life and theatricality. These 
depictions of Deng present a miniature history of the twists and turns of the 40 years 
after Mao’s era, and the performance artists’ efforts at interpreting and participating in 
the social and political events that defined much of the contemporary Chinese reality 
as well as their reflections on the heritage and debts of both the Mao and Deng eras.
 In the larger scheme of things, I argue that in a socialist state with ‘capitalist 
characteristics’ such as the PRC, ‘propaganda performance’ can no longer be simply 
dismissed as a monolithic, top-down and meaningless practice characterized solely by 
censorship and suppression of freedom of expression in a totalitarian regime. Instead, 
propaganda performance can be studied as a complex, dialogic and dialectical process, 
in which multiple voices and opposing views collide, negotiate and compromise in 
forming what looks like a mainstream ideology – and indeed functions as such – to 
legitimize the powerful state and its right to rule.
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Zhang Yimou’s Sexual Storytelling and the 
iGeneration : Contending Shanzhashu Zhi Lian 
(Under the Hawthorn Tree) on Douban
Ralph Parfect
Since at least the start of the twenty-first century, China’s internet users have increas-
ingly been turning to the public, interactive spaces of the web, not only to review 
and debate new film releases, but also to discuss the broader political, economic and 
cultural environment for film in China.1 Particularly active in this rise of web-based 
film commentary is the generation that grew up with the internet, China’s iGeneration. 
Discussion of film and moving image culture, and of individual films, has appeared 
on a profusion of online spaces, from bulletin boards (BBS) and dedicated review or 
database sites such as www.douban.com (hereafter Douban), to more individualized 
blogs and microblogs. So far, however, little research has appeared on how exactly 
these new spaces are being used to address issues relating to film in China, or on what 
the broader implications of their rising prevalence and visibility may be for China’s 
film culture.
 To the extent to which this online universe can be mapped, Sabrina Qiong Yu has 
taken a notable lead by examining the role of a variety of websites and of individual 
netizen (internet user) voices in constructing the transnational celebrity of Jet Li and 
in the debate on Zhang Yimou’s film Yingxiong (Hero) (2002).2 This chapter aims 
to contribute further to this new research area through focused analysis of a single 
review website, Douban, and the reviews hosted there of Zhang’s later film Shanzhashu 
Zhi Lian (Under the Hawthorn Tree, 2010, hereafter Hawthorn).3 In examining how 
Chinese netizens have used Douban to express conflicting views of Hawthorn, the 
chapter makes reference to Guobin Yang’s concept of ‘contention’ in Chinese internet 
culture, and to some of the characteristic genres and styles of this culture.4 This 
chapter pays special attention, as has China’s iGeneration itself, to Hawthorn’s repre-
sentation of teenage romance and sexual behaviour during the Cultural Revolution; 
in this regard, netizens’ responses to the sexual politics, both of the film itself and of 
its much-criticized marketing campaign, are read as assertions of ‘sexual citizenship’ 
that variously resist and approve the ‘sexual storytelling’ of the film.5 The chapter thus 
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argues that online reviews, as with much online film commentary, can be seen as part 
of a broader culture of internet contention that Yang terms an ‘unofficial democracy,’ 
albeit one still constrained by the dynamics of both the state and the market.6 
Although a certain freedom of expression prevails in such online spaces, writings 
that contravene government-imposed limits on internet content may find themselves 
‘harmonized;’ meanwhile the anti-commercial stance of many reviewers has limited 
power to resist, and may even contribute to, the ‘hype’ for certain products above 
others in an entertainment-driven cultural industry.
Douban, the marketization of culture and online contention 
in China
Douban was launched in March 2005, and at the time of writing ranks as the twentieth 
most popular website in China, with 68 million registered users and over 150 million 
visits each month.7 Its core function is as a place to find and share information and 
views on three kinds of cultural product: books, films and music. In its film section, 
Douban Dianying (Douban Film), users can rate a film with from one to five stars, 
or post a review of any length, on which any Douban user can then comment; these 
comments in turn can be responded to, hence allowing multi-party discussions to 
develop. Over time, Douban has added further functions such as live music streaming, 
city events listings and interest-based ‘communities’ or ‘groups’ with social media 
features. Its parent company emphasizes the website’s interactivity, describing it not 
only as ‘a cultural resource database’ with ‘high quality’ reviews, but also as ‘a creative 
community with cultural events and life-sharing.’8 Its audience is characterized as 
‘urban youth’: 80 per cent of users live in one of 12 major cities, including Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing, while 92.5 per cent are aged 18–35. The audience 
is ‘well-educated’: more than 80 per cent of users have or are taking ‘a bachelor’s 
degree or above,’ and ‘17 per cent have or are taking a Master’s degree.’ They are also 
relatively prosperous: ‘42.8 per cent have more than 3000 RMB monthly income.’9 This 
demographic is not fully coterminous with China’s iGeneration, but the two clearly 
overlap significantly.
 As a space for cultural commentary, Douban is characteristic in at least two ways of 
the broader Chinese cultural landscape of the early twenty-first century: first, it partic-
ipates in a commodity culture with retained elements of state control; and secondly, it 
belongs to a culture of the internet in post-WTO China. Just as film production and 
consumption have become strongly commercialized in the reform period in China, 
with films increasingly forced to compete as products in a globalized, consumerist 
cultural marketplace, while remaining subject to state controls including censorship,10 
so too has the nature of published comment on film changed dramatically. The 
marketization of culture since the early 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, 
has seen a proliferation of new cultural forms, including forms of commentary.11 
Facilitating this has been the rapid advance since the late 1990s of the internet, and, 
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in particular, of web 2.0 capabilities, enabling a more participatory culture of film 
criticism and commentary to take shape.
 While this culture may appear more ‘democratic,’ however, online commentary on 
film is still subject to state-imposed restrictions, just as film itself is. In common with 
much of the Chinese internet, Douban self-censors in order to retain its government-
granted permission to operate. Furthermore, like other sites hosting online film 
commentary, Douban belongs to a cultural marketplace and is subject to its logic, for 
instance obtaining income from advertising and attracting new users by prominently 
displaying new cinematic releases on the home page. Douban users often comment 
on whether or not films are worth the ticket price. Reviews themselves can become 
commodities of a kind; one Douban reviewer of Hawthorn comments of his own 
popularity: ‘I didn’t expect that this film review would become so hot’ [my italics].12
 While being rooted in China’s state-capitalist culture, Douban, again like much 
of the Chinese internet, can nonetheless share in what Yang Guobin calls a ‘culture 
of contention.’13 It is misleading, Yang argues, for the Chinese internet to be seen 
merely in terms of its two most reported aspects, government control and popular 
entertainment. Chinese internet culture rather has a contentious character, in which 
‘authority of all kinds is subject to doubt and ridicule,’ and in which a culture of 
‘online activism’ has been born.14 Among other scholars, David Herold has similarly 
described a ‘carnivalesque’ quality to the Chinese internet which often makes it a place 
of subversion.15 While this chapter will not look at activism per se, it does find Yang’s 
concept of a culture of contention applicable to the case of user-generated content 
on Douban. In 2011, for instance, Douban users posted such negative reviews of the 
film Jian Dang Wei Ye (The Founding of a Party), which had been released to mark 
the ninetieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, that the 
ratings facility for this film was disabled.16 Douban users moreover have a history of 
playfully protesting at the site’s self-censorship on sexual issues. In March 2009 users 
mocked Douban for deciding as part of an anti-pornography campaign to remove 
images of Renaissance oil paintings featuring nudity; a satirical counter-campaign 
was organized by users to post clothed images of the nude figures.17 A year and a half 
later, Douban users would again be making fun of perceived sexual censoriousness, 
this time in relation to a new film by Zhang Yimou.
Under the Hawthorn Tree: Synopsis, marketing campaign and 
internet reception
Hawthorn was Zhang Yimou’s twenty-second film as director, and was released 
cinematically in mainland China on 16 September 2010.18 It is based on a popular 
internet novel of the same title by Ai Mi, itself reportedly based on a true story.19 
Set in Hubei province in the mid-1970s, it narrates the tragic teenage romance of 
its two protagonists, Jingqiu and Lao San, which ends with the latter’s death from 
leukaemia. Several factors hinder the two lovers: the stigmatization and poverty 
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of Jingqiu’s family, her father being absent from the home for unspecified political 
reasons; an acute need for secrecy in conducting the relationship, given Jingqiu’s wish 
to become a teacher, like her mother, for which she must show exemplary behaviour, 
particularly avoiding any taint of zaolian or ‘premature love’; and the suspicious gaze 
of the mother herself, who is desperate to improve the chances not only of Jingqiu 
but also two younger children. Lao San, the son of a People’s Liberation Army area 
commander, by contrast, is relatively carefree, enjoying the deference and material 
benefits accruing to his family background. He works in a geological survey team, 
a prestigious occupation which also evidently allows him ample time and freedom 
to pursue a romance. The couple meet and subsequently fall in love after Jingqiu, as 
a zhiqing or ‘educated youth,’ is sent down temporarily from her provincial city of 
Yicheng to learn from the peasants in the nearby village of Xiping, which is also where 
Lao San’s geological team happens to be stationed. The film’s action subsequently alter-
nates between city and village, according to Jingqiu’s varying commitments. In spite of 
Lao San’s gradually worsening illness, caused by the handling of radioactive materials 
during his geological survey work, an illness that he tries to conceal from Jingqiu, 
he takes the lead in an increasingly physical intimacy. The two lovers end up in bed 
together; however, Lao San’s attempt to initiate sexual intercourse with a professedly 
willing Jingqiu stops short when she reveals her actual uncertainty and fear. The film 
ends with Lao San on his deathbed surrounded by his grieving family and a hastily 
summoned Jingqiu. In the closing credits it is stated that Jingqiu ended up years later 
leaving China for the United States, and that the hawthorn tree on a hillside near 
Xiping remained a symbol of Jingqiu and Lao San’s everlasting love.
 The promotional campaign for Hawthorn was based on the slogan ‘lishishang zui 
ganjing de aiqing gushi’ [the purest love story in history], a line recycled from the 
marketing of the popular novel on which the film script was based.20 Several Chinese 
words connoting purity and cleanness, for example chunjie and qingchun, were used in 
the various forms that the marketing campaign took. This included posters, print and 
broadcast advertisements, media interviews and even a televised launch ceremony, 
at which the film was previewed and discussed and cast members appeared and 
sang songs. At one point in this event, the teenage actress Zhou Dongyu, who plays 
Jingqiu, is asked by the presenter, ‘What is pure love?’ and she answers, shyly, ‘Ganjing’ 
[clean].21 A television advertisement further embellished the theme of purity, quoting 
the film’s producer, businessman Zhang Weiping, as saying: ‘in this commercialized 
society, I haven’t felt this unadorned simplicity for a long time.’22
 Pre-release publicity for the film and for the ‘purity’ concept of its marketing 
campaign was boosted, albeit with unintended consequences, by two incidents. First, 
at the Hong Kong Film Festival in April 2010, breaking the news of his forthcoming 
film, Zhang Yimou complained to the media of the difficulty of finding actors who 
appeared ‘innocent’ enough to play ordinary people from the Cultural Revolution 
era.23 Secondly, during filming, the production team reinforced Zhang’s complaint 
by releasing to entertainment media a comical five-minute huaxu (‘bits of news’) 
video that showed the casting panel for Hawthorn auditioning a long series of young 
actresses, but rejecting all of them; the implication being, again, that none seemed 
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‘pure’ enough.24 Following these two incidents, comments started to circulate on 
internet bulletin boards, complaining that, through his new film, Zhang wished to 
attack the sexual morals of contemporary youth. Zhang, it was argued, was endorsing 
a traditional morality of innocence and restraint inappropriate to a China charac-
terized by increasing sexual openness and acceptance of premarital sex.25 Discussion 
of Hawthorn quickly became somewhat polarized, as we shall see reflected in later 
comments found on Douban. Those who took ‘pure love’ to mean premarital chastity, 
and saw the film as trying to reinforce this traditional norm, typically attacked 
Hawthorn, whereas those reading ‘pure love’ merely as undiluted romantic love tended 
to welcome Hawthorn’s perceived romantic idealism, as against the more pragmatic, 
materialistic form of courtship taken to be the undesirable social norm of the reform 
period.
 Zhang himself insisted in interviews that he had not intended to promote tradi-
tional sexual morality, and that he lamented the damaging consequences that sexual 
ignorance could have; he dismissed the key marketing slogan ‘the purest love story 
in history’ as ‘brought over from the novel.’26 This is consistent with his early films, 
which are associated with transgressive representations of eroticism and sexuality.27 
However, some of Zhang’s comments suggested an ambivalence around contemporary 
sexual morals. In one interview he confirmed that he did think young people’s sexual 
knowledge was too great: they were growing up too fast and ‘a third year high school 
student is not like a third year high school student.’ 28 He also suggested there could 
be a quaintly comic quality about the sexual ignorance of the Cultural Revolution 
period, in which many people thought that if a couple simply held hands that could 
lead to pregnancy.29 This comic potential is indeed exploited in several scenes of the 
film, in which the naïve assumptions of Jingqiu, her mother and her friend Hong Wei 
are implicitly mocked.
 Before the film’s release, then, the controversy over the meaning of its ‘purity’ had 
made Hawthorn a ‘hot topic’ on the internet. Reviews of the film on Douban, while 
far from being the first internet comments on the film (even if many appeared rapidly, 
arriving online from the evening of the pre-release premiere on 14 September 2010) 
are indicative in their range and variety of the wider debate about the film, in spite 
of the reportedly rather homogeneous demographic of Douban users. According to 
Douban’s own statistics, of the 1891 full-length reviews posted by April 2013, 11.8 per 
cent had awarded five stars, 30.6 per cent four stars, 44.8 per cent three stars, 10.0 per 
cent two stars and 2.8 per cent one star. The average rating cited by Douban for the 
film is 6.4.
Methods, terms and contexts
This chapter is informed by the well-established tradition in reception/audience 
studies of seeing audiences as active makers of meaning, rather than being passively 
‘acted on’ by cultural texts.30 It uses a sample of 21 reviews, with accompanying 
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comments, published on Douban in 2010–11. To obtain a spread of positive, balanced 
and negative reviews, seven five-star, seven three-star and seven one-star reviews were 
read. In each category, the reviews selected were those rated as ‘useful’ by the greatest 
number of fellow Douban users. To analyse the reviews a form of close reading is used, 
informed by Yang Guobin’s concepts of ‘style’ and ‘genre’ in internet contention; both 
content and form in the material are examined with a view to observing significant 
patterns and meanings. It is conceded that no perfect methods of selection and 
analysis exist in audience/reception studies, particularly when dealing with material as 
profuse and diverse as internet film criticism. For example, for demographic reasons 
already made clear, Douban users are clearly not representative of the whole audience 
for Hawthorn, which was ostensibly pitched partly at an older generation. Nor are 
precise demographic data on individual reviewers such as age, gender and location 
available from Douban, although some users do choose to reveal this. Further illumi-
nating discussion of the issues involved in examining the reception of films using 
internet reviews may be found in Sabrina Qiong Yu’s work.31
 Before moving on to analysis of the Douban reviews, certain important terms 
and contexts should be briefly discussed. First, two terms, namely styles and genres 
of contention, are borrowed from Guobin Yang’s theorization of Chinese internet 
contention.32 A key point of Yang’s is that, in contrast to the sometimes ‘epic’ style 
of contention of protest movements in China’s past, and a residual tendency towards 
‘emperor-worship’ (that is, pinning hopes for reform onto strong leaders), China’s 
internet age has seen a ‘new sensibility towards power and authority’ emerge, in which 
‘mockery and satire’ play a prominent part.33 At the same time, alongside this more 
‘playful’ style of contention, which can also be ‘insulting’ and ‘angry,’ contention of 
a more ‘prosaic’ quality has also appeared; this style can be down-to-earth or even 
technical, again in contrast to more ‘grandiose’ modes of the past.34 Yang further 
argues that, as well as styles, genres of contention have changed. There has been a 
notable ‘flourishing of diverse speech genres,’ which in itself constitutes a ‘challenge 
to power’, given that ‘political authorities everywhere tend to employ a narrower 
range of speech types.’35 Among the genres that Yang identifies as especially popular 
on the Chinese internet are the ‘confessional and autobiographical’ and the ‘parodic-
travestying.’ The latter includes ‘jokes, doggerel [and] satire.’ 36
 As Yang makes clear, it is above all an ‘irreverence towards power and authority’ 
that characterizes the use of these styles and genres of contention.37 As this chapter 
argues with reference to the Douban reviews, the notion of a resisted ‘authority’ applies 
to Hawthorn in a number of ways: to the authority of Zhang Yimou as an established 
cultural figure; to the authority of the marketplace in an era of commercialization; 
to the authority of the notion of ‘purity’ with all its connotations of a still-influential 
traditional morality; and to the authority of historiography with reference to the 
Cultural Revolution period. It is Hawthorn’s very relationship with all of these forms 
of authority that ostensibly drives Douban reviewers to apply diverse genres and styles 
of contention to the film.
 A further key context for Hawthorn’s reception is the proliferation of sexuality 
discourses in reform-era China. While it has been well established that discourses of 
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sexuality were far from being entirely suppressed in Maoist China, even during the 
Cultural Revolution,38 the reform period has seen an explosion of representations 
of and public comment on love and sex, as part of an ‘opening up’ to increasingly 
liberal forms of sexual thought and behaviour.39 Particularly relevant to the current 
discussion, research on changing sexual attitudes in China has demonstrated the 
increasing acceptance of premarital sex.40 In contemporary Chinese literature, film 
and popular culture, much-discussed manifestations of a greater openness towards 
sex in recent decades have included the cause célèbre of Wei Hui’s sexually explicit 
Shanghai Baobei (Shanghai Baby); the more pessimistic work of Mian Mian, which 
emphasizes grotesque and nightmarish aspects of ‘open’ sexuality; the films of Andrew 
Cheng, which have adapted Mian Mian’s work; and the rising prevalence of online 
pornography.
 In interpreting such new sexuality discourses in China, the concepts of ‘sexual 
storytelling’ and ‘sexual citizenship’ have been productively deployed; and in this 
chapter these are likewise applied to Hawthorn and to the online responses to the film. 
Sexual storytelling can be defined as ‘narratives of the intimate life, focussed especially 
around the erotic, the gendered and the relational.’ 41 Sexual citizenship indicates ‘a 
cluster of rights and responsibilities […] around issues of sexual partner choices, 
control over the body, reproductive rights, intimate bonds and sexual identities.’42 
Both terms are taken here from James Farrer’s ethnographic work on youth sexual 
behaviour in Shanghai in the early 2000s, with reference also to a theoretical source 
of Farrer’s, namely sociologist Ken Plummer’s Telling Sexual Stories (1995). Writing 
about youth sexuality in Shanghai, Farrer finds not only that ‘Chinese youth have 
pursued the rights to engage in sexual relations before marriage,’ but also that ‘loose 
communities of discourse have emerged around prominent stories shared through the 
internet and other media.’43 These findings correspond to my own view of Hawthorn 
and its internet reception in two particular respects. First, just as Farrer’s youthful 
respondents use their own sexual stories and concepts of sexual rights to resist the 
authority of social norms, in particular the intolerance of ‘premature love’ (zaolian) 
in Chinese schools, so too do some viewers of Hawthorn contend the authority of 
the film’s perceived disapproval of premarital sex. Secondly, Farrer finds that ‘youth 
in present-day China have developed their own more permissive sexual standards 
primarily based on a code of romance’; Farrer calls this ‘romance as resistance.’44 In 
the analysis that follows, we will see that ‘romance as resistance’ is a tendency visible 
in many responses to Hawthorn: some viewers value the romance of the film as 
implicitly critiquing the materialism of present-day Chinese society, and they reject 
the perceived sexual cynicism of the film’s critics.
 Contextually Hawthorn should also be seen as one of a significant body of retro-
spective representations of sexual behaviour during the Cultural Revolution. As 
Wendy Larson and Emily Honig have shown, a large body of literary works and 
films have used the Cultural Revolution as a space for exploring issues, not only of 
citizenship in a broad sense, but of sexual citizenship in particular. 45 Larson discusses 
the many negative consequences of the period’s equation of sex with bourgeois 
ideology, and details examples of actual sexual abuses that took place, such as the 
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sexual exploitation of sent-down youth by rural cadres.46 However, she also demon-
strates that many Chinese, including memoir-writers and filmmakers, have found it 
valuable to speak out about the era’s sexual histories, in revisitings of the past that shed 
light on the present. While these accounts often emphasize the many sexual horrors 
of the time, others, such as Jiang Wen’s film Yangguang Canlan De Rizi (In The Heat of 
the Sun) (1994), have portrayed the sexual freedoms that became available to many in 
the relative absence of parental supervision.47 As Honig argues, both types of account 
can illuminate the present in exposing continuities as well as ruptures. In the case of 
Hawthorn, it is precisely the nature of sexual morality in the present that comes into 
question through reviewing of a Cultural Revolution ‘sexual story.’
Negative reviews: Contention of Hawthorn’s sexual storytelling
In my analysis of reviews of Hawthorn, I start with negative reviews for the simple 
reason that these perform contention most obviously, even if positive reviews will also 
be found to be contentious too in important ways. The aim here is to analyse not only 
the content but also the manner of this questioning of the film’s sexual story. Above 
all, it can be found that these reviews closely match Guobin Yang’s account of popular 
styles and genres of contention on the Chinese internet. Irreverence and playfulness 
are immediately apparent. The most popular review of Hawthorn on Douban (receiving 
the greatest number of ‘useful’ ratings) is an extended e’gao (parody) that mocks the 
perceived implausibility of the film’s plotline.48 Another parodic review incorporates a 
spoof interview with Zhang Yimou.49 Light-hearted irreverence can be seen in many 
reviews through how Zhang Yimou himself is referred to, such as, in one review, ‘old 
Mouzi,’ and, with tongue in cheek, ‘guoshi’ [educator of the nation].50
 A feature special to the irreverence of Hawthorn reviews, however, is the way in 
which graphically or suggestively sexual language and imagery in particular is used 
to contend Hawthorn’s perceived pretence of coyness. A pattern emerges of such 
language being used satirically to undermine or unmask the supposed inauthenticity 
of the sexual story. The most popular non-parodic review of Hawthorn on Douban at 
the time of writing, by ‘Gongyuan1874’, is entitled ‘Freshness and Purity Coming out 
of the Clothes of a Prostitute.’51 This begins in rather startling fashion by graphically 
describing the range of sexual gratifications available in many Chinese cities, including 
domination and school uniform fetishism. The latter is particularly emphasized in the 
review, the point being that Hawthorn is analogous with the sex industry in contem-
porary China, through amounting to little but a commercially packaged version 
of schoolgirl-style innocence designed to titillate and exploit a paying audience. 
Gongyuan1874 also complains that the emotive ending of Hawthorn is a kind of 
pornography; if we cry at seeing characters losing a loved one to leukaemia (as many 
audience members reportedly did), it is merely a physiological reaction, no different 
in essence to ‘getting an erection.’ The review links these points firmly to a critique 
of commercialism, attacking in particular the hypocritical producer Zhang Weiping 
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for making money from (covert) pornography while claiming his own product to be 
above the commercialism of the times.
 Several other reviewers attack Hawthorn, albeit playfully, using similarly graphic 
or suggestive sexual language. Some of these borrow from the rich lexicon of sexual 
Chinese internet slang; ‘Lv Jiaozhi,’ for example, pokes fun at the purity concept of 
the film by saying that Lao San is a ‘YY’ [yiyin, sexual fantasist], who really just wants 
to ‘fry rice [chaofan] with Jingqiu,’ but is forced to settle for masturbation (‘DIY’).52 
Other kinds of sexual discourse are also deployed: for example, pop psychology in 
‘Shale De Mao’s’ accusation that Zhang Yimou has a ‘virgin-complex’ (qunv qingjie), 
and literary allusion in the same review, with its claim that ‘the couple in one 
shot look like a “big uncle” and his Lolita’ (dashu he luolita). For ‘Nalanmiaoshu,’ 
Hawthorn is like a pornographic film with a ‘strange uncle’ (guai shushu), or a doctor 
seducing a patient; but at the same time Zhang Yimou is ‘like court eunuch trying to 
tell a pornographic story’; he cannot ‘hit the spot’, because he is lacking the correct 
‘organ’ to tell such a tale.53 Similarly, in criticizing the supposed unsubtleness of the 
bedroom scene in which ‘Lao San reaches straight for Jingqiu’s private parts [sichu],’ 
another reviewer exclaims: ‘Fuck! [wo cao] Zhang Yimou, what kind of depravity are 
you thinking of?’54
 What this sexually frank style highlights is the claim to sexual citizenship that 
these reviews effectively make by contending the pretence of purity in Hawthorn’s 
sexual story. By bringing sexual content to light, and moreover doing so in sexualized 
language, they implicitly wrest authority over sexual morals and rights from the film 
and its director. They demonstrate not only their facility with sexual language but 
also their knowledge of other kinds of sexual stories: one, as we have seen, is Lolita; 
another, cited by Gongyuan1874 as truly exemplifying the ‘purity’ that Hawthorn 
merely pretends to have, is the Italian film Malèna, for its depiction of a kind-hearted 
prostitute.55
 Perhaps the most playfully inventive of the negative reviews is one which combines 
a sexually frank style with verse. Yang Guobin has noted that verse has played a 
venerable role in cultures of contention in Chinese history.56 Updating this tradition, 
the review entitled ‘Great Master, the People Present You with a Pair of Pants’ is an 
elaborate ‘shape poem’ in triangular form, intended to resemble a pair of underpants 
(see figure 16.1).57 It makes much play with rhyme; every line ends in the ‘ang’ sound, 
leading to rhyming of ‘angzang’ [dirty], ‘selang’ [lustful wolf] (applied to Lao San) 
and ‘Yimou Zhang’ (Zhang Yimou’s name mockingly inverted with reference to his 
international fame, taken here as a sign of inauthenticity).
 As against all of this irreverence and profanity, some negative reviews adopt a more 
serious tone, even using more formal, literary, or academic style and answering Yang’s 
identification of a ‘prosaic’ and even technical style of Chinese internet contention. 
The review by ‘Baisange Feiyun’ advances a scholarly argument as to why Hawthorn 
should not be considered a ‘pure love’ film; it transgresses the rules of this genre, the 
proper features of which are described in some detail.58 A review by ‘andrew’ uses 
formal language to make a series of statements on moral responsibility, somewhat in 
the matter of a letter to a newspaper, such as that ‘A reputable filmmaker has a duty to 
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follow the laws of filmmaking, and protect the good name and the value of cinema,’ 
and that ‘we make ourselves complicit by going to see these films.’59 Nalanmiaoshu, 
whose blog reveals her to be a published author with a doctorate in literature,60 demol-
ishes Hawthorn via a series of numbered points and language full of literary allusion.61
 As well as academic and literary styles, negative reviewers also make use of confes-
sional and autobiographical genres, which, as mentioned above, Yang has found to be 
widely used in Chinese internet contention. Family histories are used to add veracity 
to their reviews; Gongyuan1874, for example, cites his own family’s experiences to 
argue that the Cultural Revolution was a period of sexual exploitation, far from the 
era of comic sexual innocence portrayed by the film.62 Another more mundane kind 
of ‘autobiographical’ veracity is provided by reviewers who offer first-person narratives 
of their experience of watching the film, for example Nalanmiaoshu’s wearied account: 
‘Ten minutes in, my friend and I were looking at each other in dismay, and saying 
“What shall we do? Stay or leave?”’63 Negative reviews thus use a variety of approaches, 
styles and genres to subvert the authority of the film’s sexual storytelling, to assert 
youthful sexual knowledge and rights and to reference sexual stories of their own.
Positive reviews: Romance as resistance
In contrast to the irreverent, playful and sexually frank styles used to critique the film, 
positive reviews of Hawthorn have two notable features: first, while not necessarily 
Figure 16.1 Screenshot of the review ‘Great Master, The People Present You with a 
Pair of Pants’ on douban.com.
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precluding a certain inventiveness, they tend to make use of more earnest styles 
of contention; and secondly, they frequently exemplify the notion of romance as 
resistance. These reviews often deploy a romantic language, and experiment with 
genres that can accommodate such language. The most popular positive review of 
Hawthorn on Douban is not a really a review at all, but rather a kind of polemic 
on romantic love in the form of a prose poem. Entitled ‘You Must Believe There is 
Such a Person in This World,’ this brief (277-character) text repeatedly apostrophizes 
the reader with the words ‘You must believe,’ making for a more strident appeal to 
romantic sentiment than Hawthorn itself. Using cinematic imagery, the review urges 
readers to persevere in their search for a lover ‘whether right now you are surrounded 
by light and drowning in applause, or all alone crossing the cold street, soaked by 
the heavy rain.’64 Hawthorn itself is not mentioned; it is merely implied that film and 
review share the same spirit of romantic resistance.
 Another review that uses stylized prose and a distinct genre to find resistance in 
romance is that of ‘Joyuan.’ This review takes the form of rhetorically patterned prose, 
a series of eight short paragraphs all beginning with the phrase ‘the we of then’ (na 
shi de women) and formulaically comparing past with present.65 The spartan lifestyles 
and naïve romantic behaviours of ‘then’ (the Cultural Revolution) are contrasted 
with the supposed evils of the present day, from mobile phones to ‘sweet words 
and honeyed phrases.’ Items such as ‘lovers’ adornments and rings’ and ‘man-eating 
beauty’ respectively invoke the supposed materialism and exploitation of today’s more 
cynical romantic narratives. The review concludes, breaking its rhetorical pattern, 
with a statement that the film’s protagonists ‘teach us how to believe in love and 
persevere with love’ and that the ‘callow writings’ of the reviewer are offered up ‘to 
the pure Jingqiu and Lao San and to a pure life.’ Thus the very language of Hawthorn’s 
marketing campaign, that of ‘purity,’ is reappropriated in a context of defiance and 
resistance to perceived anti-romantic tendencies in contemporary society.
 As with negative reviews, an academic or pseudo-academic style may be used 
to support the film. ‘Zhongyuan,’ for example, claims that Hawthorn embodies 
what he calls ‘Love as Metaphysics.’66 This review positively contends the value of 
Hawthorn’s romantic narrative through a rather rambling and unclear assemblage of 
philosophical quotes and ideas: the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi’s idea of ‘free and 
easy wandering’ (xiaoyaoyou), for example, is cited in support of the claim that what 
matters is the romantic ‘mood’ (xinqing) of the film, rather than consideration of its 
truth-status; while Kant is quoted as saying ‘even if reality is this way, I still believe,’ 
ostensibly in support of the notion that love should be an article of faith, and act as 
an index of virtue.
 Autobiographical and confessional modes may also be used in positive reviews, 
just as in their negative counterparts. A review entitled ‘About the Era My Mother 
Remembers,’ as well as incorporating a first-person narrative of the act of movie-
going (‘I just went to see Hawthorn with my mother’), details at some length the 
Cultural Revolution history of the reviewer’s family. 67 At times these reminiscences 
are explicitly linked to Hawthorn: ‘Jingqiu volunteers to repair the sports ground. 
Similarly my mother sprayed pesticide over a large tree. She would work voluntarily 
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until dead tired. That was the mindset of the time.’ But memoir far outweighs film 
commentary in this review, the very excess of the former thereby seeming to testify 
to the film’s historical resonance and veracity. The review ultimately uses its praise of 
Hawthorn’s truthfulness to endorse the romantic storytelling of the film: ‘People who 
haven’t experienced sincere first love and young love won’t understand this film.’
 As with negative reviews, then, positive reviews make use of a range of styles and 
genres of contention, eschewing playfulness, irreverence and sexually frank language, 
while deploying rhetorically patterned ‘poetic’ prose, pseudo-academic discourse and 
autobiographical reflections. Above all, they praise love and romance, producing the 
discourse of romance as resistance in support of Hawthorn’s variety of sexual story-
telling. The sexual citizenship assertion in these reviews, more implicit than explicit, 
consists in their upholding the right to ‘believe in love,’ to pursue romance, and to 
enjoy and praise sexual stories such as Hawthorn where these are found to be in 
keeping with a self-consciously contentious belief in anti-materialistic ‘purity.’
Counter-contention
As has already been observed, the capabilities of Douban allow for user-to-user 
interactive dialogue on films. Accordingly, a key characteristic of the commentary 
on Hawthorn is precisely its interactivity, chiefly in the form of comments directly 
supporting or criticizing reviews. Comments, like reviews themselves, contain a range 
of meanings and express these in a range of styles, variously approving, echoing, 
extrapolating, mocking and insulting the reviews to which they are attached.
 Hawthorn’s supporters, for example, frequently deplore negative reviews as forming 
part of the very culture of anti-romanticism that they see themselves as contending. 
In response to Gongyuan1874’s notion that Hawthorn fetishizes schoolgirls, one 
commenter responds: ‘I think you are just the kind of virgin-defiler and male suprem-
acist you talk about. Maybe you have never experienced true love and don’t know how 
it feels.’68 Answering Nalanmiaoshu’s structured, literary and sexually frank review is 
the comment: ‘Your remarks are not very broad, and perhaps just suit today’s society 
and taste. Kind of lamentable.’69 Not only comments, but also some reviews are written 
in response to other reviews, for example Zhongyuan’s ‘Love as Metaphysics.’ Quoting 
earlier, negative Douban reviewers’ critical comments, such as that Hawthorn merely 
shows us ‘rich kids picking up girls’ (fu’erdai paoniu), Zhongyuan remarks: ‘Seeing the 
comments on the web, I really want to curse: “You evil moths, so ignorant, please do 
not bawl mercilessly everywhere.”’70 Conversely, Hawthorn’s supporters often approve 
one another’s romantic contentions. The review entitled ‘You must believe that there is 
such a person in the world,’ for example, receives the response: ‘I do ultimately believe 
these things, even though I understand what kind of society this is.’71 Putting the 
same sentiment more strongly, one commenter on Zhongyuan’s review supportively 
remarks that it’s ‘tragedy for this society’ that so many people despise and mock a film 
like Hawthorn.72
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 In contrast to this positive-spirited interactivity, however, negative reviewers too 
use Douban’s interactive spaces to counter-contend positive reviewers’ meanings 
and styles. Zhongyuan’s pseudo-academic essay, for example, is variously refuted as 
an argument for Hawthorn’s handling of ‘love as metaphysics’ (rather, it is claimed 
that the film’s representation of love is superficial), and criticized for its haphazard 
and unclear use of philosophical terms and quotations.73 As a final point on the 
interactivity of the Douban space, it should be noted that, while some reviewers, such 
as Gongyuan1874, thank and praise the website for its services in allowing a culture 
of contention to flourish, Douban itself (through its editors) at times suppresses this 
culture through censorship. 74 One review calls itself a ‘harmonized version,’ and 
explains that it is a reposting in edited form of a highly rated and much-commented-
on review that was deleted from the site, ostensibly for using sensitive words 
blacklisted by China’s internet authorities.75 Drawing attention to the limits of internet 
contention, commentors on this review find little to do but complain at Douban for its 
capitulation to state power, via comments such as ‘Douban is really evil.’76
Conclusion
Online spaces for film criticism are a relatively new and under-researched part of film 
culture in China. Such spaces have proliferated rapidly and provide rich and diverse 
content for the understanding of this culture. Although online film commentary 
may be circumscribed by both the commercial logic of the market, with its ‘hyping’ 
of certain films, and by state power, with its restrictions on freedom of expression, 
it nevertheless allows for strongly contending meanings and forms of criticism to 
circulate and mutually interact. In spite of what might be supposed to be the limita-
tions of the film review format, comments may borrow from a range of genres and 
styles of contention, even including forms that might appear incongruous within 
established practices of film criticism. Characteristic of such contention are, on the 
one hand, playfulness, jokes, parody and irreverence towards authority, and, on the 
other, the use of more serious or deadpan styles and genres, from prosaic description 
and analysis to autobiographical narrative. The forms of authority challenged by 
reviewers may include the status of established, state-endorsed filmmakers and the 
power of the commercial film market. Film commentary may in addition contribute 
to wider social debates around matters such as sexual citizenship and historical repre-
sentation, challenging the influence of mainstream popular culture in determining 
meanings around issues of sexual citizenship, and weighing conflicting claims and 
counter-claims towards sexual stories in the public realm, for example those set during 
the Cultural Revolution. In the contestation of Hawthorn’s variously suspected and 
approved sexual storytelling, special modes of contention include, on the one hand, 
explicit or suggestive sexual language and imagery, and, on the other, a romanticism 
that sees itself as a form of resistance to crassly anti-romantic social norms and 
tendencies in contemporary China. While this chapter necessarily makes only a small 
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contribution to analysing internet cultures of contention in China, considering the 
implications of participatory spaces of film commentary for film culture, and investi-
gating the use of such commentary as a means of intervention into social debates on 
sexual citizenship, it is hoped that subsequent research will go further in investigating 
these and related issues.
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From the Glaring Sun to Flying Bullets : 
Aesthetics and Memory in the ‘Post-’ Era 
Chinese Cinema
Xiao Liu
How do we remember the past in a post-medium era in which our memories of 
a previous era are increasingly reliant upon, and thus continually revised by, the 
ubiquitous presence of media networks? Writing about the weakening historicity 
under late capitalism, Fredric Jameson sharply points out that the past has been 
reduced to ‘a multitudinous photographic simulacrum,’ ‘a set of dusty spectacles.’1 
Following Guy Debord’s critique of the spectacle as ‘the final form of commodity 
reification’ in a society ‘where exchange value has been generalized to the point at 
which the very memory of use value is effaced,’ Jameson reveals the ways in which the 
past appropriated by what he calls ‘nostalgia films’ is ‘now refracted through the iron 
law of fashion change and the emergent ideology of the generation’ for omnivorous 
consumption that is an outcome of neoliberalism and its cultural motor – post-
modernism. Implicit in Jameson’s argument is how the crisis of historicity is tied to 
the commercialization of media and the repetitious production of media simulacra. 
Jameson’s argument generally follows the line of the critique of the mass media as laid 
out of the Frankfurt School critics, focusing on the ideological function of the cultural 
industry. How has the post-medium, networked society of control changed this milieu 
diagnosed by Jameson?
 I use ‘post-medium’ on the one hand to refer to the state of media saturation in 
our current moment, and on the other hand, to illustrate the conditions of media 
convergence that challenge the modernist notion of media specificity.2 First raised 
by art critic Rosalind Krauss (2000) to address the increasing threat to the notion 
of media specificity by the pervasive power of electronic and digital media, the 
term ‘post-medium’ has become part of a contentious discourse for rethinking the 
relationship between cinema and other forms of media, as well as the socio-economic 
and political powers that shape and are in turn reshaped by a network society. 
Pertinent here is Friedrich Kittler’s observation of the convergence of media in the 
form of digital coding and computer processing. Henry Jenkins furthers Kittler’s 
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notion of ‘convergence culture,’ and adds to the technical definition with ‘the flow of 
content across multiple media platforms, the cooperation between multiple media 
industries, and the migratory behavior of media audiences who would go almost 
anywhere in search of the kinds of entertainment experiences they wanted.’3 While 
convergence culture involves a technological process of ‘bringing together multiple 
media functions within the same gadgets and devices,’ this hybrid media experience, 
above all else, also represents a shift in the cultural logic ‘as consumers are encouraged 
to seek out new information and make connections between dispersed media content.’ 
While affirming the increasing role of consumers, Jenkins also points out that this 
convergence culture is ‘shaped by the desires of media conglomerates to expand their 
empires across multiple media platforms.’
 Here Jenkins’s elaboration of convergence culture raises several pertinent issues. 
First, cultural production has shifted from a producer-controlled mode of mass 
culture to a more distributed mode of networks. Consumers are no longer just at the 
end of the commodity chain, waiting to consume the products provided to them by 
an industry, but are also today increasingly incorporated into the very production of 
these commodities. Second, while the emergence of ‘prosumers’ becomes a crucial 
issue among current network theories, in this chapter I ask what pressures are placed 
on ‘auteurs’ to replicate and be reflexive to new media platforms and distributed 
‘prosumers’? What are the aesthetic choices of ‘auteurs’ in this networked society? 
Finally, I relate this former question to the eclipse of historicity raised by Jameson: has 
the increasing participation of the audience in media culture broken down the repeti-
tious spectacularization of historical memories, as Jameson suggests?
 An examination of the media repercussions of Jiang Wen’s 2010 film Rang zidan fei 
(Let the Bullets Fly) may address this question in the context of contemporary Chinese 
cinema. Loosely set in the 1920s (a time of ‘revolutions’ against warlords and imperi-
alism) and with references to real historical figures, the film seems uninterested in 
providing a serious historical backdrop for narration: its characters mouth buzzwords 
from current social media, pulling the audience out of the film’s constructed past; any 
references to historical facts in the film are seemingly ridiculed and dismissed by its 
characters as insignificant, as Let the Bullets Fly comes to construct a past which is 
reduced to filmic bricolage.
 Despite the commercial success of the film with its domestic box office take of 700 
million RMB, Let the Bullets Fly also generated heated discussion in Chinese tabloids 
and on online social media sites. Instead of reading the film as a historical account, its 
audience read each segment of the film’s various media incidents in relation to their 
own postsocialist experiences. This anachronistic juxtaposition of the past and the 
present compels a critical reflection on the intertwined relationship between cinematic 
representation of history and social media networks. Most online discussion centred 
upon the notion of ‘revolution,’ as the protagonist of the film, Zhang Muzhi (Jiang 
Wen), is simultaneously a bandit who fights for the poor against the warlords and 
a cynical revolutionist who belittles the masses as self-interested and politically 
apathetic. The online debate around ‘revolution’ also has to do with the ambiguity of 
the overloaded word in postsocialist memories of twentieth-century China.
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 With the end of the Cultural Revolution and the Mao era, official historical narra-
tives of Chinese Revolutions gradually lost their ideological coherence and credibility 
under the drastic process of marketization led by the CCP. Though the memories 
associated with ‘revolution’ are repeatedly remediated in literature and cinema, the 
ideology and sentiments behind these narratives and representations are often fuzzy 
and self-contradictory. Without serious historical reflections, these narratives often 
slip into commercialization of the past. Thus any film that evokes the ‘revolutionary 
past’ has to address the existing media stereotypes and the danger of reducing history 
for nostalgic consumption.
 In the latter part of this chapter I will examine the ways in which the intermedia 
flows between cinema and the internet have transformed the textuality of Let the Bullets 
Fly, placing the film amid the economy of exchanges of social media and creating an 
experience of temporality that is aligned with what Jameson describes as the eclipse 
of historicity. I use ‘economy’ here because accompanied with flows of media contents 
is the flow of money, and the box office of the film affirms again that the production 
of cinema today still follows the rule of commodity production. Yet before that, I will 
draw attention to Jiang Wen’s previous film made in 2007 – Taiyang zhaochang shengqi 
(The Sun Also Rises). Aesthetically distinct from Let the Bullets Fly, The Sun Also Rises 
shows Jiang Wen’s almost modernist efforts to construct a self-enclosed cinematic 
world, and his self-conscious interrogation on the narrative possibilities of the revolu-
tionary past in a postsocialist and post-medium era. To read the two films in tandem 
promises to reveal not only the pressure of social media networks on the autonomy of 
cinema, but also their shared social conditions of production behind their disparate 
aesthetics.
 Starting with a close reading on The Sun Also Rises, I will elucidate the multiple 
temporalities implicit in the elliptical narrative of the film, which I regard as Jiang 
Wen’s reflections on the representability of the past: how to tell the stories of the past 
when the existing narratives are either hollow official ideology or commodification of 
reified nostalgia? Jiang, in his efforts to eschew media stereotypes, created exquisite 
sensuous images to evoke historical memories. Though my analysis of this film does 
not directly involve its reception on social media, I argue that the narrative and 
aesthetic of the film self-consciously address the issue of media and representability in 
a media-saturated society. The relation of cinematic images to existing media stereo-
types is implicit in Jiang’s choice of aesthetic.
 I will then come back to Let the Bullets Fly, examining its audience reception and 
the role of social media in that reception, and conclude with a parallel reading of the 
two films in terms of their shared dilemma of representing the past. In other words, 
I read both films symptomatically as revealing the crisis of historicity and represent-
ability in a post-medium, postsocialist era. The seemingly self-enclosed aesthetic of 
The Sun Also Rises displays Jiang’s arduous effort to preserve the autonomous space of 
an ‘auteur’ film amid constant flows of media, and to bring attention to the entangled 
relations between media and historicity. Let the Bullets Fly serves as a counterpoint 
in this sense, as its open textuality lends itself to the dissemination of media and the 
networked media effect of simultaneity that eclipses the historicity of ‘deep time.’ 
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Focusing on one auteur’s two films of very different aesthetics, this chapter analyses 
the dilemma of ‘writing’ memories in the postsocialist, post-medium milieu.
Elliptical remembrance and erotic memories
From his directorial debut In the Heat of the Sun, Jiang Wen has always been fasci-
nated with exploring the ambivalent experiences of his generation and their growing 
up during the Cultural Revolution as ‘eggs under the red flag.’4 To Ma Xiaojun and 
his playmates, the days ‘in the heat of the sun,’ often in the absence of their physical 
fathers, are thrilling and restless, full of adventures and disillusionment. In The Sun 
Also Rises, his third feature-film, Jiang revisited the ambivalent experiences of his 
generation again, this time in a more elliptical way. There are four fragments loosely 
woven together, with the first three set in the year 1976, the last in 1958. In the first 
fragment of the narrative, we find a son (Fang Zuling) who is eager to trace the 
whereabouts of his absentee father from his ‘mad’ yet mysterious mother (Zhou Yun), 
who secretly builds a white stone house in the forest – in effect, her own museum 
which holds pictures of opera heroes and other nostalgic items from the Maoist era. 
The second vignette is about the affair between Tang (Jiang Wen) and Dr. Lin (Joan 
Chen) and the suicide of their friend Liang (Huang Qiusheng). The third vignette is 
about another affair, of Tang’s wife (Kong Wei) with Fang. The fourth vignette is about 
two women, the mad mother and Tang’s wife, whose life paths crisscross with Xin 
Jiang, on her way to claim a few items left behind by her deceased husband, the other 
marrying Tang, an overseas intellectual who returns to ‘support the construction of 
the new China.’
 To straighten out the plot, Jiang Wen clarified in an interview in 2007, that: ‘At 
the beginning everyone comes together from all directions, everyone is in love. The 
mother is, so are Tang and his wife, and they all meet in Xinjiang. Decades later, 
husbands and wives are split, Tang betrays his wife, his wife also has an affair and 
the son is killed.’5 In Jiang’s half-joking accounts, the film becomes a cluster of stories 
about the fragmentation and deterioration of human ties across the initial decades 
of the ‘new China.’ However, the commotion and significance of political events are 
all removed from the film. Instead, the film on the surface is simply diffused with 
unaccountable erotic desires and love affairs that take up the majority of running time 
of the film. Why does Jiang strenuously reconstruct the memory of his generation as 
such a drama of erotic desires?
 To move to In the Heat of Sun, Jiang Wen consciously mediates the narrative of 
his film through the voiceover of the desire-stricken protagonist Ma. His erotic desire 
drives and manipulates the narrative, which makes him an unreliable narrator. In this 
coming-of-age story, the absence of the biological father alludes to the ubiquitous 
presence of the symbolic father – the Party, which authoritatively demands the son’s 
total submission and devotion. In this sense, the ‘illicit’ erotic desire of Ma in the 
film symptomatically indicates a love–hate relationship of the son with his symbolic 
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father. In The Sun Also Rises, the story of ‘the son’s generation’ continues as that of the 
disoriented Fang, who desperately seeks any traces left by his never-seen father. The 
plot of the film invites an allegorical reading, as it is set in 1976, the year of the end of 
the Cultural Revolution and the Mao era, and therefore also serves as an indicator of 
the shaken authority of the symbolic father. The son’s journey of seeking starts exactly 
at the point when the traces of the symbolic father begin to fade. The face-effaced 
photo of his parents, a bunch of unreadable letters and self-contradictory accounts 
by other people, all fail to give him a coherent story. Moreover, Jiang Wen’s reversed 
order of narration from the point of deterioration already suggests an impossible 
task of recuperating the past, for any such recuperation reflects the desire for intact 
memories in an era of deterioration. Along with the two temporalities of the recalling 
‘now’ and the elusive past in the film, there is also the phenomenological present of 
viewing (and making) the film: the son’s difficulty in recuperating the past is parallel 
to the tough task of the audience (and the filmmaker) to reconstruct the past. Thus the 
reverse order of storytelling in the film becomes a self-referential gesture: is it possible 
for us who live during the post-medium, postsocialist ‘now’ to recuperate the memory 
of the past? Self-consciously addressing this tension between the present and the past, 
forgetting and remembering, the stories in the film become elliptical fragments. It is 
this aesthetic of ellipsis that Jiang employs to salvage the grains of memory.
 In an interview, Jiang Wen was frank to describe the effects of his film as a ‘flirtation 
with the audience,’ as he claimed: ‘I am not content with a narration of a crawling 
speed…. I want it to be spinning and dancing, to be high and intoxicating. Only in 
this way can the film evoke the audience’s feelings and emotions.’ He also mentioned 
his fascination with the ‘red’ ballet classic The Red Detachment of Women: ‘As a boy, 
every time I watched The Red Detachment of Women, I was dazed by the dozen pairs 
of women’s legs on the stage, their toes, their revolutionary will and the music, all 
full of sensations. That is truly an extraordinary show.’6 From the young Jiang Wen’s 
perspective, the Chinese revolutionary drama could be both sensational and erotic.
 In The Sun Also Rises, Jiang reinvigorates his erotic memories of the red classic. 
The audience is provided with a scene that takes place at an outdoor film screening, in 
which the character Liang walks into an amorous field of soft, rosy light surrounding 
the screen. The next shot reveals, instead of the images on the screen, their ‘electronic 
shadows’ in a rippling pond, glittering yet blurry. An oblique vision of a corner of 
the screen soon shifts to the intoxicated audience depicted in the film, whose bodies 
involuntarily dance to the brisk music. Then the camera slowly pans to the projector, 
gently caressing its beams of blue light before shifting to the ‘pixelated’ screen, which 
finally reveals the movie to be The Red Detachment of Women. In this scene, the 
revolutionary film is no longer about iconic images and storytelling, but rather about 
sensuous light and rhythm visually abstracted. The field of the film screening becomes 
a field so infused with erotic desires that Liang cannot but help reaching out his hand 
toward a girl before him. As if to poke fun at the now-erotic ambience accumulated 
through the previous shots, an outburst from the audience ‘Catch the hooligan!’ 
turns the film screening into a comic chase scene: hundreds of flashlights mimic the 
projector, pursuing the running Liang as they project beams of light on him. The 
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projector, originally facing the screen, also turns around, joining the flashlight search, 
chasing Liang. As it sweeps across the frenzied crowd in sprint, it becomes a machine 
gun, shooting its ‘bullet-like’ beams of light toward the exhilarated crowd. The scene 
at this moment transforms itself into a mimetic reference to a war scene in so many 
of the revolutionary period films, only this time the bullets are the sensuous beams 
of cinematic light that double as reified political energies. The chase scene becomes a 
type of mass euphoria, in synch with the rhythmic movement of the sweeping light. 
Here, in Jiang Wen’s own words, revolution and erotic desires are ironically entangled. 
The diegetic and the extradiegetic spaces are blurred in this playful turn. The images, 
with no fixed, sharp shapes, become affective and fluid-like, transcending the frame of 
the screen and making the audience themselves erotic and heroic subjects.
 Jiang Wen is not alone in discovering the erotic power of revolutionary film. Recent 
scholarship has contributed helpful insights on this issue. In his ‘Communists Have 
More Fun’ (2009), Jason McGrath examines the sublimation thesis in Chinese revolu-
tionary films – whereby he posits that the sublimation of ‘libidinal drives towards the 
object of revolution’ – first advanced by Chris Berry, and fully developed by Wang 
Ban, who, against the repression thesis that revolutionary films repress individual 
desires and emotions, discovers ‘an intense emotional exuberance’ in revolutionary 
films. McGrath exquisitely pinpoints the ways in which the conventions of Hollywood 
romance are adopted and appropriated to show ‘the growing bond between the female 
protagonist and the communist cause.’7 It is through the conventions of romance 
that libidinal energy is aroused and re-channelled for revolutionary cause. Given 
this confluence of ideas, McGrath further proposes ‘the possibility that audiences 
may have enjoyed (mis)reading the visual cues of Hollywood romance according 
to their “original,” unsublimated meanings and taken pleasure in the implied love 
stories featuring attractive actors whether or not the political meanings had much 
effect on their consciousness.’ His investigation of post-Mao era films shows ‘a reverse 
sublimation in which the public and political passions of the prior narrative mode 
are quickly channeled into the private, masochistic libidinal trajectory.’ One example 
Figure 17.1 The amorous screen of revolutionary ballet in Let the Bullets Fly (2010).
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he gives is Letter from an Unknown Woman (2004), which happens to feature Jiang 
Wen as the male lead. It replaces revolutionary narrative with the erotic desire of 
individuals, and its historical setting plays only a marginal role.
 McGrath’s investigation highlights the intimate dynamics between revolutionary 
narrative and erotic desires. The attempts to write or rewrite contemporary Chinese 
history through the dynamics between revolution and erotic desire can also be found 
in Wang Xiaobo’s Foucauldian take on the Cultural Revolution. In his widely read 
stories such as ‘The Golden Age’ (Huangjin shidai) and ‘Love in an Era of Revolution’ 
(Geming shidai de aiqing), Wang provides a witty narrative in which libidinal energy 
is generated and dispersed around the sadistic mechanisms of political interrogation. 
A similar scene appears in The Sun Also Rises, in which the interrogation process to 
decide who committed sexual harassment during the film screening turns out to be an 
erotic field for the female character Lin to satisfy her own sexual desire. However, if 
Wang Xiaobo’s ironic narrator keeps his readers at a reflective distance, the sensuality 
found in The Sun absorbs its audience into an intense, erotically charged mise-en-
scène. Jiang Wen intoxicates himself with the memories of erotic desires, and ‘flirts’ 
– in his own words – with his audience through the erotic power of his film. The 
aforementioned scene of the film screening, where the cinematic apparatus becomes 
the erotic object for the camera to caress, therefore, self-referentially points back to the 
role of cinema in producing erotic desire and mediating historical memories.
 Jiang’s eroticization of the past on the one hand exposes the channelling of libidinal 
energy in revolutionary films, while on the other hand revealing that when revolu-
tionary narratives hollow out with the official ideology, it is the fragments of erotic 
memories that connect his generation to the past. In other words, historical memories 
now exist merely as remnants of bodily experience.
A textual reading of the invisible
Just as the son in The Sun Also Rises who desperately seeks the traces of his inaccessible 
father in order to approach the inapproachable, Jiang develops his own aesthetic of 
‘gesturing’ beyond the visible images. The first section of the film is made of numerous 
chase scenes, in which the camera has to desperately ‘run’ or ‘track’ its subject in 
order to follow the same desperately running son who is after his crazy mother. 
The mise-en-scène is activated and animated as the camera sweeps across a bucolic 
countryside. As if the camera is too engrossed in the single-minded chase game, it no 
longer gives a clear vision of the world. Moreover, the camera is always forced to turn 
from its headlong horizontal movement toward the vertical axis, as the mother often 
disappears from the horizontal view and suddenly reappears in a tall tree or in a cave 
beneath the roots of a tree. What can she see from atop the tree? The camera never 
follows her closely enough to provide us with her point of view. It can only mimic 
her movement, and through its ‘bodily’ mimicry induces the bodily movement of 
the audience, but also always reminds us of its own (and the audience’s) historically 
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situated and thus limited perspective on the world around us. The rhythmic repetition 
of the chase scenes conveys the pulsating movement of the camera, pushes the 
bodily experience of the audience beyond the visible, and, by calling attention to the 
restricted perspective of the camera, indicates the existence of another reality, a world 
beyond our familiar vision.
 This world beyond our familiar vision is further suggested by the mother’s floating 
slab of riverbank and her mysterious stone house in the forest. A patch of riverbank 
that can be unanchored from the riverbed gestures toward an alternative topography 
that cannot be accessed through banal perceptions of the world around us. Following 
this floating riverbank, the son is led to a white stone house. As if in dream, a hidden 
world is suddenly revealed to him. Yet at this moment when this other world begins 
to take its shape, the son shivers and his several sneezes leaves everything in ruins. 
The magic has suddenly disappeared, and the dream of the other world is as flimsy 
as cinematic images that can easily become blurry and filmy when the light disperses. 
The abrupt appearance and disappearance of this other world leaves the son (and the 
audience) oscillating between reality and illusion, this world and the dream world.
 The haunting oscillation cracks open the solid surface of the world we thought we 
understood, revealing the rich textuality and layered traces left by the hand of time. 
Thus images are no longer realistic but contingent on both personal experiences and 
historical memories that are evoked by the images. Jiang Wen describes his experience 
being haunted by the images as such:
I saw the film in my mind when I closed my eyes. Once I started shooting, I was 
fascinated with the feeling of fluidity, and tried to capture the images as I had 
seen. Their colours were always there. As if they were beams of light, the images 
sometimes jumped beside you, sometimes dwelled above your head. When you 
finally captured them, you felt that they were not your creation. They were already 
there (even before you made the film).8
In Jiang’s account, the content of these scintillating images no longer matters. It was 
the sensuality of the images that fascinated Jiang Wen and provided him a secret 
access to his innermost experience and buried memories. The images are glittering 
– intangible yet animated with their own life. It may not be a coincidence that Jiang 
requested his cinematographer Zhao Fei to overexpose the film in order to create 
a dreamy atmosphere. Overexposure brings in the glaring sunshine: everything is 
bathed in light, yet also rendered surreally nebulous. Jiang Wen’s apparent fascination 
with the sun persistently appears in the titles of his films, from In the Heat of the Sun 
to The Sun Also Rises. To people familiar with contemporary Chinese history, the sun 
in the Cultural Revolutionary years cannot be severed from its political and symbolic 
implication. Yet Jiang Wen, through his highly stylized cinematic language, trans-
forms the symbol into a hallucinatory experience of his individual take, as well as the 
euphoria and confusion of his generation growing up in the glaring sunshine. Their 
ambivalent experience of the years to be buried soon in history, their intoxication and 
disillusioned wakening, now can only appear as the sensual images and light.
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The inalienable possessions and the production of cinema
While reconstructing lost memories through sensual images, Jiang Wen is well aware 
that any reconstruction is necessarily incomplete and mediated. To a certain extent, 
the crazy mother signifies the incomprehensibility of the past from the perspective of 
the son, as Jiang Wen explains:
Why does the mad mother sing poems on the roof of her house? [That is because] 
she has an inner world that cannot be easily conveyed to her son. Any parents 
have their own stories of being thrown into mad love, and for some reason, they 
seldom tell their own love stories to their children. Their narrations are always 
broken. Their love stories may be conveyed around various objects passed down, 
but even so, the story the father told might be different with the one from the 
mother.9 (my italics)
Here ‘madness,’ instead of being perceived as abnormal, indicates unavoidable incom-
prehensibility and limited accessibility of latter generations to recover and recapitulate 
the past they scarcely knew. And stories are contingent upon objects passed down 
by their parents and inevitably fragmentary. The centrality of objects in the recol-
lections of the past brings our attention to the various particular objects in The Sun 
that connect subtly to the innermost world of the characters: the deceased husband’s 
dilapidated copy of What is to be Done?, a utopian novel on the subject of reforming 
the institutions of marriage and work by the Russian writer Nikolai Chernyshevsky; 
a stone house in the forest that holds items from an eclipsed era; and letters full of 
broken sentences and inexplicable jokes. These objects are posited at the boundary of 
reality and the realm of dream, blurring the line between the two.
 This is best seen in the pair of shoes that emerge directly from the mad mother’s 
dream: beside the shining rail tracks among flowers lies a pair of exquisitely embroi-
dered cloth shoes in the shape of fish. Next, the bare feet of a woman emerge from 
rippling water, and soon the feet are walking on a damp stone lane. As the camera 
shifts to focus on the pair of shoes in the woman’s hands, it gradually reveals the face 
of the woman to be the mad mother. These shots are fluidly bound together, with no 
distinction between dream and ‘real’ life, as if the mother retrieves the shoes directly 
out from her oneiric world, as she tells her son: ‘I dreamed the shoes. When I opened 
my eyes, I saw them.’ When she stands in front of a shop counter, the camera focuses 
on the hands on the table. Instead of those of the salesman or saleswoman, the hands 
on the other side of the table are a pair of infant’s hands, innocently knocking at the 
table as if impatiently waiting for the mother to pick up her shoes. The capricious joke 
Jiang Wen plays here immediately distances the scene from the buying-and-selling 
transactions of commodities. The pair of shoes is an inalienable possession10 with its 
own particularity, invested with the mother’s fantasies and innermost feelings. They 
are also inalienable because they are not exchangeable and replaceable commodities. 
After their mysterious disappearance, the son is never able to buy a similar pair for his 
mother.
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 However, this luscious world made of inalienable possessions cannot be severed 
from the industrial production of cinema today. The lush, colourful world in the 
cinematic space is in fact a composite of Jiang’s aesthetic pursuit as well as the 
economic rules that govern cinematic production, each reinforcing the other. Rather 
than being inalienable, objects used in the films are often transferred to the filming 
site from other remote areas. For The Sun Also Rises, hundreds of birds and beasts 
were shipped from thousands of miles away, and even the lustre of the their feather 
and fur was produced by manual labourers who literally painted them with dream-like 
colours. Tibetan-style houses that appear in the film were moved from Tibet to the 
filming site in Yunnan, but their roofs were replaced with Hani-style thatched roofs, 
typical of the dwellings of ethnic minorities in southwestern China. Even the pebbles 
used to build the stone house and the particular type of red earth in the film were 
shipped from elsewhere. Such a large scale of removal and recombination demands a 
huge amount of money to throw into the production of the film. This tension inside 
and outside of the film text is finally dramatically reflected in the film’s box office 
earnings: with an investment of 80 million RMB, the film gained merely less than 30 
million RMB. The film’s inalienable objects and the memories tied to them, which 
Jiang Wen invested great efforts to preserve, had to endure cruel economic pressures 
in an era when everything has become exchangeable commodities.
Exchangeable bullets
Jiang Wen’s 2010 film Let the Bullets Fly displays many similar ‘Jiang Wen’ elements, 
such as luscious mise-en-scène, a fascination with revolutionary history, and the 
remembrance of the past. But this time the film is set in the 1920s, in the aftermath of 
the 1911 Revolution led by Sun Yet-sen. It is also no coincidence, then, that the film 
was released on the occasion of the centenary of the 1911 Revolution. The film tells 
the story of Zhang Mazi (Jiang Wen), a previous revolutionary and now a head bandit 
committed to robbing the rich, who finds himself the enemy of a local landlord named 
Huang Silang (Chow Yun-Fat), and finally succeeds in his self-invented ‘revolution’ 
and distributes the landlord’s wealth among the masses.
 However, without the self-conscious reflection on its own narrative that occurs 
in The Sun Also Rises, Let the Bullets Fly is a facetious drama soaked with frolicking 
‘lightness’: the landlord Huang Silang has a stand-in, and the real and the stand-in 
often mimic each other; the bandits are revolutionaries at the start of the film, but 
become ‘legitimate’ government officials in the second half; prostitutes are revolu-
tionary heroines, and sometimes the propaganda team of the government; a caricature 
of the bandit leader Zhang Mazi shows no resemblance to the one who claims himself 
to be Zhang Mazi; a fake head of the county assumes the role of another fake head of 
the county; even the name Zhang Mazi is a farcical double of Zhang Muzhi. Every name 
and identity is a mask that anyone can try on for size; every individual appears with a 
different face each time. By wearing masks – in the film, characters wear literal masks 
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imprinted with abstract mah-jong signs – everyone becomes a bandit, or a hero from 
the revolution. The travesty of the role-playing game hollows out any identities. In the 
end, the narration of the film makes itself a mass entertainment in which everyone can 
imagine himself playing a role, and can release his libidinal energy in laughter.
 In this sense, Let the Bullets Fly assumes quite a different relationship with its 
audience. If The Sun keeps reminding its audience through meticulous narrative 
structure and mise-en-scène of the difficulty of recuperating the past, the participatory 
festivity of Let the Bullets Fly invites its audience members to replace history with 
their own ‘eternal present.’ In addition, fans were eager to match every detail of the 
film with recent media incidents. For example, netizens read one graphic scene in 
which one character opens up his own stomach to verify his unsullied character as a 
reference to the media explosion around a case in 2009 of a person ‘opening up the 
chest to examine his infected lung.’11 Jiang Wen’s bold imagination of having several 
galloping horses pulling a train was read as a play on the homonyms of ‘Marxism’ and 
‘horses’ in Chinese, an insinuation to the CCP’s forced ‘Marxist control’ over China. 
Let the Bullets Fly became an open text that dissipated into constant flows of media; 
its emptied signifiers provided a bit of everything for everyone, however different 
meaning each ‘prosumer’ gave to each bit. One amateur reviewer jumping on the 
historical discordance at the end of the film, in which the characters are going to the 
Pudong District of Shanghai, developed the following interpretation of the film:
The Pudong district fell under the jurisdiction of Shanghai only from 1958. It is 
totally anachronistic to have those guys by the end of the film announcing they’re 
leaving for Pudong of Shanghai. Why is this? Of course this is because Jiang 
Wen ambitiously made the film a parable of our time. Echeng and Pudong are 
two poles, one a closed, primitive inland small town, the other a coast city in the 
process of marching towards an open civil society.12
This reviewer believed that this anachronistic detail suggested Jiang Wen’s allusions 
to contemporary politics rather than his adherence to historical exactitude. Here 
‘revolution’ is equated with the reforms starting in Deng’s era. Placed within the 
simultaneity created by social media networks, the text of the film becomes a cluster 
of random hyperlinks, to which historical time becomes irrelevant.
 In contrast to The Sun’s miserable box office performance, Bullets won acclaims 
from its audience and was a box office smash. The different fates of these two films 
might testify to Henry Jenkins’s (2009) dictum, that: ‘If it doesn’t spread, it’s dead.’ 
Jenkins shows that ‘spreadable media’ involves a collaboration between the gift 
economy and commodity culture, where corporations’ best strategy for engaging 
consumer participation is to distribute ‘long tail’ content and reach niche markets 
with lower promotional budgets. The box office triumph of Bullets obviously relied 
on such spreadability. One reviewer on the Chinese social media website Douban 
demonstrates the economy of fandom:
If you are a rich man, you should treat all your friends with the movie. If you are 
unfortunately a poor guy, skip your meals and save the money for a forty-yuan 
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daytime screening. If even that won’t work, get a (pirated) DVD. Ok, at least get 
the film through E-Mule or Bi-Torrents. Even a person as stingy as me decided to 
join the fandom of Jiang Wen after watching Let the Bullets Fly.13
Corresponding to the flood of money flowing into the box office for Let the Bullets 
Fly, inside the film text itself, tonnes of silver and gold fill in the mise-en-scène. The 
streets of the fictive ECheng city are covered with tonnes of silver, as if the silver were 
mere pebbles to pave the road. Such forms of visual extravagance undoubtedly assault 
the eyes with an ostentatious display of the fetishism of money, but also deride the 
value of otherwise (and de-commodified) useless metal. Reflecting on this scene, 
one blogger amusingly described the Chinese state’s fetishism of money, writing with 
half-hearted seriousness that: ‘What’s the use of dispensing money among the masses? 
Does that help them at all? … Silver is the currency, merely a medium in circulation. 
It can neither be eaten nor drunk. It is only useful when exchanged for commodities 
and services…. The dispensing of a large amount of money would not lead to wealth, 
but inflation.’14 His comments connected the visual fetishism of money inside the text 
with the economy of the currency outside of the text, skewering the high inflation 
behind the prosperous scene of high GDP growth in China. What is of interest to 
my argument here is the ways in which exchangeable currency replaces inalienable 
objects in The Sun. If every object in The Sun is always connected with memories 
and innermost emotional investment of an individual, silver and gold in Bullets are 
homogenous and impersonal. As currency for exchange, they have no history, or 
ignore history, and substitute standardized measurability for individual needs and 
sentiments. Thus, dispensing money among the masses symptomatically becomes a 
panacea in Bullets. After all, money is assumed to be exchangeable for everything.
 There is another layer of exchangeability surrounding the film. The reception of 
the film is deeply embedded in a media network, especially facilitated by the internet. 
The space films share with other media flows places a film in simultaneity with news 
and instant messages. Spoof videos on Tudou, Youku and other YouTube-like video 
sharing websites often appropriate clips from films as mimicry of recent political and 
Figure 17.2 Paving the street with gold and silver in Let the Bullets Fly (2010).
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social incidents. This blending of different genres and media cultures seeps into the 
production of commercial movies. A conscious incorporation of recent eye-catching 
incidents and catchphrases into the textuality of a film becomes a marketing strategy 
to solicit responses from the media-savvy audience. Therefore, the consumption of 
films also becomes to a large extent a type of information processing. The compact 
information in Bullets – its fast-paced and often abrupt transition between scenes, as 
if no second should be lost in pushing forward the plot – never gives the audience a 
break in the three-hour film, a pace that follows the rhythm of our information age 
with its bombardment of simulacra. If we examine the ways in which the film was 
dispersed in the media network and gained exchangeability with other media flows, it 
is always some catchy lines or phrases from the movie that gained the most frequent 
circulation. For example, lines such as ‘Let the bullet fly!’ and ‘Be patient! Let the bullet 
fly for a few more seconds!’ soon spread widely as catchphrases. Phrases such as ‘let 
the oil price fly,’ ‘let the real estate price fly,’ ‘let the stock fly’ – all playing with the 
double meaning of ‘fei’ in Chinese as both ‘to fly’ and ‘to skyrocket’ – soon went viral 
in Chinese media. Crucial to the circulation of the phrases was their brief form, and 
their mutability, so that they became ‘meta-phrases’ that could flow to fit into different 
contexts. Let the Bullets Fly thus is a pastiche that can be taken apart and thrown into 
circulation with its easy exchangeability.
 So far my readings of Jiang Wen’s two recent films adopt quite different approaches. 
This is because The Sun Also Rises and Let the Bullets Fly are stylistically distinct texts 
that demand different approaches. The self-enclosed cinematic world of The Sun, with 
its unconventional narrative and its exquisite sensuousness, demands a phenom-
enological reading to reveal its subtlety, and even more importantly, the historical 
conditions that exert pressure on its aesthetic form. Bullets, meanwhile, invites mass 
participation through easy exchangeability of its particles with media flows in the 
network, and therefore the film per se is decentred in the constant exchanges of 
media flows. However, despite these films’ aesthetic differences, they do share certain 
commonalities. My parallel reading of the two may reveal the similar conditions of 
post-medium and postsocialism that shape their textuality and aesthetic. Though 
both films are set in historically specific years, they encounter immense difficulty 
in presenting the past: in The Sun, this difficulty is acknowledged by its integration 
of the very act of remembrance into its own textuality, through which fragmentary 
memories are evoked as affective images; Bullets circumvents the problem by replacing 
the past with stereotypical images of the present. In both cases, the past becomes a 
myth reinvented through contemporary imagination.
 Such eclipse of historicity is considered by Jameson as a symptom of our 
postmodern era. Jameson, in his Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, states that the past in films and historical novels of our era has ‘become 
a vast collection of images,’ and even a seemingly realistic novel like Ragtime by E. L. 
Doctorow becomes ‘a nonrepresentational work that combines fantasy signifiers from 
a variety of ideologemes in a kind of hologram.’15 He thus concludes that a historical 
novel in our postmodern era ‘can no longer set out to represent the historical past; 
it can only “represent” our ideas and stereotypes about that past (which thereby at 
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once becomes “pop history”).’ But ‘postmodern’ should neither be regarded as teleo-
logical replacement of ‘modern,’ nor as innate to capitalism of the West. The notion 
of ‘postmodern’ is further complicated in the Chinese context with its postsocialist 
conditions. As Zhang Xudong argues, Chinese postmodernism since 1992 is closely 
related to ‘the surplus of commodities and capital’ as well as ‘a bubble economy of 
images, signs, and discourses,’ which reinforce ‘the impression that daily life in China 
today is an integral part of timeless now of global capitalism’ (italics mine).16 He also 
points out that Chinese postmodernism means not only the dissolution of Maoism 
as a utopian ideology, but also of a monolithic, capitalist notion of ‘modern.’ With 
disillusion of both socialist utopianism and the capitalist mode of ‘modern,’ the 
postsocialist subjects’ need for a new collective identity and social ideal can be read 
from the efforts to recuperate and appropriate previous revolutionary memories, as 
demonstrated both in Jang Wen’s films and by the audience’s enthusiastic reactions 
to them. Such efforts, however, are also conditioned by the postmodern, consumerist 
culture.
Conclusion
The ambivalent memories of Jiang Wen and his generation as ‘eggs under the red 
flag’ cannot be separated from the images and stereotypes of history in postsocialist 
conditions. The references to Wang Xiaobo’s stories, the theme of ‘madness,’ as well 
as revolutionary narratives entangled with erotic desires are recycled in The Sun. 
Thus, The Sun is a tension-ridden text that on the one hand strives to reserve a 
space for memories in an era of forgetting, and on the other hand has to address the 
‘holograms’ of the past in our media-saturated postmodernist age. The experience of 
seeing the film also becomes an unstable process of moving through its sometimes 
deliberately stilted performance and ambiguous images to a sudden encounter with 
fragments of memory. However, the hybridity of the film is aesthetically smoothed 
out in its assumedly autonomous world. Such a striving for autonomy may resemble 
the pursuit of aesthetic autonomy in modernism. Yet the high investment involved 
in the production of the film that was finally reduced into the figures of its box office 
receipts only confirms once again the whip of capitalist logic on artistic production, 
and the precarious autonomy of art under certain postmodern conditions. In this 
context, Let the Bullets Fly is the other side of the same coin: by submitting itself to the 
reproduction of spectacles in accordance with Hollywood conventions, the film makes 
history appear as a game of travesty and exchangeability. Audience participation 
through social media networks did not help bring back ‘authentic’ history, but instead 
dissembled the film into flows of exchangeable bits, to which history is no different 
from clusters of hyperlinks. Perhaps, the numerous deaths in the film, both fake deaths 
and revived corpses, may serve as a best trope for the violence inflicted on memory by 
our time: any living memories of history are inextricably entangled with the corpses 
of stereotypical images of the past in the Chinese mediascape of a postsocialist era.
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